13 KiB
Security audit: R5.5 closing corrections (diff 13db553..257a29b)
- date: 2026-10-24 | branch
feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core| mode: audit (targeted diff), fresh run - contract:
.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-24-rust-r5-5-closing.md(K1-K8) - scope:
git diff 13db553..257a29b, 15 files (8 code/doc + 7.claude/registry, task, plan files) - nothing run against a real stack, no service key used, no transfer tool, no delete, no code edited
Focus 1: check_v3_shape and the untrusted v3 entries
Entries traced (wasm crates/wasm/src/lib.rs → crates/core/src/facade.rs → ops.rs / session.rs):
| Entry | Path | Shape check |
|---|---|---|
SheetHandle.import_pdf / import_pdf_bytes |
facade::import_pdf → pdf/import.rs:29 import_archive → read_archive_document → read_report_document |
yes (report/read.rs:80) |
archive.import op |
ops.rs:345 → session::import_archive → same |
yes |
draft.restore op, draft text |
ops.rs:316 → session.rs:85 read_report_document |
yes |
draft.restore op, archive text |
session.rs:103-106 parse_envelope |
yes (archive/read.rs:124-125) |
restore_copy_bytes |
facade.rs:86-101 → restore_draft(.., None) |
yes |
report-compare CLI |
pdf/compare/mod.rs:133 → read_archive_document |
yes |
These are the only paths by which an external v3 report enters. The remaining typed reads of
Report take the store's report, which is always the core's canonical output: the reducers
(ops.rs:64-87), archive.snapshot (ops.rs:301-303), the export session (pdf/write/input.rs:26),
and export_from_envelope (pdf/write/export.rs:117-130, a public library fn with test-only
callers, not exported by wasm or a binary).
Panic review: check_v3_shape (report/read.rs:55-71) uses only Value::get, as_array,
is_object, is_string, enumerate and format!. No indexing, no unwrap, no recursion. A
non-object or null input returns Ok and the typed read refuses it. No panic path.
Authentic shapes: the core's writer emits sheet and practitioner as objects and severity as
a string or omits it (skip_serializing_if). Zod refused arrays, one-key maps and null for every
earlier v3 writer. null severity was already refused before this diff: js::present calls
Severity::deserialize(null), which fails. No authentic shape is newly refused. Hermetic suites
were rerun here and are green: archive_rules 38, report_rules 17, characterisation 4,
characterisation_serde_tolerance 5, pdf_import 3.
Bypass found (M1 below). The check reads keys on the raw value, so any shape where the parent
container is itself positional skips it, because Value::get(&str) on an array returns None.
Focus 2: upload tool, Protocol and own_address
Protocol is final: storage.rs:189-197 retries Io, Timeout, HostNotFound and
ConnectionFailed only, plus 5xx (storage.rs:79-80). final_error (storage.rs:203-215)
carries no error text, so neither the key nor the header shows. The test
a_malformed_answer_is_final_and_not_retried is green: one request, exit 1.
own_address (main.rs:114-122), measured on this host with the same syscalls (UDP bind then
connect, nothing sent):
| DEV host | bind | connect | local_addr == ip | own_address |
|---|---|---|---|---|
255.255.255.255 (and the host's brd addresses, unit test) |
ok | EACCES (13) | n/a | false |
| 0.0.0.0 | ok | ok | 127.0.0.1, no | false |
| 224.0.0.251, 239.255.255.250 (multicast) | ok | ok | yes | true (L3) |
| another host's private address | EADDRNOTAVAIL (ip_nonlocal_bind = 0) |
n/a | n/a | false |
Even with ip_nonlocal_bind=1, the connect route lookup refuses a non-local source address
(no IP_FREEBIND / IP_TRANSPARENT is set). So a non-local unicast address does not pass.
Defense in depth holds. host_is_allowed (curation/upload.rs:190-200) only accepts the DEV
host when the URL host is loopback or RFC 1918 and parses equal to it. Multicast and public
addresses are neither. The kernel also refuses a TCP connect to multicast.
Packet: own_address sends nothing. A UDP connect only records the peer, there is no
send/send_to, and the socket is dropped on return. It joins no multicast group.
Focus 3: secrets and SQL claims
- No secret value in the diff. The added lines contain no JWT (
eyJ…), no CLI default secret string, nosb_secret_/sb_publishable_key and no password literal.iss: supabase-demois a claim name, not a key. - Repo-wide (tracked, at
257a29b) search for the CLI default JWT secret,eyJhbGciOi,eyJpc3Miandsb_secret_/sb_publishable_keys. Onlycrates/worker/src/config.rs:324,326matches: a fabricated test token (payload{"role":"service_role","exp":…}, signature literallysig) and the placeholdersb_secret_abc. These are not credentials. The only tracked env file is.env.example. supabase/config.toml[auth](lines 73-96) sets nojwt_secretand no signing keys, which matches ENVIRONMENTS.md §3.6. The claim that the service key is the public demo key was not checked independently: that would mean reading the key value.confirm_sheet_asset_upload:20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:57-58runsrevoke all … from public, anon, authenticatedandgrant execute … to service_role. No later migration re-grants it. The function (lines 34-52) setsuploaded_atwith nostorage.objectsexistence or byte check. pgTAP006_sheet_asset_storage.sql:73-80covers editor 42501, service-role confirm of A and B, and idempotence. It has noanonassertion, which matches the doc.- The bucket has no INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE policy. The only
storage.objectspolicies in all migrations areanatomical_sheet_assets_read(select),avatars_read(select) andavatars_upload(insert, pinned tobucket_id = 'avatars',20261013100000:284-291). RUST.md §11.18 is accurate. - No file under
supabase/changed in the diff (K5).
Findings
M1 [MEDIUM] check_v3_shape bypassable through a positional parent
crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:61-69, crates/core/src/domain/archive/read.rs:124-125
- An observation written as a positional array (
[id, zones, findings, freeTextFindings, {"mild": null}, comment]) is accepted on every entry.observation.get("severity")returnsNoneon an array, and serde's derivedObservationvisitor reads the sequence, one-key severity map included. - In
parse_envelope, areportwritten as an array (or the whole envelope as an array) makescheck_v3_shapesee no keys. All three refused shapes (sheet array, practitioner array, severity map) are then accepted. - In the import path a report-level or envelope-level array is still refused, because
version_ofandenvelope_version_ofrequire an object. - K4 states that the three shapes are refused at both v3 entries. That holds only when every parent is an object.
- Impact is low. The field values still pass every field rule and the core re-serialises
canonically, so there is no injection. What remains is a parser differential with the N-1 Zod
reader. Established by reading: it is the same
visit_seqmechanism the R5.5 characterisation proved forsheetandpractitioner. No probe was executed, because writing a test is outside this audit. - Fix direction (owner scope): require
observations[i]to be an object, and inparse_enveloperequire bothdataandreportto be objects before the shape check. A generic guard is an alternative.
M2 [MEDIUM, pre-existing, outside the diff, documented by it] DEV API reachable as service_role from the LAN
supabase/config.toml:73-96, docs/development/ENVIRONMENTS.md §3.6
- The stack runs on the CLI's public default JWT secret and 54321 is LAN-open by design.
- Any device on the private network can therefore act as
service_roleon DEV data, bypassing RLS. The doc states this accurately and leaves the choice to the owner. Production is not involved. - Not introduced by this diff, so not gated here. Resolve it before any non-test data reaches
DEV: own
jwt_secret/ signing keys throughenv(), or narrow the 54321 rule.
L1 [LOW] Remaining serde tolerance on the other nested v3 structs
crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:52-54
animal,owner,zones[],findings[],vertebrae[]andnextAppointmentvariants as positional arrays, andsideas a one-key map, are still accepted.- This is within the owner's go ("three shapes only"). But the doc comment ("The shapes Zod refused and serde's derives accept") reads as a complete list, and BDR-069's rationale ("crafted file could swap same-typed fields") applies to these shapes too.
- Hint: word the comment and §11.18 as "three of the shapes".
L2 [LOW] Error text contradicts behaviour
crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:66
The message says "expected a string or null", but null is refused. The test's own comment
says so (characterisation_serde_tolerance.rs, "null stays refused").
L3 [LOW] own_address accepts IPv4 multicast
crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:110-122
- Measured: bind and connect succeed and
local_addrequals the address. The "own unicast" claim in the doc comment and in RUST.md §11.18 is therefore inaccurate. - Not exploitable:
host_is_allowedrequires RFC 1918 or loopback, and TCP to multicast is refused by the kernel. The unit test (main.rs:255-266) does not cover multicast. - Hint: add
!ip.is_multicast(), or rely on and state the private-range filter.
L4 [LOW] own_address unit test is vacuous without ip
crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:237-244
If the ip command is missing, unwrap_or_default yields empty lists and the host unicast and
broadcast loops check nothing. The test still passes. This affects test strength only.
L5 [LOW, pre-existing, documented] confirm_sheet_asset_upload does not check the object
supabase/migrations/20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:34-52
The guard is EXECUTE (service_role only) and no API role can place bytes, so this is not exploitable today. The debt is recorded in RUST.md §11.18: check the object's existence and size before any public exposure.
L6 [LOW] Typed reads of Report outside the two checked entries
crates/core/src/ops.rs:64-87, 301-303, crates/core/src/pdf/write/input.rs:26,
crates/core/src/pdf/write/export.rs:117-130
These take store or core-canonical reports today, so none of them is an external entry. If
export_from_envelope ever reads a file-borne envelope, it skips check_v3_shape.
Anti-gaming
The diff adds no nosemgrep, nosec or eslint-disable comment and no new #[allow]. The
#![allow(clippy::…)] in characterisation_serde_tolerance.rs predates the diff and is a lint
allowance, not a security suppression.
Notes
- One command was refused by the permission rules:
git check-ignore -v .env.worker .env; grep -n "SERVICE_ROLE\|SECRET\|KEY" .env.example. It was not rerun in another form. The tracked-env check usedgit ls-filesinstead, and the only result is.env.example. - Guardrails scanner (
--domain api,supabase): 0 FAIL, 1 WARN, 1 MANUAL. The WARN (SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER,20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177) is in a file outside the diff and is filtered out. MANUAL is not reported. - Hermetic runs:
cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features upload --bin upload-sheet-assets --test upload_tool --test characterisation_serde_tolerance --test archive_rules --test report_rulesgave 1 + 13 + 5 + 38 + 17 passed.--features pdf-read --test pdf_import --test characterisationgave 3 + 4 passed.upload_tooltargets an in-process loopback stub with a made-up key.
SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
SCOPE: 15 files
BLOCKING:
(none)
REPORTED (non-blocking):
- [MEDIUM] check_v3_shape bypass via positional parent — crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:61-69, crates/core/src/domain/archive/read.rs:124-125
- [MEDIUM] DEV stack service_role reachable from LAN (pre-existing, documented) — supabase/config.toml:73-96, docs/development/ENVIRONMENTS.md §3.6
- [LOW] other nested v3 serde tolerance, doc comment overstates completeness — crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:52-54
- [LOW] error text "or null" contradicts refusal — crates/core/src/domain/report/read.rs:66
- [LOW] own_address accepts IPv4 multicast (blocked downstream by host_is_allowed) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:114-122
- [LOW] own_address test vacuous without `ip` — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:237-244
- [LOW] confirm_sheet_asset_upload no object check (pre-existing, documented) — supabase/migrations/20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:34-52
- [LOW] internal typed Report reads skip the shape check — crates/core/src/pdf/write/export.rs:117-130, crates/core/src/ops.rs:64-87
PROOF: semgrep 74 rules on 15 files → 0 findings (0 errors); checklist 8 checks → 2 findings (+ guardrails 0 FAIL / 1 WARN out of diff, filtered); targeted review 3 focus areas → 6 findings