pnpm e2e:avatar is now an alias of pnpm db:sandbox avatar-e2e and the DEV
script scripts/avatar-e2e.sh is removed; the suite fails on any target but
the sandbox gateway and database; an occupied port 57800 stops the run before
anything starts. The sandbox replaces the seed accounts' DEV password by a
per-session secret.
pnpm db:sandbox avatar-e2e runs tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts with the real
worker (default mode) on the throwaway stack; the suite now requires its
database container by name, makes both accounts per run and expedites only
its own purges. Throwaway sandbox accounts get random passwords per run.
Ten journeys, FR and EN, desktop and 375 px, axe on every state. Seeds go
through quoted SQL literals; db:sandbox e2e-shell passes its arguments to
Playwright.
A failing stage prints FAILED with its name and exits non-zero; e2e:shell is
reported NOT RUN (it needs the isolated stack); both suites keep their own
commands.
`pnpm db:sandbox up upgrade <version> <then>` applies the migrations before
<then> over the seeded older base, reports the workspaces, then the rest: the
path of a DEV database that took M1 first and M2 + M3 later.
pnpm check:all runs pnpm e2e:ui after the node stage when the Chromium of the pinned Playwright is present, and prints a SKIPPED line with the install command otherwise. The shell suite needs the isolated stack and stays a separate run.
pnpm e2e:shell (db-sandbox e2e-shell) builds a Vite server on 127.0.0.1:5192 against a Supabase URL that resolves nowhere and replays its calls on the sandbox. Per-test fictitious accounts through the admin API, a clean avatar seeded: sign-in, dashboard, the photo confirmation with a slow removal, the phone drawer, FR and EN, axe. No trace kept, fixture values masked in reports.
pnpm db:sandbox up with an unknown mode or a missing or malformed upgrade version started four containers and wrote the secrets before refusing. The mode and the version (fourteen digits) are now checked first.
Security gate findings on db-sandbox.sh: containers get secrets from 600 env files, psql and the CLI read PGPASSWORD (no password in --db-url), an incomplete secrets file stops the script before any CLI call, the state folder is refused inside the repository.
scripts/db-sandbox.sh (pnpm db:sandbox): DEV images on an own network, loopback ports distinct from DEV, no volume, secrets generated outside Git; fresh and upgrade modes through the CLI's migration up, test db and gen types with --db-url. packages/supabase/tests/sandbox: M1 sign-up and confirmation, reads and refusals per role, residual GoTrue admin path, correlation cap, concurrent sessions.
The TS pipeline, domain, upload script and legacy scripts leave; xmldom out of the
lockfile, Dockerfile copies trimmed. LEDGER.tsv (407 cases) and FILES.tsv (112 files)
record each disposition; r4 and r5 census tests guard the tree, lockfile and
production imports.
The Rust pipeline is the official seed writer (pnpm import:equine); sheet-ref.json
and report-migration-map.json carry 12d78872...74e2 and the v1 block, the only two
seed files changed. 27c7383c...2660 stays a registered alias, honoured only through
LoadedSheet::recognises_historical_stamp (verified v1, recomputed document). M1: the
snapshot of an old report keeps its stamp; export, archive reader strict. Historical
oracles run in their pre-switch context; equivalence is crate-private.
canonical_json (RFC 8785), sheet_fingerprint behind feature fingerprint,
TRUSTED_ALIASES (one equine pair), equivalence and check_declared; tests against
the RFC vectors, the V8 numbers, an independent Node reference and the archives.
No consumer wired: the switch is a rehearsed patch under .claude/tasks/plans.
Core rules curation::upload (manifest, local destination, bytes through the SVG reader,
plan from observed state); binary upload-sheet-assets over ureq (handshake, no overwrite,
confirm after verify, bounded retries, key never printed); pnpm assets:upload repointed,
e2e:sheet-assets for the local stack. 4 MiB cap on changes.json and references.json.
FLOOR clarification for audit prose with its negative proof.
crates/core/src/curation/draft behind the curation feature: strict changeset and references parsing as JSON.parse + Zod, the six ops, rename cascades, the B/C review rule, the R2 shape and integrity gate, migration map, document stats, seed SQL. import-equine writes both folders; --check reproduces legacy-import/ and the R5.3 draft files byte for byte (12 files, 0 differences), --out claims an absent or empty, non-symlink destination and never deletes. Parity: 825 records, 46 changes, stats, 612 leaves 442/141/29, 58 synthetic TypeScript cases (oracle r5/curation-synthetic.json).
pdf::write: text (safe_text with the frozen V8 classes, js_upper from the O4 tables,
js_trim, measure = Σ(WX || 250 + KPX) × size / 1000 over WinAnsi bytes, wrap_lines on JS
\s), afm_data generated by scripts/r4-afm-data.mjs from O5 and O4, dates (Date.UTC years
0-99 → 19xx, fr-FR / en-US long dates), input checks (branding and labels schemas,
snapshot gate with the R3 SVG reader, sheet mismatch, page caps), the header, footer,
observation and conclusion layouts into a DrawLog (per page, footers last, links by page).
cargo: O4 55,992 widths bit-exact, 1,168 wraps, safeText over every code point, upper
1,580, O6 6,468 cells + 22; O1 12 runs 2,124 ops equal at full precision; the Step 6 text
and image goldens (24) derive from the log. ts-rs: ExportInput, ExportErrorKind,
ExportWarning, LogoSlot.
docs/development/R4_J1.md: the two LAN surfaces (dev server, production build behind the
DEPLOY CSP through serve.mjs --host on the DEV origin), the kit folder generated by
scripts/r4-j1-kit.mjs (reference PDFs, the O8 hostile corpus with expected messages,
rescue copies), twelve checks per device, what to report.
Same perimeter as the TS baseline (226 files, 3 engines, real Home page): 666/678 outcome
and message agreements, the 12 others the 4 declared files; W5 0 long tasks (TS 91 and
173 ms); 50 MiB file in WebKit 145/126 MiB against 324 with the worker read and 76 for the
TS. CSP: editor opens with the keyword, the engine message without, in 3 engines, the
worker's wasm-eval refusal reported by Chromium and Firefox. Leak series on the app:
Chromium ≤ 2 MiB per import after init, Firefox GC sawtooth reclaimed, WebKit grows with
same-tab navigations (control too) and levels off on one page; 20/20 WebKit workers closed.
Streaming into FileBytes removes the file's JavaScript copy in Chromium and Firefox
(50 MiB: 65 and 67 MiB summed growth against 56 and 79 for the TypeScript); WebKit keeps
about 180 MiB for any file read inside a worker (272 against 76), a main-thread BYOB read
feeding the worker's sink measured at 106. Corpus 666/678 on the stream path. Leak series
(3 engines × 3 documents × 3 repetitions): Chromium ≤ 0.5 MiB over the last 5, Firefox
within ±3 (idle only), WebKit copy +13 then level (12-import series −2.3). 20 dense
imports in WebKit: no worker error event.
r4-import.mjs runs the 226 baseline files and the hostile classes through a disposable
module worker calling SheetHandle.import_pdf in Chromium 156, Firefox 157 and WebKit 27.2
under the RSS watchdog (not a guaranteed limit); compare-imports.mjs prints TS vs Rust;
serve.mjs gains opt-in mounts (/r4/, /pkg/). Results 2026-10-18-r4-import.json: 666/678
agreements, the 12 others are the 4 declared files; W4 met (max 68 MiB linear); the
1 GiB ceiling traps in every engine.