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Blockers Registry

Format: BLK-XXX | Date | Friction | Root cause | Solution | Status


BLK-001 | 2026-05-18 | pnpm not on PATH

pnpm command not found on shell start. Root: corepack shim broken on Node 20.20.0 (ERR_VM_DYNAMIC_IMPORT_CALLBACK_MISSING). Fix: curl https://get.pnpm.io/install.sh → ~/.local/share/pnpm/bin/pnpm. Status: resolved.


BLK-002 | 2026-05-18 | Pathology DB empty — pending content review

40-60 equine entries needed; source-cited from Merck Vet Manual, IMAIOS, PubMed, EVJ, WikiVet, LCAO. Client osteo will review post-scaffold. Status: resolved 2026-05-21 — superseded by hierarchical v2.0 catalog, 26 zones / 792 nodes / 612 leaves / 41 vet-referral leaves authored by domain expert. Counts blow past original 40-60 target. Source citations not yet attached on every leaf (sources optional in schema) — content review still a client task but DB no longer empty.


BLK-003 | 2026-05-19 | Detail-popup zone clicks silently dropped

Friction: clicks on head detail SVG zones did nothing. Root: EditorRoute.onZoneClick looked up id in main-SVG bones map only → detail ids (point-*) undefined → early return. Fix: parse detail SVG on detail open, store detailBones, fallback lookup bones.get(id) ?? detailBones.get(id). Status: resolved.


BLK-004 | 2026-05-19 | PDF text loop assumed one line per array entry

Friction: long zone string collided with following lines (pathologies, sévérité, commentaire). Root: pdf-lib maxWidth wraps glyph drawing but caller advanced cursor by i * 14 based on block index — wrapped lines invisible to layout. Fix: explicit wrapLines + per-line cursor advance + per-block gap. Status: resolved.


BLK-005 | 2026-05-21 | Docker build crash — ERR_UNKNOWN_BUILTIN_MODULE node:sqlite

Friction: VPS docker compose up --build -d crashed on pnpm install (fresh cold build). Root: node:20-alpine (Node 20.20.2) cannot load pnpm 11.x — pnpm 11 itself imports node:sqlite from ../store/index/lib/index.js, and node:sqlite is a Node 22.13+ built-in. Crash: ERR_UNKNOWN_BUILTIN_MODULE: node:sqlite. Local dev was deceptive — host runs Node 20 too, but pnpm install never ran on host (lockfile already resolved); pnpm run typecheck / pnpm run test only spawn child scripts and never load the store-index module. Iterations:

  1. corepack prepare pnpm@latest → fails (resolves to current pnpm 11.x).
  2. corepack prepare pnpm@11.1.3 → still fails (entire pnpm 11.x line needs Node 22.13).
  3. corepack prepare pnpm@10.13.1 → works. Last major before the node:sqlite cache backend; reads lockfile v9 unchanged; already cached on dev host. Fix: Dockerfile:7 pinned to pnpm@10.13.1. Status: resolved (commit 990c8e7).

BLK-006 | 2026-10-08 | Docker socket permission denied → no local Supabase stack for Claude

Friction: supabase start → "permission denied … /var/run/docker.sock"; daemon up (docker info client OK), user not in docker group. No psql/postgres on host either. Root: host group membership; needs sudo usermod -aG docker $USER + re-login (user runs, not Claude). Workaround: PGlite harness (BDR-028) executes migrations + 81 pgTAP checks; CLI config parses (supabase start fails only at Docker inspect). Status: resolved 2026-10-08 (same day) — user added docker group; supabase start pulled postgres 17.11.0.004, applied 3 migrations + seed; supabase test db 81/81 after scoping counts to fixture ids (seed rows broke 6 absolute counts, PGlite had no seed); gen types adopted (CLI output unformatted → piped through prettier); REST script §8 matched expectations; db reset from zero OK.


BLK-007 | 2026-10-08 | Per-schema ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES REVOKE is a no-op → private helpers kept PUBLIC EXECUTE

Friction: Step 4 verifier + security gate both found every private.* function executable by authenticated (incl. definer helpers taking a caller-supplied actor: assign_platform_role, insert_sheet_draft). Root: foundation ran alter default privileges in schema private revoke execute on functions from public; PostgreSQL adds per-schema defaults on top of the built-in PUBLIC EXECUTE, a per-schema REVOKE cannot remove it. Nothing reachable via API (PostgREST exposes public only, anon no USAGE on private) but the rule "EXECUTE revoked from public" was false. Fix: explicit revoke all on function private.f(args) from public for every function (new migration 20261008110100 for the Step 3 helpers, inline for Step 4); pgTAP 001 census: anon executes nothing in private/audit, authenticated only the 7 policy predicates. Status: resolved (commit on feature/step-04-anatomical-sheet-model).


BLK-008 | 2026-10-10 | Schema v2 CHECK migration fails on a database holding a v1 draft

Migration 20261010100000 replaces the CHECK with document_schema_version = 2 without rewriting rows → errors on any DB seeded before 4c (dev only today). Cause: schema bump shipped as constraint change, not as data migration. Solution: before real data, data migration lifting stored documents (add references: [], review_status defaults) then CHECK; rule from user: incremental non-destructive migrations, never a reset. Documented ANATOMICAL_SHEET_MODEL.md §6. Status: open (no real data yet; treat before Step 7+ persistence of user reports).


BLK-009 | 2026-10-11 | pdf-lib inflates PDF object streams without cap at PDFDocument.load (import path)

Security audit Step 6 (MEDIUM, pre-existing since Step 1 import): PDFDocument.load decodes every /ObjStm and xref stream eagerly with its own uncapped FlateStream; measured 408 KB PDF → 400 MB in 1.4 s, 468 MB RSS; MAX_PDF_BYTES 50 MiB allows ~50 GB. Attachment cap (16 MiB) covers the attachment only. Impact: tab freeze/OOM for the practitioner on a crafted PDF, no code execution. Cannot refuse /ObjStm (pdf-lib save() emits object streams in our own PDFs). Options: parse in a Web Worker (bounded blast radius), or locate the attachment by scanning bytes without a full load, or a capped custom decoder. pdf-lib 1.17.1 unmaintained since 2021 (LOW in the same audit). Status: MITIGATED on the browser import path 2026-10-11 (60ee712: byte-scan attachment reader, no PDFDocument.load on untrusted bytes, export without object streams; ObjStm bomb read in 5 ms, +0.5 MiB RSS). Then 3a6e926: inflater fed in 16 KiB slices (Chromium read-ahead defeated the cancel: 4 GiB bomb +2.2 GB → +192 MB measured), shared 16 MiB candidate budget, bounded endstream search; final loop: candidates sorted by offset, JSON depth pre-scan. Audits ×3 PASS; worst measured costs on crafted files: +192 MB single bomb, ~0.5 s / ≤0.4 GB for 32 failing inflations, ~1 s deep JSON (before the pre-scan). GATE STILL OPEN before any external-user import (BDR-040): Firefox/Safari inflater read-ahead unmeasured (no browser test runner), Worker/server import with time+memory budget, pdf-lib replacement decision (unmaintained), report collection caps on read, <use> nesting budget, low-end phone measurement. Plan: docs/development/PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING.md §5. Never close on passing tests alone.

BLK-010 | 2026-10-14 | Agent worktrees created on a stale base; their cleanup refused by the classifier

Friction: the three isolation: worktree forks of R2 started at 605ee7c (an old develop merge), not at the feature branch HEAD 22fea87; each fork noticed and moved its own temp branch (git reset --hard / checkout -B on the empty worktree, flagged by the classifier as a security warning). After merging their diffs by hand, git worktree remove --force + git branch -d worktree-agent-* refused by the auto-mode classifier. Root cause: harness side (base commit of the agent worktree), not reproducible from the repo; the removal refusal is the destructive-command policy. Solution: forks briefed with the exact base commit and told to verify git log -1; diffs collected uncommitted and copied by literal paths. Leftover: .claude/worktrees/agent-{a0cefd439bff650a2,a3f684449d0776ad1,af6ebe79b8f742039} (3.2 GB) + 3 local temp branches at 22fea87 (merged), owner removes them (git worktree remove --force <path>, git branch -d <branch>). Status: resolved 2026-10-14 — after R2 merged into develop (c3f28d8): 66 files checked blob by blob (60 identical to branch history, 6 = fork stub / merged mod lists / lifted #[ignore]), no process or agent on them, tip 22fea87 in develop → git worktree remove --force ×3 + gitflow.sh delete ×3 accepted this time. Harness base-commit cause stays upstream.

BLK-011 | 2026-10-16 | Stopped-engine message promised "bilan conservé" with draft unsaved; dead "Réessayer" paths

Friction: 0279953 picked core.stopped from CoreRuntime.stopped alone: with sessionStorage full, reload restored older draft, edits lost silently; save banner advised PDF export (needs core). CoreUnavailable, export, import, new report still offered retry after stop; failed recovery below cap = dead end (nothing called retry() in editor; canvas button only rebuilt). Root cause: terminal-state message not bound to persistence status (saveFailed existed, unread); retry labels audited only on the 8 alerts + canvas the patch touched, not every failure surface; runtime exit from unavailable only via explicit retry() called by useSheet alone. Solution: 6371523 (BDR-055): isUnsaved selector drives variant + copy; CoreStoppedNotice on all core pages; runtime self-restart below cap; FAILED not held; ESLint census. Verifier CONFORME 12/12 (pass 2), security PASS 2 LOW. Status: resolved 2026-10-16. Residuals: saveFailed also on refused archive (over-warns); offline restart never stops (copy on banner); beforeunload only in editor; trap-every-load draft → reload loop; GC finalizer of trapped-instance SheetHandle throws "memory access out of bounds" later (harmless, tests retain handles).

BLK-012 | 2026-10-17 | Rescue copy not restorable; trapping draft stuck tab; work loss outside editor

Friction: JSON copy (6371523) had no in-app restore (Home picker PDF only; devtools only). Draft trapping draft.restore → CoreUnavailable reload each load, New report/Import FAILED, every re-read spent a recovery. beforeunload only in editor; New report / Import replaced bilan in progress (memory or slot) silently. Root cause: copy shipped without restore path (round trip never tested in app); internal from draft read treated as transient core failure, no memory of trapping input; guard scoped to one route; session replacement unguarded since MVP. Solution: 9bd9aca (BDR-056). Evidence: round trip identical (3 golden reports, slot + import); fuzz 37k draft.restore 0 traps, OOM only ~50 MB drafts (5 MB worst = 0.4-0.8 GB wasm). Verifier CONFORME 10/10, security PASS 2 LOW, check:all green. Status: resolved 2026-10-17. Residuals: GC finalizer throws "memory access out of bounds" after stack-overflow trap (console only, live instance unaffected 50/50), ≤ 3 dead instances retained (~13.5 MB typical, ~4.5 MB each) until reload; raw lone surrogate in archive text quarantines readable draft (unreachable, session.rs); copy lacks archive envelope; iOS Safari likely ignores beforeunload (dialog + copy are protection there); Retry clicked during ms-long recovery → reload screen; re-importing copy of trapping draft re-traps (spends recovery); copy near 16 MiB may OOM low-memory device; storage full + confirmed replace + reload restores replaced draft; internal may come from handle rebuild (Retry reopens).