Eight documents under docs/development/ confronting the approved business architecture with the audited code: 27-step plan, repository migration map, domain map, frontend/backend architecture, migration and test strategy, open questions. Reference document placed at the repository root.
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Backend architecture (Supabase strategy)
Status: Step 0 deliverable, 2026-10-08. Conceptual only. No migration, table,
policy or function is created by this document. Table and function names
follow faunosteo-business-architecture.md §4–§20.
1. Components and what runs where
Browser (apps/app, anon key + user JWT)
│ tables via RLS, RPC (security definer), Storage signed URLs
▼
Supabase (self-hosted on Scaleway at launch, §31)
├─ Auth (GoTrue): email/password, Google, Apple, OTP, phone
├─ PostgreSQL: schemas public / private / audit, RLS, functions, pg_cron
├─ Storage: private buckets, storage.objects policies
├─ Edge Functions (Deno): public endpoints, webhooks, signed-URL issuance
└─ Realtime (optional): report sync state
Worker (apps/worker, service key, same host)
└─ jobs table in PostgreSQL, no Redis
public-web (anon key, SSR)
└─ public views / RPCs only
The browser never holds a service-role key, admin credential, storage master key or third-party refresh token (§17.1).
2. Auth
| Need | Mechanism | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Email/password, magic link/OTP | GoTrue built-in | strong password policy configured server-side |
| Google, Apple | GoTrue OAuth providers | Apple requires a paid developer account and a services id: dependency to confirm |
| Phone verification | GoTrue phone OTP needs an SMS provider (Twilio, MessageBird, Vonage) | cost and EU processing to confirm; see OPEN_QUESTIONS.md Q7 |
| Email verification | GoTrue, mandatory before professional features | |
| MFA | GoTrue TOTP; mandatory for owner/admin/moderator/support roles, enforced by RLS helper has_mfa() on admin tables |
|
| Roles | profile_roles table, never JWT custom claims as the only source (claims can lag) |
helpers read the table |
| Impersonation | dedicated RPC issuing a short-lived scoped session, audited, banner in UI (§17.5) | after MVP core |
profiles.id = auth.users.id, created by a trigger on auth.users insert.
3. PostgreSQL layout
| Schema | Content | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
public |
tables exposed to PostgREST, all with RLS enabled, separate SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policies | browser, public-web, worker |
private |
security-definer helper functions, internal tables (counters, job queue, route cache), triggers | not exposed to PostgREST |
audit |
audit_logs, append-only, insert via private.log_event() |
read by admins through a view |
Conventions fixed now so every step follows them:
- UUID primary keys (
gen_random_uuid()),created_at/updated_atwith a shared trigger, soft deletedeleted_atwhere the architecture names it. - Enums as PostgreSQL
enumtypes when the value set is closed by the business (report status, appointment status),text+ CHECK when the set is expected to grow (document types). - JSONB documents (
reports.current_document,anatomical_sheet_versions.content_jsonb) carry their ownschema_versionand are validated by the matching Zod schema at the application boundary and by a CHECK onschema_versionin SQL. SQL does not re-implement Zod. - Every table exposed to the browser: RLS enabled, no
USING (true)policy forauthenticated, no anonymous policy on core tables (§17.4).
4. RLS strategy
4.1 Helpers
Security-definer functions in private, STABLE, search_path pinned,
SET row_security = off inside where they read tables that have policies
referencing them (prevents recursion), one index per access path they use:
private.is_platform_owner(uid) private.is_platform_admin(uid)
private.is_platform_moderator(uid) private.is_support(uid)
private.is_org_member(uid, org) private.is_org_manager(uid, org)
private.is_org_practitioner(uid, org)
private.can_view_client(uid, client) private.can_view_animal(uid, animal)
private.can_view_report(uid, report) private.can_edit_report(uid, report)
private.can_use_sheet(uid, sheet) private.can_fork_sheet(uid, sheet)
private.has_active_entitlement(uid, capability text)
Each helper ships with pgTAP tests in the same migration step: positive case, negative case, expired grant, revoked grant, wrong organization.
4.2 Policy rules per domain (summary of §17.3)
| Table family | SELECT | INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE |
|---|---|---|
profiles |
own row; admins via view | own row; roles only through RPC |
organizations, organization_members |
members | managers/owners through RPC (add_member, remove_member, set_role) so that "secretary cannot self-grant practitioner" is one place |
clients, client_contacts, client_consents |
can_view_client |
create by the practitioner who starts the relationship; core identity edits restricted (open question Q6) |
animals |
can_view_animal |
practitioner with an active relationship or grant |
reports |
can_view_report |
can_edit_report for drafts; completion and numbering only via RPC |
report_revisions |
same as parent report | insert via RPC/trigger only |
anatomical_sheets |
public metadata through a view; full row for creator, grantee, or follower of a public sheet | creator only; publish via RPC |
anatomical_sheet_versions |
can_use_sheet on the parent |
insert draft by creator; published rows immutable (trigger raises on UPDATE of content_jsonb when status = published) |
practitioner_follows, sheet_usage_grants |
involved parties | own follows; grants by sheet creator or org manager |
appointments and agenda tables |
owner scope; public availability through RPC only | booking through RPC with row locks |
plans, subscriptions, entitlement_grants |
own / org manager | Stripe webhook (service) and admin RPC only |
audit.audit_logs |
admins | append-only via private.log_event |
storage.objects |
per bucket policy calling the owning domain's helper | upload paths validated against assets rows |
4.3 Public endpoints
Public profile, sheet discovery, availability and booking are security-definer RPCs or narrow views returning approved columns (§17.4). The anon role gets EXECUTE on those functions and nothing else.
5. Storage
Buckets, all private: avatars, logos, professional-documents,
client-files, animal-files, report-files, anatomical-sheets, imports.
Object key: <resource-type>/<resource-id>/<asset-id>/<safe-filename>. The
assets table is authoritative; storage.objects policies call the owning
helper (can_view_report for report-files/...). Reads go through signed
URLs issued by an RPC/Edge Function after the same check.
SVG pipeline (§15.3): upload lands in a quarantine prefix with
assets.sanitization_status = pending; a server sanitizer (Edge Function or
worker) rewrites the file (strip <script>, <foreignObject>, on*,
javascript:/external hrefs, <use> to external documents, CSS url()),
stores the clean bytes under the final key and sets status = clean. Policies
only allow reading clean assets to anyone other than the uploader. The
current 10-line client sanitizer stays as a pre-check in the editor, not as
the boundary.
Archive (§15.4, §16): S3-compatible cold storage with lifecycle rules, no Object Lock by default. Out of MVP core; designed at the data-lifecycle step.
6. Edge Functions vs PostgreSQL functions vs worker
Decision rule for each server-side behaviour:
| Put it in | When |
|---|---|
| PostgreSQL function / trigger (RPC) | Needs transactional guarantees with the data: report numbering, completion + quota, booking slot lock, grant evaluation, version publication, GC preconditions |
| Edge Function | Needs HTTP from outside or secrets: Stripe webhooks, public widget endpoints, signed-URL issuance, calendar OAuth callbacks, email send trigger, SVG sanitization (small files), import preflight (small files) |
| Worker | Long or scheduled: reminders, expiry sweeps (unless pg_cron), calendar sync, route cache, long imports, archive, GC sweeps, server PDF (later) |
Self-hosted note: Edge Functions on a self-hosted stack run in the
edge-runtime container and must be deployed by hand. The first steps lean
on PostgreSQL functions, which the CLI migrates and tests natively. See
OPEN_QUESTIONS.md Q2 on VPS sizing.
7. Migrations
- Supabase CLI,
supabase/migrations/<timestamp>_<name>.sql, forward-only, one or more per implementation step, reviewed in the step's PR. - A migration never edits an applied migration; corrections are new migrations.
- Each migration that adds a table also adds: RLS enable, policies, indexes listed in §32 of the architecture, pgTAP tests, and regenerated types.
supabase db resetmust succeed from zero on CI, thensupabase test db, then the app test suite (§36).- Seed data (
supabase/seed/): species list, plans, the official equine sheet v1 produced by the importer from the two SVGs and the catalog. Seeds are idempotent and versioned like migrations. - Production changes follow expand/contract when a column is renamed or
dropped (the
deprecation-and-migrationskill applies).
8. SQL tests
pgTAP under supabase/tests/, run by supabase test db:
- helper function unit tests (one file per helper);
- per-table RLS tests: as user A, as user B, as org member, as anon, as service; each verifies both the allowed rows and the denied rows;
- transactional rules: numbering under concurrency (two sessions), booking double-request, completion beyond quota, publish-then-update raises;
- immutability and GC preconditions for sheet versions.
Representative cross-tenant cases are a release gate (§30).
9. Generated types
supabase gen types typescript --local > packages/supabase/src/database.types.ts
after every migration. CI regenerates and fails on diff. Zod schemas in
packages/domain remain the contract for JSONB documents; generated types
cover columns and RPC signatures.
10. What must stay server-side (brief §19, architecture principles 6–13)
- Authorization: every read/write of client, animal, report, sheet, grant.
- Report numbering, completion, free-plan quota, 5-day free edit window.
- Sheet version immutability, publication, deprecation, garbage collection.
- Explicit
annotation → finding zonemapping validation on publish (no fuzzy at runtime). - Booking slot evaluation, pending-request limits, expiry, race protection.
- Entitlement computation and Stripe state.
- Referral eligibility and caps.
- Client candidate matching and sharing consent flows.
- SVG sanitization and signed URL issuance.
- Import preflight, quota check and atomic commit.
- Audit logging, impersonation, moderation.
- Archive and deletion workflows.
11. Observability and operations (minimum for MVP)
- Structured logs without clinical data or secrets; request correlation id
propagated to
audit_logs. - Daily DB backup + monthly retained copy; restore rehearsed before the first paying cohort (§31, §38).
- Dependency audit (
pnpm audit) and secret scan (gitleaks hook already in.githooks) in CI. - Security headers at the reverse proxy and in nginx (hardening step).