-- Files foundation (plan Step 8, docs/development/STORAGE.md): the `assets` -- table as the authority over every user file, the private buckets, the -- avatar read / upload policies evaluated through `assets`, the purge queue -- and the RPCs of the browser and of the Rust worker. -- -- First consumer: the profile photo (kind profile_avatar, bucket avatars). -- Every other bucket exists and stays closed (no policy names it) until its -- own step writes its rules. The sheet bucket of 20261009100000 is untouched. -- -- Invariants pinned by supabase/tests/010_files_foundation.sql: -- * no API role reads a quarantine object, ever; a final object is readable -- only through a `clean` row of the caller whose object_key is the name; -- * the browser can insert only at the quarantine key of its own -- pending_upload row; no UPDATE / DELETE policy exists on the bucket; -- * every status change is an RPC; the worker's RPCs carry a lease token so -- an old task never overwrites a newer avatar; -- * a terminal row (deleted, rejected) enqueues its objects for a deferred -- purge; a clean row's object_key never enters the queue. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Buckets: all private. Upsert so the migration converges everywhere. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- insert into storage.buckets (id, name, public, file_size_limit, allowed_mime_types) values ('avatars', 'avatars', false, 5242880, array['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp']) on conflict (id) do update set public = false, file_size_limit = excluded.file_size_limit, allowed_mime_types = excluded.allowed_mime_types; insert into storage.buckets (id, name, public) values ('logos', 'logos', false), ('professional-documents', 'professional-documents', false), ('client-files', 'client-files', false), ('animal-files', 'animal-files', false), ('report-files', 'report-files', false), ('imports', 'imports', false) on conflict (id) do update set public = false; -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- assets -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- create type public.asset_status as enum ('pending_upload', 'uploaded', 'clean', 'rejected', 'deleted'); create table public.assets ( id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(), owner_id uuid not null references public.profiles (id) on delete cascade, kind text not null constraint assets_kind_known check (kind in ('profile_avatar')), bucket_id text not null constraint assets_bucket_per_kind check ( (kind = 'profile_avatar' and bucket_id = 'avatars') ), -- Final key, server-built from uuids; one canonical file name per kind. object_key text not null unique constraint assets_object_key_shape check ( object_key ~ '^profiles/[0-9a-f-]{36}/[0-9a-f-]{36}/avatar\.webp$' ), -- Upload key; null once the worker confirmed the quarantine object is gone. quarantine_key text unique constraint assets_quarantine_key_shape check ( quarantine_key ~ '^quarantine/[0-9a-f-]{36}/[0-9a-f-]{36}/upload$' ), status public.asset_status not null default 'pending_upload', declared_mime text not null constraint assets_declared_mime_known check ( declared_mime in ('image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp') ), declared_size integer not null constraint assets_declared_size_range check (declared_size between 1 and 5242880), -- The clean output, set by complete_avatar_job. byte_size integer constraint assets_byte_size_range check (byte_size between 1 and 524288), sha256 text constraint assets_sha256_hex check (sha256 ~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'), rejection_reason text constraint assets_rejection_reason_known check ( rejection_reason in ('unsupported_type', 'decode_failed', 'dimensions', 'processing_error') ), constraint assets_rejection_reason_iff_rejected check ( (status = 'rejected') = (rejection_reason is not null) ), -- Lease: claim_avatar_jobs sets both; complete / reject require the token. attempts smallint not null default 0, locked_at timestamptz, lock_token uuid, created_at timestamptz not null default now(), updated_at timestamptz not null default now() ); comment on table public.assets is 'One row per user file, created before the bytes exist and kept after they are gone (deleted / rejected) until the purge queue has been served. Writes only through RPCs (docs/development/STORAGE.md).'; comment on column public.assets.object_key is 'Final key in the bucket (profiles///avatar.webp). Readable by the owner while the row is clean.'; comment on column public.assets.quarantine_key is 'Upload key (quarantine///upload). Never readable by an API role; null once purged.'; comment on column public.assets.lock_token is 'Lease token of the worker that claimed the row; complete_avatar_job and reject_avatar_job refuse any other token.'; -- "The" avatar of an account = its single clean row (no profile column). create unique index assets_one_clean_avatar on public.assets (owner_id) where kind = 'profile_avatar' and status = 'clean'; create index assets_claimable on public.assets (created_at) where status = 'uploaded'; -- The ceiling's pending term reads only the rows still waiting for bytes. create index assets_pending_claims on public.assets (quarantine_key) where status = 'pending_upload'; create index assets_owner_idx on public.assets (owner_id, created_at desc); create trigger assets_set_updated_at before update on public.assets for each row execute function private.set_updated_at(); -- Privileges + RLS: the owner reads the public columns of their rows; nobody -- writes through the API. revoke all on public.assets from public, anon, authenticated; grant select ( id, owner_id, kind, bucket_id, object_key, status, declared_mime, declared_size, byte_size, sha256, rejection_reason, created_at, updated_at ) on public.assets to authenticated; alter table public.assets enable row level security; create policy assets_select_own on public.assets for select to authenticated using (owner_id = (select auth.uid())); -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Purge queue (private): every object deletion the worker makes comes from -- here or from the quarantine leftover query; nothing else is ever deleted. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- create table private.object_purge_queue ( id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(), bucket_id text not null, object_name text not null, not_before timestamptz not null, enqueued_at timestamptz not null default now(), locked_at timestamptz, attempts smallint not null default 0, unique (bucket_id, object_name) ); comment on table private.object_purge_queue is 'Objects to delete after a grace period (48 h for the final key of a deleted row: longer than a backup run; 1 h for quarantine keys and rejected uploads). Served by claim_purges / ack_purge.'; revoke all on private.object_purge_queue from public, anon, authenticated, service_role; create or replace function private.enqueue_object_purge( p_bucket_id text, p_object_name text, p_grace interval ) returns void language sql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ insert into private.object_purge_queue (bucket_id, object_name, not_before) values (p_bucket_id, p_object_name, now() + p_grace) on conflict (bucket_id, object_name) do update set not_before = least(private.object_purge_queue.not_before, excluded.not_before); $$; revoke all on function private.enqueue_object_purge(text, text, interval) from public; -- A row reaching a terminal status, or disappearing (account cascade), -- enqueues both of its keys. A clean row's object_key is never enqueued. create or replace function private.enqueue_asset_objects() returns trigger language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ declare v_row public.assets; v_final_grace interval; begin if tg_op = 'DELETE' then v_row := old; v_final_grace := interval '48 hours'; else if new.status not in ('deleted', 'rejected') or old.status in ('deleted', 'rejected') then return new; end if; v_row := new; v_final_grace := case when new.status = 'deleted' then interval '48 hours' else interval '1 hour' end; end if; perform private.enqueue_object_purge(v_row.bucket_id, v_row.object_key, v_final_grace); if v_row.quarantine_key is not null then perform private.enqueue_object_purge(v_row.bucket_id, v_row.quarantine_key, interval '1 hour'); end if; return coalesce(new, old); end; $$; revoke all on function private.enqueue_asset_objects() from public; create trigger assets_enqueue_purge_on_status after update of status on public.assets for each row execute function private.enqueue_asset_objects(); create trigger assets_enqueue_purge_on_delete after delete on public.assets for each row execute function private.enqueue_asset_objects(); -- Global ceiling on the bytes present in the avatars bucket (10 GiB to start), -- measured on storage.objects, plus one 5 MiB cap per upload still expected. create or replace function private.storage_ceiling() returns bigint language sql immutable set search_path = '' as $$ select 10737418240::bigint; $$; revoke all on function private.storage_ceiling() from public; -- Bytes one account may hold in the bucket at once (its clean photo plus the -- quarantine objects of its last uploads during their grace): 64 MiB. create or replace function private.account_byte_budget() returns bigint language sql immutable set search_path = '' as $$ select 67108864::bigint; $$; revoke all on function private.account_byte_budget() from public; -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Storage policies for bucket avatars, evaluated through assets. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- create or replace function private.can_read_avatar_object(p_user_id uuid, p_object_name text) returns boolean language sql stable security definer set search_path = '' as $$ select exists ( select 1 from public.assets a where a.owner_id = p_user_id and a.kind = 'profile_avatar' and a.status = 'clean' and a.object_key = p_object_name ); $$; comment on function private.can_read_avatar_object(uuid, text) is 'Storage read predicate for bucket avatars: the object_key of a clean row of the caller. Quarantine keys never match.'; create or replace function private.can_upload_avatar_object(p_user_id uuid, p_object_name text) returns boolean language sql stable security definer set search_path = '' as $$ select exists ( select 1 from public.assets a join public.profiles p on p.id = a.owner_id and p.active where a.owner_id = p_user_id and a.kind = 'profile_avatar' and a.status = 'pending_upload' and a.quarantine_key = p_object_name ); $$; comment on function private.can_upload_avatar_object(uuid, text) is 'Storage insert predicate for bucket avatars: the quarantine_key of a pending_upload row of the caller. Final keys never match.'; revoke all on function private.can_read_avatar_object(uuid, text) from public; revoke all on function private.can_upload_avatar_object(uuid, text) from public; grant execute on function private.can_read_avatar_object(uuid, text) to authenticated; grant execute on function private.can_upload_avatar_object(uuid, text) to authenticated; create policy avatars_read on storage.objects for select to authenticated using ( bucket_id = 'avatars' and private.can_read_avatar_object((select auth.uid()), name) ); create policy avatars_upload on storage.objects for insert to authenticated with check ( bucket_id = 'avatars' and private.can_upload_avatar_object((select auth.uid()), name) ); -- No UPDATE / DELETE policy for API roles on this bucket; no policy at all on -- the six closed buckets. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Browser RPCs (authenticated). Business refusals: SQLSTATE P0001 with the -- closed code as the message; authorisation refusals: 42501. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- create or replace function public.begin_avatar_upload(declared_mime text, declared_size integer) returns jsonb language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ #variable_conflict use_variable declare v_actor uuid := auth.uid(); v_active boolean; v_id uuid := gen_random_uuid(); v_recent integer; v_used bigint; v_expected bigint; v_mine bigint; v_final_prefix text; v_quarantine_prefix text; v_object_key text; v_quarantine_key text; begin if v_actor is null then raise exception 'authentication required' using errcode = '42501'; end if; -- Serialises a double click and refuses a deactivated account. select p.active into v_active from public.profiles p where p.id = v_actor for update; if v_active is distinct from true then raise exception 'account inactive or unknown' using errcode = '42501'; end if; if declared_mime is null or declared_mime not in ('image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp') then raise exception using message = 'unsupported_type', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; if declared_size is null or declared_size < 1 or declared_size > 5242880 then raise exception using message = 'too_large', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; select count(*) into v_recent from public.assets a where a.owner_id = v_actor and a.created_at > now() - interval '1 hour'; if v_recent >= 10 then raise exception using message = 'rate_limited', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; -- Per-account budget on bytes present under the caller's two prefixes -- (clean photo, quarantine objects within their grace): bounds what one -- account can hold against the global ceiling. v_final_prefix := 'profiles/' || v_actor::text || '/%'; v_quarantine_prefix := 'quarantine/' || v_actor::text || '/%'; select coalesce(sum((o.metadata ->> 'size')::bigint), 0) into v_mine from storage.objects o where o.bucket_id = 'avatars' and (o.name like v_final_prefix or o.name like v_quarantine_prefix); if v_mine + 5242880 > private.account_byte_budget() then raise exception using message = 'rate_limited', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; -- Global ceiling: bytes that exist (every sized object of the bucket, -- whatever its row's state) plus one cap per pending upload whose bytes -- have not landed yet (the declared size is a claim the upload does not -- enforce). A claim never outlives its row and a row without bytes weighs -- nothing once it moved on, so no account can pin the ceiling. select coalesce(sum((o.metadata ->> 'size')::bigint), 0) into v_used from storage.objects o where o.bucket_id = 'avatars'; select count(*) * 5242880 into v_expected from public.assets a where a.status = 'pending_upload' and not exists ( select 1 from storage.objects o where o.bucket_id = a.bucket_id and o.name = a.quarantine_key and o.metadata ->> 'size' is not null ); if v_used + v_expected + 5242880 > private.storage_ceiling() then raise exception using message = 'storage_full', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; -- One in-flight avatar per account: a new pick supersedes the previous one. update public.assets a set status = 'deleted' where a.owner_id = v_actor and a.kind = 'profile_avatar' and a.status in ('pending_upload', 'uploaded'); v_object_key := 'profiles/' || v_actor || '/' || v_id || '/avatar.webp'; v_quarantine_key := 'quarantine/' || v_actor || '/' || v_id || '/upload'; insert into public.assets (id, owner_id, kind, bucket_id, object_key, quarantine_key, declared_mime, declared_size) values (v_id, v_actor, 'profile_avatar', 'avatars', v_object_key, v_quarantine_key, declared_mime, declared_size); return jsonb_build_object('asset_id', v_id, 'bucket_id', 'avatars', 'quarantine_key', v_quarantine_key); end; $$; comment on function public.begin_avatar_upload(text, integer) is 'Reserves an avatar upload: rate (10 per hour), per-account byte budget, global ceiling, type and size caps, supersedes any in-flight row of the caller, returns {asset_id, bucket_id, quarantine_key}.'; create or replace function public.confirm_asset_upload(asset_id uuid) returns void language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ #variable_conflict use_variable declare v_actor uuid := auth.uid(); v_active boolean; v_row public.assets; v_size bigint; v_found boolean; begin if v_actor is null then raise exception 'authentication required' using errcode = '42501'; end if; select p.active into v_active from public.profiles p where p.id = v_actor; if v_active is distinct from true then raise exception 'account inactive or unknown' using errcode = '42501'; end if; select a.* into v_row from public.assets a where a.id = asset_id and a.owner_id = v_actor for update; if v_row.id is null then raise exception using message = 'not_found', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; if v_row.status <> 'pending_upload' then raise exception using message = 'invalid_state', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; select true, (o.metadata ->> 'size')::bigint into v_found, v_size from storage.objects o where o.bucket_id = v_row.bucket_id and o.name = v_row.quarantine_key; -- No object, or an object the Storage API has not sized: nothing to confirm (fail closed). if v_found is distinct from true or v_size is null then raise exception using message = 'upload_missing', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; -- The object may not exceed the cap nor what the caller declared (the -- transport blob the browser announced). if v_size > 5242880 or v_size > v_row.declared_size then raise exception using message = 'too_large', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; update public.assets a set status = 'uploaded' where a.id = v_row.id; end; $$; comment on function public.confirm_asset_upload(uuid) is 'Explicit client signal: the quarantine object of the caller''s pending_upload row exists → uploaded. The worker never guesses from Storage internals whether a PUT finished.'; create or replace function public.remove_avatar() returns integer language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ declare v_actor uuid := auth.uid(); v_count integer; begin if v_actor is null then raise exception 'authentication required' using errcode = '42501'; end if; update public.assets a set status = 'deleted' where a.owner_id = v_actor and a.kind = 'profile_avatar' and a.status in ('pending_upload', 'uploaded', 'clean'); get diagnostics v_count = row_count; if v_count > 0 then perform private.log_event( v_actor, 'asset.avatar_removed', 'asset', null, v_actor, null, jsonb_build_object('count', v_count) ); end if; return v_count; end; $$; comment on function public.remove_avatar() is 'Every avatar row of the caller still alive (clean or in flight) → deleted; the objects are purged after the grace period. Audited.'; revoke all on function public.begin_avatar_upload(text, integer) from public, anon; revoke all on function public.confirm_asset_upload(uuid) from public, anon; revoke all on function public.remove_avatar() from public, anon; revoke all on function public.begin_avatar_upload(text, integer) from service_role; revoke all on function public.confirm_asset_upload(uuid) from service_role; revoke all on function public.remove_avatar() from service_role; grant execute on function public.begin_avatar_upload(text, integer) to authenticated; grant execute on function public.confirm_asset_upload(uuid) to authenticated; grant execute on function public.remove_avatar() to authenticated; -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Worker RPCs (service_role only; EXECUTE is the guard, as for -- confirm_sheet_asset_upload). -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- create or replace function public.claim_avatar_jobs(max_jobs integer) returns table ( asset_id uuid, owner_id uuid, bucket_id text, object_key text, quarantine_key text, lock_token uuid, attempts smallint ) language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ #variable_conflict use_variable declare v_limit integer := least(greatest(coalesce(max_jobs, 1), 1), 10); v_expired record; begin -- A third expired lease is a refusal: the content or the environment -- defeated the worker three times. for v_expired in update public.assets a set status = 'rejected', rejection_reason = 'processing_error', locked_at = null, lock_token = null where a.status = 'uploaded' and a.attempts >= 3 and a.locked_at is not null and a.locked_at < now() - interval '10 minutes' returning a.id, a.owner_id loop perform private.log_event( null, 'asset.rejected', 'asset', v_expired.id, v_expired.owner_id, null, jsonb_build_object('reason', 'processing_error', 'cause', 'lease_expired') ); end loop; return query with claimed as ( select a.id from public.assets a where a.status = 'uploaded' and a.attempts < 3 and (a.locked_at is null or a.locked_at < now() - interval '10 minutes') order by a.created_at limit v_limit for update skip locked ) update public.assets a set locked_at = now(), attempts = a.attempts + 1, lock_token = gen_random_uuid() from claimed where a.id = claimed.id returning a.id, a.owner_id, a.bucket_id, a.object_key, a.quarantine_key, a.lock_token, a.attempts; end; $$; comment on function public.claim_avatar_jobs(integer) is 'Worker: leases uploaded rows oldest first (skip locked, 10 min lease, 3 attempts); rows past their 3rd expired lease become rejected (processing_error). VOLATILE on purpose.'; create or replace function public.complete_avatar_job( asset_id uuid, lock_token uuid, byte_size integer, sha256 text ) returns void language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ #variable_conflict use_variable declare v_row public.assets; begin select a.* into v_row from public.assets a where a.id = asset_id for update; if v_row.id is null then raise exception using message = 'not_found', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; -- A superseded or removed row is no longer uploaded; an expired lease -- carries a stale token: both refuse, the purge queue owns any object. if v_row.status <> 'uploaded' or lock_token is null or v_row.lock_token is distinct from lock_token then raise exception using message = 'invalid_state', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; if byte_size is null or byte_size < 1 or byte_size > 524288 or sha256 is null or sha256 !~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$' then raise exception using message = 'invalid_output', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; -- Replacement: the previous clean avatar is enqueued (48 h) by the trigger. update public.assets a set status = 'deleted' where a.owner_id = v_row.owner_id and a.kind = v_row.kind and a.status = 'clean' and a.id <> v_row.id; update public.assets a set status = 'clean', byte_size = byte_size, sha256 = sha256, locked_at = null, lock_token = null where a.id = v_row.id; perform private.log_event( null, 'asset.avatar_set', 'asset', v_row.id, v_row.owner_id, null, jsonb_build_object('byte_size', byte_size) ); end; $$; comment on function public.complete_avatar_job(uuid, uuid, integer, text) is 'Worker: the clean object is in place → the row becomes clean and the previous clean avatar of the owner is deleted, in one transaction. Refused on any status but uploaded or on a stale lease token.'; create or replace function public.reject_avatar_job(asset_id uuid, lock_token uuid, reason text) returns void language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ #variable_conflict use_variable declare v_row public.assets; begin select a.* into v_row from public.assets a where a.id = asset_id for update; if v_row.id is null then raise exception using message = 'not_found', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; if v_row.status <> 'uploaded' or lock_token is null or v_row.lock_token is distinct from lock_token then raise exception using message = 'invalid_state', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; if reason is null or reason not in ('unsupported_type', 'decode_failed', 'dimensions', 'processing_error') then raise exception using message = 'invalid_reason', errcode = 'P0001'; end if; update public.assets a set status = 'rejected', rejection_reason = reason, locked_at = null, lock_token = null where a.id = v_row.id; perform private.log_event( null, 'asset.rejected', 'asset', v_row.id, v_row.owner_id, null, jsonb_build_object('reason', reason) ); end; $$; comment on function public.reject_avatar_job(uuid, uuid, text) is 'Worker: the upload was refused with a closed code. Same guards as complete_avatar_job.'; create or replace function public.mark_quarantine_purged(asset_id uuid) returns void language sql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ update public.assets a set quarantine_key = null where a.id = asset_id and a.status = 'clean'; $$; comment on function public.mark_quarantine_purged(uuid) is 'Worker: the quarantine object of a clean row was deleted. No-op on any other status.'; create or replace function public.claim_purges(max_items integer) returns table (purge_id uuid, bucket_id text, object_name text) language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ #variable_conflict use_variable declare v_limit integer := least(greatest(coalesce(max_items, 1), 1), 100); begin return query with claimed as ( select q.id from private.object_purge_queue q where q.not_before <= now() and (q.locked_at is null or q.locked_at < now() - interval '10 minutes') order by q.not_before limit v_limit for update skip locked ) update private.object_purge_queue q set locked_at = now(), attempts = q.attempts + 1 from claimed where q.id = claimed.id returning q.id, q.bucket_id, q.object_name; end; $$; comment on function public.claim_purges(integer) is 'Worker: due purge entries (grace elapsed), leased for 10 minutes. Delete the object, then ack_purge.'; create or replace function public.ack_purge(purge_id uuid) returns void language sql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ delete from private.object_purge_queue q where q.id = purge_id; $$; comment on function public.ack_purge(uuid) is 'Worker: the object of a purge entry is gone (a missing object counts as gone).'; create or replace function public.claim_quarantine_leftovers(older_than_seconds integer, max_items integer) returns table (bucket_id text, object_name text, asset_id uuid) language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ #variable_conflict use_variable declare v_limit integer := least(greatest(coalesce(max_items, 1), 1), 100); v_age interval := make_interval(secs => greatest(coalesce(older_than_seconds, 0), 0)); begin -- Bytes under quarantine/ whose row is no longer waiting for them: a slow -- PUT or a signed upload URL used after the row moved on, or the -- quarantine object of a clean row the worker could not delete in time. return query select o.bucket_id, o.name, a.id from storage.objects o left join public.assets a on a.bucket_id = o.bucket_id and a.quarantine_key = o.name where o.bucket_id = 'avatars' and o.name like 'quarantine/%' and o.created_at <= now() - v_age and (a.id is null or a.status not in ('pending_upload', 'uploaded')) order by o.created_at limit v_limit; end; $$; comment on function public.claim_quarantine_leftovers(integer, integer) is 'Worker sweep: quarantine objects older than the grace whose row is not pending_upload / uploaded. The worker deletes them and calls mark_quarantine_purged when asset_id is set.'; create or replace function public.expire_pending_uploads(max_age_seconds integer) returns integer language plpgsql security definer set search_path = '' as $$ #variable_conflict use_variable declare v_count integer; begin update public.assets a set status = 'deleted' where a.status = 'pending_upload' and a.created_at < now() - make_interval(secs => greatest(coalesce(max_age_seconds, 0), 0)); get diagnostics v_count = row_count; return v_count; end; $$; comment on function public.expire_pending_uploads(integer) is 'Worker sweep: pending_upload rows never confirmed within the age → deleted (their keys are enqueued by the trigger).'; revoke all on function public.claim_avatar_jobs(integer) from public, anon, authenticated; revoke all on function public.complete_avatar_job(uuid, uuid, integer, text) from public, anon, authenticated; revoke all on function public.reject_avatar_job(uuid, uuid, text) from public, anon, authenticated; revoke all on function public.mark_quarantine_purged(uuid) from public, anon, authenticated; revoke all on function public.claim_purges(integer) from public, anon, authenticated; revoke all on function public.ack_purge(uuid) from public, anon, authenticated; revoke all on function public.claim_quarantine_leftovers(integer, integer) from public, anon, authenticated; revoke all on function public.expire_pending_uploads(integer) from public, anon, authenticated; grant execute on function public.claim_avatar_jobs(integer) to service_role; grant execute on function public.complete_avatar_job(uuid, uuid, integer, text) to service_role; grant execute on function public.reject_avatar_job(uuid, uuid, text) to service_role; grant execute on function public.mark_quarantine_purged(uuid) to service_role; grant execute on function public.claim_purges(integer) to service_role; grant execute on function public.ack_purge(uuid) to service_role; grant execute on function public.claim_quarantine_leftovers(integer, integer) to service_role; grant execute on function public.expire_pending_uploads(integer) to service_role;