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Security gate R5.4 (round 11): review files in Rust

Mode: audit (delta). Repository /home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo, branch feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core, HEAD 411e105. Scope: git diff c6e0d85..HEAD -- crates/core packages/anatomy/tests docs/development/RUST.md (29 files, 21 commits). Blind run: no prior verdict or finding list consulted.

SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 29 files
BLOCKING:
  (none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
  - [LOW] anti-gaming/new-lint-allow — crates/core/tests/curation_markdown.rs:6, crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6
  - [LOW] report-guard/bare-url-autolink — crates/core/src/curation/report_guard.rs:119
PROOF: semgrep 128 rules on 29 files → 0 findings; checklist 14 checks → 2 findings

Semgrep

semgrep scan --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets --config p/owasp-top-ten --metrics=off --quiet --json <29 files>: 0 results, 0 errors, 29 targets scanned, 128 rules run (most of the 725 loaded rules do not apply to Rust). Ruleset content is fetched at run time, so the rule count can change on unchanged code.

Checklist (14 checks)

# Check Result
1 Hardcoded secret, token, key, auth-bearing URL (added lines and the two oracle JSON files) 0
2 SQL built by concatenation 0 (no SQL in the diff; seed.rs untouched)
3 Unsanitized render, eval, process spawn 0
4 Sensitive endpoint without authz n/a (no endpoint, offline CLI and library)
5 Stack trace or internal path to an end user 0 (the CLI prints paths to the local operator only)
6 Secret or PII in a log 0
7 Tracked .env or credential file 0 (only .env.example, outside the diff)
8 Guardrails scanner (--domain api,supabase) 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER, supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177), outside the diff, filtered
9 New suppressions (anti-gaming) 2 new lint allows in test files: LOW, see L1
10 Markdown structure forging (sections, list items, code spans, links, HTML) 0 forging path; one LOW note, see L2
11 Silent difference from Prettier 3.8.3 on admitted text (differential probe) 0
12 Non-well-formed review SVG 0
13 Resource bounds (records, tables, drawings, quadratic scans) 0 new
14 CLI file-system confinement (--check, --out) 0

10. Report structure forging

Every authored channel that reaches CHANGELOG.md or REVIEW-REPORT.md was traced:

  • Line breaks: list-item fields (title, rationale, question, citation, URL, DOI, vet-flag values) refuse any control character (review_report.rs:364). Table cells turn \n into a space (markdown.rs:47), and the guard refuses \r and \t (report_guard.rs:198). No authored text starts a line: every template line begins with generated text (- , N. , | ). Line-start constructs (headings, setext underlines, link reference definitions, footnote definitions, blockquotes, tables) are therefore out of reach.
  • Code spans: authored texts refuse backticks (assert_authored). Ids are validated at the op (ops.rs assert_stable_id on add, nested children and rename). Change ids match ^CHG-\d{3,}$. Change reference ids must be declared references (assert_declared), whose ids are stable ids. Field segments are limited to [A-Za-z0-9_-] (fields.rs) and ids are not settable. Targets resolve to existing items. The code-span alphabet check ([A-Za-z0-9_:/. -]) and the per-line backtick parity hold as a second layer.
  • Inline constructs: links, images, references, HTML tags, autolinks <…>, character references, liquid and padded wiki brackets are refused. Cross-field pairs were checked: ** opened in the title and closed in the rationale is refused by outside_strong, and ]( across fields is refused by rewritten_construct.
  • Invisible or bidi characters (U+202E, U+200B, NBSP) are neither alphanumeric nor in PUNCTUATION: refused.

11. Differential probe against Prettier 3.8.3

Probe: /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/diff.mjs and .../diff2.mjs. A Rust binary calls report_guard::format_report, and the repository's prettier@3.8.3 runs on the same raw report with the format.ts options. Random authored texts (letters, accents, CJK, every admitted punctuation sign, _, \, *, **word**, URL starts, &name=, &amp, &#, brackets, list and heading markers) are placed in four templates: a list-item title and rationale, a table row (cell escape as cell() does), a bibliography citation and URL, and a trailing question. Eight seeds produced 146,000 cases. 44,330 were admitted by the guard and 0 differed from Prettier byte for byte.

12. Review SVG well-formedness

Drawings are built as trees and printed by anatomy::svg::serialize. Attributes escape & < > " and \t \n \r, and text escapes & < >. drawing::first_unwritable refuses any code point outside the XML 1.0 Char production, and any carriage return, in every attribute and text node before writing. Element and attribute names are fixed. Colours come from the strict document (#rrggbb), and no href, on* or style value is author-controlled.

13. Resource bounds

  • Records: records::charge runs before the change and op are cloned. It is called from every record site (set, subtree set, add, remove, move, cite, rename links and citations, B/C marking). Each record's weight includes the change texts, the op, and the before and after values.
  • Tables: the three CHANGELOG level tables are summed in assert_table_bound from the cell bytes before table() joins them. Bytes are never fewer than the display width: the first width-2 code point is U+1100, which takes 3 bytes. Every other table is checked in align before padding.
  • Review drawings: per-annotation projection. A probe binary (.../scratchpad/probe/src/bin/drawings.rs) compared projected and written bytes on hostile documents built from the equine draft: 40 points with 6,000-character & names (ratio 0.405), "<& names (0.262), 6,000-byte &"< paths (0.170), unnamed triggers of a long view name (0.120), equine (0.406). The projection stays above what is written. The projection loop itself (views × annotations) took 1.2 s on a 7,000-view, 6,000-annotation document, which the bound then refuses.
  • Guard and aligner scans are linear per line. underscore_pairs_later only rescans after authored plain parts, and generated separators hold no _. The & and < splits are segment-local.
  • Already declared and not re-reported: the 65× parse of changes.json, the per-op bound walk (§11.13), and the linear trigger lookup in --check.

14. CLI confinement (crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs)

Every read is canonicalized and must lie inside the canonical seed folder. Reads accept only regular files and are capped at 16 MiB. Output file names come from stable view ids, and write_exclusive accepts only Normal components and create_new. Exercised in the scratchpad (fresh folders only, nothing in the repository):

  • --out into an absent folder wrote 18 files. diff -r against the seed matched except review/app-main.svg, the declared R3 difference.
  • A second run into the same folder was refused: not empty, nothing written.
  • A symbolic link was refused with and without a trailing /.
  • A path holding .. was refused, and so was an empty path.

--check against the repository reported legacy-import: 6 files, 0 differences and draft: 12 files, 0 differences (one declared: line), with git status clean afterwards. The --out refusal of a destination inside the seed was verified by reading the code and the unit test. It was not run against the real seed.

Tests run: cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features curation --release on curation_review (11), curation_markdown (2), curation_draft (18), curation_format (7) and the import-equine binary tests (3): all green.

Reported findings (non-blocking)

L1. [LOW] New lint allows in two new test files

crates/core/tests/curation_markdown.rs:6 and crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6 both add #![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]. The lint allowed here is the core's no-I/O and no-clock rule, which clippy.toml documents as allowed locally in tests. The same line heads the ten existing integration test files. It is a test-harness convention and does not suppress a security scanner (no nosemgrep, nosec or eslint-security in the diff), so it does not block. Context only.

report_guard.rs admits bare URLs (url_tokens, line 119; the &name= query rule) in every authored text, not only in the reference url and doi fields. In a GFM viewer (Gitea), a URL typed in a title, rationale or question becomes a clickable link. This does not forge or disguise anything: the visible text is the target, and the output is the TypeScript's byte for byte. The link cannot swallow generated text either, because every authored field is followed by a space, |, a line end, or a trailing , or ) that GFM excludes. Owner choice: keep it, or confine URLs to the bibliography fields if links in rationales are unwanted.