# Identity: auth, profile, /app shell (Step 7) Validated by the owner on 2026-10-12. Graphic reference: `docs/design/faunosteo-etape7-maquettes-validees.png` (see `docs/design/README.md` for what the mockup shows beyond this step). Source of truth for the signed-in space added in Step 7. The local tool (`/`, `/new`, `/editor`) is untouched and needs no account; the two live side by side until the plan's Step 14 decides what goes behind authentication. ## 1. Routes | Route | Guard | Screen | |---|---|---| | `/login` | visitor only (`RedirectIfSignedIn`) | email + password, OAuth buttons per `authProviders`, link to signup / forgot | | `/signup` | visitor only | display name, email, password ×2 → "check your inbox" step | | `/forgot-password` | visitor only | email → "link sent" step | | `/reset-password` | none; needs the recovery session | new password ×2; "invalid or expired link" otherwise | | `/auth/callback` | none | landing of OAuth redirects and confirmation links; waits for the session then goes to `/app` (or `?next=`) | | `/app` | `RequireAuth` | dashboard: greeting, profile completeness card, local tool card, account card | | `/app/account` | `RequireAuth` | Mon compte: profile photo (Step 8, `STORAGE.md` §4), personal, professional, preferences (language, timezone), security (password, TOTP factors since V1-2.5 (§4), sign out) | | `/app/anatomy`, `/:sheetId`, `/:sheetId/versions/:number` | `RequireAuth`, `RequireCatalog` (V1-2.5) | catalogue of official sheets, a sheet's current version, an earlier version; « Accès non autorisé » on the server's refusal, the same for an unknown sheet | | `/app/admin`, `/sheets`, `/sheets/new`, `/sheets/:sheetId`, `/species`, `/access` | `RequireAuth`, `RequireAdmin` (V1-2.5, step-up to `aal2`) | administration home, official sheets, species, rights (owner); each page shows what the caller's capabilities allow | `RequireAuth` waits for the client to read the persisted session, then sends a visitor to `/login?next=`; `next` is honoured only when it is a same-origin path (`safeNextPath`). `/app/*` under the guard renders inside `AppLayout` (desktop sidebar, light top bar, mobile drawer). `RequireCatalog` decides nothing: the pages ask the server and show « Accès non autorisé » (`AccessDenied`) when it refuses. `RequireAdmin` renders the admin pages only on an `aal2` session, so no admin data is requested before the step-up (§4). The « Fiches anatomiques » and « Administration » entries of the sidebar and drawer follow a hint built from the caller's own grant rows and roles (`auth/navigationHint.ts`): a hidden entry protects nothing, every RPC checks the capability and `aal2` itself. A deployment without Supabase (`APP_SUPABASE_URL` empty) shows an "unavailable" notice on the auth screens; `/app` redirects to `/login`; the Home header shows no entry to the space. With Supabase configured, the Home header shows "Se connecter" or "Mon espace". ## 2. Session and profile in the app - `state/authStore.ts` subscribes to `client.auth.onAuthStateChange` after `client.auth.initialize()` (which also exchanges the PKCE code found in the URL). Status: `loading | unavailable | signed_out | signed_in`. On sign-in it loads `profiles` (own row) and the active `profile_roles`. - `services/localeSync.ts`: when a profile loads, its `locale` wins over the device choice (once per sign-in); while signed in, switching the language (header toggle or the Preferences select) writes `profiles.locale`. - Profile writes go through `updateOwnProfile` (`packages/supabase`), one PATCH per account section; the columns are the ones the migrations grant (`display_name, first_name, last_name, phone, locale, timezone, practice_name, professional_title, siret`). `active`, `phone_verified_at` and roles are server-only. - Platform roles are read-only badges (`shell.role.*`). The administration space (V1-2.5) manages catalogue rights and species, never platform roles. - GoTrue errors never reach the screen: `classifyAuthError` folds codes into a closed `AuthFailureKind`, phrased by `auth.failure.*`. ## 3. Server configuration `supabase/config.toml`: - email/password with confirmation mandatory, password policy 12 chars + lower/upper/digit (mirrored client-side in `src/auth/validation.ts`); - `[auth.external.google]` / `[auth.external.apple]` read their ids from `env(SUPABASE_AUTH_EXTERNAL__CLIENT_ID|SECRET)`; both are `enabled = false` until the ids exist (put them in `supabase/.env`, gitignored, then flip `enabled`). Google needs an OAuth client with the redirect `http://127.0.0.1:54321/auth/v1/callback` (local) or `https://.supabase.co/auth/v1/callback`; Apple needs a paid developer account and a Services ID (BACKEND_ARCHITECTURE §2); - `[auth.mfa.totp]` enrolment and verification are on server-side; - redirect URLs allow `http://127.0.0.1:5173/**` and `http://localhost:5173/**` (local only). On the hosted project the allowlist is exact, never a host wildcard: Site URL `https://`, Redirect URLs `https:///auth/callback` and `https:///reset-password`. A broad pattern there turns `emailRedirectTo` / `redirectTo` into a server-side open redirect. The app side: `APP_AUTH_PROVIDERS=google,apple` (Docker) or `VITE_AUTH_PROVIDERS` (dev) lists the buttons to show. Showing a button for a provider the server has not enabled yields the phrased error "this sign-in method is not enabled". PKCE pitfall: a confirmation or recovery link must be opened in the browser that made the request (the code verifier lives in its localStorage). Opened elsewhere, the email is still confirmed server-side but no session opens; the callback page says so and the user signs in normally. ## 4. MFA (TOTP) Architecture §2 wants TOTP mandatory for platform roles; V1-2 decision BDR-083 requires `aal2` for every platform role change and every catalogue right (`V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md` §5.6, §5.7). State since V1-2.5: - server: TOTP enrolment and verification on (`[auth.mfa.totp]`). Since M4 (`20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening.sql`) `private.has_mfa()` reads the token's `aal` claim, and `private.has_aal2_session()` also requires the token's session to still be `aal2` in `auth.sessions`; the role and rights RPCs use the second, the catalogue policies and RPCs the first. The `is_platform_*` helpers still ignore the level: the RPCs that need it call the helpers above. - Mon compte, Sécurité (`components/account/{MfaFactors,EnrolTotp}.tsx`): the factor list (verified and unverified), adding a factor (name, QR code, secret for manual entry shown once and kept in the component's state only, then a code), removal after a confirmation. An unverified factor the enrolment made is removed on cancel or unmount (a dormant factor is a path, V1-2 contract §5.7.3). `packages/supabase/src/mfa.ts` folds GoTrue's answers into the closed `MfaFailure` kinds (`mfa.failure.*`). - Step-up at `/app/admin` (`RequireAdmin`): an `aal1` session is asked for a code from one of its verified factors; without one, it is sent to Sécurité. - Step-up inside an action (`auth/useStepUp.ts`, `components/auth/InlineStepUp`): when GoTrue refuses below `aal2` (`aal2_required`: a second factor, the removal of a verified one, a password change), the challenge opens in place and the action is sent to GoTrue again once it succeeds, never bypassed. - Password reset (`/reset-password`): an account with a verified factor steps up before the new password is sent, the recovery session included (§4.1). Still open: the recovery runbook for a lost factor (V1-2 contract §5.7.7) is rehearsed at V1-2.9; the paths and gaps are reviewed in §4.2. ### 4.1 GoTrue v2.197.0 behaviour, measured on the sandbox (V1-2.5) `packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/mfa-behaviour.sandbox.ts` (real GoTrue, run by `pnpm db:sandbox test`) asserts what the pinned image does; V1-2 contract §5.6, §5.7.1, §5.7.3, §5.7.4. None of it is assumed elsewhere. - First factor: enrolled from `aal1`, stored `unverified`; until verified a new sign-in stays `aal1`. - Verify: challenge and verify upgrade the same session (same `session_id`) to `aal2`, `amr` password + totp, and delete the account's other `aal1` sessions. GoTrue refuses their tokens at once; PostgREST keeps accepting their access token until it expires. - Second factor from `aal1`: 403 `insufficient_aal`; from `aal2`: allowed. - Removing a verified factor from `aal1`: 422 `insufficient_aal`; an unverified one: allowed. The STOP condition of §5.6 did not fire. - Removing a verified factor from `aal2`: only the sessions last verified with that factor drop to `aal1`. Their access token keeps its `aal2` claim until it expires: `has_mfa()` stays true for it, `has_aal2_session()` turns false, so the role and rights RPCs refuse it at once. Their next refresh is `aal1`. - Dormant unverified factor: one left before any verification is deleted when another factor is verified. One enrolled from `aal2` after verification is kept and can later be verified from a password-only session, reaching `aal2`. Planting it needs an `aal2` session and its secret (shown once), so it stays within the stolen-session residual (§5.7.8). Factor lists show unverified factors. - Password change or reset with a verified factor: refused at `aal1` (401 `insufficient_aal`), including from a recovery-link session (`amr` otp). From `aal2` it succeeds, keeps that session and deletes the account's others. The recovery screens and the §5.7.7 runbook must reach `aal2` first. Without a factor, `aal1` changes the password and stays `aal1`. - Refresh keeps `aal2`; a new password sign-in starts at `aal1`. - Email change: refused at `aal1`; from `aal2` the confirmation link opens a new `aal1` session. Identity linking: 404 `manual_linking_disabled`. - TOTP code reuse (case 11, asserted): GoTrue keeps no record of used codes. A code C taken in a fresh 30 s step N is accepted by session A, then by a second `aal1` session B signed in after A's verify (B proven alive first, and it reaches `aal2`), then by A again. A session D verifying C in step N+1 is accepted too (one step of skew); a session E verifying C in step N+2 is refused (422 `mfa_verification_failed`). Measured span of one code: its own step and the next, 30 to 60 s. Consequence: a code seen over a shoulder or relayed by a phishing page can be replayed once by another password-holding session within that span; it does not outlive it. Configuration that ran the measurement: the sandbox GoTrue (`scripts/db-sandbox.sh`, image `gotrue:v2.197.0`), which sets no MFA variable, so the image defaults apply. The CLI and DEV stacks are configured by `supabase/config.toml` `[auth.mfa]` (`max_enrolled_factors = 10`) and `[auth.mfa.totp]` (enrolment and verification on), no replay setting either; the same behaviour is expected there but only the sandbox was measured. No mitigation is added: the span is a residual risk (V1-2 contract §13). ### 4.2 Lost authenticator: paths and gaps Review of what happens when a person loses the device holding their TOTP factor (V1-2 contract §5.6, §5.7.7). It describes; it adds no path and does not weaken `aal2`. | Path | What exists | Gap | |---|---|---| | Second factor | A factor is enrolled from `aal2`, then any verified factor reaches `aal2`. Recommended for every capability holder, two factors on two independent devices for the owner (§5.6, §5.7.7). | Nothing forces a second factor on a capability holder; a person with one factor and a lost device has no second path. | | Self-service recovery | None. GoTrue issues no recovery codes. Password change and reset, and removal of a verified factor, need `aal2` (case 7, 4), so a lost factor cannot be removed or bypassed by the person. An ordinary account keeps its `aal1` use of the application; a capability holder loses the administration until recovery. | No recovery code or backup channel. By design. | | Authorised administrative intervention | Operator procedure of V1-2 §5.6 and §5.7.7, run with server access: sign out every session, delete the factors, ban, new password with the person present, lift the ban, two new factors, list the factors. Never an application path: no RPC, screen or service path resets a factor. | A procedure on paper: not rehearsed (V1-2.9). | | Identity checks | Out of band, the owner present, the reason recorded before anything changes. | Human control only; nothing in the system verifies it. | | Audit trail | The operator writes the `auth.mfa_factor_reset` row in the same session; GoTrue keeps its own audit log of the factor and session changes. | The row depends on the operator writing it; a forgotten row is not detected. On a single-owner platform the operator is the owner, so there is no second person to check (the real control is server access). | Production prerequisite: a recovery runbook rehearsed on the sandbox and written here before any production use of MFA-protected rights. Until it exists, the safe lost-factor recovery is missing, and capabilities must not be granted in production. ## 5. Manual validation (local stack) ```bash pnpm db:start # stack on the DEV origin (LAN address); Mailpit at http://:54325 (basic auth, pnpm dev:gateway) VITE_AUTH_PROVIDERS=google pnpm dev # http://:5173 from any device of the private network (ENVIRONMENTS.md) ``` 1. `/app` while signed out → `/login?next=%2Fapp`. The login card shows a Google button (not functional until the provider is enabled: expect the "not enabled" message). 2. Wrong password → "E-mail ou mot de passe incorrect". Seeded account `alice@faunosteo.local` / `LocalDev-only-password-1` → lands on `/app`. 3. Dashboard: greeting, "À compléter : Prénom, Nom", "Adresse confirmée", no platform role (owner@ shows "Propriétaire plateforme"). 4. Mon compte: fill professional title / practice / SIRET → "Modifications enregistrées"; SIRET `1234` → inline error, nothing saved. Language select or the FR/EN toggle → the UI switches; reload → the account language is applied (profiles.locale in Studio). 5. Mobile (375 px): hamburger opens the drawer; navigation closes it; no horizontal scroll on login, dashboard, account. 6. Home shows "Mon espace" while signed in; sidebar "Se déconnecter" → Home with "Se connecter"; `/app` guarded again. 7. `/signup` with a new address → "Vérifiez votre boîte mail"; open Mailpit, click the confirmation link in the same browser → `/app` signed in, "Adresse confirmée". 8. `/forgot-password` → Mailpit recovery link → `/reset-password` → new password → `/app`; sign out and sign in with the new password. 9. REST: anon cannot read profiles (`42501`), alice reads one row only (SUPABASE.md §8). 10. Profile photo (Step 8, worker container running: `pnpm worker:image` then `docker compose --profile worker up worker` or the container of `pnpm e2e:avatar` on the sandbox): Mon compte → Modifier la photo with a phone JPEG → preview → Enregistrer → "Traitement en cours…" → the photo in the circle, the sidebar, the drawer (mobile) and the top bar (name beside it on desktop, alone on mobile) linking to Mon compte; a renamed PNG is accepted, an HTML or SVG file is refused at the picker; replace, then Supprimer la photo → confirmation → monogram; sign in as bob: nothing of alice shows; open the object path of alice's photo in a private window → 400. Automated: `pnpm test:run` (auth store, locale sync, forms, guards, shell, dashboard, account, pgTAP 009), plus the headless end-to-end run described in the Step 7 report (not part of CI).