``` SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten SCOPE: 35 files BLOCKING: (none) REPORTED (non-blocking): - [MEDIUM] author-data-silently-replaced (non-array `children` of an added item) — crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:252 + crates/core/src/curation/draft/targets.rs:246 - [LOW] check-lists-through-top-level-folder-link — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:193 (listed, :164) - [LOW] seed-containment-is-path-based (bind-mount alias) — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:230 (inside, :253) - [LOW] declared-depth-walk-cost-understates-cap-bound-worst-case — crates/core/src/curation/draft/apply.rs:110 / docs/development/RUST.md:3046 - [LOW] unit-test-fixture-in-shared-temp-with-fixed-name — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:383 - [LOW] context: clippy purity lint allowed in a new test file (project convention, not a scanner suppression) — crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7 - [LOW] context: seed SQL rendered by string formatting from pipeline values — crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:29 PROOF: semgrep 129 rules on 35 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks → 7 findings (1 MEDIUM, 6 LOW) ``` # R5.3 draft, security gate (fresh, final 4) Branch `feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`, HEAD `6c0fe88`, scope `git diff 5e114da..HEAD` (35 files, 11 commits), with attention to `86273b6`. Read whole: `bin/import_equine.rs`, `curation/draft/{shape,ops,apply,schema,targets,fields,records,rename,stats,migration_map,seed,pipeline,mod}.rs`, `curation/mod.rs`, `scripts/import-equine.sh`, the `package.json` line, the binary and integration tests that touch the file system, the oracle generator's write guard (`MAKE_R5_ORACLES=1` only). Every probe ran in `/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/sec4.j5fliv` on a copy of the seed, through a probe binary that is `import_equine.rs` byte for byte except the `SEED` constant (pointed at the copy). Nothing ran `--out` against the repository, nothing was deleted, `git status` is clean after the run. ## Semgrep `semgrep scan --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets --config p/owasp-top-ten --metrics=off` on the 35 existing files of the diff: 129 rules run, 0 findings, 0 errors. The rulesets carry almost no Rust rules; the Rust code was covered by reading and probing. ## Checklist | Check | Result | |---|---| | Hardcoded secret / token / key / auth URL | none (grep over the 35 files) | | SQL by string interpolation | `seed.rs` renders the seed file by formatting: LOW context below, not a runtime query | | Unsanitized render (innerHTML, eval…) | not applicable (Rust CLI and library, no DOM) | | Sensitive endpoint without authz | not applicable (no endpoint) | | Stack trace / internal path to an end user | not applicable (errors go to the local developer's stderr) | | Secret / PII in a log | none (stdout/stderr carry paths, counts and refusals) | | Tracked `.env` / credential file | only `.env.example` tracked | | Guardrails scanner (`--domain api,supabase`) | 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (`SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER`, `supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177`, outside the diff, dropped), 1 MANUAL | | New suppressions (anti-gaming) | no `nosemgrep`, `nosec`, `eslint-disable`, `ts-ignore`, `noqa`; one clippy allow in a new test file (LOW context below) | ## Owner requirements, verified - Seed never modified automatically: every read goes through `read()` (canonical path inside the canonical seed, regular file, 16 MiB cap). Probed: `curation/` as a folder link out of the seed and `changes.json` as a file link out of it are both refused (`leads outside the seed folder`); a folder link that stays inside the seed is accepted. - `--check` writes nothing: only `canonicalize`, `metadata`, `read`, `read_dir` on that path. Probe copy: 12 files, 0 differences, nothing new under the fixture seed (`find -newer`). - `--out` refusals, probed on the fixture seed: a link to the seed and to `draft/` (as the destination and as its parent), a link chain `p/q` ending in a seed link, the seed path itself plus `/new`, `legacy-import/new`, `INIT_CWD` set inside the seed, `..`, an empty path, `/`: all refused, nothing created. A relative `INIT_CWD` is ignored. A valid destination gets 12 files identical to the seed (`diff -rq`), a second run on it is refused `not empty`. Files are `create_new`, folders `create_dir` tracked in `created`, so an entry that appears after the claim is refused. File names are pipeline constants. - Strict changeset validation, depth and resource caps: `deny_unknown_fields`, the `op` discriminator, non-empty strings, the shape comparison (now with array length), reserved NUL keys at parse and in field paths, 8 field segments, serde_json's 128 parse depth, 64 document levels after each op (iterative walk), 16 MiB per file. Recursive walks (`reserved_key`, `first_mismatch`, `strip_marks`, `walk`, `touch_tree`, `js_deep_equal`) are all bounded by the 128 parse depth or the 64-level check. - `86273b6`: `assert_object_children` refuses a non-object entry of a `children` or `categories` list (explicit stack); the length arm of `first_mismatch` sits before the element arm; `claim_destination(typed, seed)` with its fixture test refuses before any `create_dir`. All correct. One gap left next to the first: MEDIUM below. ## Findings ### MEDIUM: a non-array `children` on an added item is silently replaced by `[]` `crates/core/src/curation/draft/ops.rs:252` (`assert_object_children` skips a `children` value that is not an array) and `crates/core/src/curation/draft/targets.rs:246` (`children_path` overwrites any present non-array `children` with `[]`). An `add` whose value carries `"children"` as an object, a string or `null`, followed by an `add` (or a `move`) into that item, is accepted: the strict gate never sees the author's value, which is gone from `document.json` and the migration map. Probed on the real equine changeset plus one level-A change: `"children": {"author-note": {"id": "kept", ...}}` (a whole nested finding written as an object instead of an array), `"children": "author text"` and `"children": null` all give `probe-node.children = [probe-child]`, exit 0, 12 files written. Only the add record's `after` keeps the value; no R5.3 output shows it (the CHANGELOG is R5.4). Parity with the TypeScript `childrenOf`, and not declared: §11.12 says "a lean leaf gets `children: []` appended on demand", which covers an absent key, not a present value replaced. This breaks the owner's "author data never dropped silently" through a plausible typo (object in place of array). Non-blocking: no security boundary is crossed. Hint: in `assert_object_children`, refuse a present `children` or `categories` key whose value is not an array (same message family, same place as the entry check), or make `children_path` refuse a present non-array value and append `[]` only when the key is absent. Declare the split in the §11.12 table with a frozen TypeScript case. ### LOW: `--check` lists through a top-level folder link `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:193` calls `listed(&target, ...)` on `SEED/legacy-import` or `SEED/draft` without checking the folder itself: `read_dir` follows it when it is a link. Probed with `legacy-import` pointing out of the seed: the reads are refused (`missing: ...`), but `not produced: private-name.txt` and `not produced: sub/deep.txt` print the names of files outside the seed, subfolders included. Read-only, names only, same user. §11.12's "`--check` lists a link without walking into it" holds for entries, not for the generated folder itself. Hint: canonicalize the target and require `inside(&canonical, &seed)` before listing, or refuse a target whose `symlink_metadata` is a link. ### LOW: the seed guard is path-based, a mount alias passes it `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:230` compares canonical paths (`starts_with`). `canonicalize` resolves links, not mounts: if the seed (or the repository) is reachable through a second path (bind mount, the same NAS share mounted twice), `--out /.../equine/new` passes `inside` and creates a new folder inside the official seed. Only new files (never an overwrite, never a delete); the user must type the alias. Reasoned, not probed (a mount needs privileges). Hint: also compare `(dev, ino)` (`std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt`) of the canonical parent and each of its ancestors with the seed folder's; a bind mount root shares the source's pair. ### LOW: the declared depth-walk cost understates the cap-bound worst case `crates/core/src/curation/draft/apply.rs:110` runs `assert_depth` over the whole document after every op; RUST.md:3046 declares it with one sample ("a 2.4 MB changeset takes about 10 s"). The sample is right (probe: 2.3 MB, one 1 M-node add then 2,000 sets, 12.4 s, 455 MB). The worst case inside the 16 MiB read cap is two orders larger: 8.2 MB, one 4 M-node add then 1,000 sets, 35.7 s and 1.7 GB, so about 30 ms per op, and the remaining 8 MB holds about 94,000 more ops: roughly 45 minutes of CPU before the final gate refuses. Twenty thousand plain sets on the real document take 0.9 s, so ordinary changesets are not affected. Local developer tool, interruptible. The declaration is not wrong, it is incomplete. Hint: state the cap-bound figure in §11.13, or bound the work: a total node cap on the document after each op (also bounds memory), or a depth check limited to the subtree the op wrote. ### LOW: unit-test fixture at a fixed name in the shared temp folder `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:383`: `env::temp_dir().join("faunosteo-import-equine-claim")` with `create_dir_all`. On a multi-user host another account can pre-create or link that name. The test only runs refusals, so the worst outcome is a failed test or an empty folder created where the link points. The integration test already uses the private `CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR`. Hint: put the fixture under the target folder (for example `concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/../../target/...")`) or a per-run name created exclusively. ### LOW (context): clippy purity lint allowed in a new test file `crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7` `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]`. A determinism and robustness lint (no I/O, no clock in the core), not a security scanner suppression. The same line heads the ten other core test files. The binary's `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` was already present at `5e114da`. Not blocking. ### LOW (context): seed SQL rendered by string formatting `crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:29` (`sql_text`) and `:90` (`document_literal`). Every interpolated value is a pipeline constant, a sha256 hex, a derived uuid or a byte count; quotes are doubled (correct with `standard_conforming_strings` on, the PostgreSQL default); the document is embedded in a `$equine_doc$` literal and refused if it holds the tag; the formatted JSON always ends with `}`, so no tag can form at the closing boundary. This generates a reviewed seed file, it is not a runtime query. No action. ## Residual risks declared in RUST.md §11.13 Memory without a cap beyond 16 MiB per file: confirmed (1.7 GB from an 8.2 MB file), in line with the declaration. Single-user check-then-use window on reads and `--out`: confirmed as described, every file stays `create_new`. Lossy UTF-8 and repeated keys: as declared. The quadratic walk: LOW above.