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faunosteo/.claude/audits/2026-10-24-rust-r5-5-closing-security.md
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Security audit: R5.5 closing corrections (diff 13db553..257a29b)

  • date: 2026-10-24 | branch feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core | mode: audit (targeted diff), fresh run
  • contract: .claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-24-rust-r5-5-closing.md (K1-K8)
  • scope: git diff 13db553..257a29b, 15 files (8 code/doc + 7 .claude/ registry, task, plan files)
  • nothing run against a real stack, no service key used, no transfer tool, no delete, no code edited

Focus 1: check_v3_shape and the untrusted v3 entries

Entries traced (wasm crates/wasm/src/lib.rs → crates/core/src/facade.rs → ops.rs / session.rs):

Entry Path Shape check
SheetHandle.import_pdf / import_pdf_bytes facade::import_pdf → pdf/import.rs:29 import_archive → read_archive_document → read_report_document yes (report/read.rs:80)
archive.import op ops.rs:345 → session::import_archive → same yes
draft.restore op, draft text ops.rs:316 → session.rs:85 read_report_document yes
draft.restore op, archive text session.rs:103-106 parse_envelope yes (archive/read.rs:124-125)
restore_copy_bytes facade.rs:86-101 → restore_draft(.., None) yes
report-compare CLI pdf/compare/mod.rs:133 → read_archive_document yes

These are the only paths by which an external v3 report enters. The remaining typed reads of Report take the store's report, which is always the core's canonical output: the reducers (ops.rs:64-87), archive.snapshot (ops.rs:301-303), the export session (pdf/write/input.rs:26), and export_from_envelope (pdf/write/export.rs:117-130, a public library fn with test-only callers, not exported by wasm or a binary).

Panic review: check_v3_shape (report/read.rs:55-71) uses only Value::get, as_array, is_object, is_string, enumerate and format!. No indexing, no unwrap, no recursion. A non-object or null input returns Ok and the typed read refuses it. No panic path.

Authentic shapes: the core's writer emits sheet and practitioner as objects and severity as a string or omits it (skip_serializing_if). Zod refused arrays, one-key maps and null for every earlier v3 writer. null severity was already refused before this diff: js::present calls Severity::deserialize(null), which fails. No authentic shape is newly refused. Hermetic suites were rerun here and are green: archive_rules 38, report_rules 17, characterisation 4, characterisation_serde_tolerance 5, pdf_import 3.

Bypass found (M1 below). The check reads keys on the raw value, so any shape where the parent container is itself positional skips it, because Value::get(&str) on an array returns None.

Focus 2: upload tool, Protocol and own_address

Protocol is final: storage.rs:189-197 retries Io, Timeout, HostNotFound and ConnectionFailed only, plus 5xx (storage.rs:79-80). final_error (storage.rs:203-215) carries no error text, so neither the key nor the header shows. The test a_malformed_answer_is_final_and_not_retried is green: one request, exit 1.

own_address (main.rs:114-122), measured on this host with the same syscalls (UDP bind then connect, nothing sent):

DEV host bind connect local_addr == ip own_address
255.255.255.255 (and the host's brd addresses, unit test) ok EACCES (13) n/a false
0.0.0.0 ok ok 127.0.0.1, no false
224.0.0.251, 239.255.255.250 (multicast) ok ok yes true (L3)
another host's private address EADDRNOTAVAIL (ip_nonlocal_bind = 0) n/a n/a false

Even with ip_nonlocal_bind=1, the connect route lookup refuses a non-local source address (no IP_FREEBIND / IP_TRANSPARENT is set). So a non-local unicast address does not pass.

Defense in depth holds. host_is_allowed (curation/upload.rs:190-200) only accepts the DEV host when the URL host is loopback or RFC 1918 and parses equal to it. Multicast and public addresses are neither. The kernel also refuses a TCP connect to multicast.

Packet: own_address sends nothing. A UDP connect only records the peer, there is no send/send_to, and the socket is dropped on return. It joins no multicast group.

Focus 3: secrets and SQL claims

  • No secret value in the diff. The added lines contain no JWT (eyJ…), no CLI default secret string, no sb_secret_ / sb_publishable_ key and no password literal. iss: supabase-demo is a claim name, not a key.
  • Repo-wide (tracked, at 257a29b) search for the CLI default JWT secret, eyJhbGciOi, eyJpc3Mi and sb_secret_/sb_publishable_ keys. Only crates/worker/src/config.rs:324,326 matches: a fabricated test token (payload {"role":"service_role","exp":…}, signature literally sig) and the placeholder sb_secret_abc. These are not credentials. The only tracked env file is .env.example.
  • supabase/config.toml [auth] (lines 73-96) sets no jwt_secret and no signing keys, which matches ENVIRONMENTS.md §3.6. The claim that the service key is the public demo key was not checked independently: that would mean reading the key value.
  • confirm_sheet_asset_upload: 20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:57-58 runs revoke all … from public, anon, authenticated and grant execute … to service_role. No later migration re-grants it. The function (lines 34-52) sets uploaded_at with no storage.objects existence or byte check. pgTAP 006_sheet_asset_storage.sql:73-80 covers editor 42501, service-role confirm of A and B, and idempotence. It has no anon assertion, which matches the doc.
  • The bucket has no INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE policy. The only storage.objects policies in all migrations are anatomical_sheet_assets_read (select), avatars_read (select) and avatars_upload (insert, pinned to bucket_id = 'avatars', 20261013100000:284-291). RUST.md §11.18 is accurate.
  • No file under supabase/ changed in the diff (K5).

Findings

M1 [MEDIUM] check_v3_shape bypassable through a positional parent

crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:61-69, crates/core/src/domain/archive/read.rs:124-125

  • An observation written as a positional array ([id, zones, findings, freeTextFindings, {"mild": null}, comment]) is accepted on every entry. observation.get("severity") returns None on an array, and serde's derived Observation visitor reads the sequence, one-key severity map included.
  • In parse_envelope, a report written as an array (or the whole envelope as an array) makes check_v3_shape see no keys. All three refused shapes (sheet array, practitioner array, severity map) are then accepted.
  • In the import path a report-level or envelope-level array is still refused, because version_of and envelope_version_of require an object.
  • K4 states that the three shapes are refused at both v3 entries. That holds only when every parent is an object.
  • Impact is low. The field values still pass every field rule and the core re-serialises canonically, so there is no injection. What remains is a parser differential with the N-1 Zod reader. Established by reading: it is the same visit_seq mechanism the R5.5 characterisation proved for sheet and practitioner. No probe was executed, because writing a test is outside this audit.
  • Fix direction (owner scope): require observations[i] to be an object, and in parse_envelope require both data and report to be objects before the shape check. A generic guard is an alternative.

M2 [MEDIUM, pre-existing, outside the diff, documented by it] DEV API reachable as service_role from the LAN

supabase/config.toml:73-96, docs/development/ENVIRONMENTS.md §3.6

  • The stack runs on the CLI's public default JWT secret and 54321 is LAN-open by design.
  • Any device on the private network can therefore act as service_role on DEV data, bypassing RLS. The doc states this accurately and leaves the choice to the owner. Production is not involved.
  • Not introduced by this diff, so not gated here. Resolve it before any non-test data reaches DEV: own jwt_secret / signing keys through env(), or narrow the 54321 rule.

L1 [LOW] Remaining serde tolerance on the other nested v3 structs

crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:52-54

  • animal, owner, zones[], findings[], vertebrae[] and nextAppointment variants as positional arrays, and side as a one-key map, are still accepted.
  • This is within the owner's go ("three shapes only"). But the doc comment ("The shapes Zod refused and serde's derives accept") reads as a complete list, and BDR-069's rationale ("crafted file could swap same-typed fields") applies to these shapes too.
  • Hint: word the comment and §11.18 as "three of the shapes".

L2 [LOW] Error text contradicts behaviour

crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:66

The message says "expected a string or null", but null is refused. The test's own comment says so (characterisation_serde_tolerance.rs, "null stays refused").

L3 [LOW] own_address accepts IPv4 multicast

crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:110-122

  • Measured: bind and connect succeed and local_addr equals the address. The "own unicast" claim in the doc comment and in RUST.md §11.18 is therefore inaccurate.
  • Not exploitable: host_is_allowed requires RFC 1918 or loopback, and TCP to multicast is refused by the kernel. The unit test (main.rs:255-266) does not cover multicast.
  • Hint: add !ip.is_multicast(), or rely on and state the private-range filter.

L4 [LOW] own_address unit test is vacuous without ip

crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:237-244

If the ip command is missing, unwrap_or_default yields empty lists and the host unicast and broadcast loops check nothing. The test still passes. This affects test strength only.

L5 [LOW, pre-existing, documented] confirm_sheet_asset_upload does not check the object

supabase/migrations/20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:34-52

The guard is EXECUTE (service_role only) and no API role can place bytes, so this is not exploitable today. The debt is recorded in RUST.md §11.18: check the object's existence and size before any public exposure.

L6 [LOW] Typed reads of Report outside the two checked entries

crates/core/src/ops.rs:64-87, 301-303, crates/core/src/pdf/write/input.rs:26, crates/core/src/pdf/write/export.rs:117-130

These take store or core-canonical reports today, so none of them is an external entry. If export_from_envelope ever reads a file-borne envelope, it skips check_v3_shape.

Anti-gaming

The diff adds no nosemgrep, nosec or eslint-disable comment and no new #[allow]. The #![allow(clippy::…)] in characterisation_serde_tolerance.rs predates the diff and is a lint allowance, not a security suppression.

Notes

  • One command was refused by the permission rules: git check-ignore -v .env.worker .env; grep -n "SERVICE_ROLE\|SECRET\|KEY" .env.example. It was not rerun in another form. The tracked-env check used git ls-files instead, and the only result is .env.example.
  • Guardrails scanner (--domain api,supabase): 0 FAIL, 1 WARN, 1 MANUAL. The WARN (SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER, 20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177) is in a file outside the diff and is filtered out. MANUAL is not reported.
  • Hermetic runs: cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features upload --bin upload-sheet-assets --test upload_tool --test characterisation_serde_tolerance --test archive_rules --test report_rules gave 1 + 13 + 5 + 38 + 17 passed. --features pdf-read --test pdf_import --test characterisation gave 3 + 4 passed. upload_tool targets an in-process loopback stub with a made-up key.
SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 15 files
BLOCKING:
  (none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
  - [MEDIUM] check_v3_shape bypass via positional parent — crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:61-69, crates/core/src/domain/archive/read.rs:124-125
  - [MEDIUM] DEV stack service_role reachable from LAN (pre-existing, documented) — supabase/config.toml:73-96, docs/development/ENVIRONMENTS.md §3.6
  - [LOW] other nested v3 serde tolerance, doc comment overstates completeness — crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:52-54
  - [LOW] error text "or null" contradicts refusal — crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:66
  - [LOW] own_address accepts IPv4 multicast (blocked downstream by host_is_allowed) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:114-122
  - [LOW] own_address test vacuous without `ip` — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:237-244
  - [LOW] confirm_sheet_asset_upload no object check (pre-existing, documented) — supabase/migrations/20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:34-52
  - [LOW] internal typed Report reads skip the shape check — crates/core/src/pdf/write/export.rs:117-130, crates/core/src/ops.rs:64-87
PROOF: semgrep 74 rules on 15 files → 0 findings (0 errors); checklist 8 checks → 2 findings (+ guardrails 0 FAIL / 1 WARN out of diff, filtered); targeted review 3 focus areas → 6 findings