10 KiB
Security gate: Rust R5.3 draft pipeline (2026-10-22)
Mode: audit (delta list). Branch feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core, uncommitted working tree.
Scope: the R5.3 change set (8 modified files, 17 new files), read whole; --check run once
(read-only, exit 0, seed folder unchanged). No code was edited.
SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 25 files
BLOCKING:
(none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
- [LOW] symlink check covers the final component only — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:182-203
- [LOW] check-then-write is not atomic (TOCTOU) — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:213-228
- [LOW] serde_json::Map indexed with [] (panics on a missing key) — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:111
- [LOW] INIT_CWD trusted from the environment — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:206-211
- [LOW] seed SQL assembled by string formatting — crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:28-29,91-101
- [LOW] new test file carries the suite's clippy allow line (convention, not a scanner suppression) — crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7
- [MEDIUM] guardrails SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER, outside the R5.3 delta, pre-existing — supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177
PROOF: semgrep 725 rules on 25 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks → 6 findings (all LOW); guardrails scan.py --domain api,supabase → 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (out of delta), 1 MANUAL; anti-gaming → 0 new un-gated suppressions
Files scanned (25)
Modified: crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs, crates/core/src/curation/mod.rs,
crates/core/Cargo.toml, package.json, CLAUDE.md, CHANGELOG.md,
docs/development/RUST.md, .claude/tasks/TODO.md.
New: crates/core/src/curation/draft/{mod,schema,targets,fields,ops,rename,apply,records,migration_map,pipeline,seed,stats}.rs,
crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs, crates/core/tests/oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json,
packages/anatomy/tests/r5.curation-synthetic-oracles.test.ts, scripts/import-equine.sh,
.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft.md.
Findings in detail
1. [LOW] Symlink check covers the final component only
crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:182-203. writable_destination calls
fs::symlink_metadata(out) and refuses when out itself is a symbolic link. An ancestor
of out that is a symlink is not resolved: --out <typed-parent>/link/new with
link -> <elsewhere> creates new/legacy-import and new/draft under the real target of
link, and the success line prints the typed path. Because the destination must be absent
or an empty folder, nothing existing can be overwritten or deleted; the effect is new files
in a folder other than the one typed. Fix direction: fs::canonicalize the nearest existing
ancestor of out and refuse when it differs from the typed ancestor, or at least print the
canonical destination in the success line.
2. [LOW] Check-then-write is not atomic
crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:213-228. write validates with
writable_destination, then runs fs::create_dir_all and fs::write per file. A process
that swaps out (or a created subfolder) for a symbolic link between the check and the
writes would have the writes follow it. A development tool on the owner's machine has no
such adversary; reported for completeness since the brief names TOCTOU. Fix direction:
when out is absent, claim it with fs::create_dir(out) (fails if something appears) and
re-run symlink_metadata on the result before writing; a std::fs::DirBuilder without
recursive for the two folder levels achieves the same.
3. [LOW] serde_json::Map indexed with []
crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:111:
result.view_boxes[HEAD_VIEW_ID].as_str(). Index on serde_json::Map panics on a
missing key (unlike Index on Value). The legacy importer inserts both main and
head unconditionally (crates/core/src/curation/legacy/importer.rs:365-370), so the
panic is unreachable today; the same pattern was replaced by get in commit 6afc1e0 after
a previous gate. Same line in crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:72 (test code, allowed).
Fix direction: result.view_boxes.get(HEAD_VIEW_ID).and_then(Value::as_str) with a
typed error.
4. [LOW] INIT_CWD trusted from the environment
crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:206-211. base_dir takes INIT_CWD as the base
of a relative --out without checking it is absolute or exists. pnpm sets it to the
invocation folder, which is the intent; a stale or foreign value exported in the shell
silently retargets a relative --out. Mitigations already present: the destination must
be absent or empty, the resolved path is printed, an absolute --out ignores the base
(PathBuf::join replaces it). Fix direction: accept INIT_CWD only when absolute, else
fall back to current_dir.
5. [LOW] Seed SQL assembled by string formatting
crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:28-29 (sql_text, doubles single quotes) and
:91-101 (document_literal, dollar-quoted with the tag collision refused). The checklist
flags SQL built by concatenation; here the output is a committed seed file reviewed by diff
and run by supabase db reset, not a runtime query. Every interpolated value is derived by
the pipeline: the uuid sheet id, the sha256 hex and byte size of the frozen asset, the
constant file name, the constant change note, and the Prettier-formatted document inside
$equine_doc$ ... $equine_doc$. No request or user-typed value reaches it. Parity with
packages/anatomy/src/curation/seed.ts. Not a parameterization case; listed so it is not
silently dropped.
6. [LOW] Clippy allow line in the new test file
crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7:
#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]. A new
file, so new to the tree, but the identical line heads all 31 committed
crates/core/tests/*.rs files and crates/clippy.toml states the rule ("tests and the
worker binary allow these lints locally where they own I/O"). Test code, not a security
scanner suppression. The binary's pre-existing #![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]
(import_equine.rs:15) is an unchanged context line and the documented exception for the
two files allowed std::fs.
7. [MEDIUM, outside the delta] Guardrails SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER
supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177, policy
species_select_active on species not tied to auth.uid(). The scanner runs on the
project root; this file is not part of the R5.3 change set and the policy predates it.
species is shared reference data, so an owner scope is likely not the intent; confirm and
record the exception rather than leave it to be re-flagged. SB-RLS-LIVE is MANUAL (not
reported here).
Considered, no finding
- Non-ASCII slicing:
targets.rs:121slices atfind(':')andmigration_map.rs:68atrfind('/'), both ASCII bytes and therefore char boundaries;migration_map.rs:55-59(strip) works on UTF-16 units withfrom_utf16_lossy;schema.rs:319usesstrip_prefix;fields.rs:84splits on'.'. - Indexing on parsed JSON in library code:
targets.rs:250,252,253,282,415readids[0],ids[1],ids[2..]afterparse_targetguarantees one id (collections) or at least two (findings);fields.rs:92reads[0]of asplit('.')that always yields one element;pipeline.rs:81-84reads four numbers afterlen() != 4is refused;migration_map.rs:185is a slice pattern;ops.rs:277,304,309,259remove/insert at indices produced from the same list moments before (insertion_indexrefusesindex > len,u64 -> usizesaturates). Nounwrap,expect,panic!,unreachable!,unsafeorMap[...]incrates/core/src/curation/draft/*. - Panics from a hand-written
changes.json/references.json: both parsed with strict serde (deny_unknown_fields), custom validators return errors; every op failure refuses the whole changeset with the change id and op index (apply.rs:103-109); the final strict parse intoAnatomicalSheetDocumentandvalidate_sheet_documentrefuse shape and integrity errors (apply.rs:128-144);CHG-000reserved id refused (pipeline.rs:127). Recursion inwalk,touch_tree,strip_marksis bounded by document depth (serde_json caps parsed nesting at 128; only repeated authoredadds could deepen it; a stack overflow would abort a developer tool, nothing more). --checkis read-only:fs::read,fs::read_dir,println!/eprintln!only. Ran once fromcrates/coreon the native toolchain: exit 0,legacy-import: 6 files, 0 differences,draft: 6 files, 0 differences, six R5.4 files listed as pending;git statusshows the seed folder untouched.--outnever deletes: noremove_*call in the binary; refuses an empty path, a symbolic link, a non-folder, a non-empty folder; file names come from constants and the render functions (no..); parents created withcreate_dir_all.scripts/import-equine.sh:set -euo pipefail,"$@"quoted,cargo run --locked;scripts/rust-env.shonly appends an absolute$CARGO_HOME/binwhencargois absent.- TypeScript generator
packages/anatomy/tests/r5.curation-synthetic-oracles.test.ts: writes onlycrates/core/tests/oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json(OUT = resolve(HERE, '../../../crates/core/tests/oracles/r5')), and only underMAKE_R5_ORACLES=1; otherwise it reads and compares. - Secrets: none in the change set; no tracked
.envor credential file; the seed SQL carries no credential (creator_user_id null,visibility 'private'). - Logging: stderr lines carry paths of the developer's own repository; a CLI for the developer, not an end-user surface.
- Semgrep: 0 results, 0 errors, 0 skipped paths across the three pinned packs
(725 code rules loaded; Rust coverage in these packs is thin, so the manual checklist
carries the weight for
crates/). - Observation outside the change set:
.claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-22-rust-r5-pipeline-core.mdappeared as modified (1 line) during the audit; not produced by--check(no write path).
REPORT_WRITTEN: /home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo/.claude/audits/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft-security.md