# Verification: Rust R5.3 draft pipeline (2026-10-22) Contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft.md`. Fresh verifier, report-only (persisted by the orchestrator: the agent has no write tool). ## Pass 1: ECARTS(1) - C1 to C12 MET, each with code references and proofs run by the verifier: `cargo test --features curation --test curation_draft` 6/6, `curation_legacy` 5/5, the whole crate with `--features curation --locked` 22 suites green, clippy `-D warnings` clean, fmt clean, `import-equine --check` 12 files 0 differences (git status unchanged), `--out` into a `mktemp -d` folder then `diff -r` (legacy identical; draft identical but the three R5.4 entries), produced `document_sha256` = `27c7383c…2660` = sha256 of the produced `document.json`, 8 refusal and success probes of `--out`, anatomy 142/142, domain 262/262, `tsc --noEmit` clean. - C13 partial by design: `pnpm check:all` and the security gate were the orchestrator's (both green / PASS); docs present (RUST.md §11.12 and §11.13, CHANGELOG, CLAUDE.md). - Gap: the floor scan flagged the plan heading of §B.3.5 (`.claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-22-rust-r5-pipeline-core.md:94`, pre-existing at HEAD, R5.1), whose status words read as an unfinished marker. Resolved: heading reworded to "(approved at A.5, applied at R5.6)", the status BDR-068 records. - Semantic fidelity (beyond the declared `set` without `value`): no reachable divergence. Four unreachable ones: (1) `id_text` printed a non-string id as JSON text; aligned on `js_string` (`String()`); (2) `trimEnd` stripped U+0085; aligned on the core's exact JavaScript white-space set (`is_js_space`); (3) an added item with a `null` child: TypeScript throws at the op, Rust refuses at the shape gate (both refuse; kept, declared in RUST.md §11.12); (4) a position beyond 2^64: both refuse "out of range", the printed number differs (kept, declared). - Reproduced quirks: `strip` slices eight UTF-16 units of `op.to`; `apply_record` reads `record.op` whatever the record target (declared observation, RUST.md §11.12). ## Pass 2: ECARTS(3) - C1, C3 to C12 MET (proofs rerun: fmt, clippy, curation_draft 6 + curation_legacy 5, `--check` 12 files 0 differences, 11 `--out` probes incl. a symlinked parent printing the canonical path and a dangling symlink refused, `diff -r`, anatomy 142, domain 262). - C2 NOT MET: JSON `null` on the optional `scope` (set, cite), `position` (add, move) and `field` (add) parsed as absent by serde; Zod `.optional()` refused it. Not reached by the committed changeset. C13 NOT MET on the same root (undeclared). Fixed: those fields deserialised through `js::present` (absent accepted, `null` refused); three refused synthetic cases `schema-null-{scope,position,field}` added to the generator (58 cases: 9 compared, 49 refused alike). - Floor: the pass 1 record above quoted the flagged words; reworded. - Fidelity details, outcome-identical: re-homing candidates on a `Vec` where TS used a `Set` (aligned: deduplicated); `annotation_names` reads a non-string name as empty, duplicate ids first-wins (kept: the legacy import writes strings and unique ids); unlisted counter keys keep insertion order (kept: enum strings); `parseViewBox` error quoting (kept: both refuse). - Doc line count corrected (2,689). ## Pass 3: ECARTS(4) (first attempt stopped by an API credit error before any check; rerun on Opus) - C1, C4 to C10, C12 MET (fmt, clippy, curation_draft 6 + curation_legacy 5, `--check` 12/0, `--out` + `diff -r`, anatomy 142, floor clean, a TypeScript probe of 14 changesets and 2 references files). - C2: three accept/refuse splits at parse, undeclared: (a) a repeated key outside `ops` refused by serde's derive where `JSON.parse` keeps the last value; (d) a lone surrogate escape; (e) nesting deeper than 128. Fixed (a): both files parsed through `js::parse_json` then read into the typed shape (test `a_repeated_key_keeps_its_last_value_as_json_parse_does`); declared (d), (e) in RUST.md §11.12. - C3: (b) a field path ending in `__proto__`: TypeScript swallowed the write, Rust refuses at the gate: declared. (c) an authored `"\u0000touched"` key: TypeScript refused at the gate, Rust took it for a touch mark and the cleanup dropped it silently: a defect, fixed by refusing any NUL-prefixed key in the changeset at parse (test `a_reserved_touch_mark_key_in_an_authored_value_is_refused`). - C11: `--out /` (trailing slash) followed the link into an empty folder: fixed, the destination is rebuilt from its components before the symlink check (probed: `alink/` and `alink//` refused, rc 2, target left empty). - C13: the splits above undeclared, and §11.13 claimed a leftover mark would be refused by the gate while the cleanup removed it: both corrected. - The verifier asked the orchestrator to run a probe harness it had written in the scratchpad (its own run was refused by the permission layer); not run: the cases are covered by the tests above and the declared table. ## Pass 4: ECARTS(1), on C13 only - C1 to C12 MET (fmt, clippy, curation_draft 8 + curation_legacy 5, `--check` 12/0, `--out` + `diff -r`, refusal probes incl. `symlink/` and `symlink/.` rc 2, `pnpm r5:import-equine --check` rc 0, anatomy 142, floor clean). - C13: undeclared (a) invalid UTF-8 in changes.json / references.json: TS lossy, Rust refused. Fixed: `read_text` lossy, as R5.2 kept for the catalog. Declared: (b) `1e400` in a discarded value, (c) an inherited `Object.prototype` member in a field path; corrected (c') the NUL-key row, (d) test and line counts (8 tests, 2,718 lines). - Notes kept: synthetic refusals assert `is_err` only (the contract asks no reason); `scripts/import-equine.sh` called directly without INIT_CWD resolves a relative `--out` from the repository root (pnpm sets INIT_CWD). - Not re-verified by a fresh verifier after these corrections (docs plus the one-line lossy read); `pnpm check:all` rerun green on the final code (00:10:03), `--check` 12 files 0 differences. ## Final round on 8654905 (owner 2026-10-23: fresh verifier on C1 to C13 + fresh security) - Verifier ECARTS(2): C3 and C13, one defect. A `set` field path whose segment starts with NUL (`name.\u0000touched`, any settable holder, self or subtree) was written and then stripped with the touch marks: author value lost, a record claiming the write; TypeScript refused it at the gate. C1, C2, C4 to C12 MET (15 + 200 tests, `--check` 0/12, 14 destination probes, floor clean). - Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final.md`): MEDIUM-1 a 20,000-segment field path (40 KB changes.json) overflowed the stack; MEDIUM-2 `--out` writes not exclusive after the claim; LOW-1 the NUL field path (same as the verifier); LOW-2 `..` and parents created before a failed claim; LOW-3 a destination inside the seed accepted; LOW-4 INIT_CWD and direct-run base; LOW-5 non-UTF-8 argument panic; LOW-6 clippy disallowed list partial (pre-existing); LOW-7 the test allow line (convention). - Fixed: NUL segment refused at the op (`reserved key`); field paths capped at 8 segments; document depth capped at 64 levels after every op (iterative walk); `--out`: `..` refused, parent must exist, destination inside the seed refused, destination printed before writing, every folder `create_dir`, every file `create_new`; `args_os`. Documented: direct-run base (LOW-4). Kept: LOW-6 (pre-existing lint scope, out of R5.3), LOW-7 (test convention). Tests added: field-path refusals and 20,000 segments refused without crash, 40 nested adds refused at the bound, 8 `--out` refusals against the built binary with nothing written. - Next: a fresh verifier and a fresh security audit on the fixed commit. ## Second final round on 314cf04 - Verifier ECARTS(3): C2, C3 (one family) and C13. serde's derives accept a struct written as a positional array and a unit enum written as a one-key map, in changes.json, references.json and the curated document (gate through the R2 derives); Zod refused all. 55,000-changeset random differential (TS generator, Rust probe): 7,436 accepted on both sides byte-identical, 335 mismatches, all this family but one message (`document has no "categories"` vs `document has no list "categories"`). C1, C4 to C12 MET (18 tests, 203 crate tests, `--check` 0/12, refusal probes, floor clean). Note: the same derives sit in the R2 report and archive contracts (unverified there). - Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final2.md`): MEDIUM memory amplification (no cap); LOW quadratic depth walk, `--check` and reads following symlinks, residual TOCTOU, `write_exclusive` any component, lossy normalisation, test aimed at the real seed, suppressions context, lint list gaps. - Fixed: `draft/shape.rs` (typed reading serialised back, compared by shape) on both authored files and the gate; 10 changesets + 2 references files frozen from TS (all refused by TS, refused alike); missing-list message aligned; reads: regular file, 16 MiB cap; `listed` does not follow links; `write_exclusive` plain names, root re-checked; seed guard as pure `inside` + unit test, integration test no longer targets the seed. Kept, declared in §11.13: memory amplification, quadratic walk, single-user TOCTOU residual, lossy UTF-8 and repeated keys. Raised to the owner: the R2 derive leniency in the gated readers. ## Third final round on 42bbc48 - Verifier ECARTS(2), C3 + C13, one family: a null or primitive among the children of an added item. TS: TypeError where walked (refused), skipped by a reference rename's citation walk (accepted if later removed), gate if kept. Rust: tolerated by touch/walk (accepted), refused by rename's item_at_mut. Three splits; §11.12 claimed "both refuse" for the null child, false. Differential: 82,000 random changesets, 13,758 accepted identical (document, records, stats, map), 63 schema + 34 references probes agree. C1, C2, C4 to C12 MET (19 tests). - Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final3.md`), LOW only: reads follow folder links out of the seed; shape comparison ignores array length; a folder appearing after the claim accepted; seed guard wiring untested; `set name.fr.x` records `before: null`; lint allows (context). - Fixed: non-object children refused at the add (3 TS-frozen cases, 1 declared refusal); reads confined to the canonical seed; array length compared; only folders this run created; `claim_destination(typed, seed)` + fixture unit test. Declared: replaced-string `before` (TS same), memory factor ~2x TS. ## Fourth final round on 6c0fe88 - Verifier ECARTS(2), C3 + C13: records differ (document identical) on array index keys in authored values or field segments (JSON.parse puts them first) and on integers beyond 2^53 (JSON.parse rounds; a Rust record held 9007199254740993 while document.json printed ...992); §11.12 declared-case count wrong. C1, C2, C4 to C12 MET; 25,000 random changesets: 0 accept/refuse splits, 4,331 accepted identical. - Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final4.md`): MEDIUM a present non-list `children` replaced by `[]` (author data lost); LOW `--check` lists through a top-level folder link, mount alias of the seed, walk cost understated (8.2 MB file ~36 s, cap-bound worst case ~45 min), fixture in shared temp, context items. - Fixed: `text::js_normalize` (key order + big integers at parse) and `text::js_insert` (field path writes); non-list `children`/`categories` refused at add, `children_path` never replaces; `--check` requires each generated folder to be the seed's own; `inside_by_identity` (dev, ino of every ancestor); `MAX_DOCUMENT_VALUES` 200,000; fixture under target/. Cases frozen from TS: 2 key-order, 1 integer, 1 declared non-list children; Rust tests: big integer from raw text, value bound. ## Fifth final round on 3ece1a6 - Verifier ECARTS(2), C3 + C13: a `__proto__` segment in a field path: at the end, TS records `before: {}` (setter ignored the primitive) where Rust recorded null and kept a plain key; in the middle, TS polluted Object.prototype and refused, Rust accepted when overwritten; RUST.md claimed the inherited-member family refused by TS at the op, false for `__proto__`; test count stale (15 vs 13). C1, C2, C4 to C12 MET; 120,000 random changesets: 40,494 accepted identical, no other undeclared split. - Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final5.md`): LOW identity guard covers the seed folder only (a subfolder alias passes), quadratic id comparisons (parse_references 31 s at 160,000), seed SQL formatting (checked), test allow (context). - Fixed: `__proto__` segment refused at the op (reserved key), declared case frozen from TS (the non-polluting one; the polluting one tested in Rust only, it would corrupt the generator's process); identity guard over every folder of the seed tree; HashSet in assert_declared, distinct, duplicates; docs rows and counts. ## Sixth final round on c6e0d85: CONFORME 13/13 (R5.3 closed) - Verifier CONFORME: C1 to C13 MET on the committed state c6e0d85 (23 curation tests, `--check` 12/0 via cargo and pnpm, `--out` + `diff -r`, 21 destination probes, anatomy 142, floor clean; TS-vs-Rust differential on 70,073 changesets: 9,397 accepted identical, 0 Rust-only accepts, TS-only accepts all declared families). - Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final6.md`), LOW only: destination folder itself not identity-checked (needs an empty seed folder + a hand mount; none exists), one linear membership in cite (doc precision), seed SQL formatting (checked), test allow (context). - check:all green 10:54:50 on c6e0d85. - Carried into R5.4 (not applied to the verified state): destination identity check, cite membership hashed, "seed folder unreadable" message, stale test comment, doc nits (inherited row: remove form too; 200,000-value row in the table; line count 2,908; set-without-value counted among schema refusals).