From efc9bedd9c98018c07c322ac50b194bdb945f392 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bchanot Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2026 22:55:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] chore(memory): V1-2.3 closure contract and plan --- .claude/tasks/TODO.md | 7 ++++ .../contracts/2026-11-01-v1-2-3-closure.md | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-01-v1-2-3-closure.md diff --git a/.claude/tasks/TODO.md b/.claude/tasks/TODO.md index 0805d781..cbb91695 100644 --- a/.claude/tasks/TODO.md +++ b/.claude/tasks/TODO.md @@ -646,6 +646,13 @@ Order (BDR-071): P0 docs + decisions → V1-1 clients and animals → V1-2 sheet - [x] residual risk 3, closed by proof: largest allowed input measured (child max frame passed; sandbox j: document + base 2 MiB, drawings 6 MiB, worker 156/191 ms) - [x] residual risk 4, closed: sandbox throwaway password literal replaced by per-run random passwords (2a84e37); DEV seed passwords untouched - [ ] §16.11 queue inventory (avatars, purges) owed by the owner before any DEV activation; not done, not assumed + - [ ] R closure adjustments (brief « Validation V1-2.3 (M6) et derniers ajustements », on 26e4b1b: V1-2.3 VERIFIED technically; contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-01-v1-2-3-closure.md`): sandbox only, no DEV, no merge, then prepare V1-2.4 scope and STOP + - [ ] C1 retry by cause: resource_limit (intrinsic) + verdict_refused definitive at first; timeout, unavailable (incl. external SIGKILL), lease_expired transient + - [ ] C2 avatar-e2e port 57800 loopback, occupied port fails, suite refuses non-sandbox targets + - [ ] C3 `pnpm e2e:avatar` = alias of the sandbox run, scripts/avatar-e2e.sh removed, references updated + - [ ] C4 sandbox seeded accounts get a per-session secret (no DEV seed password dependency) + - [ ] C5 four historical test reductions recorded (scope, justification, security coverage) + - [ ] C6 gates + targeted independent review + verifier · C7 V1-2.4 scope prepared - [ ] V1-2.4 wireframes (editor, review, admin entry) · V1-2.5 catalogue, admin space, rights, species, MFA · V1-2.6 editor level 1 · V1-2.7 preview, review, publication UI · V1-2.8 equine working copy and review preparation · V1-2.9 FR/EN acceptance and closure (owner checkpoints V1-2.3, V1-2.4, V1-2.6, V1-2.7, V1-2.8, V1-2.9 + each DEV operation of contract §16.11) ## Release readiness track (owner 2026-10-25, distinct from the functional roadmap; nothing here authorises a release or exposure) diff --git a/.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-01-v1-2-3-closure.md b/.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-01-v1-2-3-closure.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac5029fc --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-01-v1-2-3-closure.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +# Contract: V1-2.3 closure adjustments (brief « Validation V1-2.3 (M6) et derniers ajustements ») + +Owner brief 2026-11-01 on `26e4b1b`: V1-2.3 VERIFIED technically, three closure adjustments before +V1-2.4. Branch `feature/v1-2-anatomical-sheets`. Sandbox only; DEV (containers +`supabase_*_faunosteo`, its queues, purges, secrets, accounts) untouched; no merge; no worker on +DEV; no production, no release; then prepare V1-2.4 along the existing plan (scope only) and STOP. + +## Criteria + +- C1 Retry by effective cause. Definitive at the first occurrence (round `verification_failed`, + outcome `unavailable`, its code, never claimed again): `verification.worker.resource_limit` when + the cause is intrinsic to the frozen input or the contract caps (frame refused, input over the + child cap, output over its cap, CPU budget SIGXCPU, memory budget SIGABRT, seccomp SIGSYS) and + `verification.worker.verdict_refused`. Transient, retried after 2, 5, 10, 20 s up to five + attempts: `timeout` (wall clock), `unavailable` (transport, Storage, broken child, and a child + killed from outside: SIGKILL or any signal not listed above), `lease_expired` (immediate, the + lease being the wait). Business and integrity verdicts stay definitive. Kept: five attempts, lease + 10 min, `not_before`, no blocking wait, idempotence, stale protections, dead-lease recovery; RPC + names, arguments and answers unchanged; user-facing outcome and codes unchanged. SQL holds the + code policy, the worker maps cause to code. pgTAP and worker tests for each class; sandbox case + for a definitive closure at attempt 1 with the real worker; docs (§6.4, §6.5, STORAGE.md §3.6, + RUST.md §13) state the final policy and its effect on the codes. +- C2 `pnpm db:sandbox avatar-e2e` (approved, port 57800): published on 127.0.0.1 only; an occupied + port fails explicitly before anything starts; the suite refuses (fails, never silently passes) + any target other than the sandbox gateway and database container; guards of Q1 kept. +- C3 `pnpm e2e:avatar` becomes an alias of `pnpm db:sandbox avatar-e2e`; `scripts/avatar-e2e.sh` + (DEV) removed; avatar tests kept; no missing variable, wrong argument or inherited setting can + reach DEV; every reference in scripts, workspace and live docs updated (history kept as history). +- C4 The sandbox no longer depends on the DEV seed password: the seeded accounts of the sandbox get + a per-session random secret (600 file outside Git, never on argv or in logs) after seeding; the + sandbox tests use it; `supabase/seed.sql` and every DEV account and secret untouched. +- C5 The two tracked misclassifications keep their characterising tests, open, not declared fixed. + The four historical test reductions found by the floor guard are recorded with scope and + justification; any one hiding a missing security coverage is reported before V1-2.4. +- C6 Gates: `verify-e2e`, `avatar-e2e`, `e2e:shell`, sandbox `test-db` / `types --check` / `test`, + `pnpm check:all`, worker sandbox tests (seccomp, budgets) on the final code; independent review + targeted on the retry policy and command isolation; fresh verifier. +- C7 V1-2.4 prepared, not started: exact scope from the V1-2 contract plan, for the owner.