13 KiB
SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 25 files
BLOCKING:
(none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
- [MEDIUM] check/declared-tree-rule-too-wide — crates/core/src/curation/draft/svg_compare.rs:104
- [LOW] check/unchecked-xml-characters — crates/core/src/curation/draft/app_review.rs:33
- [LOW] check/markdown-structure-injection — crates/core/src/curation/draft/review_report.rs:64
- [LOW] check/quadratic-renderers — crates/core/src/curation/draft/review_report.rs:223
- [LOW] anti-gaming/test-clippy-allow (context) — crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6
PROOF: semgrep 162 rules on 25 files → 0 findings; checklist 8 checks + anti-gaming + 5 brief probes → 5 findings
R5.4 security gate (fresh), 2026-10-23
Repository /home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo, branch feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core, HEAD
0a79c52, scope git diff c6e0d85..HEAD (25 existing files). Every changed product file was
read whole: crates/core/src/curation/draft/{labels,changelog,review_report,drawing,overlay, app_review,svg_compare,pipeline,stats,ops,mod}.rs, crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs,
plus crates/core/src/curation/markdown.rs, anatomy/svg/{serialize,tree}.rs and
anatomy/compose.rs where the new code relies on them.
Method
- semgrep 1.168.0 (
EIO_BACKEND=posix),--config p/security-audit --config p/secrets --config p/owasp-top-ten --metrics=off --quiet --jsonon the 25 files: 162 rules, 0 results, 0 errors. These packs cover Rust thinly, so the manual review carries the weight. - Checklist (CLAUDE.md defaults): secrets, SQL concatenation, unsanitized render, authz,
error exposure, secrets in logs, tracked
.env, guardrails scanner (python3 -B ~/.claude/skills/guardrails/scripts/scan.py <root> --domain api,supabase: 0 FAIL, 1 WARN, 1 MANUAL; the WARNSB-POLICY-NOT-OWNERis insupabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177, outside the delta, so it is not reported here). - Anti-gaming: the diff was scanned for new suppressions.
- Probes, all in the scratchpad: a throwaway crate linking
faunosteo-core(featurecuration) at/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/probe.DaWdIB, andimport-equinebuilt withCARGO_TARGET_DIRin the scratchpad.--checkran read-only on the repository.--outran only inside the fresh/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/out.6SamF5. Nothing was deleted, andgit statusstayed clean.
Findings
1. [MEDIUM] The tree fallback hides more than the declared trigger-name rule
crates/core/src/curation/draft/svg_compare.rs:104-123 (compare_drawing), used by
crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:196-215 for review/app-*.svg.
When the bytes differ, both files are parsed with parse_svg. That function builds the tree
of the root element only, and it keeps only elements and text
(anatomy/svg/tree.rs:155, 182-193). Everything the tree does not carry is therefore never
compared:
- the prolog: XML declaration and its
encoding, processing instructions, comments; - comments and processing instructions inside the root and after it;
- entity and character-reference forms, CDATA against escaped text, attribute quoting,
<g/>against<g></g>; - attribute-value whitespace that the parser normalises.
Measured on the real committed draft/review/app-main.svg against the produced one, with
the rule applied:
| Committed file changed by | compare_drawing |
|---|---|
| nothing | Ok(TreeAfterRule) |
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/css" href="https://attacker.invalid/hide.css"?> and a comment in the prolog, a comment and a PI right after <svg …>, a trailing comment |
Ok(TreeAfterRule) |
also encoding="UTF-8" replaced by encoding="ISO-8859-1" |
Ok(TreeAfterRule) |
In all three cases --check prints the same declared: review/app-main.svg (trees equal under the R3 trigger-name rule) line it prints today and exits 0. The same holds for
app-head.svg, which is byte-identical today: a comment-only change would turn it into a
"declared" file. The only visible sign would be the extra line.
Impact: the owner requirement "--check fails on any unauthorised difference" is not met
for the two application drawings. A stylesheet processing instruction is honoured by
browsers that open a standalone SVG: it could restyle or hide markers in the review drawing
and fetch an external URL, and --check would still pass. Exploiting it needs write access
to the repository. The files are dev review artifacts: the app, the bundle and the uploads
never read them (grep of apps/app, vite, packages/supabase). Hence MEDIUM, not
blocking.
Three declarations are materially wrong:
svg_compare.rs:7says "Any other difference is reported".import_equine.rs:185-186and the printed "declared" line suggest the rule alone explains the difference.- RUST.md §11.15 says the comparison "accepts exactly the trigger-name rule and nothing else". §11.13's R5.4 condition did mention "declaration, prefixes and whitespace declared", but §11.15 does not carry that through, and it never covered processing instructions or comments.
Fix direction: once the rule has been applied to the committed tree, require the committed
prolog to be byte-equal to the produced one. Then require
prolog + serialize(committed tree after rule) to equal the produced text byte for byte.
The core serializer writes the produced file, and app-head.svg already matches it byte for
byte. At minimum: compare the prologs and the text after the root, refuse any comment or PI
node in the committed document, and print "declared" only when the rule actually changed
the committed tree. Then correct the three declarations.
2. [LOW] XML-invalid characters from authored strings reach the review drawings unchecked
crates/core/src/curation/draft/app_review.rs:33-36 calls render_layer directly. The R3
composition passes the layer through checked / xml_safe (anatomy/compose.rs:221-236,
"refuse one XML cannot carry"), and this path skips that step. The same gap exists in
overlay.rs:194-198 (path d, ids in titles and labels).
Measured: a changeset that sets annotation:hock name to {"fr":"Jarret\u0001<b>&","en":"Hock\u000b"}
is accepted, and the produced review/app-main.svg is not well-formed (roxmltree: "a
non-XML character '\u{1}'"). A path geometry d holding U+0001 in an overlay gives the same
result. This is not markup injection: the serializer escaping holds (see "Verified"). It is
a malformed output written by --out without any refusal. --check then fails, closed.
Fix direction: run is_xml_text over the produced layer and overlay (reuse compose's
checked) and refuse. This changes nothing on the committed data.
3. [LOW] Markdown structure injection from authored text
review_report.rs:64-85(change_line:title.fr,rationale,questionwritten raw in list items);review_report.rs:295-320(questions);review_report.rs:245-278(citation,url,doi);changelog.rs:80, 85(table cells throughmarkdown.rs:43-49cell()).cell()escapes|and\n, but not\r, and not a backslash in front of a pipe.
Measured with an added change:
- a rationale
"Ligne un.\n\n## 10. Décisions réservées au professionnel\n\nAucune question ouverte. <img …>"forges a second section 10 inside section 6 ofREVIEW-REPORT.md(lines 92 and 343) and passes raw HTML through; - a
\rin a title reachesCHANGELOG.mdraw. GFM treats a CR as a line ending, so the table row breaks; - an authored
\|becomes\\|.format_markdownand micromark both read that as an escaped backslash followed by a real delimiter, so the row gains a ninth column under an eight-column header.
Context: the text comes from the repository owner, and the code matches the TypeScript
(markdown.ts). The current data holds none of this: no LF, CR, pipe or backtick in any
title, rationale or question. The one <0697:toih> in a DOI and its URL renders as text,
because a scheme cannot start with a digit. Gitea strips raw HTML. The code spans hold only
constrained strings: CHG-\d{3,}, stable ids, resolved targets and allowlisted fields.
§11.11's "Markdown risks" are about Prettier differences, so this risk is not declared
anywhere.
Fix direction: refuse CR, LF and control characters in single-line authored fields at
parse_changeset and parse_references (title, question, citation, doi). Either refuse
them in the rationale too, or render newlines as spaces in list items. Escape \ in front of
| in cell(). Optionally escape <.
4. [LOW] Quadratic renderers on authored volume
review_report.rs:223-234citation_countrebuildsall_findings(document), one allocatedFindingEntryper finding, for every reference: O(R × F).overlay.rs:87-143: linearfindoverpreviousandkept.contains, O(A²) per view.review_report.rs:47-54subjects: changes × records.
Measured with render_review_report on synthetic documents:
| References | Leaves | Time |
|---|---|---|
| 1,000 | 1,000 | 0.35 s |
| 4,000 | 4,000 | 5.9 s |
| 8,000 | 8,000 | 22.6 s |
Extrapolated, not measured: about 3 to 4 minutes for a balanced document at the 200,000-value
bound. The equine data (48 references, about 600 findings) renders in milliseconds:
--check takes 0.13 s wall time and 18 MB RSS. This is the same class as the declared
"minutes for a 16 MiB changeset" risk (§11.13), but these renderers are not declared.
Fix direction: count citations in one pass into a HashMap<&str, usize>, index previous
and kept with a HashMap / HashSet, and group records by change id once.
5. [LOW, context] New clippy allow in a test crate
crates/core/tests/curation_review.rs:6
#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]. This is an
integration test, outside the library, with the same header as all 33 files of
crates/core/tests. It is a lint allow, not a security-scanner suppression. No new
nosemgrep, nosec, eslint-disable, ts-ignore or noqa appears in the diff. Not
blocking.
Verified, no finding
- SVG markup injection: element and attribute names are literals. Values go through the
core serializer, which escapes
& < > "and\t \n \rin attributes and& < > \rin text. Probe: an annotation nameJ"><script>alert(1)</script>&, an English name]]><!--x-->, a view nameT</title><script>y</script>and an overlay pathd="M0 0…\"/><script>x</script>". The output is well-formed (apart from finding 2's control character), with 0scriptelements and every payload escaped. - File names built from view ids: views are
stable_id([a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}), enforced by the typed parse inpipeline.rs:206before any write.write_exclusivealso refuses any component that is notNormal. The--checkreads stay canonical inside the seed. - Panics on authored input:
compact_valueslices only past 120 UTF-16 units and decodes lossily. The prolog slice ends at roxmltree's root start (<, a char boundary).style()[0]is a static slice. Polygon centroid: at least 3 points (typed), NaN otherwise, never a panic. Nounwrap,expector unchecked index on data in the product files. Recursion infirst_differenceandTriggerNames::applyis bounded by the reader's depth cap (64). --checkis read-only: no file inlegacy-import/ordraft/changed andgit statusstayed clean. Output:legacy-import: 6 files, 0 differences,draft: declared: review/app-main.svg …,draft: 12 files, 0 differences. A file that is missing, not produced or not UTF-8 fails. A generated folder must canonicalise to the seed's child. Files other thanreview/app-*have no rule and must be byte-equal.horse.svgis compared with itself, but its sha256 drivesassets.json,document.jsonand the seed SQL, so a change to it fails the check.--out, probed in the mktemp folder:- refused, nothing written: a non-empty folder, a symbolic link (with and without a
trailing
/), a file,x/../fresh, a missing parent, an empty path; - written: a fresh relative path through
INIT_CWD(18 files), and a fresh folder under a parent link inside the scratchpad (the parent is resolved as documented); - refused: a second run on the same destination ("not empty");
diff -ragainst the seed:legacy-importidentical,draftidentical exceptreview/app-main.svg, the declared trigger names.
- refused, nothing written: a non-empty folder, a symbolic link (with and without a
trailing
- R5.3 carry-overs: a seed walk that fails is now an error, and the claim refuses ("the
seed folder cannot be read"). An existing destination folder is identity-checked
(device, inode) against every folder of the seed. Checked by reading only: a second
mount path needs a bind mount (root), and a symlink to the repository was not used,
because the brief forbids
--outinto the repository. ops.rscite: theHashSetkeepsbefore.includes(id)semantics (string equality only).- No secret, token, auth URL or private key in the diff (the
.claudeaudit texts only cite the semgrep command). No SQL is built in the diff. stdout and stderr carry paths, counts and refusals only. The only tracked env file is.env.example.
Residual risks already declared (RUST.md §11.13, §11.15)
Checked and accurate, apart from the §11.15 sentence corrected by finding 1:
- the emoji refusal of the alignment;
- the single-user TOCTOU of
--out, mitigated bycreate_new; - records memory and the bound-walk time;
- the frozen
horse.svg.