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faunosteo/.claude/audits/2026-10-25-rust-r5-6-final-security.md
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Security audit: R5.6 final switch state (M1 correction)

  • Date: 2026-10-25. Mode: audit, fresh and blind (no prior verdict used).
  • Target: worktree /tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/3571c861-cd6e-4751-a25e-c26da95beb85/scratchpad/r56final, detached at 8e77e37 + .claude/tasks/plans/r5-6-switch.patch. The worktree diff is line-identical to the committed patch at baff882 (index lines aside). No code under crates/ packages/ apps/ scripts/ supabase/ differs between 943a25a, 8e77e37 and baff882, so the patch applies to the official code state.
  • Contract: .claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-25-rust-r5-6-rehearsal.md S1-S8 and the 2026-10-25 Clarification.
  • Scope: the 30 files of the diff (9 Rust sources, Cargo.toml, 7 Rust tests + 2 fixtures, 4 TS tests/helpers, 2 scripts, package.json, .prettierignore, CLAUDE.md, the 2 switched seed files).

Attack on the alias decision

Every Rust site that decides "same document" was enumerated (grep of equivalence, TRUSTED_ALIASES, TrustedAlias, same_document, recognises_historical_stamp, document_sha256 across crates/core/src, crates/wasm/src, apps/app/src, packages/core-wasm/src).

Path Decision Result
ops.rs:361 archive.snapshot → snapshot_rules.rs:60-68 build_sheet_snapshot alias only through recognises_historical_stamp holds
pdf/write/input.rs:204-210 assert_exportable (wasm export session, export_pdf, export_from_envelope) strict sheet_id + document_sha256 equality, unchanged from 943a25a holds
report/rebase.rs:42-46 (reached by draft.restore, archive.import, import_pdf, restore_copy) exact equality (pre-existing) or recognises_historical_stamp with same sheet id holds
archive/read.rs:116-119 snapshot_matches strict equality report vs archived snapshot, unchanged holds (mixed alias/canonical archive loses its snapshot, tested)
pdf/compare/lines.rs:350-376 report-compare recognises_historical_stamp, both raw values printed through esc holds
session.rs, ops.rs, facade.rs (one arm), crates/wasm no own comparison; route to the above holds
app TypeScript no stamp comparison (only provider.ts:52 copies the ref) holds

recognises_historical_stamp (loaded.rs:163-171) requires, in this order: a loader-verified v1 value, that value still equal to reference.document_sha256, the registry pair (sheet id, stamp as alias, verified value as canonical, one direction only, fingerprint.rs:63-75), and a fresh document_fingerprint(&self.document) equal to the verified value. Because the registry canonical must equal a value recomputed from the current document, the privilege is granted only when the loaded content hashes to the registered equine canonical (SHA-256 preimage otherwise). A JS caller building a SheetHandle from a hand-made bundle gains nothing unless its document is that content.

Forging the private state:

  • Struct literal and functional update ..base: impossible outside loaded.rs (private verified_fingerprint, index, drawings; E0451). No other constructor than from_bundle (grep: test helpers all go through it).
  • Deserialize, Default, Serialize: not derived on LoadedSheet. unsafe_code = "forbid" workspace-wide (Cargo.toml:55), no transmute. No Cell/RefCell.
  • Clone: copies a consistent state; mutating the clone's pub document or reference is caught by the recomputation and the verified == reference check (tested, r5_6_switch.rs a_mutated_document_or_reference_never_keeps_the_alias).
  • SheetHandle (crates/wasm/src/lib.rs:26-37) holds the sheet privately; no &mut access to it from JS.
  • Even a forged verified_fingerprint on a v0 sheet would only grant the alias when the content is the canonical one: a policy deviation from S3, never a content confusion.

Fingerprint block handling (loaded.rs:39-57, 191-210): absent → v0, unverified, no privilege; explicit null → refused (present_block); string, unknown key, missing key → refused (deny_unknown_fields, required fields); convention other than v1, non 64-lowercase-hex value, value equal to a registered alias, unregistered alias in the list, value not recomputed from the document (including a document with integrity errors) → refused at load, closed invalid_sheet kind, detail never rendered (useSheet.ts:60). Duplicate JSON key: last wins, a trailing null is refused. A misspelt block key at ref level (no deny_unknown_fields on BundledRef) loads as v0: fail-closed (less privilege, old reports rebase onto identical content).

v1 with warnings (fingerprint.rs:253-256): errors refuse, warnings do not. This only widens which documents get a value; it grants no equivalence, and a warning-only document with another content gets another value (tested, it rebases old reports).

Recursion and cost

  • canonical_json (fingerprint.rs:121-193): containers refused at depth ≥ 128 with CanonicalError::TooDeep, tested at the bound (sheet_fingerprint.rs:280-292). Its only non-test caller is document_fingerprint, whose only caller is loaded.rs on the loaded sheet's document (the build-time bundle). Attacker data (archives, drafts, PDFs, rescue copies) never reaches canonical_json; archived snapshot finding depth stays capped at 8 by assert_snapshot before shape. The new load-time validate_sheet_document + serde_json::to_value on the bundle are bounded by serde_json's parse limit (127 containers).
  • Recomputation cost: native release, a test with about 3 fingerprints, 7 loads and 1 import runs in 84-87 ms against 32 ms for 3 loads with none, so one fingerprint of the 296 KB document is in the low milliseconds. The recomputation runs only when the stamp already equals the registered alias (short-circuit order, loaded.rs:167-170; identical stamps never pay it), at most once per archive.snapshot (once per export, export.ts:146), per import (one candidate, import.rs:24-30) or per draft restore, plus one at each v1 load. Import worker timeout 20 s (controller.ts:19). Repeated calls only cost the user's own tab: no DoS.

Findings

No CRITICAL, no HIGH, no new security suppression.

  • [LOW] hardening — crates/core/src/domain/sheet/fingerprint.rs:63 — equivalence is a crate-public function that answers TrustedAlias from the registry alone, with no verified state and no recomputation. Its only caller today is recognises_historical_stamp (loaded.rs:169); a future caller (the Supabase sheet provider of Step 13, a new export path) could reopen the flaw of the previous round. Hint: pub(crate) or private to loaded, or a census test that pins its callers.
  • [LOW] by design, context — crates/core/src/pdf/write/input.rs:204-210 — the export session accepts any self-consistent caller-supplied (report, snapshot) pair: a script in the page can write an archive whose report and snapshot both carry the alias with a hand-built snapshot. No equivalence is granted there (every reader re-decides against its loaded sheet), the alias adds nothing a forged canonical stamp could not already do, and this is the pre-switch behaviour for any stamp.
  • [LOW] context, pre-existing — crates/core/src/domain/report/rebase.rs:43 — the exact-equality branch keeps a report of another sheet id unrebased when it carries the loaded value; unchanged since R2 (the new alias branch does check the sheet id). Equal SHA-256 means equal content, so no confusion.
  • [LOW] context — crates/core/tests/r5_6_switch.rs:8 — new #![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)], test-only, the header 40 existing test files carry; not a security-tool suppression.
  • Out of diff, filtered: guardrails WARN SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177 (species_select_active, catalog read policy), pre-existing.

Non-security note: r5_6_switch.rs:133-135 writes <repo>/target/tmp/r5-6/ even when CARGO_TARGET_DIR points elsewhere (git-ignored, .gitignore:65).

Proof

  • semgrep 1.168.0, p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten, --metrics=off: 163 rules on the 30 diff files, 0 results, 0 errors. Caveat: these packs carry few Rust rules; the Rust review above is manual. p/* content is fetched at run time, not frozen by the CLI pin.
  • Checklist, 9 checks on the added lines and the tree: hardcoded secret/auth URL (0), SQL by concatenation (0), unsanitised render/eval (0), sensitive endpoint without authz (n/a, no endpoint in the diff), internal error to the user (0: invalid_sheet detail not rendered), secret/PII in a log (0), tracked .env (0, only .env.example), guardrails --domain api,supabase (0 FAIL, 1 WARN out of diff, filtered), new suppressions (0 security; 1 test lint allow, LOW).
  • Hermetic tests run in the worktree, CARGO_TARGET_DIR=<worktree>/target, release, --features cli: r5_6_switch + sheet_fingerprint 25 passed; pdf_import, pdf_compare, archive_rules, report_rules, sheet_contract 78 passed.
  • Seed check: draft/document.json still hashes (bytes) to the registered alias 27c7…, document.json, horse.svg, equine_draft.sql unchanged; only sheet-ref.json and the map's sheet.documentSha256 changed.
  • Nothing edited in either tree except this report; no network beyond the semgrep rule download, no Supabase.

TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten SCOPE: 30 files BLOCKING: (none) REPORTED (non-blocking):

  • [LOW] hardening: crate-public registry-only equivalence — crates/core/src/domain/sheet/fingerprint.rs:63
  • [LOW] by design: export accepts caller-supplied consistent snapshot — crates/core/src/pdf/write/input.rs:204
  • [LOW] pre-existing: exact-equality rebase branch without sheet id — crates/core/src/domain/report/rebase.rs:43
  • [LOW] test lint allow (crate convention) — crates/core/tests/r5_6_switch.rs:8 PROOF: semgrep 163 rules on 30 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks → 4 findings (LOW), 1 out-of-diff WARN filtered SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS