-- audit.audit_logs: sensitive operations leave a row, rows are immutable, -- only owners/admins read them. begin; select plan(12); insert into auth.users (id, email) values ('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'root@test.local'), ('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'alice@test.local'), ('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b', 'bob@test.local'); select private.assign_platform_role(null, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'owner'); -- 1. Bootstrap is audited as a system action select results_eq( $$ select actor_user_id, action, resource_type, target_user_id, metadata ->> 'role' from audit.audit_logs where target_user_id = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001' $$, $$ values (null::uuid, 'platform_role.granted'::text, 'profile_role'::text, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'::uuid, 'owner'::text) $$, 'bootstrap grant logged with null actor' ); -- 2. RPC grant and revoke are audited with the actor set local role authenticated; select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","role":"authenticated"}', true); select public.grant_platform_role('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'admin'); select public.revoke_platform_role('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'admin', 'rotation'); reset role; select results_eq( $$ select action, actor_user_id, target_user_id, metadata ->> 'reason' from audit.audit_logs where actor_user_id = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001' order by occurred_at, action $$, $$ values ('platform_role.granted'::text, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'::uuid, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a'::uuid, null::text), ('platform_role.revoked'::text, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'::uuid, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a'::uuid, 'rotation'::text) $$, 'grant and revoke logged with actor, target and metadata' ); select is( (select count(*) from audit.audit_logs a join public.profile_roles r on r.id = a.resource_id where a.target_user_id in ('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', '00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a')), 3::bigint, 'every fixture audit row points at its profile_roles row' ); -- 3. Append-only, even for the privileged owner session select throws_ok( $$ update audit.audit_logs set action = 'platform_role.tampered' $$, '42501', null, 'audit rows cannot be updated' ); select throws_ok( $$ delete from audit.audit_logs $$, '42501', null, 'audit rows cannot be deleted' ); -- 4. log_event validates its inputs select throws_ok( $$ select private.log_event(null, 'Bad Action', 'profile') $$, '23514', null, 'action must match .' ); select throws_ok( $$ select private.log_event(null, 'export.requested', 'profile', null, null, null, '[]'::jsonb) $$, '23514', null, 'metadata must be a JSON object' ); -- 5. Read access: owner yes, plain user no, anon no, nobody writes through the API set local role authenticated; select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","role":"authenticated"}', true); select is( (select count(*) from audit.audit_logs where target_user_id in ('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', '00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a')), 3::bigint, 'owner reads the audit log' ); select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b","role":"authenticated"}', true); select is((select count(*) from audit.audit_logs), 0::bigint, 'plain user reads nothing'); select throws_ok( $$ insert into audit.audit_logs (action, resource_type) values ('x.y', 'z') $$, '42501', null, 'authenticated cannot insert audit rows' ); select throws_ok( $$ select private.log_event(null, 'x.y', 'z') $$, '42501', null, 'authenticated cannot call log_event' ); set local role anon; select throws_ok( $$ select * from audit.audit_logs $$, '42501', null, 'anon cannot read the audit log' ); select * from finish(); rollback;