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Security gate R5.4 (round 12): review files in Rust

Date: 2026-10-23. Mode: audit (fresh, blind). Branch feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core, HEAD c4e717d. Scope: git diff c6e0d85..HEAD -- crates/core packages/anatomy/tests docs/development/RUST.md (29 files, none deleted).

SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 29 files
BLOCKING:
  (none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
  - [LOW] quadratic-scan (latent, unreachable today) — crates/core/src/curation/report_guard.rs:216
  - [LOW] quadratic-scan (bounded, ~2 s at the document bound) — crates/core/src/curation/draft/pipeline.rs:256
  - [LOW] new lint allowance (context, documented convention) — crates/core/tests/curation_markdown.rs:6, crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6
  - [LOW] declaration precision (R5.3 code, outside the diff) — crates/core/src/curation/draft/schema.rs:430
PROOF: semgrep 128 rules on 29 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks → 0 findings (guardrails 0 FAIL, 1 WARN outside the diff); differential probes 38,378 admitted template reports + 898 admitted real-pipeline reports → 0 silent differences; display width 1,112,032 code points → 0 differences

Tool run

  • semgrep scan --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets --config p/owasp-top-ten --metrics=off on the 29 scope files: 128 rules applicable, 0 results, 0 errors.
  • Guardrails scanner (--domain api,supabase, project root): 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER, supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177, not in the diff, dropped), 1 MANUAL (not reported).

Checklist (9 checks)

Check Result
hardcoded secret, token, key, auth URL in added lines none
SQL by concatenation none in the diff (seed.rs untouched)
unsanitized render, eval, shell none; SVG output escaped (below)
sensitive endpoint without authz N/A (offline CLI, no endpoint)
stack trace or DB error to an end user N/A (operator CLI; refusals print {:?}, control characters escaped)
secret or PII in a log none
tracked .env or credential file none (git ls-files)
guardrails scanner run, nothing in the diff
new suppression (anti-gaming) no nosemgrep, nosec, eslint-disable; two lint allowances in test files (LOW 3)

What was verified, by probe or by reading

Markdown guard (report_guard.rs) against Prettier 3.8.3 with the repository options, from a scratch harness (Prettier imported from the repository's node_modules, the Rust guard through a scratch crate depending on faunosteo-core with curation):

  • template reports reproducing the ten list-item and cell positions of the two reports (title, rationale, question, citation, URL, DOI, vet-flag before/after, label cell): 1,197 hand probes (reference shapes [a] [b], [a] (b), \| outside tables, +/>/1./# mid-line, URL trailing punctuation and &name=, _ near URLs, **word**), 27,000 random single-field, 10,000 random cross-field and 36,000 URL-centric cases: 38,378 admitted, 0 differ from Prettier;
  • the real generators: 7,200 random changesets run through the TypeScript (applyChangeset, renderChangelog, renderReviewReport, formatMarkdown) and through the Rust (apply_changeset, render_changelog, render_review_report, format_report): 898 admitted, 6,302 refused, 0 raw-text differences, 0 silent formatted differences;
  • text::display_width against Prettier's util.getStringWidth for "a" + c, every scalar value from U+0020 to U+10FFFF: 0 differences wherever the port measures (it refuses the rest).

Report structure: authored texts carry no backtick (assert_authored on every authored field of both reports), list-item fields refuse control characters, cells turn \n into a space and escape |; ids written by add/rename are stable ids or region codes, field segments [A-Za-z0-9_-], targets resolve only to existing stable ids, so no author byte starts a line or writes a code span. Email autolinks need @, which the allowlist refuses.

SVG drawings: the serializer escapes & < > in text and & < > " \t \n \r in attributes (]]> cannot appear); drawing::first_unwritable refuses non-XML characters and CR; element and attribute names are constants; colours are #rrggbb by schema; view ids (file names) are stable ids. Drawings projection: names copied at most four times per annotation, worst escape & → 5 bytes per JSON byte, so 24 × (json + longest name) holds.

Records bound: every record site goes through Recorder::record or mark_to_confirm, both charged before the clone. Aligned tables: CHANGELOG projected from cell bytes (bytes ≥ display width, numbers ≤ 25), every table rechecked in align before padding.

CLI import_equine.rs: reads only canonical regular files inside the canonical seed, 16 MiB cap; --check refuses a generated folder that is not the seed's own, lists without following links, compares bytes (app drawings only through the strict rebuild rule); --out refuses .., symlinks, non-empty folders and any path inside the seed by prefix or by (dev, inode), writes with create_dir/create_new, deletes nothing; file names from views are stable ids and write_exclusive accepts only normal components. The check/use race is declared (§11.13).

Timing of the guard on adversarial lines (linear): 400,000 & in 7.9 ms, 400 KB of [[x, x ]], **ab**, <, URL &a=1 runs under 10 ms, a 1.4 MB 100,000-column table in 95 ms.

Findings (non-blocking)

LOW 1: underscore_pairs_later is quadratic, latent

crates/core/src/curation/report_guard.rs:216. For every plain part holding _, the function rescans all later code parts and re-collects each into a Vec<char>. A synthetic line of 100,000 `ab` x_y (900 KB) took 53.7 s. Not reachable today: authored text holds no backtick, so the generator alone interleaves code spans and plain parts, and on every line of both reports at most two plain parts can carry an authored _ (title with rationale, question), which keeps the scan linear. A future line that puts authored text between generated spans would turn it quadratic. Hint: scan the parts right to left once, keeping a "a later code part closes" flag.

LOW 2: drawings projection walks views × annotations before the bound

crates/core/src/curation/draft/pipeline.rs:256. review_drawings_bytes runs layer_bytes over every annotation for every view, and the view count is not yet bounded there (only by the 200,000-value document bound). Measured on a synthetic DraftResult: 10,000 × 10,000 in 1.8 s, 20,000 × 20,000 in 7.6 s; the document bound allows about 11,000 of each, so about 2 s. Hint: group annotations by view_id once, or stop as soon as the running total passes the bound.

LOW 3: lint allowances in the two new test files (context)

crates/core/tests/curation_markdown.rs:6, crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6: #![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]. The lint is the core's no-clock, no-file-system rule; clippy.toml documents that tests allow it locally, and every existing integration test file carries the same line. Not a security-rule suppression.

LOW 4: §11.15 names changes.json alone for the parse amplification

crates/core/src/curation/draft/schema.rs:430. parse_references goes through the same json_parse as parse_changeset, so references.json under its 16 MiB cap should hold the same order of memory (factor not measured here). R5.3 code, outside this diff; the residual line could name both files.

Notes

  • The working tree changed during the run (comment and doc lines only, by another agent): .claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-review-verify.md, docs/development/RUST.md, packages/anatomy/tests/r5.review-synthetic-oracles.test.ts. HEAD stayed c4e717d; this gate judges the committed range.
  • Declared residuals (§11.15, including the ~65× changes.json parse) not re-reported.
  • Probes and harnesses live in the session scratchpad only; no tracked file touched, the import-equine binary never run; the scratch crates read only the committed sweep oracle.