5.9 KiB
PDF import hardening — BLK-009 analysis
Status 2026-10-11: analysis requested by the user after Step 6. Nothing here is implemented; §4 says what can land now and §5 what must land before the import is opened to external users.
1. The problem
readReportArchive loads the whole PDF with pdf-lib (PDFDocument.load)
before looking for the attachment. pdf-lib's parser inflates every object
stream (/ObjStm) and cross-reference stream eagerly with its own, uncapped
inflater. Measured by the security audit: a 408 KB PDF expanded to 400 MB in
1.4 s (468 MB RSS); a 131 KB PDF to 128 MB. The ratio is about 1000:1, so the
50 MiB file cap still allows tens of gigabytes of expansion. Our 16 MiB caps
protect the attachment stream only, which the reader inflates itself.
Effect: a crafted PDF freezes the practitioner's tab or kills it (out of memory). No code execution, no data access. A file size limit cannot help: the amplification lives inside the compression.
Why /ObjStm cannot simply be refused: pdf-lib's save() writes object
streams by default (useObjectStreams: true), so every Faunosteo PDF
produced so far carries them, and refusing them would refuse the archive.
2. What the reader actually needs from the file
One embedded file stream, found through its /Filespec, and the document
keyword stamp. A PDF stream object can never live inside an object stream:
the EmbeddedFile dictionary and its data are always in clear text in the
file (<< /Type /EmbeddedFile /Filter /FlateDecode /Length N … >> stream … endstream). Only the small dictionary objects (Filespec, Info, catalog) may
be packed into object streams.
So the attachment can be located by scanning the bytes, without parsing the PDF object graph at all.
3. Options
| Option | Protection | Cost | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
A. Byte-scan reader: find /Type /EmbeddedFile streams, read /Length (direct integer, as pdf-lib writes it; fall back to endstream search), inflate with the existing capped inflateFlate, parse JSON; no PDFDocument.load on import |
removes pdf-lib from the import path entirely: the only inflation is our capped one | one module (~120 lines) + tests on every fixture (v2, bare v3, envelope, object streams on/off, several streams, foreign PDF) | recommended, can land now |
B. Export with useObjectStreams: false |
the Filespec name, the Info keywords and the Filespec→EF link become visible to a byte scan, so the filename-first rule and the attachment_stripped detection keep working without the object graph; files a few KB larger |
one save option; older PDFs keep their object streams, which A tolerates | recommended with A |
| C. Load in a Web Worker with a timeout and a memory budget | contains the damage (the tab survives, the worker dies) | worker bundling, message protocol, no memory cap API in browsers (only termination on timeout) | defence in depth, later |
D. Pre-scan declared /Length of /ObjStm streams and refuse above a sum |
partial: declared lengths are the compressed sizes, the expansion is unknown | small | insufficient alone |
E. Replace pdf-lib's parser (fork @cantoo/pdf-lib, or pdf.js for reading) |
maintained parser; pdf.js has its own limits | dependency change, larger bundle | evaluate for Step 14 (server-side import) |
With A, the import path reads bytes, finds at most a few streams, inflates one
under 16 MiB, parses JSON under the existing schema caps. pdf-lib stays on
the export side (trusted inputs) and in the report:compare CLI (operator
tool, Node, acceptable risk but same fix applies).
Edge cases A must handle: several EmbeddedFile streams (pick the one whose
Filespec name starts with osteo-report when visible, else the first whose
inflated content parses as a report or an envelope); /Length as an indirect
reference (pdf-lib writes direct lengths; other producers may not: fall back
to scanning for endstream); \r\n versus \n after stream; encrypted
PDFs (today loaded with ignoreEncryption: the attachment stream of an
encrypted file is encrypted too and would fail to inflate → no_attachment,
same outcome as today in practice); the 50 MiB file cap stays as the scan
bound.
4. What can be done now (before merge of Step 6, or as the next chore)
- Option A in
packages/pdf/src/attachment/scan.ts, used byreadReportArchive;readAttachedDocument(pdfDoc)kept for the CLI until it moves to the scanner too. - Option B on export (
pdfDoc.save({ useObjectStreams: false })): no visible change; goldens unaffected (they record drawn text, images, links); the envelope roundtrip tests prove the reader still finds the attachment in both layouts. - Tests: every existing import fixture through the scanner; a crafted
object-stream bomb (the audit's recipe: a few hundred KB inflating to
hundreds of MB) imports in milliseconds without inflating it; a PDF with
two embedded files; a PDF whose
/Lengthis indirect. - Docs:
docs/PDF-FORMAT.md"Reading an archive" and "Known limits".
Estimated size: one executor phase, about 300 lines including tests.
5. Prerequisites before external users (Step 7+ sync, Step 14 worker)
- Option A merged and the CLI on the scanner; no
PDFDocument.loadon any untrusted input in the browser. - Option C or a server-side import (Step 14) with a hard memory and time budget per file, for any path that still parses PDF objects.
- Dependency decision on pdf-lib (unmaintained since 2021): keep it for generation only, or move to the maintained fork; recorded as a Step 14 question.
- Report collection caps on read (observations, zones, findings per observation) so a hostile report cannot freeze the editor before the export's own caps refuse it.
- The remaining low findings of the Step 6 audits:
<use>nesting budget in the sanitiser (today bounded by the rasterizer), the decoder memory envelope of PNG logos (bounded by the 4096² cap, about 430 MB worst case for four logos).