14 KiB
Backend architecture (Supabase strategy)
Status: Step 0 deliverable, 2026-10-08. Conceptual only. No migration, table,
policy or function is created by this document. Table and function names
follow faunosteo-business-architecture.md §4–§20.
Revised 2026-10-25 (P0): Edge Functions retired (D-R9, BDR-045), worker =
crates/worker in Rust, data contracts in crates/core (R2), bucket list and
signed-URL rule as built at Step 8 (STORAGE.md). Hosting stays open
(OPEN_QUESTIONS.md Q2).
1. Components and what runs where
Browser (apps/app, anon key + user JWT, Rust core as WebAssembly)
│ tables via RLS, RPC (security definer), Storage under storage.objects policies
▼
Supabase (self-hosted on Scaleway at launch, §31; hosting open, Q2)
├─ Auth (GoTrue): email/password, OAuth providers (Google, Apple), OTP, phone; keeps the OAuth flows (D-R9)
├─ PostgreSQL: schemas public / private / audit, RLS, functions, pg_cron
└─ Storage: private buckets, storage.objects policies evaluated on public.assets
Rust worker (crates/worker, container faunosteo_worker, service key, same host)
└─ jobs claimed from PostgreSQL through RPCs (lease token), no Redis; decode child sandboxed
Rust HTTP services (same image, other subcommands, own secrets; from the first inbound need)
└─ webhooks (Stripe), OAuth callbacks of external calendars, public endpoints that SQL cannot serve
public-web (Astro, D-R8; anon key)
└─ public views / RPCs only
Edge Functions are not used (D-R9): limits on the self-hosted edge runtime, hand deployment, and one Rust runtime for every server process.
The browser never holds a service-role key, admin credential, storage master key or third-party refresh token (§17.1).
2. Auth
| Need | Mechanism | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Email/password, magic link/OTP | GoTrue built-in | strong password policy configured server-side |
| Google, Apple | GoTrue OAuth providers | Apple requires a paid developer account and a services id: dependency to confirm |
| Phone verification | GoTrue phone OTP needs an SMS provider (Twilio, MessageBird, Vonage) | cost and EU processing to confirm; see OPEN_QUESTIONS.md Q7 |
| Email verification | GoTrue, mandatory before professional features | |
| MFA | GoTrue TOTP; mandatory for owner/admin/moderator/support roles, enforced by RLS helper has_mfa() on admin tables |
TOTP enabled server-side; has_mfa(), enrolment and enforcement not built (IDENTITY.md §4, TODO RR-3) |
| Roles | profile_roles table with the platform_role enum (owner, admin, moderator, support: BDR-026), never JWT custom claims as the only source (claims can lag) |
helpers read the table; professional statuses (practitioner, student, professor) come from verification, cabinet roles from membership, never from this enum |
| Impersonation | dedicated RPC issuing a short-lived scoped session, audited, banner in UI (§17.5) | after MVP core |
profiles.id = auth.users.id, created by a trigger on auth.users insert.
3. PostgreSQL layout
| Schema | Content | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
public |
tables exposed to PostgREST, all with RLS enabled, separate SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policies | browser, public-web, worker |
private |
security-definer helper functions, internal tables (counters, job queue, route cache), triggers | not exposed to PostgREST |
audit |
audit_logs, append-only, insert via private.log_event() |
read by admins through a view |
Conventions fixed now so every step follows them:
- UUID primary keys (
gen_random_uuid()),created_at/updated_atwith a shared trigger, soft deletedeleted_atwhere the architecture names it. - Enums as PostgreSQL
enumtypes when the value set is closed by the business (report status, appointment status),text+ CHECK when the set is expected to grow (document types). - JSONB documents (
reports.current_document,anatomical_sheet_versions.content) carry their ownschema_versionand are validated by the Rust core's contracts (crates/core/src/domain, since R2) at the application boundary and by a CHECK onschema_versionin SQL. Since V1-2.1 the core is the only authority on the sheet document's rules: SQL keeps the structural guards (shape, schema version, size, species) and the declared status check at approval and publication, and publication rests on a server verdict (V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md§12.2, O22). - Every table exposed to the browser: RLS enabled, no
USING (true)policy forauthenticated, no anonymous policy on core tables (§17.4).
4. RLS strategy
4.1 Helpers
Security-definer functions in private, STABLE, search_path pinned,
SET row_security = off inside where they read tables that have policies
referencing them (prevents recursion), one index per access path they use:
private.is_platform_owner(uid) private.is_platform_admin(uid)
private.is_platform_moderator(uid) private.is_support(uid)
private.is_org_member(uid, org) private.is_org_manager(uid, org)
private.is_org_practitioner(uid, org)
private.can_view_client(uid, client) private.can_view_animal(uid, animal)
private.can_view_report(uid, report) private.can_edit_report(uid, report)
private.can_use_sheet(uid, sheet) private.can_fork_sheet(uid, sheet)
private.has_active_entitlement(uid, capability text)
Each helper ships with pgTAP tests in the same migration step: positive case, negative case, expired grant, revoked grant, wrong organization.
As built from V1-1 (contract V1-1_OWNERS_ANIMALS.md §9, BDR-073/074): the
perimeter is a workspace, not an organization. private.caller_workspace_ids()
(member, active profile, confirmed email; no parameter, auth.uid() only;
EXECUTE for authenticated) and private.writable_workspace_ids() (the same,
restricted to a write role; EXECUTE for nobody, called inside definer RPCs)
replace is_org_* and can_view_client/animal for V1-1 records. They avoid
RLS recursion by running as the table owner (security definer, owner
postgres, search_path = '') rather than with row_security = off. No
helper or policy has a platform-role branch (D16). Every V1-1 table revokes
all privileges from anon and service_role (N7); postgres keeps
BYPASSRLS on the Supabase image and the service key stays a GoTrue admin
credential, residual paths named in the contract §6.3.
4.2 Policy rules per domain (summary of §17.3)
| Table family | SELECT | INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE |
|---|---|---|
profiles |
own row; admins via view | own row; roles only through RPC |
workspaces, workspace_members (V1-1; cabinets extend them instead of organizations) |
members, through caller_workspace_ids() |
none through the API: personal workspace created by trigger; cabinet membership RPCs come with Step 10 |
clients, animals, animal_client_relations (V1-1, built: M2 and M3) |
members of the workspace, through caller_workspace_ids() |
none through the API: definer RPCs check the write role of the workspace (writable_workspace_ids()); relations only between an animal and a client of one workspace (composite keys), voided instead of deleted (V1-1_OWNERS_ANIMALS.md §8.2, §8.3) |
client_contacts, client_consents (later steps) |
can_view_client |
create by the practitioner who starts the relationship; core identity edits restricted (open question Q6) |
reports |
can_view_report |
can_edit_report for drafts; completion and numbering only via RPC |
report_revisions |
same as parent report | insert via RPC/trigger only |
anatomical_sheets |
public metadata through a view; full row for creator, grantee, or follower of a public sheet | creator only; publish via RPC |
anatomical_sheet_versions |
can_use_sheet on the parent |
insert draft by creator; published rows immutable (trigger raises on UPDATE of content_jsonb when status = published) |
practitioner_follows, sheet_usage_grants |
involved parties | own follows; grants by sheet creator or org manager |
appointments and agenda tables |
owner scope; public availability through RPC only | booking through RPC with row locks |
plans, subscriptions, entitlement_grants |
own / org manager | Stripe webhook (service) and admin RPC only |
audit.audit_logs |
admins | append-only via private.log_event |
storage.objects |
per bucket policy calling the owning domain's helper | upload paths validated against assets rows |
4.3 Public endpoints
Public profile, sheet discovery, availability and booking are security-definer RPCs or narrow views returning approved columns (§17.4). The anon role gets EXECUTE on those functions and nothing else.
5. Storage
Buckets, all private, as built (STORAGE.md): avatars (the only one with
policies), logos, professional-documents, client-files, animal-files,
report-files, imports (closed until their step writes the rules), and
anatomical-sheet-assets (sheet drawings, its own policy).
Object keys are built by the server from uuids
(profiles/<owner>/<id>/avatar.webp, quarantine/<owner>/<id>/upload). The
assets table is authoritative; storage.objects policies compare whole keys
through assets. Owner-only files are downloaded under the SELECT policy with
no signed URL (BDR-048); a shared kind may use a short-lived signed URL issued
by the Storage API after the same policy. There is no issue_signed_url RPC.
Untrusted uploads (§15.3) land under a quarantine key; the Rust worker's sandboxed child decodes them and writes the clean object; a quarantine object is never readable by an API role. User SVG uploads arrive with Step 13 and go through the Rust core's one SVG reader (prescan caps, allowlist, reference graph), never a browser sanitiser as the boundary.
Archive (§15.4, §16): S3-compatible cold storage with lifecycle rules, no Object Lock by default. Out of MVP core; designed at the data-lifecycle step.
6. PostgreSQL functions vs Rust worker vs Rust HTTP services
Decision rule for each server-side behaviour (D-R9 replaced the Edge Functions row):
| Put it in | When |
|---|---|
| PostgreSQL function / trigger (RPC) | Needs transactional guarantees with the data: report numbering, completion + quota, booking slot lock, grant evaluation, version publication, GC preconditions |
Rust HTTP service (crates/worker image, serve subcommand behind the reverse proxy) |
Needs inbound HTTP from outside or third-party secrets: Stripe webhooks, public widget endpoints SQL cannot serve, external calendar OAuth callbacks; each service holds only its own secrets |
Rust worker (crates/worker, job loop) |
Long, scheduled or untrusted-bytes work: file decoding (avatar since Step 8), reminders and email sending, expiry sweeps (unless pg_cron), calendar sync, route cache, long imports, archive, GC sweeps, server PDF (later) |
Supabase Auth keeps the OAuth sign-in flows it already handles. Shared rules
come from crates/core; the worker and the HTTP services are distinct
processes with their own least privilege. See OPEN_QUESTIONS.md Q2 on VPS
sizing.
7. Migrations
- Supabase CLI,
supabase/migrations/<timestamp>_<name>.sql, forward-only, one or more per implementation step, reviewed in the step's PR. - A migration never edits an applied migration; corrections are new migrations.
- Each migration that adds a table also adds: RLS enable, policies, indexes listed in §32 of the architecture, pgTAP tests, and regenerated types.
supabase db resetmust succeed from zero on CI, thensupabase test db, then the app test suite (§36).- Seed data (
supabase/seed/): the official equine sheet as a DRAFT, generated by the Rust pipeline (pnpm import:equine) from the legacy sources and the curation changeset; it is published only by a platform admin after business review (BDR-034, BDR-037). Reference lists (species, later plans) are written by migrations. Seeds are idempotent and versioned like migrations. - Production changes follow expand/contract when a column is renamed or
dropped (the
deprecation-and-migrationskill applies).
8. SQL tests
pgTAP under supabase/tests/, run by supabase test db:
- helper function unit tests (one file per helper);
- per-table RLS tests: as user A, as user B, as org member, as anon, as service; each verifies both the allowed rows and the denied rows;
- transactional rules: numbering under concurrency (two sessions), booking double-request, completion beyond quota, publish-then-update raises;
- immutability and GC preconditions for sheet versions.
Representative cross-tenant cases are a release gate (§30).
9. Generated types
pnpm db:types regenerates packages/supabase/src/database.types.ts after
every migration; pnpm db:types:check diffs it (no CI runs on the forge,
BDR-047). The Rust contracts of crates/core/src/domain, exported to
TypeScript by ts-rs, are the contract for JSONB documents; generated types
cover columns and RPC signatures.
10. What must stay server-side (brief §19, architecture principles 6–13)
- Authorization: every read/write of client, animal, report, sheet, grant.
- Report numbering, completion, free-plan quota, 5-day free edit window.
- Sheet version immutability, publication, deprecation, garbage collection.
- Explicit
annotation → finding zonemapping validation on publish (no fuzzy at runtime). - Booking slot evaluation, pending-request limits, expiry, race protection.
- Entitlement computation and Stripe state.
- Referral eligibility and caps.
- Client candidate matching and sharing consent flows.
- Untrusted file decoding (worker child), SVG reading by the core on every product drawing, Storage access through policies.
- Import preflight, quota check and atomic commit.
- Audit logging, impersonation, moderation.
- Archive and deletion workflows.
11. Observability and operations (minimum for MVP)
- Structured logs without clinical data or secrets; request correlation id
propagated to
audit_logs. - Daily DB backup + monthly retained copy; restore rehearsed before the first paying cohort (§31, §38).
- Dependency audit (
pnpm audit) and secret scan (gitleaks hook already in.githooks) in CI. - Security headers at the reverse proxy and in nginx (hardening step).