27 KiB
Rust in the Faunosteo monorepo
Status: plan R0 (foundation, validated 2026-10-13) and R1 (the Step 8 worker,
2026-10-13, feature/step-08-files-foundation). Rule and roadmap:
RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md (rule "Rust by default", Part III boundary
rules, Part IV the worker, Part VI phases R0–R5, Annex B R0 scope, Annex C
owner amendments). R0 shipped the toolchain, the workspace skeleton, the
worker's sandboxed child, the browser module loader and seven experimental
proofs; R1 ships the worker's job loop and sweeper for the avatar pipeline
(STORAGE.md §3). The frontend does not load the browser module before R2.
1. Toolchain: native on the development machine, reproducible in Docker, never on the VPS
Three environments, three roles (owner decision of 2026-10-13, review Annex C addendum). The development machine is a self-hosted Ubuntu server (native, not WSL, not the VPS) with Docker rootless.
| Environment | Role | Rust |
|---|---|---|
| Ubuntu development machine, native | daily development (cargo check / test / build / clippy / fmt), the browser module build, every check before a merge (pnpm check:all) |
user-level rustup in ~/.cargo and ~/.rustup, channel pinned by rust-toolchain.toml |
| Docker on that machine | the Supabase stack, the worker's sandbox tests and seccomp derivation, integration tests, the application and worker images, and the reproducible run of the same Rust scripts through the builder image | inside images only |
| Production VPS | runs images; never compiles | none |
1.1 Native toolchain (the primary path)
Everything lives in the user's home: no global package, no sudo. Checked on
2026-10-13 (Ubuntu 26.04.1, x86_64): build-essential (gcc 15, the C
compiler that builds the worker's vendored libwebp), libc6-dev,
pkg-config, libssl-dev and strace were already installed; no system
package is missing.
# once: rustup, the user-level installer (https://rustup.rs); ~/.bashrc and ~/.profile source ~/.cargo/env
rustup show # from the repository: installs 1.99.0 + rustfmt + clippy
rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown # browser build of crates/wasm
cargo install wasm-bindgen-cli --version 0.2.129 --locked # = the wasm-bindgen crate in Cargo.lock
cargo install cargo-deny --version 0.20.2 --locked
rustup show run inside the repository installs the channel of
rust-toolchain.toml (rustup auto-install), so cargo here is always
1.99.0 whatever the default toolchain of the machine. Non-interactive
shells (editor tasks, git hooks, agent shells) skip ~/.bashrc and start
without ~/.cargo/bin on PATH: the scripts source scripts/rust-env.sh,
which prepends it when cargo is not found.
| Piece | Native | Builder image | Pinned by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rust 1.99.0, edition 2024, rustfmt, clippy | rustup show (auto-install) |
FROM rust:1.99.0-bookworm + rustup component add |
rust-toolchain.toml |
wasm32-unknown-unknown |
rustup target add |
RUN rustup target add |
same channel |
wasm-bindgen-cli 0.2.129 |
cargo install --locked |
same | wasm-bindgen = "=0.2.129" in Cargo.toml; scripts/wasm-build.sh refuses to run when Cargo.lock and the CLI on PATH differ |
cargo-deny 0.20.2 |
cargo install --locked |
same | deny.toml |
| worker builder (musl, libwebp) | not native: sandbox tests run in Docker only | crates/worker/Dockerfile (FROM rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24, build-base) |
same channel |
Commands (root package.json; every Rust script is one file run natively
or inside the builder image):
pnpm rust:check # scripts/rust-check.sh, native: fmt --check, clippy -D warnings (all targets),
# cargo test (core, wasm, worker unit tests), ts-rs export, cargo deny licenses/bans/sources
pnpm wasm:build # scripts/wasm-build.sh, native: crates/wasm → packages/core-wasm/pkg (git-ignored), sizes printed
pnpm check:all # scripts/check-all.sh: the pre-merge gate (§4): rust:check, types drift, wasm:build,
# pnpm check, application image, worker:test, worker:image started read-only
pnpm rust:check:docker # the same rust-check.sh inside the builder image (reproducible run)
pnpm wasm:build:docker # the same wasm-build.sh inside the builder image
pnpm rust:builder # builds faunosteo_rust_builder:1.99.0 once (about 6 minutes cold)
pnpm worker:test # Docker only: crates/worker/Dockerfile stage test, 16 sandbox tests + seccomp derivation
pnpm worker:image # Docker only: runtime image faunosteo_worker:dev (distroless/static:nonroot)
bash docker/rust-run.sh cargo <anything> # any cargo command in the builder
cargo check | test | build | clippy | fmt # the inner loop, from the repository root
The native target/ (git-ignored, .dockerignored) and the builder's named
volumes faunosteo_cargo_registry / faunosteo_rust_target are two
separate caches; neither invalidates the other.
1.2 What stays in Docker, and why
- The worker's sandbox tests (
crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs) are gated by thetest-hooksfeature: a nativecargo testcompiles that target empty and runs the worker's unit tests only. The seccomp allowlist is derived bystraceon the musl static binary that ships, inside the Alpineteststage, and glibc would need other syscalls (brk,mprotect,futex): running the sandbox natively would either kill a legitimate decode or prove nothing about the shipped binary.pnpm worker:testis the only path, and the worker keeps running in its container. - The Supabase stack, the application image, the worker image and the
integration tests on them:
pnpm db:start,docker build -t faunosteo .,pnpm worker:image. - The builder image stays as the reproducible alternative (same compiler, same tools, a clean environment) and as the reference a future runner uses; it is not needed for a compile or a test on the development machine.
Exposure change, stated for the record: a native build runs the build
scripts and proc-macros of the dependencies under the user account (the
builder container ran them with the repository mounted read-write, so the
difference is the rest of the home directory). Mitigations in place:
--locked everywhere, deny.toml [sources] limited to crates.io with
unknown registries and git sources denied, cargo deny check licenses bans sources in every check.
2. Workspace
Cargo.toml workspace (resolver 3), pinned [workspace.dependencies], lints, profiles
rust-toolchain.toml channel 1.99.0, components rustfmt + clippy
rustfmt.toml edition 2024, max_width 100
clippy.toml disallowed-methods: std::time::*::now, std::fs::*, std::env::var* (the core)
deny.toml licences allow-list, bans (duplicates warn, wildcards deny, path deps allowed), sources
.cargo/config.toml wasm shadow stack 1 MiB (explicit), TS_RS_EXPORT_DIR = packages/core-wasm/types
crates/core faunosteo-core: lib, no I/O (lint), serde + serde_json only
crates/wasm faunosteo-wasm: cdylib facade over core (wasm-bindgen)
crates/worker faunosteo-worker: bin + lib (image, libwebp-sys, seccompiler, rlimit)
packages/core-wasm loader, generated types (committed), vitest proofs
Lints: unwrap_used, expect_used and disallowed_methods are errors in the
libraries (tests allow them explicitly at the top of the file); unsafe_code
is forbidden everywhere except the worker (libwebp FFI, each block with a
SAFETY comment). Dependencies are optimised even in debug builds
(profile.dev.package."*") because the sandbox tests decode 4096² images
under a 10 s CPU limit.
2.1 Boundary rules in code (review III.3)
faunosteo_core::facade::call(op, json) -> json: one operation name, one JSON text in, the outcome envelope out ({"ok":true,"value":…}or{"ok":false,"kind":…,"detail":…}), never a panic on content. R0 ops:core_version,pretty_json,sheet_ref,report_zone.faunosteo_core::json:js_number(f64)prints floats as ECMAScriptNumber::toString;JsPrettyFormatterisserde_json's pretty formatter with that rule;to_js_prettyandpretty_js_round_tripproduceJSON.stringify(v, null, 2)byte for byte (proof §5.2).faunosteo_core::domain::report:SheetRef,ReportZone,Vertebra,LateralSide,Unresolved, field order of the Zod schemas, optional fieldsskip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none", nullable fields plainOption, unknown keys ignored where Zod strips them.cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features tswrites the TypeScript types topackages/core-wasm/types(committed; CI fails on drift).packages/core-wasm/src/index.ts:loadCore()instantiates a fresh module each time (cache-busting import of the glue),callCore()parses the envelope,isCoreBuilt()lets the proofs skip whenpkg/is absent.
3. The worker (R0 sandboxed child, R1 job loop)
faunosteo-worker is one static musl binary with subcommands dispatched by
a plain main (no async runtime, no thread), so decode installs its
sandbox in a single-threaded process. R1 (Step 8) adds the keyed parent:
run polls claim_avatar_jobs through PostgREST every 2 s, downloads the
quarantine object, feeds it to a decode child, uploads the 512 × 512 WebP
at the final key, commits the row (complete_avatar_job with the lease
token), deletes the quarantine object, and sweeps (expired uploads, the
purge queue, quarantine leftovers) every 10 minutes. Modules: config (env,
secret newtype that no Debug output prints, JWT expiry), log (JSON lines,
field allowlist, child stderr escaped and cut at 200 bytes), keys (strict
four-segment key shapes validated before any URL), backend (trait, closed
BackendError), http (ureq 3 on rustls + ring with the bundled roots, 30 s
global / 5 s connect timeouts, no redirect, P0001 bodies → closed
refusals, the Storage API's HTTP 400 + statusCode 404 → 404), decoder,
job (the STORAGE.md §3.4 mapping), sweep (§3.5), watchdog (per-stage
deadlines, exit 21 on overrun; Broken child → exit 20), run
(WORKER_ONCE, --check). Library choice recorded against the review's
Part V list: ureq instead of tokio + reqwest, hand-written JSON lines
instead of tracing, a 25-line base64url decoder instead of base64: the
loop is sequential, nothing needs an async runtime, and the keyed process
keeps a smaller dependency tree (34 → 84 crates, aws-lc-rs absent, no
cmake on Alpine). The decode child's traced syscall set did not change with
the parent's TLS code (§5.4 re-run at R1: the same seven). Image 11.6 MB
(8.7 MB at R0: ring + rustls). Tests: crates/worker/tests/job_loop.rs (11,
fake backend + fake decoder) and the module unit tests run natively; the
real-stack end-to-end runs through pnpm e2e:avatar (STORAGE.md §6).
The sandboxed child, unchanged from R0:
decode: refuses a non-empty environment; checksThreads: 1in/proc/self/status; disables core dumps (PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0,RLIMIT_CORE 0: a dump would hold the uploaded photo);RLIMIT_AS512 MiB,RLIMIT_CPU10 s soft / 12 s hard (soft = hard made the kernel SIGKILL first, finding §5.4); seccomp allowlist installed with TSYNC,KillProcesson anything else, with argument filters:tkill/tgkillmay only send SIGABRT to the child's own pid (never a signal to the keyed parent or a sibling),mmapmay not mapPROT_EXEC; then reads ≤ 5 MiB on stdin, sniffs the format (JPEG, PNG, WebP), decodes withimage::Limits(sides ≤ 4096, alloc 256 MiB), applies the EXIF orientation,resize_to_fill512 × 512, encodes lossy WebP (q 82) throughlibwebp-sys(C, this process only), writes stdout. Exit codes inexit_codes.rs(10–19, never 1, 101 or a signal number); every decode-time error maps to a content code (unsupported_type,decode_failed,dimensions,resource_limit), so no upload can produce a broken-environment code.- the parent side (
spawn::Spawner, used by the tests now and by R1):env_clear, stdin/stdout/stderr piped, output read up to 512 KiB (the child is killed past it), 20 s deadline, classification of every exit (Produced,Rejected{code}for the content codes (exit_codes::is_content_rejection, an explicit list),Broken{code}when the child could not run properly (usage, non-empty environment, sandbox failure, encode or output failure, internal: R1 alerts instead of blaming the upload; no content can produce it),Signalled{signal},OutputOverflow,Timeout,Failed). The parent never decodes:webp_check::inspectparses the RIFF container only (chunk allowlistVP8X,VP8,VP8L,ALPH; the encoder's structure enforced: optionalVP8Xfirst, optionalALPHonly in an extended file, exactly one frame; canvas size from the headers, the frame size must agree with the canvas; anyEXIF,XMP,ICCPor unknown chunk refuses the output; owner amendment of D-R4). The child's stderr (≤ 4 KiB) is child-controlled text: R1 never logs it raw (LRN-044). run --check: prints the resolved configuration without secrets (which variables are set, the linked libwebp version, refused below 1.6.0, the JWT expiry of the service key); exit 0 when startable or when no worker variable is set at all, 2 on a partial configuration.runstarts the loop (STORAGE.md §3.2 for the variables).version: binary, workspace and libwebp versions.- test hooks (
--features test-hooks, never in a release build): fixtures generated in memory (no binary in git),--no-seccomp(rlimits only, prints theSECCOMP-MARKERline for the strace derivation),--violate(getcwdafter the filter),--flood,--alloc-gib n,--spin,print-allowlist.
Image: crates/worker/Dockerfile, stages build (release, static),
test (sandbox tests and scripts/derive-seccomp.sh on the release
profile with the test-hooks feature, so the binary under test differs
from the shipped one by the feature-gated hooks only), runtime
(gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot, USER nonroot, ENTRYPOINT /faunosteo-worker, CMD run --check). Measured 2026-10-12: image 8.7 MB (one static
binary), run --check exits 0 with --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges:true.
4. Checks before a merge, and the workflow files (prepared, no CI active)
No CI/CD runs on the forge today (2026-10-13): no runner, no secret, no
registry. The YAML files under .gitea/workflows/ are kept as prepared
material for that separate decision; a green workflow is never claimed
until one has actually run on the forge. Until then the gate is local:
pnpm check:all # scripts/check-all.sh, stops at the first failure
Stages, in order: scripts/rust-check.sh (native), the ts-rs types drift
(git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all -- packages/core-wasm/types
must be empty: a modified or a new type file both fail, whatever the git
configuration), cargo deny check advisories
(warn-only: out of the blocking path by design, review VIII.3, but printed
here because no nightly job runs yet; needs the network), scripts/wasm-build.sh
(native), pnpm check (typecheck, tests including the core-wasm proofs on
the module just built and the pgTAP suite on PGlite, lint, build), the
application image, pnpm worker:test (sandbox tests and seccomp derivation
on the musl binary), pnpm worker:image started once with --read-only --cap-drop ALL. The local Supabase stack is not required; pnpm db:test
is the real-stack complement after a change under supabase/.
Workflow files, each mapping onto those stages so a future runner calls the same scripts:
ci.yml(push on main/develop, pull requests): jobrust(builder image,scripts/rust-check.sh, types drift,scripts/wasm-build.sh), jobcheck(module built the same way, then the Node pipeline), jobdocker(application image, workerteststage, worker runtime started read-only), jobsupabase(real stack, pgTAP, generated types diff).rust-advisories.yml: nightly and manualcargo deny check advisories, out of the blocking path on purpose.release-images.yml: manual only; the dispatch input is a typed choice re-validated through an environment variable; the RustSec and npm (pnpm audit --prod) advisories gates run first in a job without secrets; a named ephemeralbuildxbuilder (--builder, no silent fallback) with its own cache builds the images; the registry token reaches the login step only, into a per-jobDOCKER_CONFIGunderRUNNER_TEMPcreated before any step and removed by a literal path; digests read from the build metadata;actions/checkoutpinned to a commit. Theif: github.refline is not a boundary (push access and the token's scope are; a dedicated release runner label is the Step 27 operation). It would pushfaunosteo_app:<sha>andfaunosteo_worker:<sha>and print their digests. Deploys nothing (DEPLOY.md "Image deploy by digest").
Target of the future CI/CD step (planned, not yet built; recorded so the scripts stay compatible): tests on every push and pull request, Rust and TypeScript checks, PostgreSQL/RLS tests, Docker builds, security checks, branch verification before a merge, image publication only in an explicitly authorised workflow.
Not measured: the forge runner's cache behaviour, cold build times and the
workflow syntax (job-level env, GITHUB_ENV path) have never run. The
builder image build took about 6 minutes cold on the development host; both
image builds reuse BuildKit cache mounts (faunosteo_cargo_registry_musl,
faunosteo_target_musl).
5. R0 proofs (2026-10-12, development host, Docker 29.8 rootless, kernel 7.0)
Each proof is a permanent test; the numbers are what the run produced.
5.1 Panic strategy on wasm32 (packages/core-wasm/tests/panic.test.ts)
- A Rust panic reaches JavaScript as
WebAssembly.RuntimeError(unreachable): the module is panic = abort,catch_unwindcannot be used there. - Exhausting the 1 MiB shadow stack (2 000 000 frames of 128 bytes) traps
(
RuntimeError) instead of corrupting memory. - After a stack-exhaustion trap, the next call on the same instance fails in
the allocator (
memory access out of bounds, deterministic). After a plain panic the same instance still answers, with a stack pointer that was never unwound: the dangerous case. Rule for R2: no instance is reused after any trap; a fresh instance is a new module record (the wasm-bindgen glue caches its instance in a module variable, and the ESM cache returns the same module for the same URL:loadCore()imports with a cache-busting query; in the browser the glue must be a static asset imported the same way, or the core runs in a Worker recreated on trap).
5.2 Serialisation contract (tests/serialisation.test.ts, crates/core/tests)
- Byte equality with
JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(text), null, 2)onreport-v3.demo.json,report-v2.full.json, the 296 KB equinedocument.jsonand the 84 KBreport-migration-map.json, plus a number corpus (1523,1715.4285714285713,0.85,1e+21,1e-7,0.000001,-0→0,123456789012345680000,5e-324,1.7976931348623157e+308). - Finding:
serde_json's default float parser is a documented fast path that can be one ULP off; the first run printed1715.428571428571and123456789012345670000. Thefloat_roundtripfeature (enabled inCargo.toml) fixes it; the module grew from 187 KB to 225 KB raw. - Optional fields absent, nullable fields
null, unknown keys ignored,unresolved: falserefused; the currentReportZoneSchemaandSheetRefSchema(Zod 3,@faunosteo/domain) parse what the core writes.
5.3 musl static binary with libwebp (crates/worker/Dockerfile)
Builds on rust:1.99.0-alpine3.24 with build-base; libwebp-sys 0.14.4
compiles its vendored libwebp with cc; WebPGetEncoderVersion() reports
1.6.0 (logged by run --check, test
the_linked_libwebp_is_recent_enough). The runtime image carries the one
static binary.
5.4 seccomp allowlist, derived and proven (crates/worker/tests/sandbox.rs)
- Derivation (
scripts/derive-seccomp.sh, strace over png, jpeg, webp, a 4096 × 4096 JPEG and a 3000 × 3000 PNG, after the marker): exactlyread write mmap munmap mremap exit_group getrandom. musl's mallocng used neitherbrknormprotect; nofutexin a single-threaded decode. The allowlist is that set plus the abort path (rt_sigaction,rt_sigprocmask,getpid,gettid,tkill,tgkill,exit). - Proven on the release-profile musl binary with the test hooks, inside
Docker's default seccomp profile: 16 tests green (
png_jpeg_and_webp_decode_through_the_full_sandbox,inputs_at_the_caps_decode_within_the_limits(4096²), dimensions 32 px and 20 000² header, GIF and SVG refused, truncated PNG, non-empty environment refused,--violate→ SIGSYS 31,--flood→ output cut,--alloc-gib 2→ SIGABRT 6 underRLIMIT_AS,--spin→ parent deadline,--spin→ SIGXCPU 24 at the CPU soft limit, libwebp ≥ 1.6.0; negative proofs of the argument filters:--signal-parent(tkillto the parent) and--mmap-exec→ SIGSYS; aniCCPbomb of 300 MB inflated → a content rejection, never a broken-environment outcome). - Findings: with
RLIMIT_CPUsoft = hard the kernel sends SIGKILL (hard limit checked first), indistinguishable from the parent's deadline kill; the soft limit is now two seconds below the hard one. The 4096² decode exceeded 10 s of CPU in an unoptimised debug build: dependencies are optimised in every profile.
5.5 CSP with 'wasm-unsafe-eval' (docker/csp-proof/run.sh)
Served packages/core-wasm/pkg through nginx:1.31-alpine with
docker/nginx.conf plus the exact Content-Security-Policy of
DEPLOY.md, loaded by headless Chrome for Testing 156:
| Header | Result |
|---|---|
production (script-src 'self') |
FAIL WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming(): Compiling or instantiating WebAssembly module violates the following Content Security policy directive because 'unsafe-eval' is not an allowed source of script in the following Content Security Policy directive: "script-src 'self'" |
script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' |
OK 0.1.0 (module instantiated, core_version() answered) |
The keyword allows WebAssembly compilation only: an inline <script>
variant stayed blocked under both headers. nginx serves .wasm as
application/wasm out of the box.
5.6 Served size and instantiate time (tests/size.test.ts)
faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm: 224 713 bytes raw, 85 396 bytes gzip-9 (with
float_roundtrip; 186 805 / 72 917 without), instantiate 2.7 ms in Node 24.
The D-R13 budget (600 KB compressed) is asserted by the test from R0 on.
5.7 Runner caches and build times
Not measurable from this host (no forge runner here). Recorded instead: builder image cold build about 6 minutes; worker test stage cold about 2 minutes, warm under 30 s with the BuildKit cache mounts; the wasm build under 10 s warm. The first run on the forge records its own numbers here.
5.8 Native toolchain run (2026-10-13, Ubuntu 26.04.1, rustup 1.29.1, 16 cores)
Same proofs, native toolchain (rustc 1.99.0 (b940084d7 2026-09-28),
cargo 1.99.0, clippy 0.1.99, rustfmt 1.10.0-stable, wasm-bindgen 0.2.129, cargo-deny 0.20.2), compared with the builder image runs above:
| Measure | Native | Builder image (R0) |
|---|---|---|
cold cargo build --workspace --all-targets (libwebp compiled by gcc 15) |
31.5 s | not timed at R0 |
| cold wasm release build | 4.3 s | under 10 s warm |
scripts/rust-check.sh warm (fmt, clippy, tests, ts export, deny) |
32 s | 2.2 s warm volumes (same script, same results) |
| cargo tests | core 10 + 2, worker unit 9, core with ts 14 + 2, all green |
identical counts |
| committed ts-rs types | unchanged after the export | unchanged |
faunosteo_wasm_bg.wasm raw |
224 777 B | 224 713 B |
| gzip -9 | 84 924 B (gzip), 85 390 B (the vitest measure) |
84 927 B / 85 396 B |
| sha256 | 2d559a6b…bb3a |
451d49c1…a752 |
| core-wasm proofs | 14 passed, instantiate 3.9 ms | 14 passed, 2.7 ms |
The 64-byte difference and the distinct hashes come from the source paths
embedded in the panic locations (/home/<user>/Documents/faunosteo/…
natively, /w/… in the builder): the module is not bit-reproducible across
build roots without --remap-path-prefix, which R0 does not set. The
builder image is the reference when two builds must match byte for byte.
cargo deny prints the same warnings in both environments
(license-not-encountered for six allowed licences, duplicate miniz_oxide
and syn): policy warn, not failures.
6. Reproduction
pnpm rust:check # §2, §5.2 (cargo side), native
pnpm wasm:build && pnpm --filter @faunosteo/core-wasm test:run # §5.1, §5.2, §5.6, native module
pnpm rust:builder && pnpm rust:check:docker && pnpm wasm:build:docker # the same, reproducible in the builder
pnpm worker:test # §5.3, §5.4 (tests + derivation in the build log)
pnpm worker:image && docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL faunosteo_worker:dev # §3
CHROME=<chromium binary> bash docker/csp-proof/run.sh # §5.5 (playwright-core on NODE_PATH)
pnpm check:all # everything above but the CSP proof, in one command
7. What stays hypothetical after R0
- Follow-ups from the R0 security audit, owned by R1 unless stated: base
images pinned by digest in the three Dockerfiles (today by tag, as the
existing
Dockerfile); a verification decode of the child's output in a second sandboxed child (the RIFF check validates the container, not the bitstream); the shared BuildKit cache mounts of the CI builds (the release workflow already uses its own builder);actions/*@v4tags inci.yml(pre-existing practice) to pin by commit at Step 27. - The browser-side fresh-instance mechanism (static glue URL with a cache-busting query under Vite, or a Worker per instance) is designed, not built: R2 builds and tests it.
- HTTPS from the worker: R1 links
ureqwith rustls and the bundledwebpki-roots(distroless has no CA bundle; none is needed), but every run so far targets the local stack over plain HTTP on the Docker network; the first managed (HTTPS) target proves the roots. - The forge runner's cache and timings (§5.7), and the workflow files themselves: no runner exists, none of the three workflows has ever run (§4).
- The allowlist is x86_64; an aarch64 host would need its own derivation
(
target_archselects the seccomp architecture, the syscall numbers come fromlibc).