# Security gate: Rust R5.7 (deletion of packages/anatomy and packages/domain) Date 2026-10-25. Branch `feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`. Scope `756b7ef..4e0a6c0` (149 paths in the diff: 110 deletions, 2 renames, 37 modified or added files). Fresh auditor, no prior verdict consulted. ``` SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten SCOPE: 39 files (the existing files of the diff; 110 deleted paths inspected through git) BLOCKING: (none) REPORTED (non-blocking): - [LOW] new-suppression (clippy allow, not a security-tool suppression) — crates/core/tests/curation_leaves.rs:6 - [LOW] census-weakness (ledger target resolved by `fn (` presence, not `#[test]`) — apps/app/tests/unit/r5.census.test.ts:103 PROOF: semgrep 158 rules (725 loaded, 3 packs) on 39 files → 0 findings; checklist 8 checks → 0 findings; guardrails scan.py api,supabase → 0 FAIL, 1 WARN outside the diff (filtered), 1 MANUAL (not reported); anti-gaming 1 new allow (LOW) ``` ## Semgrep `semgrep scan --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets --config p/owasp-top-ten --metrics=off --quiet --json <39 paths>`: 0 results, 0 errors, 0 skipped. The verbose rerun confirms 725 rules loaded from the 3 packs, 158 applicable to the languages present (TypeScript, Rust, Dockerfile, JSON, YAML, Markdown, shell), 39 files scanned. ## Checklist (8 checks, 0 findings) | Check | Result | |---|---| | Hardcoded secret, token, key, auth URL in added lines | None. The only hit is the variable name `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY` in a CLAUDE.md command description, no value. | | SQL by concatenation | No new SQL. `crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs` (doc comment only in this diff) keeps `sql_text` quote doubling and `$equine_doc$` dollar quoting; the deleted `importer.guards.test.ts` case "refuses a document that contains the dollar-quote tag" is ported as `a_document_holding_the_dollar_quote_tag_is_refused_by_the_seed` (curation_draft.rs). | | Unsanitized render (innerHTML, eval, raw) | None in the diff. | | Sensitive endpoint without authz | No endpoint, policy or RPC in the diff. | | Stack trace / internal path to the user | None. | | Secret or PII to a log | None. | | Tracked `.env` or credential file | Only `.env.example` is tracked; `.dockerignore` excludes `.env`, `.env.*`, the gateway htpasswd and Mailpit password. | | Guardrails scanner (`~/.claude/skills/guardrails/scripts/scan.py`, domains api,supabase) | 0 FAIL. 1 WARN `SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER` on `supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177` (`species_select_active`): pre-existing, file not in the diff, filtered per gate rule. 1 MANUAL `SB-RLS-LIVE`, not reported here. | Local paths (`/home/`, `/Users/`), user names, e-mail addresses and private IP ranges: none in the added lines. The URL `https://www.instagram.com/paws.iin.harmony` present in the moved fixtures is the product's existing partner credit (`apps/app/src/pdf/branding.ts`, `components/brand/Footer.tsx`), product data, not personal data introduced by this change. ## Anti-gaming One new suppression-like marker in the added lines: `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]` at `crates/core/tests/curation_leaves.rs:6`. It is a clippy allow, not a semgrep, bandit or ESLint-security suppression, and it is the identical header the 40 sibling integration tests under `crates/core/tests/` already carry (`disallowed_methods` forbids I/O and clock in the core library; integration tests read fixtures from disk). Reported LOW, not blocking. No removed suppression, no `nosemgrep`, `nosec`, `eslint-disable`, `@ts-ignore`, `.skip` or `#[ignore]` added. ## Focus (1): controls still needed by active paths Pre-state references to the deleted code in production paths (`apps/app/src`, `packages/core-wasm/src`, `packages/supabase/src`, `Dockerfile`, `docker/`, vite and tsconfig files, `scripts/`, `.gitea/`): exactly two, both removed by the diff. - `Dockerfile:39-40`: `COPY packages/domain/package.json` and `COPY packages/anatomy/package.json`. - `packages/supabase/package.json:21`: script `assets:upload:legacy` → `node scripts/upload-sheet-assets.ts`. Post-state: zero references in those paths (the `scripts/r4-ledger.mjs` hits are `.tsx` file names). `pnpm-workspace.yaml` globs `packages/*`; the lockfile importers are now exactly `.`, `apps/app`, `packages/core-wasm`, `packages/supabase`, and the Dockerfile builder stage copies exactly those four manifests before `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`, then `COPY . .`. The image build is coherent with the lockfile. Each control the brief names lives in the Rust core and is untouched (the four `crates/core/src` changes are doc comments only): | Control | Where it runs now | Present at 4e0a6c0 | |---|---|---| | PDF import (byte scan, capped inflation, layered read) | `crates/core/src/pdf/{read,import.rs}` | yes | | SVG sanitising (caps, allowlist, reference graph) | `crates/core/src/anatomy/svg/{prescan,sanitize}.rs` | yes | | Sheet integrity rules | `crates/core/src/domain/sheet` | yes | | Seed SQL generation (quoting, dollar-tag refusal) | `crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs` | yes | | Upload tool (local-only URL, private-bucket handshake, no overwrite, key never printed) | `crates/core/src/curation/upload.rs`, `crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets`, `scripts/upload-sheet-assets.sh` (`env -u SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY cargo build`, then exec) | yes | | Archive readers | `crates/core/src/domain/archive` | yes | | N-1 Zod reader (frozen copy of the deleted domain) | `packages/core-wasm/tests/n-1/domain` | yes | Declared functional loss, not a security loss: the xmldom-based re-cleaning of a legacy SVG (`packages/anatomy/src/curation/assets.ts`) is not ported; the pipeline reads the committed cleaned `draft/assets/horse.svg` bytes and verifies them through the core reader (`FILES.tsv` row, BDR-068). Every drawing the application loads still goes through `anatomy::svg::read_svg` at sheet load regardless of its origin. ## Focus (2): lockfile and supply chain `pnpm-lock.yaml`: 1 insertion, 69 deletions. - Removed: importers `packages/anatomy` and `packages/domain`; package and snapshot entries of `@xmldom/xmldom@0.9.12`; the `deprecated:` metadata line of `eslint@9.39.4` (registry metadata refreshed at install, same version). - Added: `optional: true` on the `tsx@4.23.15` snapshot. `tsx` is declared in no manifest (`git grep tsx -- '*/package.json'` → none) and stays resolved only as the optional peer of vite/vitest. - No new package, no version change on any package. ## Focus (3): secrets, local paths, personal data See the checklist rows above: none in the 20,666-line diff's added lines. The `.claude/tasks` contract and plan files added by the diff were in the semgrep scope and the grep; clean. ## Focus (4): the new tests New or extended Rust tests (`curation_leaves.rs` new, 263 lines; additions in `curation_draft`, `curation_format`, `curation_review`, `anatomy_compose`, `report_contract`, `archive_rules`, `archive_support`, `report_rules`): fixture access is read-only through `common::repo_path` / `repo_file` (`CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR/../../`) and the frozen oracles; `files_under` walks the two seed folders with `read_dir` only. No network, no `std::process`, no `std::env` read, no write, no delete in the added code. The one test in these files that spawns a process and writes (`import_equine`, `out_fixtures`, `out_refuses_every_unsafe_destination_and_writes_nothing`, `curation_draft.rs` ~768-816) is pre-existing (before the diff's second hunk at line 963): it writes fixed fixtures under `CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR/import-equine-out` only and asserts the binary refuses every unsafe `--out` destination (symlink, file, non-empty folder, `..`, absent parent) with exit code 2 and writes nothing. Not changed by this diff. `archive_rules.rs` and `archive_support/mod.rs` only repoint the two moved fixtures (`crates/core/tests/fixtures/report-v2.{full,minimal}.json`, R100 renames) and a doc comment. ## Focus (5): census tests not vacuous `apps/app/tests/unit/r5.census.test.ts` (new) asserts positive facts before the negatives: the manifest list must contain the four remaining packages; the lockfile importer set must equal the manifest set exactly; `packages.length > 100` and a `zod@` key must be found; the scanned source set must exceed 100 files and must contain the `@faunosteo/core-wasm` specifier; the Dockerfile `COPY ` list must contain the two package manifests and each copied manifest must exist; `FILES.tsv` must hold more than 80 rows with each counterpart present; `LEDGER.tsv` must hold exactly 407 rows (144 anatomy, 263 domain), each oracle path present and each `cargo ::` target resolved to a `fn (` in the right file; the two moved fixtures are pinned by SHA-256; ten oracle and N-1 paths must exist. `r4.census.test.ts` gains `@faunosteo/anatomy` and `@xmldom/xmldom` in the bans and replaces the "xmldom only under packages/anatomy" assertion by an importer-list assertion with its own non-vacuity check (`arrayContaining(['.', 'apps/app', 'packages/core-wasm'])`). Weakness reported LOW: `cargoTargetFile('faunosteo_core')` accepts a `fn (` anywhere under `crates/core/src`, so a ledger row pointing at a non-test function would pass. The ban regexes and the specifier scanner cover `from`, `import()` and `require()` forms and relative `anatomy/src` / `domain/src` paths. ## Not done (out of scope or forbidden) No command executed from the repository other than semgrep, the guardrails scanner and read-only git / grep. No test suite run, no `cargo` invocation, no Supabase access. The runtime behaviour of the ported tests is attested by the dev's own gate, not by this audit.