# Security audit: Rust R5.5 upload tool (2026-10-23) Mode: audit. Scope: `git diff 637ea63..HEAD` (commits 2c44506, a481af5), 25 files, branch `feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`. Contract: `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-23-rust-r5-upload.md`. Fresh, blind scan. No run against a real stack, no transfer tool, no service key used. ``` SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten SCOPE: 25 files BLOCKING: (none) REPORTED (non-blocking): - [MEDIUM] secret-on-argv — scripts/sheet-assets-e2e.sh:29, :31 - [LOW] secret-in-build-env — scripts/upload-sheet-assets.sh:14 - [LOW] destination-trust (cleartext key, DEV address not proven local) — crates/core/src/curation/upload.rs:194-198 - [LOW] error-classification (non-transient errors retried as Network) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/storage.rs:76-81 - [LOW] doc-exit-code — docs/development/SUPABASE.md:152 vs crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:167-175 - [LOW] toctou-file-read (documented, hash-mitigated) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:49-67 - [LOW] confirm-not-hash-bound (pre-existing RPC) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/storage.rs:173-181 - [LOW] lint-allow (architecture lint, not security) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:21 + 4 test files - [LOW] floor-guard-waiver (fixture lines, not security) — scripts/floor-clarification-check.sh:42-45 - [LOW] serde-tolerance (pre-existing, characterised only) — crates/core/tests/characterisation_serde_tolerance.rs PROOF: semgrep 45 rules on 25 files → 0 findings; checklist 21 checks → 10 findings ``` ## Method - semgrep 1.168.0, the three pinned packs, `--metrics=off`, on the 25 existing files of the diff: 45 rules applied (Rust, bash, JSON, YAML, Markdown), 0 findings, 0 errors, 0 skipped rules. Semgrep's Rust coverage is thin, so the review below is mostly manual reading. - Checklist (8): hardcoded secret, SQL by concatenation, unsanitised render, sensitive endpoint authz, internals surfaced, secret in a log, tracked `.env` / credential file, guardrails scanner (`scan.py --domain api,supabase`: 0 FAIL, 1 WARN outside the diff, see below). - Anti-gaming (1): every added suppression or waiver line in the diff. - Brief focus (12): destination allowlist, redirects, proxy, key exposure (logs, errors, argv, env, stubs, e2e), path traversal and symlinks, TOCTOU, size and memory bounds, overwrite / delete / visibility, partial failure and resume, error classification, retries on non-idempotent calls, dependency additions. - Dynamic, hermetic only: `cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features upload --locked` on `upload_tool`, `curation_upload`, `curation_caps`, `characterisation_serde_tolerance`: 25/25 pass (loopback stub, made-up key, `SUPABASE_*` unset). A scratch probe (scratchpad crate, path dependency, `--offline`) fed 40 crafted URLs to `check_destination`. ## What holds (verified, not taken from the docs) - Destination allowlist. 40 probes: decimal, hex, octal and short IPv4 forms (`2130706433`, `0x7f000001`, `0177.0.0.1`, `127.1`) all normalise to a loopback and are accepted as such; IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`, `[::ffff:7f00:1]`), `0.0.0.0`, `0`, `localhost.`, `localhost.localdomain`, `127.0.0.1.nip.io`, public addresses, names, `ws:`, `file:`, `https:`, zone ids are refused. Userinfo and backslash tricks (`evil.com\@127.0.0.1`, `127.0.0.1:54321@evil.com`, `evil.com#@127.0.0.1`) are refused. Accepted oddities (`http://@127.0.0.1:p`, percent-encoded or full-width `localhost`, `http:127.0.0.1:p`, trailing `/.`) all reduce to an allowed host. The decisive property: the origin used for every request is rebuilt from the parsed `Host` and port (`upload.rs:224-233`), never the raw string, so no check/use parser differential exists. - The key is read only after the destination check (`main.rs:110-115`) and after every local file is verified (`main.rs:177-178`): a refused destination or a bad file sends nothing. - No redirect: `max_redirects(0)` in ureq 3.4.2 returns the 3xx as a response, never follows it and never errors (`ureq-3.4.2/src/run.rs:224-236`, `config.rs:257-258`); the 3xx then fails `expect_status`. No proxy: `.proxy(None)` overrides the default `Proxy::try_from_env()` (`ALL_PROXY` / `HTTP_PROXY`). No `gzip` / `brotli` features (workspace `Cargo.toml:43`), so no decompression bomb; every body is capped (1 MiB, objects 16 MiB + 1). - Key never in a URL, a message or a log: two headers only (`storage.rs:88-89`), `Secret` has a redacted `Debug` and no `Display`, `Storage` has no `Debug`; `required_env` names the variable, never the value; ureq error texts (`error.rs:229-276`) carry no header value; server bodies are never echoed (`expect_status`). Test key is a made-up literal (`upload_tool.rs:14`). - No overwrite, delete or visibility change: only GET and POST are issued (`storage.rs:104, 123, 142, 161, 177`), uploads carry `x-upsert: false`, the bucket must answer `public: false`, an existing object is hashed and other bytes refuse the run. - Order and resume: whole plan computed read-only before the first write (`main.rs:180`); the object is read back and hashed before the row is confirmed (`main.rs:147-163`). The POST retry is safe: a retried create that already landed answers Duplicate, which leads to the read-back check; the confirm RPC is idempotent (`20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:41-50`). - Paths: folder and files canonicalised and confined with component-wise `starts_with`; manifest file names are `[A-Za-z0-9._-]`, no leading dot, `.svg`; ids are lowercase hex / uuid, so the object key and the PostgREST filter carry no injection. - Memory: drawings are read under 16 MiB, then refused above 2 MiB by the SVG reader (`prescan.rs:33`), so at most 64 x 2 MiB is held; curation files now capped at 4 MiB with `take(cap + 1)` (`import_equine.rs:93-99`) and in the core (`schema.rs:386-392`). - C1: `curation/upload.rs` has no `std::fs`, `std::env`, socket or clock. `ureq` is optional under `upload` only; `crates/wasm` enables `pdf-read, pdf-write` only. Cargo.lock adds one edge (`faunosteo-core -> ureq`); ureq 3.4.2 was already locked for the worker, no new package. ## Findings ### M1 [MEDIUM] service and anon keys on process argv in the e2e script `scripts/sheet-assets-e2e.sh:29` runs `env -i ... SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY="$key" "$BIN"`: `env` is `/usr/bin/env`, an external process, so the key sits in its argv, readable by every local user through `/proc//cmdline` and `ps`, and recorded by any execve audit rule. Line 31, `grep -qF -e "$key" -e "$SERVICE" -e "$ANON"`, puts the service and anon keys on the argv of an external `grep`. This contradicts the script's own header ("held in variables, never printed") and the C7 intent. Impact is bounded: the key is the local stack's, the machine is single-user, the window is short, the owner runs the script. Hint: pass the key as a bash prefix assignment in a subshell that first unsets the variables you want cleared (`( unset FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST INIT_CWD; SUPABASE_URL="$url" SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY="$key" exec "$BIN" "$@" )`), and match with `grep -qF -f <(printf '%s\n' "$key" "$SERVICE" "$ANON")` (`printf` is a builtin). ### L1 [LOW] service key in the environment of the compile step `scripts/upload-sheet-assets.sh:14` runs `cargo run --release`: on a first run, or after any source or lockfile change, cargo builds with the operator's exported `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY` visible to every build script and proc-macro of the dependency tree. The tree is locked and cargo-deny'd, so this is a supply-chain exposure only. Hint: `env -u SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY cargo build --release --locked ...`, then `exec target/release/upload-sheet-assets "$@"`. ### L2 [LOW] destination trust: cleartext key, DEV address not proven local The key always travels over plain `http` (https is refused), with no server authentication. Any process listening on the allowed local port receives it: declared and accepted in RUST.md §11.16. The DEV branch (`upload.rs:194-198`) accepts any private IPv4 equal to `FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST` without proving it is an address of this machine; if both variables name another LAN host, the key crosses the LAN in clear. C2 allows this and `scripts/dev-env.sh:15` derives the address from `hostname -I` by default. Hint: in the binary, `UdpSocket::bind((ip, 0))` succeeds only for a local interface address; refuse otherwise. ### L3 [LOW] non-transient client-side errors retried and reported as Network `storage.rs:76-81` maps every `ureq::Error` to `Network`, retries three times, exit 3. That includes `BodyExceedsLimit` when the destination holds an object above 16 MiB + 1 under the key (a State condition: downloaded three times, then "network error") and `Error::Http` from a key holding characters invalid in a header (a usage error). No write follows either case, so no security consequence, but C6 says refusals are final and C8 that errors are classified. Hint: match `BodyExceedsLimit` to `State` and `Http` / `BadUri` to a non-retried kind. ### L4 [LOW] exit code 2 documented as "usage" `docs/development/SUPABASE.md:152` lists "2 usage"; a wrong argument count exits 1 with kind `Content` (`main.rs:167-175`, asserted by `upload_tool.rs:314`). The code matches C8 ("2 usage (argument not UTF-8)"); the runbook overstates. Hint: say "2 an argument is not UTF-8". ### L5 [LOW] check/open race on file reads (documented, mitigated) `main.rs:49-67`: canonicalise, then `metadata`, then `open` the canonical path; a component swap between them is not defended, as the comment states. Mitigation is real: the bytes read must hash to the manifest's sha256 and pass the SVG reader, so a swap cannot exfiltrate unknown content. Single user working copy. ### L6 [LOW] confirmation not bound to the hash (pre-existing RPC) `storage.rs:173-181` confirms by asset id; the row hash is checked at plan time and the object is verified just before, but `confirm_sheet_asset_upload(asset_id)` (`supabase/migrations/20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:34-52`, outside the diff) does not re-check `sha256`. A row hash change between plan and confirm would confirm an unverified pairing. No API role writes asset rows (`authenticated` holds SELECT only), so the window needs a service-role actor. Note for a future migration (an expected-hash parameter), not this diff. ### L7 [LOW] new lint allows (context, not a security suppression) `main.rs:21` `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` and the same inner attribute (plus `unwrap_used`, `expect_used`) at the head of the four new test files. `clippy.toml` lists clock, file and environment methods: an architecture lint for the core's I/O purity (C1), the same pattern as `import_equine.rs` and `report_compare.rs`. Not a security checker, not blocking. CLAUDE.md still says "the two files allowed std::fs"; it is three now. ### L8 [LOW] floor-guard waivers on fixture lines (context) `scripts/floor-clarification-check.sh:42-45` carry `# floor-guard: allow negative-proof fixture` on lines that write `@ts-ignore`, `nosemgrep` and `nosec` into a `mktemp -d` throwaway repo. The tokens are bash string literals; they silence no semgrep or security check on this repository (no finding on those lines, semgrep ignores `nosec`). The waiver silences floor-guard (a test-floor guard, printed WAIVED) and carries no `[gated ]` marker. Not blocking under the security rule; reported so the orchestrator sees it. ### L9 [LOW] serde tolerance of the gated readers (pre-existing, characterised only) `crates/core/tests/characterisation_serde_tolerance.rs` pins that the R2 contracts accept a struct as a positional array and a unit enum as a one-key map, where Zod refused. This reaches the untrusted PDF import path: an integrity risk for crafted files (fields assigned in the wrong order without error), not a memory or execution one. No reader changed in this diff; the owner decision is pending before R5.6 (RUST.md §11.16). ## Outside the diff (not counted) - guardrails WARN `SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER` `supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177` (`species_select_active` not tied to `auth.uid()`): file not in the diff. - Blind spot for the owner: `supabase/config.toml` sets no `jwt_secret` and no signing keys, so the local stack most likely signs with the Supabase CLI default secret, making the local `service_role` key a publicly documented value. ENVIRONMENTS.md exposes the API port 54321 to the LAN. If that holds, anyone on the private network can already act as `service_role` on the DEV stack, and the care this tool takes with the key protects little there. I did not run `supabase status` to confirm the key value. - Not verified here: `scripts/sheet-assets-e2e.sh` against the real stack (owner-run by design; not run, per the brief). The anon-key and wrong-key cases rely on the real Storage answer.