10 KiB
Security audit: R5.6 final switch state (M1 correction)
- Date: 2026-10-25. Mode: audit, fresh and blind (no prior verdict used).
- Target: worktree
/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/3571c861-cd6e-4751-a25e-c26da95beb85/scratchpad/r56final, detached at8e77e37+.claude/tasks/plans/r5-6-switch.patch. The worktree diff is line-identical to the committed patch atbaff882(index lines aside). No code undercrates/ packages/ apps/ scripts/ supabase/differs between943a25a,8e77e37andbaff882, so the patch applies to the official code state. - Contract:
.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-25-rust-r5-6-rehearsal.mdS1-S8 and the 2026-10-25 Clarification. - Scope: the 30 files of the diff (9 Rust sources, Cargo.toml, 7 Rust tests + 2 fixtures, 4 TS tests/helpers, 2 scripts, package.json, .prettierignore, CLAUDE.md, the 2 switched seed files).
Attack on the alias decision
Every Rust site that decides "same document" was enumerated (grep of equivalence, TRUSTED_ALIASES,
TrustedAlias, same_document, recognises_historical_stamp, document_sha256 across crates/core/src,
crates/wasm/src, apps/app/src, packages/core-wasm/src).
| Path | Decision | Result |
|---|---|---|
ops.rs:361 archive.snapshot → snapshot_rules.rs:60-68 build_sheet_snapshot |
alias only through recognises_historical_stamp |
holds |
pdf/write/input.rs:204-210 assert_exportable (wasm export session, export_pdf, export_from_envelope) |
strict sheet_id + document_sha256 equality, unchanged from 943a25a |
holds |
report/rebase.rs:42-46 (reached by draft.restore, archive.import, import_pdf, restore_copy) |
exact equality (pre-existing) or recognises_historical_stamp with same sheet id |
holds |
archive/read.rs:116-119 snapshot_matches |
strict equality report vs archived snapshot, unchanged | holds (mixed alias/canonical archive loses its snapshot, tested) |
pdf/compare/lines.rs:350-376 report-compare |
recognises_historical_stamp, both raw values printed through esc |
holds |
session.rs, ops.rs, facade.rs (one arm), crates/wasm |
no own comparison; route to the above | holds |
| app TypeScript | no stamp comparison (only provider.ts:52 copies the ref) |
holds |
recognises_historical_stamp (loaded.rs:163-171) requires, in this order: a loader-verified v1 value, that value
still equal to reference.document_sha256, the registry pair (sheet id, stamp as alias, verified value as canonical,
one direction only, fingerprint.rs:63-75), and a fresh document_fingerprint(&self.document) equal to the verified
value. Because the registry canonical must equal a value recomputed from the current document, the privilege is
granted only when the loaded content hashes to the registered equine canonical (SHA-256 preimage otherwise). A
JS caller building a SheetHandle from a hand-made bundle gains nothing unless its document is that content.
Forging the private state:
- Struct literal and functional update
..base: impossible outsideloaded.rs(privateverified_fingerprint,index,drawings; E0451). No other constructor thanfrom_bundle(grep: test helpers all go through it). Deserialize,Default,Serialize: not derived onLoadedSheet.unsafe_code = "forbid"workspace-wide (Cargo.toml:55), no transmute. NoCell/RefCell.Clone: copies a consistent state; mutating the clone's pubdocumentorreferenceis caught by the recomputation and theverified == referencecheck (tested,r5_6_switch.rsa_mutated_document_or_reference_never_keeps_the_alias).SheetHandle(crates/wasm/src/lib.rs:26-37) holds the sheet privately; no&mutaccess to it from JS.- Even a forged
verified_fingerprinton a v0 sheet would only grant the alias when the content is the canonical one: a policy deviation from S3, never a content confusion.
Fingerprint block handling (loaded.rs:39-57, 191-210): absent → v0, unverified, no privilege; explicit null →
refused (present_block); string, unknown key, missing key → refused (deny_unknown_fields, required fields);
convention other than v1, non 64-lowercase-hex value, value equal to a registered alias, unregistered alias in the
list, value not recomputed from the document (including a document with integrity errors) → refused at load,
closed invalid_sheet kind, detail never rendered (useSheet.ts:60). Duplicate JSON key: last wins, a trailing
null is refused. A misspelt block key at ref level (no deny_unknown_fields on BundledRef) loads as v0:
fail-closed (less privilege, old reports rebase onto identical content).
v1 with warnings (fingerprint.rs:253-256): errors refuse, warnings do not. This only widens which documents
get a value; it grants no equivalence, and a warning-only document with another content gets another value
(tested, it rebases old reports).
Recursion and cost
canonical_json(fingerprint.rs:121-193): containers refused at depth ≥ 128 withCanonicalError::TooDeep, tested at the bound (sheet_fingerprint.rs:280-292). Its only non-test caller isdocument_fingerprint, whose only caller isloaded.rson the loaded sheet's document (the build-time bundle). Attacker data (archives, drafts, PDFs, rescue copies) never reachescanonical_json; archived snapshot finding depth stays capped at 8 byassert_snapshotbefore shape. The new load-timevalidate_sheet_document+serde_json::to_valueon the bundle are bounded by serde_json's parse limit (127 containers).- Recomputation cost: native release, a test with about 3 fingerprints, 7 loads and 1 import runs in 84-87 ms
against 32 ms for 3 loads with none, so one fingerprint of the 296 KB document is in the low milliseconds.
The recomputation runs only when the stamp already equals the registered alias (short-circuit order,
loaded.rs:167-170; identical stamps never pay it), at most once perarchive.snapshot(once per export,export.ts:146), per import (one candidate,import.rs:24-30) or per draft restore, plus one at each v1 load. Import worker timeout 20 s (controller.ts:19). Repeated calls only cost the user's own tab: no DoS.
Findings
No CRITICAL, no HIGH, no new security suppression.
- [LOW] hardening —
crates/core/src/domain/sheet/fingerprint.rs:63—equivalenceis a crate-public function that answersTrustedAliasfrom the registry alone, with no verified state and no recomputation. Its only caller today isrecognises_historical_stamp(loaded.rs:169); a future caller (the Supabase sheet provider of Step 13, a new export path) could reopen the flaw of the previous round. Hint:pub(crate)or private toloaded, or a census test that pins its callers. - [LOW] by design, context —
crates/core/src/pdf/write/input.rs:204-210— the export session accepts any self-consistent caller-supplied (report, snapshot) pair: a script in the page can write an archive whose report and snapshot both carry the alias with a hand-built snapshot. No equivalence is granted there (every reader re-decides against its loaded sheet), the alias adds nothing a forged canonical stamp could not already do, and this is the pre-switch behaviour for any stamp. - [LOW] context, pre-existing —
crates/core/src/domain/report/rebase.rs:43— the exact-equality branch keeps a report of another sheet id unrebased when it carries the loaded value; unchanged since R2 (the new alias branch does check the sheet id). Equal SHA-256 means equal content, so no confusion. - [LOW] context —
crates/core/tests/r5_6_switch.rs:8— new#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)], test-only, the header 40 existing test files carry; not a security-tool suppression. - Out of diff, filtered: guardrails
WARN SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNERsupabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177(species_select_active, catalog read policy), pre-existing.
Non-security note: r5_6_switch.rs:133-135 writes <repo>/target/tmp/r5-6/ even when CARGO_TARGET_DIR points
elsewhere (git-ignored, .gitignore:65).
Proof
- semgrep 1.168.0,
p/security-audit,p/secrets,p/owasp-top-ten,--metrics=off: 163 rules on the 30 diff files, 0 results, 0 errors. Caveat: these packs carry few Rust rules; the Rust review above is manual.p/*content is fetched at run time, not frozen by the CLI pin. - Checklist, 9 checks on the added lines and the tree: hardcoded secret/auth URL (0), SQL by concatenation (0),
unsanitised render/eval (0), sensitive endpoint without authz (n/a, no endpoint in the diff), internal error to
the user (0:
invalid_sheetdetail not rendered), secret/PII in a log (0), tracked.env(0, only.env.example), guardrails--domain api,supabase(0 FAIL, 1 WARN out of diff, filtered), new suppressions (0 security; 1 test lint allow, LOW). - Hermetic tests run in the worktree,
CARGO_TARGET_DIR=<worktree>/target, release,--features cli:r5_6_switch+sheet_fingerprint25 passed;pdf_import,pdf_compare,archive_rules,report_rules,sheet_contract78 passed. - Seed check:
draft/document.jsonstill hashes (bytes) to the registered alias 27c7…,document.json,horse.svg,equine_draft.sqlunchanged; onlysheet-ref.jsonand the map'ssheet.documentSha256changed. - Nothing edited in either tree except this report; no network beyond the semgrep rule download, no Supabase.
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten SCOPE: 30 files BLOCKING: (none) REPORTED (non-blocking):
- [LOW] hardening: crate-public registry-only
equivalence— crates/core/src/domain/sheet/fingerprint.rs:63 - [LOW] by design: export accepts caller-supplied consistent snapshot — crates/core/src/pdf/write/input.rs:204
- [LOW] pre-existing: exact-equality rebase branch without sheet id — crates/core/src/domain/report/rebase.rs:43
- [LOW] test lint allow (crate convention) — crates/core/tests/r5_6_switch.rs:8 PROOF: semgrep 163 rules on 30 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks → 4 findings (LOW), 1 out-of-diff WARN filtered SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS