# Security gate: Rust R5.3 draft pipeline (2026-10-22) Mode: audit (delta list). Branch `feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`, uncommitted working tree. Scope: the R5.3 change set (8 modified files, 17 new files), read whole; `--check` run once (read-only, exit 0, seed folder unchanged). No code was edited. ``` SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten SCOPE: 25 files BLOCKING: (none) REPORTED (non-blocking): - [LOW] symlink check covers the final component only — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:182-203 - [LOW] check-then-write is not atomic (TOCTOU) — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:213-228 - [LOW] serde_json::Map indexed with [] (panics on a missing key) — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:111 - [LOW] INIT_CWD trusted from the environment — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:206-211 - [LOW] seed SQL assembled by string formatting — crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:28-29,91-101 - [LOW] new test file carries the suite's clippy allow line (convention, not a scanner suppression) — crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7 - [MEDIUM] guardrails SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER, outside the R5.3 delta, pre-existing — supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177 PROOF: semgrep 725 rules on 25 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks → 6 findings (all LOW); guardrails scan.py --domain api,supabase → 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (out of delta), 1 MANUAL; anti-gaming → 0 new un-gated suppressions ``` ## Files scanned (25) Modified: `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs`, `crates/core/src/curation/mod.rs`, `crates/core/Cargo.toml`, `package.json`, `CLAUDE.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`, `docs/development/RUST.md`, `.claude/tasks/TODO.md`. New: `crates/core/src/curation/draft/{mod,schema,targets,fields,ops,rename,apply,records,migration_map,pipeline,seed,stats}.rs`, `crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs`, `crates/core/tests/oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json`, `packages/anatomy/tests/r5.curation-synthetic-oracles.test.ts`, `scripts/import-equine.sh`, `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft.md`. ## Findings in detail ### 1. [LOW] Symlink check covers the final component only `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:182-203`. `writable_destination` calls `fs::symlink_metadata(out)` and refuses when `out` itself is a symbolic link. An ancestor of `out` that is a symlink is not resolved: `--out /link/new` with `link -> ` creates `new/legacy-import` and `new/draft` under the real target of `link`, and the success line prints the typed path. Because the destination must be absent or an empty folder, nothing existing can be overwritten or deleted; the effect is new files in a folder other than the one typed. Fix direction: `fs::canonicalize` the nearest existing ancestor of `out` and refuse when it differs from the typed ancestor, or at least print the canonical destination in the success line. ### 2. [LOW] Check-then-write is not atomic `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:213-228`. `write` validates with `writable_destination`, then runs `fs::create_dir_all` and `fs::write` per file. A process that swaps `out` (or a created subfolder) for a symbolic link between the check and the writes would have the writes follow it. A development tool on the owner's machine has no such adversary; reported for completeness since the brief names TOCTOU. Fix direction: when `out` is absent, claim it with `fs::create_dir(out)` (fails if something appears) and re-run `symlink_metadata` on the result before writing; a `std::fs::DirBuilder` without `recursive` for the two folder levels achieves the same. ### 3. [LOW] `serde_json::Map` indexed with `[]` `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:111`: `result.view_boxes[HEAD_VIEW_ID].as_str()`. `Index` on `serde_json::Map` panics on a missing key (unlike `Index` on `Value`). The legacy importer inserts both `main` and `head` unconditionally (`crates/core/src/curation/legacy/importer.rs:365-370`), so the panic is unreachable today; the same pattern was replaced by `get` in commit 6afc1e0 after a previous gate. Same line in `crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:72` (test code, allowed). Fix direction: `result.view_boxes.get(HEAD_VIEW_ID).and_then(Value::as_str)` with a typed error. ### 4. [LOW] `INIT_CWD` trusted from the environment `crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:206-211`. `base_dir` takes `INIT_CWD` as the base of a relative `--out` without checking it is absolute or exists. pnpm sets it to the invocation folder, which is the intent; a stale or foreign value exported in the shell silently retargets a relative `--out`. Mitigations already present: the destination must be absent or empty, the resolved path is printed, an absolute `--out` ignores the base (`PathBuf::join` replaces it). Fix direction: accept `INIT_CWD` only when absolute, else fall back to `current_dir`. ### 5. [LOW] Seed SQL assembled by string formatting `crates/core/src/curation/draft/seed.rs:28-29` (`sql_text`, doubles single quotes) and `:91-101` (`document_literal`, dollar-quoted with the tag collision refused). The checklist flags SQL built by concatenation; here the output is a committed seed file reviewed by diff and run by `supabase db reset`, not a runtime query. Every interpolated value is derived by the pipeline: the uuid sheet id, the sha256 hex and byte size of the frozen asset, the constant file name, the constant change note, and the Prettier-formatted document inside `$equine_doc$ ... $equine_doc$`. No request or user-typed value reaches it. Parity with `packages/anatomy/src/curation/seed.ts`. Not a parameterization case; listed so it is not silently dropped. ### 6. [LOW] Clippy allow line in the new test file `crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7`: `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]`. A new file, so new to the tree, but the identical line heads all 31 committed `crates/core/tests/*.rs` files and `crates/clippy.toml` states the rule ("tests and the worker binary allow these lints locally where they own I/O"). Test code, not a security scanner suppression. The binary's pre-existing `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` (`import_equine.rs:15`) is an unchanged context line and the documented exception for the two files allowed `std::fs`. ### 7. [MEDIUM, outside the delta] Guardrails `SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER` `supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177`, policy `species_select_active` on `species` not tied to `auth.uid()`. The scanner runs on the project root; this file is not part of the R5.3 change set and the policy predates it. `species` is shared reference data, so an owner scope is likely not the intent; confirm and record the exception rather than leave it to be re-flagged. `SB-RLS-LIVE` is MANUAL (not reported here). ## Considered, no finding - Non-ASCII slicing: `targets.rs:121` slices at `find(':')` and `migration_map.rs:68` at `rfind('/')`, both ASCII bytes and therefore char boundaries; `migration_map.rs:55-59` (`strip`) works on UTF-16 units with `from_utf16_lossy`; `schema.rs:319` uses `strip_prefix`; `fields.rs:84` splits on `'.'`. - Indexing on parsed JSON in library code: `targets.rs:250,252,253,282,415` read `ids[0]`, `ids[1]`, `ids[2..]` after `parse_target` guarantees one id (collections) or at least two (findings); `fields.rs:92` reads `[0]` of a `split('.')` that always yields one element; `pipeline.rs:81-84` reads four numbers after `len() != 4` is refused; `migration_map.rs:185` is a slice pattern; `ops.rs:277,304,309,259` remove/insert at indices produced from the same list moments before (`insertion_index` refuses `index > len`, `u64 -> usize` saturates). No `unwrap`, `expect`, `panic!`, `unreachable!`, `unsafe` or `Map[...]` in `crates/core/src/curation/draft/*`. - Panics from a hand-written `changes.json` / `references.json`: both parsed with strict serde (`deny_unknown_fields`), custom validators return errors; every op failure refuses the whole changeset with the change id and op index (`apply.rs:103-109`); the final strict parse into `AnatomicalSheetDocument` and `validate_sheet_document` refuse shape and integrity errors (`apply.rs:128-144`); `CHG-000` reserved id refused (`pipeline.rs:127`). Recursion in `walk`, `touch_tree`, `strip_marks` is bounded by document depth (serde_json caps parsed nesting at 128; only repeated authored `add`s could deepen it; a stack overflow would abort a developer tool, nothing more). - `--check` is read-only: `fs::read`, `fs::read_dir`, `println!`/`eprintln!` only. Ran once from `crates/core` on the native toolchain: exit 0, `legacy-import: 6 files, 0 differences`, `draft: 6 files, 0 differences`, six R5.4 files listed as pending; `git status` shows the seed folder untouched. - `--out` never deletes: no `remove_*` call in the binary; refuses an empty path, a symbolic link, a non-folder, a non-empty folder; file names come from constants and the render functions (no `..`); parents created with `create_dir_all`. - `scripts/import-equine.sh`: `set -euo pipefail`, `"$@"` quoted, `cargo run --locked`; `scripts/rust-env.sh` only appends an absolute `$CARGO_HOME/bin` when `cargo` is absent. - TypeScript generator `packages/anatomy/tests/r5.curation-synthetic-oracles.test.ts`: writes only `crates/core/tests/oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json` (`OUT = resolve(HERE, '../../../crates/core/tests/oracles/r5')`), and only under `MAKE_R5_ORACLES=1`; otherwise it reads and compares. - Secrets: none in the change set; no tracked `.env` or credential file; the seed SQL carries no credential (`creator_user_id null`, `visibility 'private'`). - Logging: stderr lines carry paths of the developer's own repository; a CLI for the developer, not an end-user surface. - Semgrep: 0 results, 0 errors, 0 skipped paths across the three pinned packs (725 code rules loaded; Rust coverage in these packs is thin, so the manual checklist carries the weight for `crates/`). - Observation outside the change set: `.claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-22-rust-r5-pipeline-core.md` appeared as modified (1 line) during the audit; not produced by `--check` (no write path). REPORT_WRITTEN: /home/bchanot/Documents/faunosteo/.claude/audits/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft-security.md