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Rust in the Faunosteo monorepo

Status: plan R0 (foundation, validated 2026-10-13), R1 (the Step 8 worker, validated 2026-10-13) and R2 (the domain core, validated and merged 2026-10-14) and R3 (the anatomy core, validated after the owner's LAN acceptance and merged 2026-10-17). Rule and roadmap: RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md (rule "Rust by default", Part III boundary rules, Part IV the worker, Part VI phases R0–R5, Annex B R0 scope, Annex C owner amendments). R0 shipped the toolchain, the workspace skeleton, the worker's sandboxed child, the browser module loader and seven experimental proofs; R1 ships the worker's job loop and sweeper for the avatar pipeline (STORAGE.md §3); R2 moves the application's domain rules into crates/core and switches the application to them (§8).

1. Toolchain: native on the development machine, reproducible in Docker, never on the VPS

Three environments, three roles (owner decision of 2026-10-13, review Annex C addendum). The development machine is a self-hosted Ubuntu server (native, not WSL, not the VPS) with Docker rootless.

Environment Role Rust
Ubuntu development machine, native daily development (cargo check / test / build / clippy / fmt), the browser module build, every check before a merge (pnpm check:all) user-level rustup in ~/.cargo and ~/.rustup, channel pinned by rust-toolchain.toml
Docker on that machine the Supabase stack, the worker's sandbox tests and seccomp derivation, integration tests, the application and worker images, and the reproducible run of the same Rust scripts through the builder image inside images only
Production VPS runs images; never compiles none

1.1 Native toolchain (the primary path)

Everything lives in the user's home: no global package, no sudo. Checked on 2026-10-13 (Ubuntu 26.04.1, x86_64): build-essential (gcc 15, the C compiler that builds the worker's vendored libwebp), libc6-dev, pkg-config, libssl-dev and strace were already installed; no system package is missing.

# once: rustup, the user-level installer (https://rustup.rs); ~/.bashrc and ~/.profile source ~/.cargo/env
rustup show                                                   # from the repository: installs 1.99.0 + rustfmt + clippy
rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown                      # browser build of crates/wasm
cargo install wasm-bindgen-cli --version 0.2.129 --locked     # = the wasm-bindgen crate in Cargo.lock
cargo install cargo-deny --version 0.20.2 --locked

rustup show run inside the repository installs the channel of rust-toolchain.toml (rustup auto-install), so cargo here is always 1.99.0 whatever the default toolchain of the machine. Non-interactive shells (editor tasks, git hooks, agent shells) skip ~/.bashrc and start without ~/.cargo/bin on PATH: the scripts source scripts/rust-env.sh, which prepends it when cargo is not found.

Piece Native Builder image Pinned by
Rust 1.99.0, edition 2024, rustfmt, clippy rustup show (auto-install) FROM rust:1.99.0-bookworm + rustup component add rust-toolchain.toml
wasm32-unknown-unknown rustup target add RUN rustup target add same channel
wasm-bindgen-cli 0.2.129 cargo install --locked same wasm-bindgen = "=0.2.129" in Cargo.toml; scripts/wasm-build.sh refuses to run when Cargo.lock and the CLI on PATH differ
cargo-deny 0.20.2 cargo install --locked same deny.toml
worker builder (musl, libwebp) not native: sandbox tests run in Docker only crates/worker/Dockerfile (FROM rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24, build-base) same channel

Commands (root package.json; every Rust script is one file run natively or inside the builder image):

pnpm rust:check          # scripts/rust-check.sh, native: fmt --check, clippy -D warnings (all targets),
                         # cargo test (core, wasm, worker unit tests), ts-rs export, cargo deny licenses/bans/sources
pnpm wasm:build          # scripts/wasm-build.sh, native: crates/wasm → packages/core-wasm/pkg (git-ignored), sizes printed
pnpm check:all           # scripts/check-all.sh: the pre-merge gate (§4): rust:check, types drift, wasm:build,
                         # pnpm check, application image, worker:test, worker:image started read-only
pnpm rust:check:docker   # the same rust-check.sh inside the builder image (reproducible run)
pnpm wasm:build:docker   # the same wasm-build.sh inside the builder image
pnpm rust:builder        # builds faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 once (about 6 minutes cold)
pnpm worker:test         # Docker only: crates/worker/Dockerfile stage test, 16 sandbox tests + seccomp derivation
pnpm worker:image        # Docker only: runtime image faunosteo_worker:dev (distroless/static:nonroot)
bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo <anything>   # any cargo command in the builder
cargo check | test | build | clippy | fmt  # the inner loop, from the repository root

The native target/ (git-ignored, .dockerignored) and the builder's named volumes faunosteo_cargo_registry / faunosteo_rust_target are two separate caches; neither invalidates the other.

1.2 What stays in Docker, and why

  • The worker's sandbox tests (crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs) are gated by the test-hooks feature: a native cargo test compiles that target empty and runs the worker's unit tests only. The seccomp allowlist is derived by strace on the musl static binary that ships, inside the Alpine test stage, and glibc would need other syscalls (brk, mprotect, futex): running the sandbox natively would either kill a legitimate decode or prove nothing about the shipped binary. pnpm worker:test is the only path, and the worker keeps running in its container.
  • The Supabase stack, the application image, the worker image and the integration tests on them: pnpm db:start, docker build -t faunosteo ., pnpm worker:image.
  • The builder image stays as the reproducible alternative (same compiler, same tools, a clean environment) and as the reference a future runner uses; it is not needed for a compile or a test on the development machine.

Exposure change, stated for the record: a native build runs the build scripts and proc-macros of the dependencies under the user account (the builder container ran them with the repository mounted read-write, so the difference is the rest of the home directory). Mitigations in place: --locked everywhere, deny.toml [sources] limited to crates.io with unknown registries and git sources denied, cargo deny check licenses bans sources in every check.

2. Workspace

Cargo.toml              workspace (resolver 3), pinned [workspace.dependencies], lints, profiles
rust-toolchain.toml     channel 1.99.0, components rustfmt + clippy
rustfmt.toml            edition 2024, max_width 100
clippy.toml             disallowed-methods: std::time::*::now, std::fs::*, std::env::var* (the core)
deny.toml               licences allow-list, bans (duplicates warn, wildcards deny, path deps allowed), sources
.cargo/config.toml      wasm shadow stack 1 MiB (explicit), TS_RS_EXPORT_DIR = packages/core-wasm/types
crates/core             faunosteo-core: lib, no I/O (lint), serde + serde_json + url (Zod's .url())
crates/wasm             faunosteo-wasm: cdylib facade over core (wasm-bindgen)
crates/worker           faunosteo-worker: bin + lib (image, libwebp-sys, seccompiler, rlimit)
packages/core-wasm      runtime (lazy, poison, recovery), Node source, generated types (committed), N-1 reader, tests

Lints: unwrap_used, expect_used and disallowed_methods are errors in the libraries (tests allow them explicitly at the top of the file); unsafe_code is forbidden everywhere except the worker (libwebp FFI, each block with a SAFETY comment). Dependencies are optimised even in debug builds (profile.dev.package."*") because the sandbox tests decode 4096² images under a 10 s CPU limit.

2.1 Boundary rules in code (review III.3)

  • faunosteo_core::facade::call(op, json) -> json and call_with_sheet(sheet, op, json): one operation name, one JSON text in, the outcome envelope out ({"ok":true,"value":…} or {"ok":false,"kind":…,"detail":…[, "found":<number>]}), never a panic on content. The operations of R2 are listed in §8.2 (crates/core/src/ops.rs).
  • faunosteo_core::json: js_number(f64) prints floats as ECMAScript Number::toString; to_js_pretty / to_js_compact produce JSON.stringify(v, null, 2) / JSON.stringify(v) byte for byte (proof §5.2). Every facade output goes through them.
  • faunosteo_core::domain::js: the JavaScript and Zod semantics the contracts depend on (JSON.parse duplicate keys, a lone surrogate escape refused as lone_surrogate (L1, §8.7), .int() as JsInt, UTF-16 lengths, the id / region / colour / sha256 / base64 / uuid / URL patterns, optional fields absent and never null, nullable fields required). Fields are declared in the Zod schema order (D-R11). cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features ts writes the TypeScript types to packages/core-wasm/types (committed; the drift gate of check:all fails on any change).
  • packages/core-wasm: CoreRuntime (browser-safe) and the Node source (@faunosteo/core-wasm/node); a fresh instance is a new glue module record (cache-busting import), never the trapped one (§8.3).

3. The worker (R0 sandboxed child, R1 job loop)

faunosteo-worker is one static musl binary with subcommands dispatched by a plain main (no async runtime, no thread), so decode installs its sandbox in a single-threaded process. R1 (Step 8) adds the keyed parent: run polls claim_avatar_jobs through PostgREST every 2 s, downloads the quarantine object, feeds it to a decode child, uploads the 512 × 512 WebP at the final key, commits the row (complete_avatar_job with the lease token), deletes the quarantine object, and sweeps (expired uploads, the purge queue, quarantine leftovers) every 10 minutes. Modules: config (env, secret newtype that no Debug output prints, JWT expiry), log (JSON lines, field allowlist, child stderr escaped and cut at 200 bytes), keys (strict four-segment key shapes validated before any URL), backend (trait, closed BackendError), http (ureq 3 on rustls + ring with the bundled roots, 30 s global / 5 s connect timeouts, no redirect, P0001 bodies → closed refusals, the Storage API's HTTP 400 + statusCode 404 → 404), decoder, job (the STORAGE.md §3.4 mapping), sweep (§3.5), watchdog (per-stage deadlines, exit 21 on overrun; Broken child → exit 20), run (WORKER_ONCE, --check). Library choice recorded against the review's Part V list: ureq instead of tokio + reqwest, hand-written JSON lines instead of tracing, a 25-line base64url decoder instead of base64: the loop is sequential, nothing needs an async runtime, and the keyed process keeps a smaller dependency tree (34 → 84 crates, aws-lc-rs absent, no cmake on Alpine). The decode child's traced syscall set did not change with the parent's TLS code (§5.4 re-run at R1: the same seven). Image 11.6 MB (8.7 MB at R0: ring + rustls). Tests: crates/worker/tests/job_loop.rs (11, fake backend + fake decoder) and the module unit tests run natively; the real-stack end-to-end runs through pnpm e2e:avatar (STORAGE.md §6).

The sandboxed child, unchanged from R0:

  • decode: refuses a non-empty environment; checks Threads: 1 in /proc/self/status; disables core dumps (PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0, RLIMIT_CORE 0: a dump would hold the uploaded photo); RLIMIT_AS 512 MiB, RLIMIT_CPU 10 s soft / 12 s hard (soft = hard made the kernel SIGKILL first, finding §5.4); seccomp allowlist installed with TSYNC, KillProcess on anything else, with argument filters: tkill/tgkill may only send SIGABRT to the child's own pid (never a signal to the keyed parent or a sibling), mmap may not map PROT_EXEC; then reads ≤ 5 MiB on stdin, sniffs the format (JPEG, PNG, WebP), decodes with image::Limits (sides ≤ 4096, alloc 256 MiB), applies the EXIF orientation, resize_to_fill 512 × 512, encodes lossy WebP (q 82) through libwebp-sys (C, this process only), writes stdout. Exit codes in exit_codes.rs (10–19, never 1, 101 or a signal number); every decode-time error maps to a content code (unsupported_type, decode_failed, dimensions, resource_limit), so no upload can produce a broken-environment code.
  • the parent side (spawn::Spawner, used by the tests now and by R1): env_clear, stdin/stdout/stderr piped, output read up to 512 KiB (the child is killed past it), 20 s deadline, classification of every exit (Produced, Rejected{code} for the content codes (exit_codes::is_content_rejection, an explicit list), Broken{code} when the child could not run properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox failure, encode or output failure, internal: R1 alerts instead of blaming the upload; no content can produce it), Signalled{signal}, OutputOverflow, Timeout, Failed). The parent never decodes: webp_check::inspect parses the RIFF container only (chunk allowlist VP8X, VP8 , VP8L, ALPH; the encoder's structure enforced: optional VP8X first, optional ALPH only in an extended file, exactly one frame; canvas size from the headers, the frame size must agree with the canvas; any EXIF, XMP , ICCP or unknown chunk refuses the output; owner amendment of D-R4). The child's stderr (≤ 4 KiB) is child-controlled text: R1 never logs it raw (LRN-044).
  • run --check: prints the resolved configuration without secrets (which variables are set, the linked libwebp version, refused below 1.6.0, the JWT expiry of the service key); exit 0 when startable or when no worker variable is set at all, 2 on a partial configuration. run starts the loop (STORAGE.md §3.2 for the variables).
  • version: binary, workspace and libwebp versions.
  • test hooks (--features test-hooks, never in a release build): fixtures generated in memory (no binary in git), --no-seccomp (rlimits only, prints the SECCOMP-MARKER line for the strace derivation), --violate (getcwd after the filter), --flood, --alloc-gib n, --spin, print-allowlist.

Image: crates/worker/Dockerfile, stages build (release, static), test (sandbox tests and scripts/derive-seccomp.sh on the release profile with the test-hooks feature, so the binary under test differs from the shipped one by the feature-gated hooks only), runtime (gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot, USER nonroot, ENTRYPOINT /faunosteo-worker, CMD run --check). Measured 2026-10-12: image 8.7 MB (one static binary), run --check exits 0 with --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges:true.

4. Checks before a merge, and the workflow files (prepared, no CI active)

No CI/CD runs on the forge today (2026-10-13): no runner, no secret, no registry. The YAML files under .gitea/workflows/ are kept as prepared material for that separate decision; a green workflow is never claimed until one has actually run on the forge. Until then the gate is local:

pnpm check:all   # scripts/check-all.sh, stops at the first failure

Stages, in order: scripts/rust-check.sh (native), the ts-rs types drift (git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all -- packages/core-wasm/types must be empty: a modified or a new type file both fail, whatever the git configuration), cargo deny check advisories (warn-only: out of the blocking path by design, review VIII.3, but printed here because no nightly job runs yet; needs the network), scripts/wasm-build.sh (native), pnpm check (typecheck, tests including the core-wasm proofs on the module just built and the pgTAP suite on PGlite, lint, build), the application image, pnpm worker:test (sandbox tests and seccomp derivation on the musl binary), pnpm worker:image started once with --read-only --cap-drop ALL. The local Supabase stack is not required; pnpm db:test is the real-stack complement after a change under supabase/.

Workflow files, each mapping onto those stages so a future runner calls the same scripts:

  • ci.yml (push on main/develop, pull requests): job rust (builder image, scripts/rust-check.sh, types drift, scripts/wasm-build.sh), job check (module built the same way, then the Node pipeline), job docker (application image, worker test stage, worker runtime started read-only), job supabase (real stack, pgTAP, generated types diff).
  • rust-advisories.yml: nightly and manual cargo deny check advisories, out of the blocking path on purpose.
  • release-images.yml: manual only; the dispatch input is a typed choice re-validated through an environment variable; the RustSec and npm (pnpm audit --prod) advisories gates run first in a job without secrets; a named ephemeral buildx builder (--builder, no silent fallback) with its own cache builds the images; the registry token reaches the login step only, into a per-job DOCKER_CONFIG under RUNNER_TEMP created before any step and removed by a literal path; digests read from the build metadata; actions/checkout pinned to a commit. The if: github.ref line is not a boundary (push access and the token's scope are; a dedicated release runner label is the Step 27 operation). It would push faunosteo_app:<sha> and faunosteo_worker:<sha> and print their digests. Deploys nothing (DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").

Target of the future CI/CD step (planned, not yet built; recorded so the scripts stay compatible): tests on every push and pull request, Rust and TypeScript checks, PostgreSQL/RLS tests, Docker builds, security checks, branch verification before a merge, image publication only in an explicitly authorised workflow.

Not measured: the forge runner's cache behaviour, cold build times and the workflow syntax (job-level env, GITHUB_ENV path) have never run. The builder image build took about 6 minutes cold on the development host; both image builds reuse BuildKit cache mounts (faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl, faunosteo_target_musl).

5. R0 proofs (2026-10-12, development host, Docker 29.8 rootless, kernel 7.0)

Each proof is a permanent test; the numbers are what the run produced.

5.1 Panic strategy on wasm32 (packages/core-wasm/tests/panic.test.ts)

  • A Rust panic reaches JavaScript as WebAssembly.RuntimeError (unreachable): the module is panic = abort, catch_unwind cannot be used there.
  • Exhausting the 1 MiB shadow stack (2 000 000 frames of 128 bytes) traps (RuntimeError) instead of corrupting memory.
  • After a stack-exhaustion trap, the next call on the same instance fails in the allocator (memory access out of bounds, deterministic). After a plain panic the same instance still answers, with a stack pointer that was never unwound: the dangerous case. Rule for R2: no instance is reused after any trap; a fresh instance is a new module record (the wasm-bindgen glue caches its instance in a module variable, and the ESM cache returns the same module for the same URL: loadCore() imports with a cache-busting query; in the browser the glue must be a static asset imported the same way, or the core runs in a Worker recreated on trap).

5.2 Serialisation contract (tests/serialisation.test.ts, crates/core/tests)

  • Byte equality with JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(text), null, 2) on report-v3.demo.json, report-v2.full.json, the 296 KB equine document.json and the 84 KB report-migration-map.json, plus a number corpus (1523, 1715.4285714285713, 0.85, 1e+21, 1e-7, 0.000001, -0 → 0, 123456789012345680000, 5e-324, 1.7976931348623157e+308).
  • Finding: serde_json's default float parser is a documented fast path that can be one ULP off; the first run printed 1715.428571428571 and 123456789012345670000. The float_roundtrip feature (enabled in Cargo.toml) fixes it; the module grew from 187 KB to 225 KB raw.
  • Optional fields absent, nullable fields null, unknown keys ignored, unresolved: false refused; the current ReportZoneSchema and SheetRefSchema (Zod 3, @faunosteo/domain) parse what the core writes.

5.3 musl static binary with libwebp (crates/worker/Dockerfile)

Builds on rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24 with build-base; libwebp-sys 0.14.4 compiles its vendored libwebp with cc; WebPGetEncoderVersion() reports 1.6.0 (logged by run --check, test the_linked_libwebp_is_recent_enough). The runtime image carries the one static binary.

5.4 seccomp allowlist, derived and proven (crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs)

  • Derivation (scripts/derive-seccomp.sh, strace over png, jpeg, webp, a 4096 × 4096 JPEG and a 3000 × 3000 PNG, after the marker): exactly read write mmap munmap mremap exit_group getrandom. musl's mallocng used neither brk nor mprotect; no futex in a single-threaded decode. The allowlist is that set plus the abort path (rt_sigaction, rt_sigprocmask, getpid, gettid, tkill, tgkill, exit).
  • Proven on the release-profile musl binary with the test hooks, inside Docker's default seccomp profile: 16 tests green (png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox, inputs_at_the_caps_decode_within_the_limits (4096²), dimensions 32 px and 20 000² header, GIF and SVG refused, truncated PNG, non-empty environment refused, --violate → SIGSYS 31, --flood → output cut, --alloc-gib 2 → SIGABRT 6 under RLIMIT_AS, --spin → parent deadline, --spin → SIGXCPU 24 at the CPU soft limit, libwebp ≥ 1.6.0; negative proofs of the argument filters: --signal-parent (tkill to the parent) and --mmap-exec → SIGSYS; an iCCP bomb of 300 MB inflated → a content rejection, never a broken-environment outcome).
  • Findings: with RLIMIT_CPU soft = hard the kernel sends SIGKILL (hard limit checked first), indistinguishable from the parent's deadline kill; the soft limit is now two seconds below the hard one. The 4096² decode exceeded 10 s of CPU in an unoptimised debug build: dependencies are optimised in every profile.

5.5 CSP with 'wasm-unsafe-eval' (docker/csp-proof/run.sh)

Served packages/core-wasm/pkg through nginx:1.31-alpine with docker/nginx.conf plus the exact Content-Security-Policy of DEPLOY.md, loaded by headless Chrome for Testing 156:

Header Result
production (script-src 'self') FAIL WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming(): Compiling or instantiating WebAssembly module violates the following Content Security policy directive because 'unsafe-eval' is not an allowed source of script in the following Content Security Policy directive: "script-src 'self'"
script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' OK 0.1.0 (module instantiated, core_version() answered)

The keyword allows WebAssembly compilation only: an inline <script> variant stayed blocked under both headers. nginx serves .wasm as application/wasm out of the box.

5.6 Served size and instantiate time (tests/size.test.ts)

faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm: 224 713 bytes raw, 85 396 bytes gzip-9 (with float_roundtrip; 186 805 / 72 917 without), instantiate 2.7 ms in Node 24. The D-R13 budget (600 KB compressed) is asserted by the test from R0 on.

5.7 Runner caches and build times

Not measurable from this host (no forge runner here). Recorded instead: builder image cold build about 6 minutes; worker test stage cold about 2 minutes, warm under 30 s with the BuildKit cache mounts; the wasm build under 10 s warm. The first run on the forge records its own numbers here.

5.8 Native toolchain run (2026-10-13, Ubuntu 26.04.1, rustup 1.29.1, 16 cores)

Same proofs, native toolchain (rustc 1.99.0 (b940084d7 2026-09-28), cargo 1.99.0, clippy 0.1.99, rustfmt 1.10.0-stable, wasm-bindgen 0.2.129, cargo-deny 0.20.2), compared with the builder image runs above:

Measure Native Builder image (R0)
cold cargo build --workspace --all-targets (libwebp compiled by gcc 15) 31.5 s not timed at R0
cold wasm release build 4.3 s under 10 s warm
scripts/rust-check.sh warm (fmt, clippy, tests, ts export, deny) 32 s 2.2 s warm volumes (same script, same results)
cargo tests core 10 + 2, worker unit 9, core with ts 14 + 2, all green identical counts
committed ts-rs types unchanged after the export unchanged
faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm raw 224 777 B 224 713 B
gzip -9 84 924 B (gzip), 85 390 B (the vitest measure) 84 927 B / 85 396 B
sha256 2d559a6b…bb3a 451d49c1…a752
core-wasm proofs 14 passed, instantiate 3.9 ms 14 passed, 2.7 ms

The 64-byte difference and the distinct hashes come from the source paths embedded in the panic locations (/home/<user>/Documents/faunosteo/… natively, /w/… in the builder): the module is not bit-reproducible across build roots without --remap-path-prefix, which R0 does not set. The builder image is the reference when two builds must match byte for byte. cargo deny prints the same warnings in both environments (license-not-encountered for six allowed licences, duplicate miniz_oxide and syn): policy warn, not failures.

6. Reproduction

pnpm rust:check                                            # §2, §5.2 (cargo side), native
pnpm wasm:build && pnpm --filter @faunosteo/core-wasm test:run   # §5.1, §5.2, §5.6, native module
pnpm rust:builder && pnpm rust:check:docker && pnpm wasm:build:docker   # the same, reproducible in the builder
pnpm worker:test                                           # §5.3, §5.4 (tests + derivation in the build log)
pnpm worker:image && docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL faunosteo_worker:dev   # §3
CHROME=<chromium binary> bash docker/csp-proof/run.sh      # §5.5 (playwright-core on NODE_PATH)
CHROME=<chromium> PLAYWRIGHT_NODE_MODULES=<dir> bash docker/csp-proof/app-image.sh   # §8.5, the R2 image
pnpm check:all                                             # everything above but the CSP proofs, in one command

7. What stays hypothetical after R0

  • Follow-ups from the R0 security audit, owned by R1 unless stated: base images pinned by digest in the three Dockerfiles (today by tag, as the existing Dockerfile); a verification decode of the child's output in a second sandboxed child (the RIFF check validates the container, not the bitstream); the shared BuildKit cache mounts of the CI builds (the release workflow already uses its own builder); actions/*@v4 tags in ci.yml (pre-existing practice) to pin by commit at Step 27.
  • The browser-side fresh-instance mechanism is built at R2 (§8.3): the glue is a Vite asset imported with a query per instance, one spare record imported in advance.
  • HTTPS from the worker: R1 links ureq with rustls and the bundled webpki-roots (distroless has no CA bundle; none is needed), but every run so far targets the local stack over plain HTTP on the Docker network; the first managed (HTTPS) target proves the roots.
  • The forge runner's cache and timings (§5.7), and the workflow files themselves: no runner exists, none of the three workflows has ever run (§4).
  • The allowlist is x86_64; an aarch64 host would need its own derivation (target_arch selects the seccomp architecture, the syscall numbers come from libc).

8. R2: the domain core in Rust, used by the application (2026-10-14)

Plan and contract: .claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-13-rust-r2-domain-core.md (revision 2 after three plan challenges). The application's domain rules run in crates/core, reached through crates/wasm and packages/core-wasm; React, the DOM, the forms, Zustand and supabase-js stay TypeScript.

8.1 What runs in Rust, and who calls it

Former TypeScript Rust (crates/core/src) Application consumer
sheet document schema (Zod, strict) domain/sheet/schema.rs SheetHandle load (useSheet), snapshot gate, publish check
validateSheetDocument (21 rules), isPublishable, createEmptySheetDocument domain/sheet/{validate,check,create}.rs sheet.check → publishSheetVersion (packages/supabase), snapshot integrity
buildSheetIndex (closures over Maps) domain/sheet/{index,index_data}.rs, SheetHandle useSheet → SheetIndex (precomputed tables, no call in a render)
report v3 / v2 / identity / migration map (Zod) domain/report/{v3,v2,identity,migration_map}.rs every op that takes or returns a report
migrateReportV2ToV3, readReportDocument domain/report/read.rs draft restore, import
rebaseReportOnSheet (gated, D-R12) domain/report/rebase.rs draft restore, import
snapshot / branding / labels / envelope schemas, buildSheetSnapshot, assertSnapshot, readArchiveDocument (gated, D-R12) domain/archive/* export (archive.snapshot), import (archive.import), draft restore (archive kept beside the draft)
services/zoneInteraction.ts (click decision, 7 reducers, collectVertebrae, syncVertebrae) domain/editor/zone.rs EditorRoute click chain, ObservationPickers, zone chips
FindingsTreePicker.toggleLeaf (Finding builder) domain/editor/finding.rs ObservationCard → findings picker
VertebraPicker toggle / all / none domain/editor/vertebra.rs VertebraPicker tap handlers
store newReport, emptyObservation, add / remove / move domain/editor/report_ops.rs reportStore actions (answer { ok })
persistence draft / archive parsing domain/session.rs (restore_draft) reportStore.restoreDraft (quarantine on content kinds)
engine readReportArchive (layered part) domain/session.rs (import_archive) HomeRoute import after the engine's byte scan

8.2 Facade operations (crates/core/src/ops.rs, facade.rs)

Free (call): sheet.check, report.new, report.add_observation, report.remove_observation, report.move_observation, vertebra.select; R0 proofs kept: core_version, pretty_json, sheet_ref, report_zone. On the session's sheet (SheetHandle.call): index_data, zone.click, zone.add_sides, zone.remove_at, vertebra.initial, vertebra.sync, finding.toggle, draft.restore, archive.import, archive.snapshot. Closed failure kinds: invalid_json, invalid_shape, unknown_op, internal, invalid_sheet (handle), invalid / unsupported_version / rebase_failed (restore), incompatible_version (with found) / no_attachment / invalid (import), unknown_annotation, unknown_zone, unknown_node, invalid_index, invalid_count (editor); the runtime adds core_unavailable. Input contracts are exported as TypeScript types.

8.3 Runtime in the browser (packages/core-wasm/src/runtime.ts, apps/app/src/core/)

  • Lazy: the glue (10 KB) and the module are Vite assets (?url), never in a route chunk; nothing is fetched before ready(). Callers: the editor (useSheet), the new-report submit, the PDF import. /login, /app/*, Mon compte and Home never request it (proven, §8.5); Home and /new read the sheet availability from the bundle alone.
  • Synchronous calls once ready. A WebAssembly.RuntimeError poisons the instance: the call answers internal, the instance is dropped, a fresh one is created from the compiled module kept in memory and a glue record imported in advance (no network needed), at most 3 times per page; calls made meanwhile answer core_unavailable. Sheet handles carry the instance generation and are rebuilt from the retained payload, never called on a dropped instance. A recovery that fails below the cap (network lost, spare record missing) is not final: the next call or ready() restarts the runtime, reusing the compiled module; a restart is not a recovery and does not touch the counter. A failed first load is restarted by retry() only. subscribe(listener) reports status changes after a microtask (a throwing listener changes nothing); the pages follow stopped through it.
  • A load failure (CSP, network, old browser) gives core_unavailable; the editor and the new-report page show the notice with "Réessayer" (the retry clears the runtime, useSheet and provider caches), never redirect, never read or write the draft. Once the engine stopped, the notice is the stopped one (§9.4 item 7), without a retry.
  • Editor, storage full while the engine runs: the editor.save_failed banner gains the engine-free "Télécharger une copie" button, and a beforeunload guard (app/useUnsavedGuard.ts, called once in App, on every page) asks before a reload, a close or a full-page redirect while the report is only in memory.
  • Two builds: pkg/ ships (no trap export, checked by scripts/wasm-build.sh and a test), pkg-proofs/ carries the trap exports for the tests. Both carry BUILD_STAMP (hash of the Rust sources); the vitest global setup of core-wasm, app and supabase refuses to run on a missing or stale module (pnpm wasm:build first).

8.4 TypeScript deleted, kept, frozen (census)

  • Deleted at R2: apps/app/src/services/zoneInteraction.ts and its suite (13 cases ported to crates/core/tests/editor_rules.rs), the Finding builder of FindingsTreePicker, the selection rules of VertebraPicker, the store's report construction and list rules, the Zod parsing in persistence.ts and sheets/provider.ts, the domain re-exports of services/sheetIndex.ts, hydrateReport, the publish gate's assertPublishable call.
  • Kept TypeScript, each with its constraint (review II.2 class C): display helpers over core data (zoneLabel, describeZone, zoneTrees, unresolvedFindings, the findings picker's matches / isLeafSelected / countSelectedUnder, the vertebra grid extent and chip state, import message lines, isIdentityComplete, pickLabel = pickLocaleLabel); form glue (D-R7: identity, texts, comment, severity and free-findings assignments, FreeTextFindingInput trimming, the practitioner prefill schema of practitionerCache.ts); storage adapters (persistence.ts, quarantine writes); isObservable (a type guard); the SheetIndex class (reads precomputed tables only); the runtime and its sources (Vite asset URLs, dynamic import).
  • Frozen TypeScript, still used, never extended: packages/domain (PDF engine and apps/app/scripts/compare-reports.ts until R4, pipeline until R5), packages/pdf (byte scan and writer, R4), packages/anatomy/render (canvas and engine, R3). The report:compare CLI reads the sheet with the frozen domain (apps/app/scripts/compare/sheet.ts).
  • Census: grep -rn "@faunosteo/domain" apps/app/src returns nothing, enforced by ESLint (no-restricted-imports on apps/app/src).

8.5 Proofs and tests (2026-10-14)

  • Cargo: 135 core tests (contracts byte-equal to the Zod output on the curated and legacy sheets, the demo report and the three frozen archive envelopes; the ported domain suites; 49 editor cases, 84 report and archive cases and 765 Zod verdicts frozen from the TypeScript; 26 conformance fixtures; the 612 legacy leaves), 32 wasm + worker unit tests.
  • Node: 906 tests (app 313 on the real core, core-wasm 25 incl. the runtime, trap, size and measurement tests, supabase 39 incl. the publish gate on the real core, domain 262 incl. the oracle generators, pdf 137, anatomy 130); the 39 step6 goldens and the seed golden unchanged.
  • SQL: supabase/tests/011_sheet_conformance.sql generated from the fixtures (cargo drift test), PGlite 12/12 files, real stack 446/446.
  • N-1: the Zod schemas of develop 1a7ee7d (packages/core-wasm/tests/n-1) parse every draft and archive the core-fed application writes; the three frozen envelopes are deep-equal to the R2 exports.
  • CSP on the real image (docker/csp-proof/app-image.sh, Chrome for Testing 156, DEPLOY.md header): with 'wasm-unsafe-eval' a report is created and a zone click is applied by the core with no script or wasm violation; without it the browser refuses the module (script-src wasm-eval), the editor shows the notice, stays on /editor and leaves the draft byte-identical; /login, /app/account and / request neither the glue nor the module (15/15). Recovery after a forced trap checked in the browser on the dev server and the production build; real traps on the proofs build in Node.
  • pnpm check:all: green in 2 min 17 s.

8.6 Measurements (development machine, Node 24, Chrome 156)

Measure Value
shipped module 1,044,559 B raw (native), 340,154 B gzip -9 (budget 600 KB); before the by-reference deserialisation of the security follow-up: 1,180,153 B raw / 372,275 B served by the image; after L1 (no rewrite pass, §8.7): 1,040,784 B raw / 339,933 B gzip -9
glue 10,171 B
load (compile + instantiate) 6 to 8 ms
sheet handle + index data (bundle 0.5 MB) 22 to 27 ms (TypeScript parse + index on the same input: 12 to 15 ms)
zone.click 0.03 ms
draft.restore (demo report) 0.26 ms
archive.import (demo envelope, 184 KiB) 2.4 ms (TypeScript layered read, without rebase: 1.0 to 1.1 ms)
archive.snapshot 0.4 to 0.5 ms
linear memory after the editor path 4.1 MiB
app image 104 MB (wasm stage: the Rust toolchain stays in the builder)

Pages without the core load nothing more than before R2; the sheet pages fetch about 351 KB more (glue + gzip module) once per session. JSON inputs are deserialised by reference (T::deserialize(&Value)): the imported attachment is never copied as a whole value (its strings are copied once into the typed contract), and one deserialiser instead of two keeps the module smaller. Operation inputs (parse_input) keep the parsed value alive while their strings are copied out: a transient, linear peak on inputs the application itself builds.

8.7 Behaviour differences (declared)

  1. L1 (owner decision 2026-10-14, BDR-051): a JSON text that escapes a lone UTF-16 surrogate is refused whole with the closed kind lone_surrogate, never altered (TypeScript kept the surrogate; a Rust string cannot hold it, and the U+FFFD replacement delivered first was refused). serde_json rejects the escape like any other error and js::parse_json classifies the failure with a strict escape scan, run on failures only. A draft goes to osteo:quarantine:draft verbatim with the existing quarantine notice; an archive kept beside a draft goes to osteo:quarantine:archive; an import is refused with home.import.error_lone_surrogate and the file is not modified; an editor action on a report holding one (only a pasted malformed text can bring it) is refused with core.action_failed and the report is left as it was; the publish gate reads it as invalid_shape. Keeping such a string byte for byte would need a JSON reader of our own and a lossless string type across the contracts (rejected for R2, the refusal leaves that door open: nothing is lost). Invariant of the boundary: callers pass JSON.stringify output only, which escapes a lone surrogate as \uXXXX; a raw JavaScript string handed to a wasm-bindgen &str parameter would be re-encoded with U+FFFD before the core sees it. The pretty_json proof op reads with serde_json directly and refuses such text as invalid_json.
  2. Drafts and the attachment's report are written in contract order instead of insertion order (D-R11); values unchanged, the N-1 reader parses them.
  3. An unreadable draft or archive is set aside under osteo:quarantine:* with the editor.draft_quarantined alert, instead of being dropped silently; a draft rebased with unresolved items keeps its raw text under osteo:quarantine:draft-pre-rebase. An unreadable draft goes there with the archive kept beside it, both or neither. A slot already holding another text is never replaced. Owner rule of 2026-10-14 (maintenance B): no session text is removed or overwritten implicitly when a save or a set-aside fails. Such a text stays in place and is held: nothing is opened over it (RestoreResult held: an unreadable draft, its companion archive, an unreadable archive, or the original of a draft to rebase), and the editor shows the resolution panel (download an exact copy, delete permanently or open the adapted version after a confirmation, retry). A new report or an import refuses to start (reason: 'held', alert, then the panel) while such a text is held, and first reads through the core any draft this page never opened: an unreadable one is set aside before the new session replaces it, a readable one is replaced as before. R3 final checks (2026-10-17): a draft the engine traps on (draft.restore answering internal, an out-of-memory trap on a very large draft) is held too, as the engine_failure row with its archive as companion (session.held.notice_engine), kept as is; the store remembers the (draft, archive) pair that trapped and answers held without calling the core again, from the editor, New report and Import alike (ActionResult.engine, alert session.held_blocked_engine), until the panel's "Réessayer" (retryTrapped) or a confirmed discard; other core failures keep their behaviour (core_unavailable: the reload screen). New report and the Home file pick ask first (ReplaceSessionDialog: cancel, open the bilan in progress, replace) whenever a report is in memory or a draft sits in the slot. The draft mirror is written only when the report changes (an unrelated store change never removes it); a refused write keeps the previous text and shows the editor.save_failed banner until a write succeeds; a refused archive write at a new session removes the replaced session's archive rather than leave it paired with the new draft, and shows the same banner (the tab's copy lacks it). The rescue download and the PDF export keep their object URL alive 30 s (WebKit cancels a download whose URL is revoked at once; both go through downloadBlob, apps/app/src/lib/download.ts).
  4. A core that cannot load leaves the editor on the degraded notice (before R2 a failed sheet chunk left it on "loading").
  5. Home and /new no longer load the sheet into memory on mount.
  6. Inputs the interface never produced get typed errors where the TypeScript would throw or corrupt a list (invalid_index on a move past the end, invalid_count beyond 65,535 vertebrae, unknown_*).
  7. A click on an existing spine zone no longer writes an identical observation back (the value is the same).
  8. The publish gate throws SheetPublishError with closed kinds (invalid_shape, not_publishable with the same message as before, validator_unavailable), never a raw ZodError.
  9. Superseded by item 3 (maintenance B, 2026-10-14): an unreadable draft that cannot be set aside shows the resolution panel, no longer the engine notice.

8.8 Residual risks

  • The import reads up to the 16 MiB attachment cap inside the long-lived instance (linear memory never shrinks) until R4 moves the reader into a terminated Web Worker.
  • No React error boundary: every core entry point catches, but an uncaught error elsewhere still blanks the page (unchanged since before R2).
  • The CSP proof runs Chromium only (no Firefox or WebKit build on this machine): the owner's manual run of the image on other browsers and the phone covers Safari and Firefox.
  • The module grows with each phase (340 KB of the 600 KB budget at R2; the url crate's IDNA tables are part of it): R3/R4 must keep measuring.
  • The quarantine slots (osteo:quarantine:*) keep verbatim copies of drafts (practitioner, owner and animal data) until the tab closes, the same exposure as osteo:draft itself (sessionStorage, tab and origin scoped); nothing clears them on a new report, by design (they exist to survive it). They have no interface yet: the practitioner cannot see or download a set-aside text, and it disappears when the tab closes (owner decision 2026-10-14: follow-up, not part of the maintenance fix).
  • "New report" from Home replaces the tab's readable draft without asking, as before R2 (a single draft per tab, the PDF is the saved copy); the maintenance fix only guards texts that are unreadable or held.
  • Base images by tag, the new rust:1.99.0-bookworm included (digest pinning is the Step 27 follow-up of R0).
  • The documented CSP refuses the footer's external credit logo (img-src), an older matter seen by the proof.

9. R3: the anatomy core in Rust, drawn by the editor canvas (2026-10-15)

Plan and contract: .claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-14-rust-r3-anatomy-core.md (revision 2 after three plan challenges, 32 findings folded). Status: validated by the owner's LAN acceptance (functional and graphical) and merged into develop on 2026-10-17. Residual risks are tracked in the project's blocker registry (BLK-011, BLK-012).

9.1 What runs in Rust, and who calls it

Former TypeScript Rust (crates/core/src/anatomy) Consumer
apps/app/src/anatomy/drawing.ts denylist + DOMParser parse of the asset (deleted) svg/{prescan,tree,sanitize,refs,number,serialize}.rs, svg::read_svg the sheet load (LoadedSheet, each drawing read once)
packages/anatomy/src/render/layer.ts (renderAnnotationLayer, viewBoxOf) layer.rs view.canvas; the highlight
the canvas composition of drawing.ts (fresh root, viewBox rules, layer last) compose.rs compose_canvas view.canvas → SheetIndex.canvasSvg → AnatomyCanvas
packages/anatomy/src/render/compose.ts (composeViewSvg, highlightLayer, halo) compose.rs compose_highlight none yet: proven against the engine (O3), wired at R4 in R4's snapshot-based call
packages/pdf/src/svg/sanitize.ts allowlist and value rules svg/sanitize.rs (same lists, same rules, declared additions 9.4) the canvas now; the engine keeps its TypeScript copy until R4

One facade operation on the sheet handle: view.canvas { viewId } → { svg }, failures unknown_view, no_asset, svg_rejected (reason in detail: too_large, doctype, malformed, not_svg, too_many_elements, too_deep, too_many_uses, too_complex, reference_cycle, or removed <names> when the allowlist would take something out of a product drawing), invalid_character. The result is constant for a loaded sheet: SheetIndex memoises it per view; AnatomyCanvas parses it with DOMParser, imports it and restyles data-state in place as before.

9.2 The SVG reader (read_svg)

  1. Bounds before any parser (prescan.rs, a markup state machine: comments, CDATA, PIs and quoted values skipped by the grammar, each closer searched after its whole opener so <!--> cannot hide markup, no regex): 2 MiB, a leading BOM refused, <!DOCTYPE/<!ENTITY anywhere, depth 64, 20,000 elements, 256 attributes per element and 100,000 in all, 16 namespace declarations, 100,000 raw < and 200,000 raw =. Reason: roxmltree 0.21.1 builds its tree recursively (measured: a 1 MiB stack overflows between 1,000 and 3,000 nesting levels; the iterative fix is unreleased), and it pre-allocates on the raw </= counts, checks duplicate attributes quadratically and copies inherited namespaces per declaring element.
  2. roxmltree 0.21.1 (DTD refused, node limit 200,000 as a backstop) into the core's own tree, names as written (the allowlist matches qualified names like the engine).
  3. The allowlist (sanitize.rs): the engine's 28 elements, 74 attributes, 27 presentation attributes and value rules (no backslash, every url( local, href to #id only, style without forbidden tokens or functions, the stdDeviation clamp with JavaScript Number() reproduced by hand), and the <use> count cap 256.
  4. The reference graph (refs.rs): tree edges plus every href/xlink:href and url(#id) to the first element of that id; a cycle is refused, and so is an expanded size over 50,000 elements (each reference adds its target's expanded subtree, saturating, iterative, early exit).
  5. The serialiser (serialize.rs): XML 1.0, & < > " and \t \n \r as references in attributes, & < > and \r in text; a re-read gives the same tree. A composed view over 4 MiB is refused.

9.3 Proofs and tests (oracles frozen with the TypeScript first)

  • O1 (apps/app/tests/fixtures/goldens/r3/canvas.*.json, 47c5f49): the canvas tree of each view and the layer of 14 state sets per view (the three reference reports). Green on the Rust composition in cargo (tests/anatomy_compose.rs), in the app suite on the mounted canvas (canvas.trees.test.tsx) and in Chromium 156 on the live page (scripts/visual-canvas.mjs dom): equal for both views.
  • O2 (oracles/r3/layer.json): 8 layer trees with attribute order (draft + an edge document: twin radius floor, 1e+21, path geometry, circle trigger without a name, colour fallback, laterality): exact, order included.
  • O3 (oracles/r3/highlight.json): 36 highlighted compositions (every observation and view of the three reports, an existing nested <defs>, a detail view with its own asset and no viewBox): tree-equal.
  • O4/O5 (oracles/r3/sanitiser.json): 42 hostile files (tests/fixtures/svg/hostile) and 10 generated cases: equal to the TypeScript verdict or a declared one (9.4); the 4 product SVGs (horse drawing, partner logo, 2 public logos) untouched, tree-equal. Mutation checks run on the oracle tests (a cap, the namespace rule, the twin floor, the halo placement): each mutant failed the suite.
  • Security audit pass 1: PASS with one MEDIUM in the prescan (a closer searched from inside its own opener: <!--> let crafted markup hide 5,000 nesting levels or 3,000 attributes, then roxmltree overflowed the stack), fixed with regression cases in cargo and through the shipped wasm; two LOW (Unicode-spaced href, root painting attributes) fixed the same way. Pass 2 on the fix: PASS (about 4 million differential documents, prescan against roxmltree: no undercount, no cap breach, no stack overflow on a 64 KiB stack; the old desync and its variants answer too_deep on the shipped module); its LOW (the same Unicode-space tolerance inside url() fixed.
  • Shipped wasm (packages/core-wasm/tests/anatomy.test.ts): the corpus plus floods (99,000 nesting levels, 20,001 nodes, 150,000 < in a comment, 257 attributes, 2 MiB + 1, a 12 × 20 <use> chain, 1.9 MiB of >), each in a fresh instance (50 cases): a closed outcome, no trap, slowest 24 to 37 ms over runs, largest linear memory growth 10.1 MiB.
  • Runtime: the SheetHandle constructor's closed refusal (<kind>: <detail> from a plain Error) is invalid_sheet; any other throw (RangeError, InternalError, a trap) poisons the instance (runtime.test.ts).
  • Visual, Chromium 156 (scripts/visual-canvas.mjs): 30 captures before (TypeScript canvas) and after (Rust), desktop 1280 × 800 and phone 390 × 844, no selection, each demo observation active, hover, main and head: 30/30 pixel-identical. The method's own noise floor: two captures of the same build 30/30 identical; its classifier flags a 10 × 10 change as a regression and a one-pixel edge nudge as anti-aliasing.
  • The Step 6 goldens (39) and the seed and review-drawing goldens are untouched: the engine and the pipeline still run the TypeScript renderer.

9.4 Behaviour differences (declared; none touches a product SVG)

  1. An element outside the SVG namespace is removed (<path xmlns="…">), and xlink:href must be in the xlink namespace whatever its prefix.
  2. Comments and processing instructions are dropped; non-whitespace text is kept only in title/desc, each at most 4 KiB (longer: refused whole).
  3. The root loses class and style (an inline SVG lives under the page's CSS: class="fixed inset-0 …" would cover the application) and transform, filter, mask, clip-path (they can paint outside the canvas box); an id outside [A-Za-z_][\w.:-]* is removed; an href is local only when it reads #name once ASCII whitespace is stripped, as the URL parser strips it (the TypeScript also trimmed Unicode spaces, so a no-break space before #a passed and resolved as a relative URL); inside url( only CSS whitespace is skipped before #, for the same reason.
  4. A reference cycle, an expansion over 50,000 elements, and the floods of 9.2 step 1 are refused; the TypeScript accepted them (size counted on the raw text, refused subtrees included).
  5. A product drawing the allowlist would alter is refused at sheet load for the views on that asset (svg_rejected, removed …); the TypeScript canvas dropped such parts silently.
  6. A label or path the document holds with a code point XML 1.0 cannot carry is refused (invalid_character); the DOM path drew it.
  7. When the canvas cannot be drawn, it says why, inside the canvas (owner decision 2026-10-15): the engine did not run (core_unavailable, internal: the existing sheet.core_unavailable notice with "Réessayer", the retry builds again on a fresh instance), the engine stopped after its three recoveries (CoreRuntime.stopped: no retry anywhere; the canvas shows the stopped text, and CoreStoppedNotice sits in the editor's banner slot in place of the storage-full text, at the top of Home and New report, and replaces the full-page CoreUnavailable retry. Two variants: the tab's copy of the report is saved, core.stopped with "Recharger la page"; the tab's storage refused the last write (saveFailed), core.stopped_unsaved with "Télécharger une copie" (the in-memory report as JSON, no engine needed), never the reload button. Action, export, import and new-report alerts say the same text instead of "try again"; "Réessayer" on the canvas restarts the engine before building again) or the view itself cannot be drawn (svg_rejected, no_asset, unknown_view, invalid_character, a parse failure: the canvas.view_unavailable notice, no retry since nothing would change). The technical kind and detail stay in the core's outcome and the DEV console; the refused drawing and the session are left as they are. Before R3 a failure there left the canvas blank (an uncaught error).
  8. A trigger without a name carries the opened view's name in each language (owner decision 2026-10-15: until then both name attributes and its title held the French name). Display only; the frozen oracles stay as frozen and the tests apply this declared change before comparing.
  9. R3 final checks (owner decisions 2026-10-17). The rescue copy (the "Télécharger une copie" JSON, byte format of osteo:draft) is importable: the Home picker accepts it beside the PDF, routed by content from the first KiB (%PDF- goes the PDF path), refused above MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES, decoded as strict UTF-8, read by the core's draft.restore (no archive) and opened like an import; a copy the core refuses is home.import.error_invalid_copy (file and session untouched), a rebased one shows editor.draft_rebased. The copy lacks the archive envelope, which the original PDF keeps. A draft that traps the engine opens the resolution panel and is read once (§8.7 item 3); importing the copy of a trapping draft runs the same input again.

9.5 Measurements

Measure Value
shipped module 1,188,310 B raw, 395,613 B gzip -9 at 23895b9 (+55.7 KB over R2; budget 600 KB; the app image's build root gives 395,541 B)
sheet handle with the drawing read (Node) 8 to 10 ms
view.canvas main, first (Node) 1.2 to 1.4 ms; head warm median 0.85 ms; 143 KiB of SVG
Chromium, preview build, CPU × 4, medians of 3 editor to canvas 503 ms (476 ms before R3); detail open 143 ms (125 ms before R3, runs 109 to 157); browser parse + import of the canvas text 21 ms (22 ms)
50 detail open/close cycles, CPU × 4 JS heap +0.72 MiB (+0.89 MiB before R3), DOM nodes +0 (+0)

9.6 TypeScript deleted, kept

  • Deleted: the canvas denylist sanitizeSvg, parseDrawing, the parse cache, assetOfView, the states input of the canvas build, the assets field of SheetIndex, the app's dependency on @faunosteo/anatomy.
  • Kept, with their consumers: packages/anatomy/src/render/** (PDF engine until R4, curation pipeline until R5), packages/pdf/src/svg/** (engine until R4), the R3 oracle generators (packages/anatomy/tests/ r3.layer-oracles.test.ts, packages/pdf/tests/r3.{highlight,sanitiser}- oracles.test.ts: they still pass on the TypeScript and keep the freeze honest until R4/R5).

9.7 Residual risks

  • The engine (PDF) still sanitises with the TypeScript allowlist and has no reference budget: the <use> expansion gate of PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING.md §5 is met in the core, closed for the PDF path only when R4 switches it.
  • roxmltree's recursion: safe behind the prescan depth cap (differentially fuzzed, 9.3); pin the release with the iterative parser when it ships.
  • References are checked inside one drawing; in the page #id resolves against the whole document (the detail modal imports a second copy of the drawing, as before R3). Drawings with their own assets (Step 13) should get ids scoped per view before external uploads are drawn.
  • Firefox and WebKit: not run here (no browser build); the owner's LAN run on the phone covers WebKit.
  • The worker's TLS path has not run against a real HTTPS endpoint (every run targets the local stack over HTTP): exercise it before the deployment that needs it.
  • WASM budget: 396 KB of 600 KB used; R4 adds the PDF reader and writer.

10. R4: the PDF core in Rust (R4.1 freeze 2026-10-18, export and report:compare switched 2026-10-19, closed and merged 2026-10-21: §10.15)

Plan and contract: .claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-17-rust-r4-pdf-core.md (revision 2, validated by the owner 2026-10-18 with the conditions of its §A.6). Branch feature/rust-r4-pdf-core, cut from develop at 66909b6. §10.1 and §10.2 record what R4.1 froze and the TypeScript baselines every later slice was measured against; the slices follow in order, §10.15 is the close.

10.1 R4.1: what is frozen, and where (no Rust yet)

Every oracle below was generated by the TypeScript code at the commits listed, behind MAKE_R4_ORACLES=1; without the flag the same test asserts equality with the committed file. None of them is regenerated without the owner (plan §B.5.1). The Step 6, R2 and R3 goldens and the R3 oracles are byte-identical to develop (git diff --stat develop..HEAD on those paths is empty).

Oracle Content Files Commit
O11, O13 frozen TS attachment scanner as the N-1 PDF reader (6 tests); synthetic reports L (60 observations, 120 views) and CAP (500, 1,000) packages/core-wasm/tests/n-1/scanner/, apps/app/tests/fixtures/r4/reports/{L,CAP}.json 7ecbee9
O8 differential tolerance corpus on the full R3 import path, 51 PDFs with the outcome and message of today crates/core/tests/oracles/r4/tolerance.json, apps/app/tests/fixtures/pdf/r4/tolerance/ 7a42979
O1, O2, O3 12 draw logs (every text, image, line, rectangle, link at full precision); 12 R3-build PDFs plus the real-raster export of v2full observation 1 (two PNGs and a manifest) and the store-path PDF with its report; 3 pre-R2 envelope PDFs apps/app/tests/fixtures/goldens/r4/draw.*.json, apps/app/tests/fixtures/pdf/r3/, apps/app/tests/fixtures/pdf/step6/envelope.*.pdf 87b8873
O7, O9 155 reader inputs as bytes with their outcome (regex-semantics rows included); 24 zlib framing inputs, 26 verdict rows of inflateFlate in Node crates/core/tests/oracles/r4/{read,inflate}.json, apps/app/tests/fixtures/pdf/r4/{read,inflate}/ 96df15e
O4, O5, O6 text (measure 8 rows with units per glyph and a 200-row width sample, wrapLines 5, safeText 2, upper 4), AFM widths of Helvetica, Helvetica-Bold and Times-Roman over WinAnsi, dates (grid of 4 locales × forms, 22 others), 108 PNG gate and decode cases over 103 files crates/core/tests/oracles/r4/{text,afm,dates,png}.json, crates/core/tests/fixtures/png/r4/ 516342b
O10 230 report:compare invocations over 14 scenarios, 72 rows declared r4Declared; the test ledger crates/core/tests/oracles/r4/compare/, crates/core/tests/pdf/LEDGER.tsv, scripts/r4-ledger.mjs 4bdfda5
O9 browsers, O12 O9 verdicts in Chromium, Firefox and WebKit; the browser harness and the TS baselines of 10.2 crates/core/tests/oracles/r4/inflate.browsers.json, scripts/browser/ 4439fd2

Ledger (crates/core/tests/pdf/LEDGER.tsv): 299 TypeScript cases at the freeze, 150 ported, 28 replaced, 88 kept, 33 deleted; the census check of plan §B.6 runs from R4.2 on.

Weight added to the repository by the freeze: 421 blobs, 11.63 MB raw, 5.92 MB stored (plan §A.2 OD-7 said about 5 MB; the overshoot is the real-raster set and the browser results file, 0.65 MB raw, 45 KB stored). .gitleaks.toml allowlists one generated file, compare/compare.json, whose fixture names contain key next to sha256 digests.

Findings of the freeze, each one a declared difference or a port constraint for the later slices (none changes the TypeScript):

  • UPNG deviates from the PNG specification on two inputs (interlaced filter-3 first row; 16-bit grey tRNS alpha offset); the gate accepts a palette image without PLTE and pdf-lib then throws; raster-bad-adler is refused by the gate but UPNG decodes it. R4.4 follows the oracles.
  • safeText maps U+0178 to ydieresis (159) and drops the soft hyphen; numberToString(1e-7) gives 0.00000009999999999999999; formatDate("0000-01-01") gives « 1 janvier 1900 » (years 0 to 99, arbitration A3: unchanged).
  • O8: the decoy-first attachment that R3 imports will be refused by R4 (OD-4 class, to present before the switch); an invalid byte between tokens, a /V number followed by a string and a depth of 65 all give attachment_stripped today.
  • The APAFML notice is not in @pdf-lib/standard-fonts; R4.4 decides the AFM source.
  • The zlib-dependent verdicts of O9 depend on Node's bundled zlib (1.3.2.1); the browser columns agree on every row (10.2).

10.2 TypeScript baselines (2026-10-18, scripts/browser/results/2026-10-18-ts-baseline.json)

Harness: scripts/browser/ (README there), Playwright 1.64.0 outside the repository, build SHEET_BUNDLE=draft at 87b8873 (the app, engine and module sources are identical at 516342b, the recorded HEAD), served on 127.0.0.1 with the DEPLOY.md CSP plus 'wasm-unsafe-eval', locale fr. Engines: Chromium headless shell 156.0.8078.4, Firefox 157.0, WebKit 27.2 (WPE MiniBrowser); none is a branded browser or a phone. Host: i7-11700B, 15.1 GB RAM, 8.4 GB available at start, no CPU throttling.

The 4 GiB RSS watchdog is not a guaranteed memory limit. It samples the browser's process tree every 50 ms, so a faster allocation can overshoot before the kill; summed VmRSS counts shared pages once per process; a process outside the tree is not seen. It keeps the shared host away from the kernel OOM killer; stopped_by_ceiling is a recorded result.

Export (TS engine). Medians over 3 runs, range in brackets; CAP one run. "PNG blobs" counts every blob the rasteriser encoded, the first being the partner SVG logo; the time runs on the page clock from the click to the PDF Blob's object URL.

Engine Report Outcome Export s PDF MB PNG blobs View PNG sum MB View PNG KB Stopped at
Chromium demo downloaded 1.4 (1.4–1.4) 2.7 8 3.7 508–614
Chromium L downloaded 19.4 (19.4–19.5) 41.9 121 65.8 508–614
Chromium CAP stopped_by_ceiling 4,102 MB at 101 s, ≥ 857 PNGs
Firefox demo downloaded 1.6 (1.6–1.8) 2.7 8 3.2 462–492
Firefox L downloaded 35.3 (24.8–37.0) 42.1 121 56.0 462–492
Firefox CAP stopped_by_ceiling 4,111 MB at 73 s, ≥ 577 PNGs
WebKit demo downloaded 2.6 (2.6–2.6) 2.4 8 2.4 345–371
WebKit L downloaded 52.2 (52.2–52.2) 36.8 121 42.1 345–371
WebKit CAP stopped_by_ceiling 4,101 MB at 384 s, ≥ 973 PNGs

Export memory, MB. "Summed" is the browser tree, "Content" the content processes. "Settled": forced GC through CDP plus 1 s in Chromium, 5 s idle in Firefox and WebKit; the PDF Blob is still alive through its object URL for 30 s (download.ts), so "after" includes it.

Engine Report Summed before / peak / after Content before / peak / after JS heap before → after (CDP)
Chromium demo 473 / 640 (626–642) / 499 155 / 313 / 171 7.4 → 9.4
Chromium L 475 / 1,128 (1,110–1,137) / 566 158 / 805 (787–814) / 201 8.1 → 11.1
Chromium CAP 502 / 4,102 (stop) / – 182 / 3,751 / – 13.2 → –
Firefox demo 778 / 974 / 815 152 / 359 / 228
Firefox L 791 / 1,932 (1,929–1,998) / 943 160 / 1,351 (1,346–1,420) / 327
Firefox CAP 834 / 4,111 (stop) / – 198 / 3,522 / –
WebKit demo 499 / 815 / 778 306 / 617 / 581
WebKit L 512 / 1,370 (1,368–1,471) / 743 316 / 1,157 (1,154–1,209) / 510
WebKit CAP 574 / 4,101 (stop) / – 375 / 3,895 / –

What the export rows say for the plan: CAP (1,000 views) does not complete in any engine under 4 GiB with the TS engine, as §B.4 predicted; L costs 0.8 to 1.35 GB of content-process peak; browser PNGs are 0.35 to 0.61 MB per view (WebKit about 40 % smaller than Chromium, hence the PDF sizes), against the 0.54 MB resvg figure of §B.4.

Import (TS reader), 226 files × 3 engines (678 runs), a fresh context per file; the duration runs on the Node clock from the file being set to the first of editor, alert or inline error. No file gets a different outcome or message in any engine. Every v2, v3, step6 and R3 PDF opens the editor in 39 to 112 ms. The largest growth is tolerance/values-1m.pdf (+105 / +153 / +102 MB summed); the slowest inputs are the 20 to 50 MiB generated ones (170 to 309 ms, all error_no_attachment). Chromium shows one long task on 9 files (52 to 173 ms), all among the 10 to 50 MiB inputs, values-1m and 612-leaves; Firefox and WebKit do not expose long tasks.

Engine Group (files) Outcome Duration ms median (range) Max summed RSS growth MB Max content growth MB
Chromium base (3) / r3 (14) / step6 (3) editor 53 / 63 / 61 28 / 44 / 39 23 / 38 / 33
Chromium tolerance (51) editor 33, error 18 57 (23–122) 105 99
Chromium read (155) editor 23, error 132 66 (22–309) 75 68
Firefox base / r3 / step6 editor 39 / 73 / 69 63 / 54 / 52 14 / 33 / 32
Firefox tolerance / read as Chromium 53 (25–153) / 78 (25–286) 153 / 86 131 / 61
WebKit base / r3 / step6 editor 52 / 62 / 66 52 / 54 / 53 50 / 52 / 51
WebKit tolerance / read as Chromium 59 (23–141) / 75 (22–238) 102 / 101 100 / 99

O9 in the browsers: the 26 rows give the same verdict in Chromium 156, Firefox 157 and WebKit 27.2 as in Node 24.21.0 (8 non-null, 18 null).

Not measured: CAP export time and PDF size (ceiling first); JS heap in Firefox and WebKit (CDP is Chromium only, and Chromium's figure leaves out ArrayBuffer memory); memory after an import settles (the §B.3 check belongs to the R4 worker proof); real browsers and phones (J1 and the owner's iPhone run). Seen on every page: the known img-src refusal of the footer's external credit logo; no script or wasm violation.

10.3 R4.2: the reader in Rust (2026-10-18, no import switched yet)

What runs in Rust (crates/core/src/pdf, feature pdf-read, enabled by the wasm facade, never by the worker): the byte scan of scan.ts (read/scan.rs, strings.rs, stamp.rs, the JavaScript regex semantics reproduced by hand and pinned by the semantics.* rows of O7), the inflation on miniz_oxide (read/inflate.rs, non-wrapping output buffer growing to the limit plus one, trailing bytes refused, Adler-32 checked: the verdicts of DecompressionStream), the JavaScript-path side effects of the probe (json_js.rs: TextDecoder parity with one BOM dropped, overflow to null, the lone surrogate neutralised for the probe only, the depth and value pre-scan), the probe itself (read/probe.rs, one 16 MiB budget shared by the candidates, a cancelled inflation not charged) and pdf::import::import_pdf, which hands the text to the unchanged R2 session import. On the facade: SheetHandle.import_pdf(bytes) with the kinds of PdfImportKind (ts-rs). Nothing in the application calls it yet (R4.3).

Parity (every suite green on the committed oracles, cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features pdf-read and the core-wasm Node suites):

Oracle Rust check Result
O7 findEmbeddedFiles, hasArchiveStamp, decodePdfString pdf_scan 144 PDF inputs, 178 candidates, 19 string rows, all equal
O9 and the O7 flate rows pdf_inflate 26 + 12 verdicts equal to Node; the browser columns agree on every row
TextDecoder lossy decode pdf_json_js on fixtures/pdf/r4/utf8-lossy.json (400 cases, scripts/r4-utf8-oracle.mjs) 0 difference
O7 locateAttachment, readAttachedDocument, readReportArchive pdf_import 144 inputs equal (candidate, name, offset, bytes digest, parsed-object digest; origin, counters, snapshot rejection, report digest)
O8, the full R3 import path, 51 PDFs pdf_import natively and pdf-import.test.ts through the shipped module 47 equal, 4 declared differences below
Reference PDFs (Step 5, Step 6, R3, O2) pdf-import.test.ts every one imports

Declared differences, all on hostile files (plan §A.3):

  • OD-4, three O8 cases (surrogate-content-overwritten, surrogate-version-overwritten, two-files-decoy-first): the text holds a lone UTF-16 surrogate escape in a value that a later duplicate key overwrote. JSON.parse kept the last value, so the stringified object the core received no longer held the escape and R3 imported the file; the core refuses the text whole (lone_surrogate), nothing altered. Why the refusal is right: a Rust string cannot carry a lone surrogate, so reading such a text means either altering it silently (L1 forbids it) or reading only the parts that happen to survive duplicate-key resolution, which is reading a document other than the one in the file. In two-files-decoy-first R3 did not import the real envelope at all: it imported the decoy (conclusion « Leurre ») that sorted first. No legitimate Faunosteo document is affected: every PDF the product wrote comes from JSON.stringify of one object, which never emits a duplicate key, and a lone surrogate in a kept value is already refused by R3 (error_lone_surrogate); the proof is the O2, O3, O7 and Step 5 reference set above, imported identically, and the O8 corpus where the only lone-surrogate cases that import in R3 are the three duplicate-key constructions.
  • OD-3, one O8 case (values-1m): over the value cap (below). It is skipped like a candidate nested too deep, so the kind follows the stamp (attachment_stripped here, as depth-65 already answers in R3).
  • The archiveSha256 column of the O7 readReportArchive rows is not compared: the frozen TS domain stringified its Zod output, keys in schema order, where the core keeps the document's order (R2); the R3 application stored the core's form, which O8 pins and matches.

Memory protections (OD-3), measured in the shipped module, one fresh instance per case (packages/core-wasm/tests/pdf-import.budget.test.ts, R4_BUDGET_ALL=1 for the slow classes; values from cargo test --test pdf_budget -- --nocapture):

Document Bytes Values (json_js::prescan)
demo fr logos (R3 export) 305,938 2,559
v2full fr logos (R3 export) 298,035 2,232
612 leaves (O7 export) 739,316 23,803
L envelope (60 observations, 120 views, logos) 403,016 6,740
CAP envelope (500 observations, 1,000 views, logos) 1,164,658 39,652
hostile values-1m.pdf 2,006,973 1,000,364

The parser's tree costs about 100 bytes of linear memory per value (the final Vec doubling included). Cap off, a 16 MiB token-dense document (8.4 million values) takes 784 MiB of linear memory and 0.9 s in Node, what BLK-012 observed; every shape tried (numbers, empty strings, nesting at the depth cap, the rescue copy) lands at the same 784 MiB, under the 1 GiB ceiling, so the cap is the guard and the ceiling the backstop.

Thresholds set (to confirm before R4.3):

  • json_js::MAX_JSON_VALUES = 400,000, ten times the CAP envelope (the plan's rule), 17 times the 612-leaf export; applied in the attachment probe and in draft.restore (the rescue copy and the tab's draft: an over-budget text is invalid, set aside verbatim, never dropped). Worst case left: about 40 MiB of tree on top of the file copy.
  • --max-memory 1 GiB on the module (.cargo/config.toml): an allocation past it traps (allocate_for_test on the proofs build: 256 MiB returns, 1,100 MiB throws RuntimeError), and CoreRuntime poisons and re-creates the instance as for any trap. The ceiling applies to the export too; the R4.6 measurements must stay well below it (CAP export estimated at about 0.4 GB in §B.4).

Per class, cap on (Node, i7-11700B, shipped module; "linear" is the instance's growth, which never shrinks; "RSS" the Node process):

Case Outcome ms Linear MiB Node RSS MiB
L envelope (394 KB) ok 11 0.6 0.4
CAP envelope (1,138 KB) ok 40 10.0 14.9
demo fr logos (R3 export, 237 KB) ok 7 0.0 1.3
612 leaves (O7 export) ok 23 2.8 5.4
values-1m (O8 hostile, 2 MB attachment) attachment_stripped 11 3.1 3.0
16 MiB dense numbers (8.4 M values) attachment_stripped 103 16.1 16.0
16 MiB dense strings (5.6 M values) attachment_stripped 85 16.1 16.0
16 MiB at depth 64 attachment_stripped 92 16.1 16.0
16 MiB dense numbers as a rescue copy invalid 152 48.1 80.1
16 MiB at depth 65 as a rescue copy invalid 128 48.1 80.3
16 MiB inflation (zeros, not JSON) attachment_stripped 14 31.3 31.0
16 MiB + 1 inflation (bomb, refused) attachment_stripped 19 63.4 47.0
32 bombs (17 MiB each) before the attachment attachment_stripped 181 63.9 47.5
50 MiB file, attachment at the end no_attachment 73 50.0 50.0

Same classes, cap off: values-1m 109 ms and 98 MiB; the three 16 MiB documents 0.6 to 0.9 s and 784 MiB; the rescue copy 0.4 s and 792 MiB. W4 (≤ 256 MiB linear on every hostile class) holds with the cap on; the 16 MiB file copy and the inflation buffer dominate what is left.

Module: 1,251,849 B raw, 421,940 B gzip -9 (W1: +26 KB over R3, budget 600 KB, report line 550 KB).

Residual risks and open points for the owner (R4.2 checkpoint):

  • The thresholds above are set from fixtures at the collection caps; a report far denser than CAP per observation (hundreds of findings on each of 500 observations) would be refused as a hostile file. 400,000 values is 17 times the densest export seen (612 leaves on one observation).
  • The ceiling is a module-wide constant: it bounds the import worker and the main instance alike. If an R4.6 export measurement approaches it, the value must be revisited, never the cap.
  • The Node numbers measure the module, not a browser: the browser run of the same classes (content-process RSS, worker terminated, GC) is in 10.4.
  • Found by the independent security gate of R4.2 and fixed (593893a): the value count stopped at the depth cap, so a rescue copy nested 65 deep hid its 8 million values from the budget (792 MiB built, the cap-off figure). The count now runs to the end whatever the depth verdict, and the budget covers the archive text of draft.restore too. Reported, not blocking: the TypeScript import path and archive.import carry no budget until R4.3 replaces them (BLK-012, pre-existing); a 50 MiB file with 32 stream heads walks its whitespace 32 times (783 ms against 269 ms, bounded by MAX_CANDIDATES, as the TypeScript); the inflation buffer's capacity reaches 2 × limit during its last growth (the 63 MiB row); the 50 MiB size check runs after the glue copied the bytes, so the main thread's pre-check must stay on the R4.3 worker path.
  • The probe parses the candidate twice (version check, then the session), as the TypeScript did; the peak is one tree since the first is dropped. A single parse would need the gated session reader to take a value.

10.4 R4.2: the Rust import in the browsers (2026-10-18, scripts/browser/results/2026-10-18-r4-import.json)

Harness scripts/browser/r4-import.mjs (README there): the shape plan §B.1.5 gives the application at R4.3, a module worker created for one import, the compiled WebAssembly.Module posted by the main thread, the File read in the worker, one SheetHandle.import_pdf, the worker terminated; the same 226 files, engines, groups and RSS metrics as the TypeScript baseline of 10.2 (compare-imports.mjs prints both side by side). Chromium 156 headless shell, Firefox 157, WebKit 27.2 (WPE), headless only; the 4 GiB RSS watchdog is not a guaranteed memory limit. Module ba070c29…, 1,252,727 B, memory maximum 16,384 pages (1 GiB).

Agreement: 666 of 678 (engine, file) pairs give the same outcome as the TS import (editor ↔ ok, error ↔ a failure kind). The 12 others are the four declared files in each engine: values-1m (OD-3), surrogate-content- overwritten, surrogate-version-overwritten, two-files-decoy-first (OD-4). Mapped to the §B.1.8 messages, no other difference.

Legitimate groups, TS → Rust (median ms on the Node clock, with the Rust page clock after the slash; max RSS growth MiB summed / content):

Engine base r3 step6 tolerance read
Chromium ms 53 → 65 / 32 63 → 80 / 43 61 → 65 / 41 57 → 63 / 31 66 → 68 / 29
Chromium MiB 28 / 23 → 17 / 15 44 / 38 → 16 / 16 39 / 33 → 17 / 17 105 / 99 → 18 / 16 75 / 68 → 117 / 115
Firefox ms 39 → 67 / 22 73 → 55 / 30 69 → 54 / 28 53 → 46 / 21 78 → 45 / 21
Firefox MiB 63 / 14 → 52 / 9 54 / 33 → 60 / 35 52 / 32 → 52 / 26 153 / 131 → 58 / 35 86 / 61 → 154 / 127
WebKit ms 52 → 45 / 25 62 → 55 / 37 66 → 50 / 33 59 → 44 / 26 75 → 43 / 24
WebKit MiB 52 / 50 → 61 / 59 54 / 52 → 71 / 67 53 / 51 → 60 / 59 102 / 100 → 70 / 67 101 / 99 → 324 / 299

The durations are not strictly like for like: the TS baseline ran the whole application (the core loads during the import), the Rust page compiles the module at page load (8 to 25 ms) and builds a SheetHandle per import (about 21 ms in Chromium). The hostile tolerance group costs a fifth of the TS memory under Rust. The read group costs more: its 20 to 50 MiB inputs are held twice in the worker, the File's ArrayBuffer and the glue's copy in linear memory (54 MiB), and WebKit adds more on top (size-exactly-50mib: Chromium 117 against 56 MiB, Firefox 154 against 79, WebKit 324 against 76). R4.3 releases the buffer after the copy or reads the file in chunks. Chromium main-thread long tasks during the imports: 0 (W5).

Hostile classes, Rust (Chromium / Firefox / WebKit; linear memory is the instance's, the same in every engine; the GC delta is Chromium's content process after the worker is terminated and a GC forced):

Class Outcome Page ms Summed peak MiB Content peak MiB Linear MiB GC delta MiB
L envelope ok 46 / 36 / 45 4 / 11 / 9 6 / 9 / 7 4.6 11.7
CAP envelope ok 88 / 77 / 83 31 / 20 / 39 29 / 18 / 35 13.9 14.2
16 MiB dense numbers attachment_stripped 183 / 199 / 130 45 / 47 / 124 47 / 45 / 114 20.0 11.8
16 MiB dense strings attachment_stripped 153 / 188 / 122 43 / 48 / 122 47 / 45 / 113 20.0 11.1
16 MiB at depth 64 attachment_stripped 180 / 198 / 136 45 / 47 / 123 48 / 45 / 114 20.0 12.2
16 MiB rescue copy invalid 178 / 190 / 164 113 / 145 / 234 115 / 143 / 225 52.0 15.4
16 MiB inflation attachment_stripped 43 / 37 / 43 20 / 12 / 13 18 / 10 / 11 35.3 11.1
16 MiB + 1 bomb attachment_stripped 50 / 44 / 49 5 / 8 / 10 7 / 7 / 8 67.3 12.1
32 bombs attachment_stripped 218 / 221 / 203 68 / 64 / 81 66 / 61 / 77 67.9 12.6
50 MiB file no_attachment 176 / 217 / 127 113 / 115 / 317 115 / 113 / 295 53.9 11.3
  • W4: linear memory at most 67.9 MiB on every hostile class (budget 256).
  • The ceiling: in the three engines, allocate_for_test(256) returns and allocate_for_test(1100) throws RuntimeError (proofs build, linear 257 MiB). Cap off, the 16 MiB dense document reaches 788 MiB of linear memory and 817 to 851 MiB of content-process peak in about 1 s; with the cap, 45 to 114 MiB.
  • Worker start, median (max): Chromium 6.3 (40.6) ms, Firefox 10.0 (20.0), WebKit 5.0 (8.0). W2: the L envelope imports in 46 ms page-to-result in Chromium, CAP in 88 ms. The structured clone of the compiled Module works in the three engines (236 of 236 workers ready from the clone). No CSP violation in any page or worker under the production policy with 'wasm-unsafe-eval'.
  • The §B.3 "content process back within 10 MiB after GC" check is not met as written on a first import: 3 of 238 Chromium runs; the median delta is 11.7 MiB (7.3 to 13.3; hostile max 15.4). It is a one-time cost, not a leak: three imports in one page give +11.6, +1.9, −0.2 MiB (L) and +11.0, +1.4, +0.2 (dense); an empty module worker leaves about 2 MiB, an instantiated one 3.7, the cloned Module is not the cause (the same without it). Firefox and WebKit got 5 s idle only (indicative: Firefox +4.8 then flat, WebKit +24.5 / +43.2 then down to −3). Owner decision: the criterion counts the first import, or the growth per import.
  • Seen once in a WebKit smoke run before the full run: 2 of 3 repeated imports of the 16 MiB dense document ended with a worker error event, text not captured then; not reproduced in two targeted reruns nor in the full run (0 failures across 242 WebKit workers). Error text is captured now; to watch at J1.

Not measured: real devices and browsers (J1), forced GC in Firefox and WebKit, CPU throttling, the hostile classes on the TS side, the negative CSP proof (without the keyword), the application's own worker (R4.3).

10.5 R4.3: the import in a disposable worker (2026-10-18, application switched)

What runs where (apps/app/src/core/worker/, plan §B.1.5 with one amendment below): the page refuses up front when its own engine stopped, routes on the first KiB and checks the sizes as before, then creates a module worker (import.worker.ts, the glue bundled statically into a hashed /assets/ chunk that script-src 'self' allows), posts the task with the bundled sheet text and its runtime's compiled WebAssembly.Module (structured clone: 236 of 236 workers in R4.2e, every engine), reads the file in 1 MiB chunks with a BYOB reader and streams them to the worker (chunk / ack with the buffer transferred both ways: the page holds one chunk, the worker's FileBytes sink the only whole copy, no byte parsed on the page), posts end, and reads the first of result, failed, an error event (never masked), the start timer (10 s to ready), the task timer (20 s, paused while the page is hidden; the J1 hypothesis) or a cancel; the worker is terminated in every case. The worker answers ready, builds its SheetHandle, runs import_pdf_bytes or restore_copy_bytes (strict UTF-8, one BOM, the OD-3 budget) and answers the core's envelope; every throwable becomes one failed with its phase and kind. The page then loads its own index for hydrateImport, as before; a result is dropped when the session changed since the pick, leaving Home cancels the import, one import runs at a time, and the worker chunk is prefetched once the editor has loaded the engine so an offline import still starts.

Amendment to §B.1.5 item 3 ("the File itself, never read on the main thread"): the file is read on the page, chunk by chunk, because reading a file inside a WebKit worker costs about 180 MiB of content-process RSS whatever the method (arrayBuffer, default stream, BYOB; 14 MiB on the page, 13 to 15 in Chromium and Firefox workers), measured in R4.3a on a 50 MiB file: worker read 272 to 316 MiB against 76 for the TypeScript, page read feeding the worker's sink 106. The isolation stays: untrusted bytes are parsed in the worker only; the page moves buffers.

Messages (§B.1.8, OD-5), pinned on every file of the frozen corpora by routes.HomeRoute.messages.test.tsx through the real worker logic in-process: O8 51 PDFs (47 as R3, the four declared), the stored O7 inputs (over 130), the O2, O3 and Step 5 reference PDFs (editor), the 612-leaf export (editor); a worker trap, a timeout or a file the page cannot read is « Erreur de lecture du PDF. », a worker that cannot start is the engine message, and the page's own runtime stays ready after a worker trap. Suites: handler and client in-process (core.importWorker, core.importClient), the six existing Home / core-failure suites migrated to the real worker logic (53 cases, titles kept), 458 app tests.

Memory, large files (summed / content RSS growth MiB; TS reader · Rust, worker read, R4.3a page · Rust, page read, R4.3d application build):

File Chromium Firefox WebKit
50 MiB file (size-exactly-50mib) 56/55 · 65/66 · 75/73 79/59 · 67/65 · 103/78 76/60 · 272/251 · 145/126
32 MiB (32-raw-1mib-brackets) 46/40 · 48/48 · 75/70 53/52 · 49/47 · 88/62 50/39 · 185/170 · 124/112
20 MiB (32-open-streams) 27/26 · 38/36 · 61/55 26/25 · 35/34 · 63/44 35/28 · 127/116 · 96/88
10 MiB (one-10mib, opens) 58/53 · 26/26 · 35/33 61/38 · 26/25 · 58/36 79/73 · 81/74 · 76/72
16 MiB rescue copy (page) – · 33/33 · – – · 29/30 · – – · 133/124 · –
CAP envelope (page) – · 16/17 · – – · 19/16 · – – · 41/37 · –

The streaming sink removed the file's JavaScript copy; the page-side read brought WebKit from 272 to 145 MiB on a 50 MiB file (the probe without the application around it gave 106; the application build adds about 40, three samples 141 to 158). What remains in WebKit is its own cost of the module's linear memory (the sink alone, no file read, measured at 81 MiB for 55 MiB of linear memory) plus the worker; it cannot be removed without scanning the file without holding it, which the reader's contract (§B.1.2, one 16 MiB shared budget over candidates found anywhere in the file) does not allow cheaply. Note the 50 MiB cap is older than R4 (MAX_PDF_BYTES): an export of about 140 observations with rasters reaches it; L (121 views, 42 MB) imports.

Application build, the same 226 files and engines as the TypeScript baseline (R4.3d, scripts/browser/results/2026-10-18-r4-app-import.json, dist of e659924 built with SHEET_BUNDLE=draft; the hardenings of 8ddf185 are not in that build, they change no outcome): outcome and message identical on 666 of 678 pairs, the 12 others the four declared files; 0 page errors; W5: 0 Chromium long task over 50 ms (the TypeScript showed 91 and 173 ms); small files cost 25 to 35 ms more (the worker start and its sheet handle per import); the tolerance group costs half the TypeScript's memory. Duration medians, TS → Rust (ms): Chromium base 53 → 80, r3 63 → 100, step6 61 → 90, tolerance 57 → 82, read 66 → 75; Firefox 39 → 71, 73 → 107, 69 → 104, 53 → 79, 78 → 81; WebKit 52 → 80, 62 → 89, 66 → 91, 59 → 78, 75 → 77.

CSP (r4-app-csp.mjs): with the keyword the reference PDF opens the editor in the three engines (the known footer image violation only); without it, « Le moteur de lecture n'a pas pu être chargé. Réessayez l'import. » in the three engines, the button enabled again, no page error, every worker closed; Chromium and Firefox report the worker's wasm-eval refusal through report-uri, WebKit reports nothing for a worker.

Leak series on the application (R4.3d, content RSS, init = first import, then six imports of the same document with page.goto('/') and the replace dialog between them, 2 s idle each, 5 s at the end; init delta / growth over the last five / the same after the final idle, three repetitions): Chromium (forced GC) L 49 / 7.6, 9.7, 8.0 / 1.6, 3.6, 0.5; dense 10.6 / 2.1 ×3 / −0.6; copy 42 / 6.8, 11.0, 4.8 / −3.5, 1.1, −4.4, per-import deltas at or under 2 MiB after init. Firefox (idle only) L 72 / 42, 35, 44 / −5, −7, −13; dense 36 / 8.8, 9.1, 10.7 / −6; copy 60 / −2.6, 17.3, −5.0 / −21: a GC sawtooth reclaimed by the final reading, as its navigation-only control. WebKit (idle only) L 102 to 110 / 53, 67, 53 / 44, 65, 46; dense 44 / 38, 37, 34 / 40; copy 88 / 69, 35, 44 / 61, 35, 41: above the 10 MiB tolerance in every series, but the navigation-only control (same readings, no pick) grows 27 MiB too (about 5 MiB per same-tab navigation, the page cache), and a 12-import series on one page levels off at 365 to 382 MiB; a surplus over the control remains (about 2 MiB per import for the refused document, 6 for one that opens the editor) that cannot be called reclaimable without a forced GC. Twenty picks of the dense document on one WebKit Home page: 20 workers created and closed, 0 page error, content 330 → 379 MiB, peak 405.

Leak series (R4.3a measurement page, content RSS, init = first import): Chromium (GC forced) init 9 to 11 MiB, growth over the next five within ±0.5 on the three documents, three repetitions each; Firefox (idle only) init 5 to 7, swings of ±3 from its own GC timing, final idle delta 0; WebKit (idle only) init 17 to 38, the 16 MiB documents warm up in one or two steps (dense +17 to +20 once; copy +12 to +15 then +17 to +19) and drop 3 to 6 MiB at the fifth import, so the copy misses the 10 MiB window as written (+12.7 to +14.1 over the last five of six) while a 12-import series levels off (−2.3 over its last five). Twenty consecutive dense imports in WebKit: all refused, no worker error event (the one seen in an R4.2e smoke run did not reproduce).

J1 device run (2026-10-18, R4_J1.md, owner decisions BDR-059: both WebKit reserves accepted provisionally, PDF cap kept at 50 MiB): the owner reports the functional checks they executed on a computer as passed, no failure; iPhone / Safari iOS could not be run and is deferred, so it stays not tested and the final acceptance of R4.3 waits for it (OD-6). The browser and version, the checks covered, the timings (J1.8, J1.12) and the memory observations (J1.9, J1.10) are recorded in R4_J1_RESULTS.md as the owner confirms them. Headless engines never stand for Safari or a phone.

Residual risks and open points (R4.3, for the J1 checkpoint):

  • WebKit, 50 MiB file: 145 MiB of content growth against 76 for the TypeScript (BDR-058 gate "resolved or decided with numbers"): the owner decides between accepting it (an absolute peak of about 150 MiB, below the worker-read 324), lowering the PDF cap, or a streaming scanner later.
  • WebKit leak criterion: not demonstrable headless without a forced GC (above); the one-page series levels off; the device run at J1 gives the real signal (Safari's memory warning or a reload).
  • A hidden tab pauses the task timer by design (§B.1.5 item 3): a hostile file keeps the worker's CPU and up to about 51 MiB busy in the background until the tab is shown again; the core's own bounds (R4.2) are the only limit then.
  • The page reads the first KiB of the file to route it (unchanged since R3); nothing else of the file is parsed on the page.
  • The IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS 20 s and the 10 s start timer are hypotheses to confirm on the owner's devices (plan §B.3 rule).
  • The import is 25 to 35 ms slower on small files (worker start and sheet handle per import); posting the handle's work is not worth a shared worker, which would keep hostile memory alive between imports.
  • The TypeScript reader stays in packages/pdf until R4.8 (parity and the full switch); apps/app/src/pdf/import.ts is now used by tests only.

10.6 R4.4: the layout in Rust (2026-10-18, nothing wired yet)

What runs in Rust (crates/core/src/pdf/write, feature pdf-write, enabled by the wasm facade and linked into the module only once R4.5 and R4.6 call it; the shipped size is unchanged until then): the text rules of packages/pdf/src/text.ts and render/text.ts (text.rs: safe_text with the Cc, Cf, Zl and Zp classes frozen from V8 in O4, not Rust's tables; js_upper from the O4 runs and specials; js_trim and the JS \s set; measure = Σ (WX or 250) + KPX over WinAnsi bytes, then × size / 1000 in that order; wrap_lines with JS split(/\s+/) semantics, empty words included), the AFM metrics and Unicode tables generated from O5 and O4 by scripts/r4-afm-data.mjs (afm_data.rs, 82 KB, deterministic), the dates of render/dates.ts (dates.rs: Date.UTC with years 0 to 99 mapped to 1900 to 1999 as A3 keeps them, proleptic Gregorian, fr-FR and en-US long forms), the input checks of export.ts (input.rs: branding and labels through their schemas, the snapshot gate with every asset through the R3 SVG reader, sheet mismatch, 500 observations and 8 views per observation) and the four layouts (layout/{header,footer,observation,conclusion}.rs) into a DrawLog (draw_log.rs: every text, image, line, rectangle call with its arguments at full precision, per page with the footer last, the links by page, the images in embed order with their pixel size read from the PNG header; the PNG gate and decode are R4.5).

Parity (cargo, pdf_text and pdf_layout):

Oracle Check Result
O4 measure 2,333 rows × 3 fonts × 8 sizes 55,992 widths equal; 4,800 recorded widths bit for bit
O4 wrapLines 73 cases × 2 sizes × 8 widths 1,168 wraps equal
O4 safeText every code point 0..0x10FFFF (the 2,048 surrogates excepted: not a Rust char; their row is question) 79 ranges equal
O4 upper every scalar value 1,580 changed code points equal; Rust's to_uppercase (Unicode 17) agrees with V8 on all of them
O5 every WX by byte and every kerning pair equal; WinAnsi pairs: Helvetica 1,295, Helvetica-Bold 1,181, Times-Roman 986
O6 6,468 grid cells × 2 locales, 22 others equal (1,355 refused cells)
O1 12 runs (3 reports × 2 locales × 2 logo modes), inputs = the envelope of each run's own R3 PDF, rasters = the goldens' stubs 2,124 calls equal at full precision, embeds and links equal
Step 6 text.* and images.* 24 goldens derived from the log in the engine's global call order (page contents, then footers), two decimals equal

Subtleties the port had to carry: U+00AD is WinAnsi (hyphen) but Cf, so dropped, while U+00A0 is kept; kerning goes by glyph name, so bytes 32/160, 45/173 and 255/159 share their pairs; a leading or trailing whitespace run gives an empty word to the wrap, which joins as a trailing space when it fits; words are split on raw JS whitespace before safeText runs (U+200B is dropped but not \s); Date.UTC applies the leap rule to the mapped year (0000-02-29 is refused, 1900 is not leap); the first-page link order of the saved file is per page (header, then footer), whatever the call order; the Step 6 text golden is in global call order, footers after every page.

Declared differences: none in the oracles. The snapshot assets go through the R3 SVG reader where the TypeScript ran its sanitiser (declared at R3, RUST.md §9.4, plan §A.3): a foreign archive the sanitiser cleaned and the reader refuses is snapshot_invalid with the reader's reason in the detail (the detail reaches the DEV console only).

Cost (release build, i7-11700B): L (60 observations) 61 pages, 2,377 calls, 124 embeds, checks 1 ms, layout 3 ms; CAP (500 observations) 501 pages, 19,625 calls, 1,004 embeds, checks 1 ms, layout 24 ms (debug: 29 and 222 ms).

Residual risks and open points (R4.4):

  • The PNG header alone sizes an image (embedPng's width and height); the UPNG acceptance rules and the branding PNG gate (pngIssue) are R4.5, with the O6 PNG cases (108). A PNG the header reads and UPNG refuses is not detected before R4.5.
  • rasterSizeOf (the raster request size from a viewBox, JS Number semantics) and numberToString are pinned in O4 but ported at R4.5 / R4.6 with the content emitter and the session.
  • The module size impact of the writer is measured when R4.5 links it (W1, the afm_data tables are 82 KB of source, the compiled tables about 12 KB).

10.7 R4.5: the serialiser in Rust (2026-10-18, nothing wired yet)

What runs in Rust (crates/core/src/pdf/write, with R4.4's layout): the content-stream emitter (content.rs: pdf-lib 1.17.1's operator sequences for the four calls, its cleanText, 24 TL, upper-case hex text, the doubled m of a line, h f of a filled rectangle; numberToString with its e-N / e+N branches and V8's Math.pow(10, k) one-ULP quirk at k = 23 and 210; WinAnsi encoding), the PNG side (png.rs: the branding gate pngIssue in its order, and a decoder that reproduces UPNG's decode and toRGBA8 with the deviations the O6 oracle pinned: the Average first-row pre-pass at absolute offsets, the 16-bit grey tRNS key at off + x, the 16-bit high byte, palette tRNS by declared length; pdf-lib's alpha drop; caps checked before any allocation; crafted files refused where UPNG spun or threw), a minimal object writer (objects.rs: numbered objects, streams, a classic xref, pdf-lib's string forms: UTF-16BE hex with a BOM, D: dates, hex ASCII URIs), the serialiser (serialize.rs: catalog with the names tree and /AF, the page tree, three Type1 WinAnsiEncoding fonts, one image XObject per embed with a DeviceGray /SMask /Decode [0 1] when an alpha is below 255, Link annotations /Border [0 0 0], the Info dictionary with Producer and Creator Faunosteo, the Flate EmbeddedFile with Params and its Filespec in clear, per-page resources listing only the images the page draws) and the driver (export.rs: the R4.4 checks, the envelope as JSON.stringify(_, null, 2) under 16 MiB, the layout, the file, then the self-check: the file re-read by the R4 reader must carry the envelope it was written with; export_from_envelope). The facade gets export_pdf_for_test on the proofs build only; the application's session is R4.6, so the shipped module is unchanged (426 KB gzip) until then.

Deviation from the plan, declared: pdf-writer is not used. The document has a dozen object kinds; a writer of 150 lines spells every number through numberToString (the B5 f32 difference the plan allowed never arises), keeps the string forms and key order under our control and adds no dependency to the module.

Parity (cargo pdf_content, pdf_png, pdf_serialize; Node pdf-export.test.ts, pdf-export.ts-engine.test.ts):

Check Result
Content streams of the 12 R3 PDFs (60 pages, 224,534 bytes) from the O1 logs equal byte for byte, resource names renamed only
O4 numberToString 703 cases equal
O6 PNG: 108 rows (gate verdicts, decode planes, error rows) equal; the 50 hostile files UPNG never ran return in under 20 ms
O2, 14 runs (12 stub-raster, the real-raster v2full-obs1, the store path): content after B3 name resolution, image planes and SMasks, links (rect spellings and URIs), Info but Producer/Creator, attachment bytes (store path: values; D-R11 order) equal
qpdf --check, pdfdetach -list clean, osteo-report.json listed, 14 files
poppler 150 dpi, R3 against R4, every page 0 of 150,193,611 pixels differ (14 runs)
R4 PDF → Rust import = R3 PDF → Rust import; report value equal to the envelope's 14 runs
re-export from the envelope byte-identical to the first export
wasm (proofs build) output the native digests, 14 runs (goldens/r4/pdf.*.sha256)
frozen O11 scanner and N-1 Zod readers (the R3 build and 0.2.0) read every R4 PDF; a stripped R4 PDF answers attachment_stripped
the TypeScript engine's reader the R4 PDFs give the R3 outcome, 12 runs
E2 (file ≤ R3 + 5 %) 12 runs: smaller every time
export-side security hostile SVG asset snapshot_invalid, URL injection refused by the schema and hex-only sink, a refused PNG logo fails alone with logo_failed

Cost, Node, stub rasters, same inputs for both (TS engine → Rust through the module): demo 198 → 36 ms, 29 → 3 MiB of RSS growth, 243 → 236 KB; L 772 → 57 ms, 50 → 1 MiB, 463 → 386 KB; CAP 5.7 s → 0.22 s, 155 → 9 MiB, 2.24 → 1.60 MB (the per-page resources: listing every embed on every page had cost 9 MB on CAP, fixed). Native release, L with a real 1200 × 943 raster on each of its 120 views: 46.5 MB file, 5.2 s (120 PNG decodes and deflates at pako's level 6; --ignored timing test).

Memory: linear memory of the proofs module after a one-shot export, stub rasters: demo 3.1 MiB, L 4.2, CAP 14.1. With the real raster on L, the one-shot proofs path reaches 524 MiB and 7.6 s: it receives the 120 PNGs as one JSON of base64 (85 MB as text, parsed to a value, decoded to 63 MB), the layout holds every PNG until the serialiser decodes it, and the file is assembled from the object bodies. That path is the test's, not the application's: R4.6's session (OD-2) must take each raster as bytes, decode and write its XObject on arrival and drop the PNG, so that the high-water mark is the file so far plus one decode (plan §B.4: ≈ 0.37 MB per view plus 9 MB). The serialiser is ready for that order (an image is written as its own object when given); the driver that interleaves the calls is R4.6.

Module size (W1): the writer linked (proofs build, which also holds the trap and allocation proofs) 1,652,719 B raw, 531,573 B gzip -9, +105 KB over the shipped module, inside the plan's estimate (+100 to 150 KB) and under 600 KB; above 550 KB it is to be reported, so R4.6 measures the shipped module again once the session links the writer.

Independent security gate (R4.5): PASS, 4 LOW, no blocker. Its probe ran 131,648 mutated or synthetic PNGs through the gate and the decoder (0 panic, 0 overflow, slowest 198 ms), 6.7 million rounds over the base64, date and number helpers, and hostile exports: report names holding PDF syntax reach the file as hex only (0 raw occurrence, qpdf --check clean, every /Length and xref offset exact), hostile URLs and exportedAt refused. Applied: the self-check scans without the reader's 50 MiB file cap (an export above it is a valid file the import refuses by size, as before); Ref(0) cannot underflow; pdf-write implies pdf-read. Reported: the self-check proves the attachment and the reader's read only (poppler covers the rendering of the corpus); the external-tools test skips on a host without qpdf and poppler (it ran here); the one-shot path holds each PNG twice and the file twice at the end (R4.6 input, OD-2); a view raster whose header reads but whose body fails to decode fails the export as self_check_failed where R4.6 makes it a per-key view_raster_failed warning.

Residual risks and open points (R4.5):

  • The one-shot export of L with real rasters is slow (5 s native, dominated by deflate level 6 of 400 MB of planes); E3 (≤ 1.2 × the TS export time in Chromium) is judged at R4.6 on the whole export; a lower deflate level would trade E2 (size) for time.
  • The decoder reproduces UPNG's accepted deviations on the oracle corpus; on files outside it (unusual interlace or tRNS combinations) UPNG's behaviour is reproduced by the code's structure, not pinned.
  • The self-check proves the file carries its envelope and that the R4 reader reads it; it does not render the pages. poppler's 0-pixel result covers the corpus only.
  • MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES keeps the 16 MiB envelope cap; an exportedAt that is not an ISO UTC timestamp is a new closed kind invalid_input, never reachable from the application.

10.8 R4.6: the application export on the core's session (2026-10-19, export switched)

What runs where. The core (crates/core/src/pdf/write/session.rs, views.rs) holds an ExportSession: new(input) runs the R4.4 checks, builds the envelope under 16 MiB and opens the file (header, Info, the three fonts); next_step() answers the rasters the next step needs (RasterRequest { key, svg, widthPx, heightPx }: the SVG logos in slot order, then each observation's views, main view first, composed by R3's compose_highlight at the size rasterSizeOf gives, the O4 cases pinned) or done; add_raster(key, png) and raster_failed(key) answer one key each; finish() lays out the conclusion page and the footers, writes the pages and the attachment, runs the self-check, and hands the file out in parts (take_part()). The refusals are closed kinds (unknown_key, duplicate_key, out_of_order), never a trap. The wasm facade exposes the same struct (crates/wasm: ExportSession, outcome envelopes); packages/core-wasm wraps it (CoreExportSession, openExportSession): every call goes through CoreRuntime.invoke, so a trap poisons the instance as any core call, and a session of a dropped instance answers core_unavailable without touching the dead handle. The application (apps/app/src/pdf/export.ts) drives it: the snapshot from the sheet handle, the bundled branding, the labels (labels.ts, moved verbatim from the engine, same key order), the clock, then the loop (browserRasterizer under Promise.all per batch, rasterFailed as each raster rejects, addRaster in request order once the batch settled, as the engine embedded), finish, a Blob of the parts, free() in finally; leaving the editor aborts the export (the session freed, no file). EditorRoute and its alerts are unchanged. exportReportToPdf keeps its signature but returns the Blob.

Buffers, ownership and lives (OD-2, the owner's R4.6 item 2):

Buffer Owner Lives Size
the ExportInput JSON the page (a string), copied into linear memory by the glue for new() the call report + snapshot + branding + labels (demo 338 KB)
CheckedInput (report, snapshot with its asset texts, index, the sanitised asset trees, branding, labels) the session until free() demo: 3.7 MiB of linear memory after new()
the envelope text the session until the self-check the attachment's size (demo 55 KB)
the file being written the session's Objects: chunks never reallocated, the target 1 MiB doubling to 8 MiB per chunk, an object larger than the target in a chunk of its own, a sealed chunk shrunk to its bytes until take_part() moves each one out (copied into the page, freed in the module) the file
a request's SVG text the core builds it, the page receives it as JSON the next_step() call (module side), the batch (page side) 143 KB per view
a raster PNG the page's Uint8Array, copied into linear memory by the glue for add_raster the call: decoded (RGBA, raw scanlines, RGB and alpha planes), deflated, written, then freed before the call returns 0.5 MB (PNG), about 10 MB of transients for a 1200 × 943 raster
a logo raster the session, until its batch completes (the branding embeds in slot order, as the engine did) the branding step the four logos
the draw log the session until finish() the text calls (KB)

So the module holds, at its highest, the file so far plus one decode plus the parsed input plus the open chunk's slack; nothing of the rasters once their object is written, nothing of the file once the parts are out. Measured on a fresh instance per run, the shipped module in Node, the growth of linear memory from before new() to after free() (linear memory never shrinks: the high-water mark), file in parts:

Run views PDF bytes parts linear before linear after growth / PDF ms
demo, 2 × 1 stub 7 235,948 1 1.25 MiB 5.9 MiB 20.6 52
L, stub 120 386,414 1 1.25 MiB 6.6 MiB 14.6 179
CAP, stub 1,000 1,599,445 2 1.25 MiB 13.7 MiB 8.2 1,195
demo, real 1200 × 943 7 3,282,540 3 1.25 MiB 18.0 MiB 5.4 499
L, real 120 46,464,887 8 1.25 MiB 62.3 MiB 1.38 7,062

L with real rasters: 62 MiB held for a 44 MiB file, where the 120 PNGs alone weigh 64 MB and the engine held every decoded plane until save() (plan §B.4: about 0.45 GB); the plan's estimate for the session was 53 MB (file + 9 MB). What the module holds beyond the file is bounded (the test asserts it under 24 MiB): the parsed input and trees (3.7 MiB), one decode (about 10 MiB), the open chunk's slack (up to 8 MiB). Stage by stage on L real: 1.3 MiB at start, 5.0 after new(), 15.5 after the second raster (the first decode), then 0.34 MB per raster for 0.364 MB of file per raster, 62.3 before finish(), 62.3 after, 62.3 after the parts are out and the session freed.

Two findings on the way, measured and kept:

  • A single growing Vec for the file (amortised doubling) spiked to 125 MiB on L real: the reallocation holds the old and the new buffer while it copies, and the decode transients sit between the file and the top of the heap, so dlmalloc could not grow it in place. Chunks never reallocated remove the spike.
  • Chunks of 1 MiB cost 0.12 MB of fragmentation per view (a long-lived allocation interleaved with 10 MB of transients every other raster: 74 MiB for the same file); 8 MiB chunks cost none (62.3 MiB). The target starts at 1 MiB and doubles per chunk up to 8 MiB, so a small file pays little slack (demo: one chunk).

Declared differences, each one a B2 or B4 class of plan §B.2.3, every O2 comparison and the poppler render re-run unchanged:

  • The catalog and the page tree (objects 1 and 2) are written last (the xref maps them); R4.5 wrote them first. The R4 digests (goldens/r4/pdf.*.sha256, the writer's own bytes, not a TypeScript oracle) were rewritten once for it, with the O2 suite, qpdf, pdfdetach and poppler (0 pixel) green on the new layout.
  • UTF-16BE hex strings are printed in upper case, as pdf-lib printed them (R4.5 printed lower case: B4, the same decoded value).
  • pdf-writer stays unused (R4.5).
  • A view raster the decoder refuses is that view's view_raster_failed warning, as embedPng throwing was in the engine; R4.5's one-shot path made it self_check_failed.
  • The self-check scans the bytes from the attachment stream object to the end of its chunk, behind the file header, with the R4 reader: the reader finds the attachment by scanning its bytes, never by the xref, and the file is never held whole in the module. The bytes scanned are the file's.

Parity and restoration (cargo pdf_session, pdf_serialize, pdf_layout; Node pdf-export.session.test.ts; the app suites):

Check Result
the session driven key by key = export_pdf one-shot (bytes, envelope, warnings); the file grows as the rasters arrive demo, equal
the 14 O2 runs through the shipped module and CoreExportSession the native digests
every view request = the TypeScript composeHighlightedViewSvg text of that (observation, view); every (observation, view) the snapshot holds requested once 14 runs, all views
the real-raster run: the two SVGs the R4.1 rasteriser drew (manifest.json svgSha256, 1200 × 263 and 1200 × 943) equal, sizes equal
rasterSizeOf, the O4 cases (JS Number() on the viewBox parts, the clamps) 57 cases equal
warnings: a raster that fails before any embed, then a PNG the decoder refuses, view order; a logo warning at its slot whatever the arrival as the engine recorded them
refusals: before next(), a key not in the batch, answered twice, next() with keys unanswered, finish() early or twice, after free(); garbage, empty and truncated PNGs closed kinds, no trap
a trap mid-session (proofs build) the instance poisoned, the session answers core_unavailable, free() safe, a new session on the recovered instance writes the digest
export Rust → import Rust (the module's import_pdf, the bundled sheet) 14 runs: envelope_v1, the report equal, not rebased
export Rust → the kept TypeScript reader (importReportFromPdf, the app suites) → the core the roundtrip, leaves, N-1 and envelope suites (27 cases): equal reports, the 612 leaves (29 unresolved) kept
N-1 (O11 scanner and the Zod copy: the R3 build and 0.2.0) every R4 PDF of the O2 runs read; a stripped one attachment_stripped (R4.5 suite, unchanged)
the app path (exportReportToPdf, stub rasters, the clock fixed at FIXED_EXPORTED_AT) the 12 R4 digests (3 reports × 2 locales × 2 logo modes)
the Step 6 goldens (text with page, position, size and font; images; links) read back from the app path's file 12 runs equal, in page order (the recorder listed every footer last; the file lists each page's footer after its content)
pdf.roundtrip (16), pdf.goldens (13), pdf.export.app (2), routes.EditorRoute.export (6, abort on unmount added), routes.coreStopped (15), state.coreFailures (5), migration.leaves (2), n-1.reader (6), archive.envelopes (3) green on the Rust export; the suites read the file's content streams (tests/helpers/pdfRead.ts) where they spied pdf-lib
the oracle generator r4.writer-oracles (17) still verifies the frozen O1 / O2 oracles against the TypeScript engine, called directly with the application's inputs

The engine leaves the application's export path: apps/app/src imports @faunosteo/pdf for the kept reader only (pdf/import.ts); pdf-lib is no longer in the application bundle (index chunk 922 KB). packages/pdf stays until R4.8 as the R3 reference of the oracle suites and the tests' reader.

E3 and E4 in the browsers (scripts/browser/export-baseline.mjs, 2026-10-19, results/2026-10-19-ts-export.json on the build of the last TypeScript-export commit, results/2026-10-19-r4-export.json on the R4.6 build; both under the same harness, the same host, the same evening, demo and L three runs each, CAP once; the production CSP; compare-exports.mjs prints the tables). Time is the page clock from the click to the PDF blob, the median of the runs:

Engine Report TS Rust Rust / TS TS file Rust file
Chromium 156 demo 1,372 ms 916 ms 0.67 2,852,004 2,823,275
Chromium L 19,286 ms 14,218 ms 0.74 43,893,082 43,536,994
Chromium CAP stopped by the 4 GiB ceiling after 818 PNGs 117.6 s 360,935,689
Firefox 157 demo 1,559 ms 1,035 ms 0.66 2,872,189 2,843,130
Firefox L 24,559 ms 16,574 ms 0.67 44,105,143 43,743,780
Firefox CAP stopped after 565 PNGs 138.0 s 362,665,313
WebKit 27.2 demo 2,626 ms 2,386 ms 0.91 2,493,691 2,473,027
WebKit L 52,251 ms 49,538 ms 0.95 38,557,714 38,286,426
WebKit CAP stopped after 962 PNGs 412.2 s 317,323,081

E3 (Rust ≤ 1.2 × the TypeScript on demo and L in Chromium): 0.67 and 0.74, met; Firefox 0.66 and 0.67, WebKit 0.91 and 0.95. E4: L completes on the three engines (it did with the engine); CAP completes on the three (1,001 rasters, a 361 MB file) where the engine was stopped by the harness ceiling on every engine, as at R4.1. The phone part of E4 is the owner's J2.6.

Where the time goes (medians; head = click to the first raster, raster phase = first toBlob start to last toBlob end, tail = last raster to the PDF blob; the Rust driver's User Timing adds the sum of its core calls and of its rasteriser awaits):

Engine Report TS head / raster phase / tail Rust head / raster phase / tail Rust core calls Rust raster awaits
Chromium demo 62 / 794 / 518 27 / 803 / 80 487 415
Chromium L 66 / 11,880 / 7,381 27 / 14,014 / 178 7,153 7,066
Chromium CAP 57 / 117,093 / 495 58,970 58,521
Firefox demo 62 / 841 / 650 20 / 942 / 74 455 573
Firefox L 67 / 14,762 / 9,731 25 / 16,382 / 173 6,684 9,862
Firefox CAP 60 / 137,464 / 474 55,024 82,803
WebKit demo 63 / 2,193 / 370 20 / 2,283 / 81 455 1,918
WebKit L 70 / 47,227 / 4,957 25 / 49,260 / 251 6,733 42,693
WebKit CAP 54 / 411,048 / 1,091 55,372 356,032

The engine's tail (its save(): every plane deflated at the end) is gone: the Rust tail is the conclusion page, the pages, the attachment and the self-check (80 to 250 ms on demo and L). The core's own work (decode, deflate at level 6, write) is 7 s on L and 59 s on CAP in Chromium, interleaved with the browser's rasterisation, which is the other half (7 s on L in Chromium, 43 s in WebKit); the export is bound by those two, in sequence per batch.

Memory in the browsers (content process RSS, MiB; growth = settled after − settled before, forced GC in Chromium, idle elsewhere):

Engine Report TS peak Rust peak TS growth Rust growth
Chromium demo 307 264 17 28
Chromium L 805 470 43 92
Chromium CAP 3,739 (stopped) 1,787 560
Firefox demo 378 291 77 78
Firefox L 1,397 819 183 264
Firefox CAP 3,487 (stopped) 1,914 826
WebKit demo 658 593 277 144
WebKit L 1,191 848 210 218
WebKit CAP 3,871 (stopped) 2,633 552

The peak falls everywhere (L: 805 → 470 MiB in Chromium, 1,397 → 819 in Firefox, 1,191 → 848 in WebKit). The settled growth after the export is higher on L and CAP: it is the module's linear memory, which never shrinks (plan §B.4 "the same high-water, until reload"): the file was held once in the module (44 MB on L, 361 MB on CAP) plus the transients, and that memory stays reserved for the page's next export instead of being returned. The engine's growth was JavaScript heap, collected. On CAP the page keeps about 560 to 830 MiB after the export; CAP is the cap, not a bilan, and the engine never finished it.

Release across exports (scripts/browser/r4-export-series.mjs, results/2026-10-19-r4-export-series.json, …-ts-export-series-chromium.json, …-r4-export-series-chromium-12.json): one editor tab, the start level, a first export (init) and six more, the content RSS read after each (forced GC in Chromium; idle elsewhere, indicative), the import series' criterion of 10 MiB over the last five:

Engine Report Init Per export Last 5 Peak content
Chromium, Rust demo 28.0 MiB 1.5 / 2.5 / 2.8 / 2.5 / 3.4 / 1.2 12.3 MiB 287 MiB
Chromium, Rust L 92.2 25.5 / 21.1 / 20.1 / 13.3 / 23.9 / 22.4 100.8 643
Chromium, TypeScript (control) demo 16.1 3.1 / 3.3 / 2.1 / 1.6 / 2.2 / 1.6 10.9 330
Chromium, TypeScript (control) L 44.6 20.7 / 14.8 / 19.6 / 18.3 / 22.1 / 22.7 97.6 957
Chromium, Rust, 12 exports L 95.2 19.7 / 27.3 / 11.1 / 29.5 / 14.0 / 28.4 / 16.7 / 22.6 / 4.4 / 1.5 / 3.4 / −4.3 27.6 (the last five) 686
Firefox, Rust demo 95.1 93.9 / −6.7 / 103.3 / −50.4 / 96.5 / −41.8 100.8 596
Firefox, Rust L 263.8 156.8 / 0.7 / 86.9 / −196.3 / 58.7 / 74.1 24.0 1,024
WebKit, Rust demo 139.8 91.5 / 225.9 / −216.8 / 108.3 / −90.4 / −0.3 26.9 946
WebKit, Rust L 326.7 153.7 / 14.7 / 1.2 / 1.1 / −0.4 / 2.3 19.0 1,992

Reading: the per-export growth of about 20 MiB on L in Chromium is the browser's, not the session's: the TypeScript build shows the same figures on the same page (control), and the module's linear memory, read in Node over seven L exports with real rasters on one instance, stays at 62.3 MiB from the first export to the last (the session frees everything at free() and the next export reuses it). Over twelve exports Chromium's growth stops after the eighth (the last five: 27.6 MiB, then a plateau), which points at a bounded cache (canvas backing stores or the blob URLs kept 30 s by downloadBlob), not at a leak that grows with use. Firefox and WebKit sawtooth without a forced GC, as in the import series; WebKit L settles after the second export. The criterion as written (10 MiB over five) is not met by either build on L in Chromium; the behaviour is the engine's, the module flat, the plateau reached. Kept as an observation for the owner (BDR-058's reserves extend to it), with the phone series J2.7 due.

Release on the other paths (cargo pdf_session, Node pdf-export.session.test.ts, the route test): success (every part out, free()), a refused input (no session, the runtime stays ready), a raster that fails (its warning, the export continues), a trap mid-session (the instance poisoned and recovered, the session answers core_unavailable, free() a no-op on the dead handle), a cancelled export (the editor left mid-way: the signal aborts the driver, free() in finally, no download, no alert). Dropping the session, finished or not, frees everything it holds (Rust ownership); nothing of the file survives free() in the module.

Module size (W1): the shipped module with the writer and the session linked, 1,535,289 B raw, 519,730 B gzip -9 (the proofs build 531.6 KB at R4.5 held the trap and allocation proofs too). Under the 550 KB report line and the 600 KB budget; from 426 KB at R4.3, +94 KB for the whole writer. DEPLOY.md's served-size note is updated at R4.8 with the final module.

Residual risks and open points (R4.6):

  • The settled growth after a large export is the module's linear memory (the file once, the transients, the chunk slack), kept until reload: 92 MiB after L and 560 MiB after CAP in Chromium. Within the plan (OD-2: "the same high-water, until reload"); the disposable export worker (S2) stays the fallback if a device fails L (J2.6).
  • The export is bound by the browser's rasterisation and the core's decode and deflate (level 6) in sequence per batch: L takes 14 s in Chromium and 50 s in WebKit (the engine: 19 and 52). A lower deflate level or overlapping the next batch's rasterisation with the core's writing would cut it, at the price of E2 or of a second copy in flight; not done.
  • The per-export RSS growth in Chromium is the browser's and plateaus; the 10 MiB criterion is not met by either build on L. Owner decision.
  • view_raster_failed now also covers a PNG the decoder refuses and a view that cannot be composed; a raster that never settles still hangs the export (the engine's residual, unchanged; the abort on leaving the editor frees the session).
  • The headless runs validate nothing on a device: J2 (R4_J2.md) on the owner's computer and iPhone, with the J1 import recette still due.

10.9 R4.7: the archive check tool on the core (2026-10-19, pnpm report:compare switched)

What runs where. crates/core/src/pdf/compare (feature cli, which enables the reader and the writer; never enabled by the wasm facade, so the shipped module is unchanged: 1,535,289 B raw, 519,795 B gzip -9) holds the tool without its file system: compare_bytes reads a PDF's attachment with the R4 reader (read_attached_document, no value cap, as the TypeScript had none), parses it as the session does (parse_json), reads it through the layered archive reader (read_archive_document, the R2 code the application imports with), and prints it as compare/report.ts did (lines.rs: zone and finding lines, !! UNRESOLVED with its reason, the migration lines of a v2 archive, the header with the sheet check and the counts, the footer, the --full texts), with esc on every untrusted string (V8's [\p{Cc}\p{Cf}

], the SAFE_TEXT_DROPPED table of R4.4); run.rs is main (parse_args, the loop over the entries, --summary, --diff, stdout, stderr and the exit code) over a Files trait. The binary src/bin/report_compare.rs (the one file of the crate allowed std::fs and std::env) loads the seed draft sheet (sheet-ref.json, document.json, report-migration-map.json; no drawing: the comparison needs none), resolves the arguments against INIT_CWD (the folder pnpm was typed in, as the TypeScript did) and implements Files (a folder stands for its .pdf files sorted; a missing, unreadable, irregular or oversized entry is a failed entry). pnpm report:compare runs scripts/report-compare.sh (rust-env.sh, then cargo run --release --locked -q --features cli --bin report-compare): the first run compiles the binary (25 s on the development machine), the next ones start at once. The TypeScript CLI (apps/app/scripts/compare-reports.ts, compare/*) and its vitest suite stay until R4.8 (the O10 generator still runs them), with the app's own report:compare script no longer behind the root one.

Parity (cargo pdf_compare, 15 tests, 1.6 s): the 230 invocations of the O10 oracle (tests/oracles/r4/compare/compare.json: every fixture PDF, the step6 folder with and without options, the argument errors, the 22 runs of the 11 scripts.compare.test.ts cases on their scenario PDFs) replayed in-process through run on the seed sheet. The 158 rows the plan does not declare match exactly (stdout, stderr, exit code); the 11 cases have one cargo test each (the ledger targets, pdf_compare::<case>, 0 pending rows left of 301). The real binary is spawned on the six cli and folder rows and on two scenario rows: byte-equal to the pure run and to the oracle. The 72 declared rows (§A.3) print one closed line each, exit 2:

TypeScript printed Rows Rust prints
a ZodError dump (the issues as JSON, escaped) 63 report document invalid: <the core's detail> (62: missing field \id`on the scan and read corpora,missing field `conclusion`, invalid type: null, expected f64` for the overflowing vertebra index); 1 decoy-first file whose decoy holds a lone surrogate: the refusal below, before any schema
the comparison, a lone surrogate kept in the content or a key, or overwritten by a duplicate (OD-4) 6 attachment refused: lone UTF-16 surrogate escape at byte N
report version Infinity cannot be read (2) and the report under archive v1 (snapshot rejected: unsupported_envelope) (1) 3 report version null cannot be read: the overflow reads as null in the core (rewrite_overflow_numbers), as the R3 application path already saw it (O8 no_attachment for the same three files)

Nothing else differs: the labels, the migration lines, the __proto__ ids, the control characters escaped (\u001b, \u000a, \u009b, ‮, 
, five-digit code points as 1), the --diff of the placeholder and --full forms, the usage and option errors on stderr with exit 1, the failed entries with exit 2.

Time and memory (release binary, the development machine): one PDF 7 ms (the seed read and indexed, the file compared), the three fixture folders (72 entries, the R3 real-raster PDFs and the tolerance corpus included) 185 ms, the r4/read corpus (131 files) 135 ms; 6 MiB resident on the step6 folder. Through pnpm report:compare the launch is cargo's (about 250 ms per invocation, the binary already built); the TypeScript CLI took 270 ms for one PDF and 410 ms for the three folders under tsx.

Declared behaviour (plan §A.3, no other): the three lines above. The output of every other row is the TypeScript's. --locale, --summary, --full, --diff and the folder expansion keep their meaning; the exit codes keep theirs (0, 1 usage or option, 2 failed entries).

Residual risks and open points (R4.7):

  • The tool reads the seed from the repository checkout (CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR/../../supabase/seed/…), as the TypeScript read it from its script folder: the binary is not relocatable. A copied binary prints the missing seed path and exits 1.
  • The report document invalid line carries the core's serde detail (missing field …, invalid type …, unknown variant …): the field name or the offending value of the file, escaped; the TypeScript's ZodError dump carried the same and more.
  • A PDF over 50 MiB is refused by the entry check (file too large) before the reader, as before; the reader's own cap would say not a readable PDF.

10.10 R4.8: the TypeScript PDF engine deleted (2026-10-19)

Audit before every deletion (owner's R4.8 brief §2): every importer of @faunosteo/pdf, pdf-lib, @pdf-lib/*, @resvg/resvg-js, @xmldom/xmldom and @faunosteo/domain was listed across the application, the glue package, the tests, the scripts, the pipeline, the workspace files, the Dockerfile, the CI files and the docs (grep census, now the r4.census suite). The application's last consumer of the engine (the TypeScript import path, tests only since R4.3) and the glue's (the session suite's compose check, the engine comparison) were moved onto the core or deleted first; the pipeline's consumers (packages/anatomy/src/curation/app-review.ts → render/compose.ts, 22 files → @faunosteo/domain) stay until R5.

Deleted (70 files, 12,010 lines of TypeScript):

  • packages/pdf/** (3,122 lines of engine, 8,211 of tests): the export, the layered reader, the byte-scan attachment reader, the SVG sanitiser and the view composition, the page renderers, the branding gate, the labels, the 140 engine cases and the R3 and R4 oracle generators (r3.{highlight,sanitiser}-oracles, r4.{dates,inflate,png,reader,text}-oracles) with their helpers (resvg, the reader-input crafters).
  • apps/app/scripts/compare-reports.ts and compare/{report,sheet}.ts (589 lines, the TypeScript CLI replaced at R4.7), tests/unit/scripts.compare.test.ts.
  • apps/app/src/pdf/import.ts (the TypeScript scanner behind importReportFromPdf, tests only since R4.3) and tests/unit/pdf.import.test.ts.
  • tests/unit/pdf.export.app.test.ts (T2 and scenario 3 through the engine's exportFromEnvelope: the re-export from the envelope alone is cargo's export_from_envelope, whose signature takes no sheet and no branding, byte-equal to the R4 files on 13 runs).
  • The application's generators r4.{compare,tolerance,writer}-oracles and tests/helpers/r4-draw.ts (the pdf-lib draw recorder); the glue's pdf-export.ts-engine.test.ts (the Node timings against the engine, recorded in §10.7).
  • Dependencies: @faunosteo/pdf (app, core-wasm), pdf-lib, tsx and the app's report:compare script (app), @faunosteo/domain (app: its two incidental test uses moved to @faunosteo/core-wasm/types and the N-1 Zod copy), the Dockerfile's COPY packages/pdf/package.json. pnpm-lock.yaml holds no pdf-lib, @pdf-lib/* or @resvg/resvg-js any more; @xmldom/xmldom only under packages/anatomy.

Replaced in the tests (no case ignored, no golden regenerated):

Before After
pdf-lib parsed the app export's file (texts, images, page count, Info, Filespec) tests/helpers/pdfFile.ts, a reader of the writer's own format (objects, dictionaries, Flate streams through node:zlib, pages in /Kids order, Info, annotations, XObjects); pdfRead.ts keeps its content-stream parser on it
pdf-lib read the links of the file the same reader's annotations (goldens.ts readLinks)
pdf-lib built the foreign PDFs of the rejection cases buildPdfWithAttachment (a minimal file with one embedded file in clear) and the frozen hostile fixtures
pdf-lib's embedPng checked the golden rasters the XObject sizes read from the app export's file
the engine composed the views of the views.*.json goldens the SVGs the core's session asks the rasteriser for, captured at the mocked rasteriser in request order
the engine's scanner read the attachment of the envelope and N-1 suites the frozen O11 scanner, now exported by @faunosteo/core-wasm/n-1 (readAttachmentBytes, readAttachedDocument): the R3 build's reader, as a rollback would read
importReportFromPdf (TypeScript scanner + core) tests/helpers/pdfImport.ts: the module's SheetHandle.import_pdf on a handle of the bundled sheet, the envelope mapped by the worker's pdfImportOf (the same kinds HomeRoute shows); the main-thread session still never calls the reader (OD-1)
the session suite compared each request SVG with the engine's composeHighlightedViewSvg structural facts per request (the view's frame, the highlight, no editor attribute) and the real-raster manifest digests; the text itself is cargo's (pdf_session against compose_highlight, anatomy_compose against the frozen R3 trees)

Still TypeScript, with the reason (owner's R4.8 brief §6.4):

  • packages/anatomy (the curation pipeline, the legacy importer, the frozen renderer render/ and @xmldom/xmldom): R5's scope, consumed by pnpm import:equine and the seed golden; no app and no PDF consumer.
  • packages/domain: the pipeline's schemas until R5; the application and the glue no longer depend on it.
  • packages/core-wasm/tests/n-1/{domain,scanner}: the frozen N-1 readers (the R2 Zod schemas, the R3 byte-scan reader), never edited, permanent.
  • apps/app/src/pdf/{export,labels,branding,browserRasterizer}.ts: the application's side of the export (input assembly, the session driver, the browser's rasteriser), UI glue by the review's boundary.
  • apps/app/src/core/worker/**: the import worker (protocol, timers, outcome mapping), browser glue.
  • The test readers above (pdfFile.ts, pdfRead.ts, pdfImport.ts): tooling on the writer's own files, never product logic.
  • scripts/r4-afm-data.mjs: the generator of afm_data.rs from the frozen O4/O5 oracles (no pdf-lib: reads afm.json and text.json), kept so the tables stay reproducible.

Census and gates: apps/app/tests/unit/r4.census.test.ts (8 checks) fails on a reintroduced import of the engine, pdf-lib, the TS domain or xmldom under apps/app/src or packages/core-wasm/src, on a dependency added back, on a lockfile holding pdf-lib, on an export that does not open the core's session, on an import that does not go through the worker, on a root report:compare that is not the binary, and on a missing N-1 reader or oracle folder. The ledger (scripts/r4-ledger.mjs) now reads its 301 frozen cases from the committed TSV (the deleted suites cannot run), re-derives the dispositions and checks every cargo target against cargo test --list and every vitest (same case…) target against the live report of the surviving suites: 150 ported, 29 replaced, 89 kept, 33 deleted, 0 pending. Test counts after R4.8: apps/app 57 files, 427 cases (460 before: 42 of the deleted suites, 1 roundtrip case added, 8 census); packages/core-wasm 58 (60); packages/pdf 146 → 0; cargo unchanged (R4.7: the compare suite included). pnpm typecheck, pnpm -r lint, pnpm check and pnpm rust:check green; pnpm check:all (the app image, the worker test stage and image) recorded below.

Non-regression (owner's R4.8 brief §3), each with its proof:

Guarantee Proof
the application imports through the core's reader r4.census (HomeRoute → core/worker, handler.ts → import_pdf_bytes, no scanner identifier under src); the route and worker suites (routes.HomeRoute.{import,archive,rescueCopy}, core.importWorker)
the export runs on the core's session r4.census (export.ts → openExportSession); pdf.goldens: app-path bytes = the R4 digests at the fixed time
report:compare is the binary r4.census (root script → scripts/report-compare.sh → --features cli --bin report-compare); cargo pdf_compare spawns it
v2 and v3 archives stay compatible pdf.roundtrip (the frozen v2 PDFs migrated, unresolved items flagged), migration.leaves (612 leaves exported and read back through the module, 29 unresolved kept), cargo pdf_import O7/O8
historical PDFs stay readable cargo pdf_import and pdf_serialize::restoration_round_trip_loses_nothing on the Step 6 and R3 fixtures; pdf.goldens on report-v3.bare.pdf; the N-1 suites on the R4 files
the validated renders stay conformant pdf.goldens (Step 6 text, images, links read from the file; the R4 digests), cargo pdf_layout (O1), pdf_serialize (O2, poppler 0 pixel recorded at R4.5)
rescue copies and data-loss protections routes.HomeRoute.rescueCopy (13), routes.coreStopped (15), state.coreFailures (5), the quarantine suites, unchanged
no TypeScript engine active in parallel r4.census; the only TypeScript readers left are the frozen N-1 copies, read by tests only

Residual risks and open points (R4.8):

  • The test reader pdfFile.ts reads the writer's own format only (one dictionary per line, direct /Length, classic xref): a change of the writer's layout changes it too; it is tooling, pinned by the suites that use it.
  • tests/helpers/pdfImport.ts runs the module's reader on the test process's main instance (a throwaway handle, freed): the application never does (OD-1); the worker path keeps its own suites.
  • A stale packages/pdf/node_modules folder (git-ignored symlinks of the previous install) may linger on a development machine after the pull: rm -rf packages/pdf by hand; the census checks the package files, not the folder.
  • The open points of §10.8 stand: the Chromium per-export growth (BDR-063, an open reserve), J1 and J2 on real devices before any merge, the WebKit reserves BDR-058/059, the hostile-file protections (PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING §5 gate open), the module at 519,795 B gzip of a 600 KB budget. R4.8 measured nothing new on memory or time and claims nothing.

R5 prerequisites (the pipeline port): packages/anatomy (curation pipeline, importer, render/, the review drawings) and packages/domain are the last TypeScript business packages; their oracles (the seed golden, the 612-leaf semantics, the determinism and count suites, the R3 layer oracle) are in place; documentSha256 will change once (D-R5) and every older archive will rebase on import; @xmldom/xmldom, tsx and prettier on generated files leave with them.

10.11 R4.9: final checks, memory bench, audits (2026-10-20)

The owner's R4.9 brief: final verification without new development, the memory bench before any merge (the R4.6 Chromium reserve stays open until measured), the import risks classified, the J1 / J2 recettes re-issued, the independent verifier and security audit. Contract .claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-20-rust-r4-final-1000.md.

Memory bench (scripts/browser/r4-memory-bench.mjs, probes in lib/memory-probes.mjs, results scripts/browser/results/2026-10-20-r4-memory-bench*.json; build f36dbdd, module faunosteo_wasm_bg-9CH7GQ4e.wasm 1,535,289 B; i7-11700B, 16 threads, 15.8 GB; Chromium 156, Firefox 157, WebKit 27.2, headless). One editor tab per engine and report, the start level, the init export, then 6 exports (16 for the Chromium series below), then four rest windows: settled (5 s), after the 30 s downloadBlob revocation window, Home (the editor left by its link, the page and its runtime kept), Home idle (10 s); Chromium ends with a simulated critical memory pressure (CDP). Every reading tells apart (1) the module's linear memory, read on the page's live WebAssembly.Memory, (2) the renderer RSS (and the summed RSS of the browser tree), (3) the live canvases, images, bitmaps, Blobs and PDF Blobs (created − collected, FinalizationRegistry) and the object URLs (created − revoked), plus in Chromium the precise JS heap, the DOM counters and a heap snapshot census of the same classes, (4) the transient peak of the renderer during each export, (5) what each rest window keeps against the level after the init export. Chromium readings follow a forced GC; Firefox and WebKit are read after idle only (no forced GC: their RSS figures are indicative, their collection counts are not forced).

Renderer RSS, MiB (absolute; linear memory in the last column):

Engine Report Start After init After 6 Settled After revoke Home Home idle Max peak Linear after init (then flat)
Chromium demo 150 190 204 202 197 198 188 302 18.8
Chromium L 155 260 393 389 395 395 386 626 63.8
Firefox demo 160 241 461 426 332 331 287 628 18.8
Firefox L 168 516 432 420 280 280 237 1,147 63.0
WebKit demo 319 466 820 820 813 815 813 944 18.8
WebKit L 329 666 758 758 752 757 754 2,129 55.0

What each dimension shows:

  1. Linear memory: the init export grows it once (demo +14.2 MiB, L +50 to 59 MiB: the file held once plus the transients, OD-2), then 0.0 MiB on every later export in the three engines, through 16 exports in Chromium, and nothing after the rest windows or Home (it never shrinks, by design, until reload). One instance, never re-instantiated. The session frees everything it holds at free() and the next export reuses it.
  2. Renderer RSS: see below for Chromium. Firefox ends below its post-init level on L once the revocation window passes (−279 MiB at Home idle) and 46 MiB above it on demo, a sawtooth without forced GC. WebKit climbs over the first three demo exports, then stays flat (export 3 to 6: +0.1, +5.5, +0.3; Home idle 813 against 820 after the sixth) and grows 54 MiB over the last five L exports, flat over the rest windows: a high-water reached early, not a slope per use; no forced GC there, so the figure is the engine's lazy return.
  3. Canvases, images, Blobs, object URLs: every canvas, Blob and PDF Blob the exports created was collected in Chromium (847 / 847 on L), Firefox (L 847 / 847; demo 54 / 56 without a forced GC) and WebKit; the 4 images still alive are the page's own (header logos); every object URL was revoked once the 30 s window had passed (854 / 854 on L), none during it but the downloads'. The Chromium heap census holds one canvas element and no image beyond the page's own after the series; the precise JS heap stays at 6.8 to 8.4 MiB (7.4 at Home). No DOM node, document or listener accumulates (L: 3,364 nodes after every export).
  4. Transient peaks: per export, the renderer rises 86 to 112 MiB on demo and 220 to 390 MiB on L in Chromium, 350 to 600 MiB on L in Firefox and about 1.3 GiB on L in WebKit (its rasterisation, 50 s per export), then falls back; none approaches the harness ceiling.
  5. Durable retention: Chromium is the only engine whose settled level keeps rising with exports on L, so it got its own series and a control.

Chromium, L, 16 exports, and the raster-only control (--mode raster: after the init export, each step replays the rasteriser's own steps on the view drawings the init export drew, at its sizes, with no core call), renderer RSS after each step (MiB):

Run Init Steps 1 to 8 Steps 9 to 16 Last 5 Home idle After critical pressure
Export (core session + rasteriser) 264 287 → 428 (+20 per step) 439 → 436 −7.3 437 438
Control (rasteriser only, no core) 262 286 → 429 (+21 per step) 433 → 438 +3.8 436 437

Reading. The growth of about 20 MiB per L export in Chromium is the browser's raster path, not the session's: the control, which never calls the core, grows by the same amount at every step and reaches the same plateau (436 against 437 MiB); the module's linear memory is flat, the JS heap flat, no canvas, Blob or URL survives. Both runs stop growing after the eighth step and stay flat for eight more (last five: −7.3 and +3.8 MiB, inside the 10 MiB criterion of BDR-058). A simulated critical pressure does not return it, so it is memory the renderer keeps (an internal raster or decode cache, or allocator pages it does not release) rather than objects the page holds. The R4.6 observation is confirmed and now explained: bounded at about 170 MiB above the post-init level for 120 views of 1200 px per export, reached after about 8 L exports, identical without the core; the deleted TypeScript engine showed the same figures (§10.8 control). On demo the same path costs about 2 MiB per export.

Class: not a retention of the export (the core frees everything; the page keeps no canvas, image, Blob or URL); not blocking. Severity: a desktop tab that exports L eight times carries about 170 MiB more until it is closed; a phone that exports L repeatedly is J2.7 and J2.6's object (the device run, not the headless one, decides). Correction proposed only if a device shows it: draw every view on one reused canvas (or an OffscreenCanvas) instead of a new canvas per view, measured with this same bench against the control before any adoption; no change made at R4.9 (no measure says it would help, and the rasteriser's output is pinned pixel-identical).

Proof pnpm report:compare (J2.14 dry run): the R3 demo PDF and an R4 session export of the bilan it carries (shipped module, stub rasters): --diff prints identical v3 content, exit 0 (first run 25 s: the tool compiles); the single listing has no !! line, 0 unresolved.

Full checks (2026-10-20, f36dbdd): pnpm check:all green in 2 min 37 s: rust-check (fmt, clippy -D warnings, cargo test, ts-rs, deny; advisories ok), types drift none, wasm:build, Node typecheck + tests (app 427, core-wasm 58, domain 262, anatomy 131, supabase 40) + lint 0 + build, the application image, the worker sandbox tests and the read-only worker image. Ledger: 301 rows, 0 pending, every target present (node scripts/r4-ledger.mjs regenerates the committed TSV byte for byte). Frozen oracles and goldens: nothing frozen at R4.1 (aada799) differs but the two R4.2 additions; the R4 digests are unchanged since their declared R4.6 re-freeze (d492bf7). WASM size: 519,795 B gzip -9, the 600 KB budget and the 550 KB report line unchanged in packages/core-wasm/tests/size.test.ts.

Import security: the open points are classified in PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING.md §6 (fixed with proof, accepted temporarily, blocking before merge, before public exposure). J1 / J2: R4_J1.md and R4_J2.md re-issued on this build with the OD-6 device list; every result cell stays NON TESTÉ until the owner runs it.

Gates (2026-10-20). Verifier, fresh per pass, 16 criteria: pass 1 found the core alone no longer compiled with no feature (facade::restore_copy used the feature-gated reader's cap; the workspace run unified the wasm crate's features and hid it from rust:check and check:all): fixed, and rust:check now lints the core alone; pass 2 found the §6 register without the J2 merge-gate row: added; pass 3 CONFORME 16/16. The floor lists the test files R4.8 deleted (23 by git log --diff-filter=D on 0dc1ba2, the one deleting commit of the branch; the verifier counted 21, a census error): approved in the owner's brief, 22 traced case by case in the ledger with a present target, the glue's pdf-export.ts-engine.test.ts traced in §10.10; the owner's written approval is the R4.9 contract's header (2026-10-20) and BDR-064, and the owner confirmed on 2026-10-21 that it covers exactly these 23 files (§10.12 D). A [gated] line needs an explicit owner decision; the owner may delegate its writing. Security, fresh: pass 1 BLOCK(1) on the R4.1 .gitleaks.toml path allowlist, which carried no [gated] marker (the owner approved the exception on 2026-10-18 but had not yet decided the marker; Claude wrote it at R4.10h on the owner's explicit authorization, §10.12 D), and a MEDIUM, the recette server bound every interface on an empty --host; three targeted re-gates closed it: the host is resolved first and any wildcard result refused in every spelling, the server listens on the resolved address and re-checks the bound one, and report-compare reads at most the 50 MiB cap after checking the file's type. Last re-gate PASS, LOW residuals only (a local writer swapping a FIFO in between the CLI's stat and open can make it wait). Final pnpm check:all green on 49b812b (2 min 51 s).

10.12 R4.10: the J1 / J2 anomalies (2026-10-21, scripts/browser/results/2026-10-20-r4-offline-import.json)

The owner's run (computer: Chrome, Firefox, Brave; Android; Safari iOS not run) reported two failures. Results as declared: R4_J1_RESULTS.md, R4_J2_RESULTS.md.

A. J1.7, offline import (FAIL on Brave and Firefox, surface 2). Reproduced headless on the same build and server (reference PDF imported online, editor loaded, network cut, « Accueil », « Choisir un fichier », « Remplacer », same PDF), two ways to cut: Playwright's offline mode and the server process killed.

Engine Before (serve.mjs without cache lines) After (nginx.conf lines)
Chromium the worker chunk refused from the cache (net::ERR_ABORTED), inline line « Le moteur de lecture n'a pas pu être chargé. » editor, both cuts
Firefox editor (offline mode serves the stale entry) editor, both cuts
WebKit inline line inline line, both cuts

Cause found: scripts/browser/serve.mjs sent no Cache-Control and no validator on /assets/, where docker/nginx.conf sends public, max-age=31536000, immutable; without it a browser may not reuse the prefetched worker chunk offline. A recette surface defect, not an application one: production already sends the line. Fixed: the server sends the two nginx lines (env.js no-store, /assets/ immutable); scripts/browser/r4-offline-import.mjs re-runs the path on the three engines and both cuts and checks the headers (6 runs as expected; with the old server, Chromium fails both: exit 1). Headless WebKit never takes a worker script from the HTTP cache offline, even immutable: the page shows the inline line, stays usable, no data changes. Whether Safari iOS does the same is not known: J1.7 on the iPhone tells.

Not reproduced: the file picker that does not open and the browser that becomes unusable. In every headless run the page answers (picker event, editor or inline line, no page error). The picker is the operating system's dialog, which a headless browser replaces; the page's click handler calls input.click() synchronously, before any network call. A dialog that hangs when the network goes is consistent with a file dialog opening on a network folder (the kit read from a share) but nothing proves it yet: the mini-recette's discriminating step settles it (Ctrl+O offline in an empty tab, the kit copied to a local folder).

Settled by the owner (2026-10-21, mini-recette M1 and M2 on Firefox and Brave, the kit stored locally): with the system's network cut, the file dialog takes about one minute to open, from Ctrl+O in an empty tab as from the Faunosteo button alike, and the offline import then works. The symptom exists outside Faunosteo, so no proof of an application defect remains; J1.7 is a functional PASS with a performance reserve on the picker's opening. The cause of the minute is not established (the share hypothesis is not confirmed; nothing was measured or traced) and no application change follows without proof of a Faunosteo defect. The recette server's cache fix stays: a demonstrated defect on its own.

B. J2.3, export without logos (FAIL). The reference file 1-reference/r3-demo.fr.nologos.pdf carries an archive whose branding has the four logo slots null (the R3 oracle's nologos mode: the logo fetch answered 404, STEP6_PDF_ARCHIVE_ANALYSIS.md §17). The editor export builds its branding from apps/app/src/pdf/branding.ts (loadBranding(), the four bundled logos) on every export; the imported archive's branding is kept in the session (osteo:archive) but never handed to the writer. Same rule before R4: apps/app/src/pdf/export.ts at 66909b6 already passed loadBranding() to the TypeScript engine. The archived branding is used only by export_from_envelope (cargo, the oracles), never by the application. The writer draws the text fallback only for a null slot or a logo that failed to embed, which the application's bundled branding never has since the logos are bundled (Step 6, fetch removed). So the application behaves as specified, and the expected result of J2.3 written at R4.6 was wrong: it described the oracle's nologos file, not an editor export. Nothing changed (goldens, oracles, rules and the expected result untouched); an owner decision is needed: keep the rule and correct the expected result of J2.3, or make a re-export of an imported bilan reuse the archived branding (a product change). Owner decision (2026-10-21): option 1. A new export from the editor is a new document with the application's current branding; the archive keeps its own branding for a faithful reproduction by the tool (export_from_envelope). Only the expected result of J2.3 and the recette documents changed; the owner's observed result is acceptable under the corrected rule, subject to the logos shown being the current branding.

C. The footer's ZenQuality logo under the production CSP (2026-10-21, owner's ask). Footer.tsx loaded « Propulsé par » from https://zenquality.fr/assets/logo-horizontal-1024.png since the footer exists (caac149, 2026-05-21), and DEPLOY.md's CSP, img-src 'self' data: blob:, dates from the same day (98117b3). Impact: on an origin that sends that policy, the image is refused and its slot shows the alt text « ZenQuality » (or the browser's broken-image mark); the link itself still works, nothing else on the page depends on it. The exported PDF is not affected: pdf/branding.ts embeds the bundled zenquality-logo-fr.png, never a fetched file. Where the policy lives: the VPS reverse proxy (DEPLOY.md, nginx Option A or Caddy), not docker/nginx.conf, which sets no CSP; faunosteo.com answered with no Content-Security-Policy header on 2026-10-21 (HEAD request), so the live site does not refuse it today. Why the recettes did not report it: the J1 / J2 checklists carry no footer item, and the development server (pnpm dev) sets no policy; the headless CSP proofs did see it, on every page since the R2 app-image proof (§8) and in r4-app-csp.mjs (§10.3), recorded as "the one known violation" and excluded from their verdict. Fix (R4.10j): the same file bundled under src/assets/brand/zenquality-logo-horizontal.png (1024 × 237, the bytes fetched from zenquality.fr on 2026-10-21, sha256 8625f6b1…) and imported with ?url like the partner's drawing, so the pixels do not change and the CSP stays as documented; the hotlink no longer sends the visitor's address to a third party either. components.Footer pins it (every footer image served by the application; the test fails on the hotlinked version); r4-app-csp.mjs drops its known-host exception, any violation is now a problem: 12 passes, no violation, no report (results/2026-10-21-r4-csp.json); r4-offline-import.mjs 6 runs as expected on the same build (results/2026-10-21-r4-offline-import.json). The two ?inline PDF logos and the fr variant are untouched: the footer shows the file it always showed.

D. Owner decisions recorded (2026-10-21, after the R4.10 gates).

  • J1.7: M1 and M2 PASS, the file dialog opening after about 60 s with the system's network cut, the same through Ctrl+O outside Faunosteo; J1.7 a functional PASS with a documented performance reserve. M3 NON TESTÉ: it becomes a complementary control, not blocking, never reported PASS without a run. M4 and M5 NON TESTÉ in the mini-recette (the earlier J1 declarations stand); M6 NON TESTÉ. The Cache-Control fix and its proofs stay. No application work on the 60 s without proof of a cause specific to Faunosteo.
  • J2.3: option 1 is final. A new export from the editor carries the application's current branding, even when the imported archive has no logo; the corrected expected result of J2.3 is validated. Historical data, oracles and goldens are unchanged.
  • ZenQuality footer logo (dcc7940): validated, the same image, no visual change, no CSP relaxation, no dependency on zenquality.fr. The tests that refuse a CSP-forbidden external resource stay (components.Footer, r4-app-csp.mjs), and so does the hardened CSP proof: every violation is a failure, except a refusal a negative test expects explicitly.
  • [gated 2026-10-18] in .gitleaks.toml: valid. The marker needs an explicit owner decision; its writing can be delegated, and Claude wrote it under the owner's explicit authorization (R4.10h).
  • R4.8 deletions: the owner's authorization covers the 23 test files deleted by 0dc1ba2 (22 in crates/core/tests/pdf/LEDGER.tsv, the glue's pdf-export.ts-engine.test.ts in §10.10). The count 21 was a census error. No further file may be deleted under this authorization.
  • Safari iOS stays NON TESTÉ until the owner reports results from the real iPhone. A simulator never stands for it and is never a memory proof; nothing is reported PASS for it in the meantime (reported the same day, §10.15).

10.13 R4.11: dependency maintenance before the R4 merge (2026-10-21)

Owner's ask: three advisories reported by the R4.10 checks, verified and updated where the affected versions were present, minimal updates, one commit each, no architecture change, no exclusion to silence an alert.

Advisory Component, path Before After Audit Residual
RUSTSEC-2026-0382, rustls-webpki: certificate verification may accept distrusted intermediates the worker's HTTPS client only (ureq 3.4.2 → rustls 0.23.46 → rustls-webpki); the core and the wasm crate have no TLS 0.103.15 0.103.16 (7a7b71c, Cargo.lock only) cargo deny check advisories ok; tests/tls.rs below the worker talks to one managed Supabase origin over HTTPS; the advisory concerned a chain built through a distrusted intermediate, which only an attacker in the network path could present
RUSTSEC-2026-0381, webpki-roots: bundled roots allow trust in distrusted emSign intermediates same path (ureq → webpki-roots, the worker's trust store, no system store in the distroless image) 1.0.9 1.0.10 (7a7b71c) same same; the store is bundled at build time, so a future root change needs a rebuild of the worker image
GHSA-wrjc-x8rr-h8h6, react-router: open redirect via backslash in <Link> and useNavigate (moderate) the application (react-router-dom → react-router), BrowserRouter SPA 7.15.1 7.18.4 (c9dab63, ^7.18.4 in apps/app/package.json) pnpm audit --prod: no known vulnerability; app suite 59 files / 429 cases, the routing, guard, auth and redirect suites among them the only destination from untrusted data is the next query value, rebuilt by safeNextPath from a URL parsed against a sentinel origin (/\host and //host fall back): not reachable before the update either; every other to is a literal
GHSA-chx6-hx7r-mcp5, react-router: unauthenticated DoS via inefficient route matching (high) same 7.15.1 7.18.4 same server-side route matching; the application matches in the visitor's own tab, no server runs the router
GHSA-qwww-vcr4-c8h2 (RSC CSRF, high), GHSA-h8fp-f39c-q6mh (RSC error handler XSS), GHSA-337j-9hxr-rhxg (SSR hydration constructor injection) same 7.15.1 7.18.4 same RSC and SSR modes: the application uses neither (no loader, action, server or hydration)

React Router 7.16 to 7.18.4 are patch-level releases for this application (the 7.x changelog: framework-mode and data-mode fixes, precomputed route matchers, URL normalisation); no API the application calls changed, the typecheck and the suites pass unchanged, and the shipped module bytes are the same (1,535,289 B raw, 519,795 B gzip: the lockfile change touches no wasm input).

TLS proof (crates/worker/tests/tls.rs, a604c07): an in-process rustls server presents a self-signed certificate for 127.0.0.1; the HttpBackend built from https://127.0.0.1:<port> must answer Network naming the certificate, the service key must not appear in the message, and the server must see the connection dropped during the handshake, never a request. Negative run: with disable_verification(true) on the agent (a temporary edit of http.rs, reverted) the server answers [] and the call succeeds, so the test fails as it should. The proof covers validation being active on the worker's client with its bundled store, not the emSign distrust itself (that would need the distrusted chain). Dev-dependencies added for it: rustls (already in the tree through ureq, same features) and rcgen 0.14.10 (the rustls project's generator, ring provider, no pem): the test build adds rcgen, time and yasna; the lockfile also lists rcgen's optional x509-parser family, not compiled. The test runs natively in rust:check and in the worker image's musl test stage.

Checks on a604c07: pnpm rust:check green (fmt, clippy, tests, ts-rs, cargo deny check licenses bans sources); cargo deny check advisories ok (it was failing on the two RUSTSEC ids); pnpm audit --prod: no known vulnerability (the dev-only tinypool advisories of the full audit stay, vitest's, outside this maintenance); pnpm check:all green (17:27:54: Rust, wasm, Node, app image, worker sandbox tests and runtime image); the goldens, oracles and R4 digests untouched (git diff --stat 8943bf3 -- apps/app/tests/fixtures crates/core/tests empty). Nothing is called fixed because it compiles: the Rust ids are gone from the advisory check and the npm ones from the production audit, and the two reachable behaviours (certificate validation, next redirection) have a test each.

10.14 R4.12: the three pre-merge fixes of the Context7 review (2026-10-21)

Owner decisions on .claude/audits/CONTEXT7-2026-10-21.md: D1, D3 and D6 now, one commit each; D2 (Tailwind outline-hidden) and D5 (MotionConfig reducedMotion="user") for a separate accessibility chantier with a visual recette; D4 (vitest coverage block, jest-dom entry, defineConfig, forwardRef, the authStore comment) in the maintenance backlog; no major upgrade.

D3, safeNextPath (51a5a80). The URL parser's own normalisation turned /..//evil.test, /.//, /a/..//, /%2e%2e//, /.%2e//, /..\\ and a tab inside .. into //evil.test: same origin for the sentinel, yet a protocol-relative path once returned. The rebuilt value is now refused when it starts with // or no longer resolves to the sentinel origin, so the function's contract holds by itself. Consumers (LoginRoute, RedirectIfSignedIn, AuthCallbackRoute): with react-router 7.18.4, useNavigate checks the target (« External navigation is not allowed ») and <Navigate> collapses the slashes (resolvePath('//evil.test/app/account') = /evil.test/app/account), and the old function made the LoginRoute test fail without leaving the origin. The security gate read one more path in the installed package: history.push falls back to window.location.assign when pushState throws. So the router's guards are not a contract this code may lean on, and the fix does not rely on them. Tests: 4 new safeNextPath cases (12 dot-segment spellings, external schemes and escapes, encoded slashes kept literal and legitimate paths unchanged, idempotence) and a LoginRoute case through the real router (next=/..//evil.test/app/account lands on the dashboard); on the old function, 3 of them fail.

D1, worker runtime image (49b1849). gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12 → static-debian13:nonroot (the distroless README: only the Debian 13 tags are still published and updated). Provenance: the official gcr.io/distroless registry, digest sha256:d62067879de890a1def9da0e7766b7d20810a5e5555cef8506b752437d7a3e88 at the build; its cosign signature was not checked (no cosign on this machine). Same contents for the worker: user nonroot 65532, no shell (/bin/sh absent), CA bundle at /etc/ssl/certs (the worker's TLS uses the bundled webpki roots, not the system store). The build, the sandbox and seccomp test stage and the binary are unchanged. Proofs: pnpm worker:test (sandbox tests 11 + 16, TLS 1, seccomp derivation), pnpm worker:image (user nonroot, run --check, 12.1 MB), run --check under --read-only --cap-drop ALL --network none, and pnpm e2e:avatar against the local Supabase stack with this image: 5/5 (clean upload, replacement and purge, signed-URL leftovers, hostile and corrupted uploads refused with closed codes, removal); the stack was stopped afterwards (volumes kept).

D6, DEPLOY.md host nginx (60faac8). listen 443 ssl http2; → listen 443 ssl; + http2 on;. Incompatibility found and kept visible: faunosteo.com answers Server: nginx/1.24.0 (Ubuntu), and nginx 1.24 does not know http2 on (nginx -t in a throwaway nginx:1.24-alpine: unknown directive "http2"), while nginx 1.31 accepts it and warns that listen ... http2 is deprecated. The runbook gives the new form for nginx >= 1.25.1 and names the old one for 1.24, with nginx -v to choose; no other directive changed, no server touched.

Checks on 60faac8: pnpm check:all green (18:55:30; apps/app 59 files, 434 cases; the worker image on the Debian 13 digest; the TLS test native and in the musl stage); pnpm audit --prod clean; cargo deny check (all four) ok; the goldens, oracles and the PDF engine untouched (git diff --stat 8943bf3 -- apps/app/tests/fixtures crates/core/tests crates/core/src empty).

10.15 R4 closed: device acceptance, residual risks, merge (2026-10-21)

Owner's final validation (2026-10-21): J1 and J2 run on the computer (Chrome, Firefox, Brave), on Android with its browser and on a real iPhone with Safari iOS, reported as passed with no blocking anomaly; the R4.12 checkpoint and every earlier decision validated; the merge into develop authorised, subject to the usual final checks. Results as declared, with what was not given marked as missing rather than inferred: R4_J1_RESULTS.md, R4_J2_RESULTS.md, R4_MINI_RECETTE.md.

What the acceptance covers, and its limits:

  • Computer, Android, iPhone: a declaration per recette, no per-check or per-browser split beyond J1.7. For the iPhone, the model, the iOS and Safari versions, the surface, the timings (J1.8, J1.12, J2.6) and the memory observations (J1.9, J1.10, J2.6, J2.7) were not reported. The plan's OD-6 rule is met at the device level (every listed device was run on a real machine); the per-check measures it also asked for are the first follow-up below.
  • J1.7: functional PASS with the picker-delay reserve (about 60 s to open the file dialog with the computer's network cut, seen with Ctrl+O outside Faunosteo as well); cause not established, no application change (§10.12). M3 of the mini-recette not run: complementary, not blocking.
  • J2.3: PASS under the approved rule; a new export carries the application's current branding, the archive keeps its own (§10.12 B).

Residual risks accepted by the owner for the merge into develop, open until their own deadline (none is closed by the merge):

Risk Where Deadline
Worker base image referenced by tag (static-debian13:nonroot), not by digest; cosign signature not checked (no cosign on the build machine) §10.14 D1 before a production image is published
Semgrep partial parse of two test files (routes.LoginRoute.test.tsx, routes.coreStopped.test.tsx: the >() generic call syntax), test coverage gap only R4.12 security gate next security pass
Guardrails WARN outside the R4 diff: SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER on species_select_active (migration 20261008110000, a catalog read policy by design) R4.12 security gate, /guardrails its own review, not an R4 item
Device timings and memory observations not reported (items 5, 6, 7, 9, 20 of PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING.md §6) PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING.md §7 before the import is offered to external users (item 18)
J1.7 picker delay offline, cause not established §10.12 A reopened only on a new proven defect
Chromium per-export growth of the browser's raster path (BDR-063) §10.11 a device observation, then one reused canvas if needed
Accessibility (D2 outline-hidden, D5 reduced motion) and the D4 configuration chores .claude/tasks/TODO.md separate chantiers, not scheduled

Checks on the final state before the merge (HEAD 22bbfb4, the code state of 60faac8 plus memory and documentation commits): pnpm check:all green at 22:15:50 (rust-check, types drift, wasm build, app 59 files / 434 cases, domain 262, core-wasm 58, anatomy 131, supabase 40, app image, worker test stage with the TLS test, worker image on the Debian 13 digest sha256:d62067…3e88); pnpm audit --prod clean (the full audit lists 54 advisories in the development tooling only: 26 on the pinned pnpm 10.13.1 itself, the rest on vite, vitest and their transitive packages; none reaches the production bundle); gitleaks on the 111 commits of the branch: no leak, and on the working tree one finding in the git-ignored .env.worker only; no /home/<user> path, personal identifier or LAN host in a versioned file (the LAN subnet of ENVIRONMENTS.md and the forge URL of DEPLOY.md predate the branch); git merge-tree develop HEAD clean; the Step 6 goldens untouched since 8b86b92 (identical on develop), the R4 oracles since 4439fd2 and the R4 digests since d492bf7 (the declared R4.6 re-freeze); 51 deletions on the branch, all in 0dc1ba2 (R4.8, authorised), none after. Merge: gitflow finish on feature/rust-r4-pdf-core (no-ff into develop, branch deleted local and remote), recorded in .claude/memory/journal.md. Release 0.2.0, faunosteo.com and R5 untouched.