test(supabase): V1-2.1 re-runnable sandbox suite, two-session cases, caps timing
F18 and workspaces no longer leave the seed owner changed. Ten two-session scenarios with a blocking session, seed-owner AR-1 acceptance, shim columns against the image, save/submit/approve/publish timed at the caps.
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/**
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* V1-2.1 acceptance of AR-1 B on the seed owner (contract §16.2 "a stack
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* upgraded from the DEV state with an owner holding two verified factors keeps
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* working at aal2 and is refused at aal1; the same upgrade with an owner
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* holding none stays usable at aal1 for everything but role and rights
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* management"), with real GoTrue. Meant for the stack of `pnpm db:sandbox up
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* upgrade` (the DEV path); it holds on a fresh stack too. The seed owner's
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* factors and sessions made here are removed afterwards (as postgres), so the
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* owner is back to no factor and the suite runs again on the same stack.
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*/
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import { confirmedAccount, errorCode, rest, rpc, signIn, sql } from './stack'
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import { claimsOf, enrolTotp, stepUp, verifyTotp } from './mfa'
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const OWNER = '10000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'
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const OWNER_EMAIL = 'owner@faunosteo.local'
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const OWNER_PASSWORD = 'LocalDev-only-password-1'
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const FACTOR_PREFIX = 'seed-owner-test'
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const passwordSession = async (): Promise<string> => {
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const session = await signIn(OWNER_EMAIL, OWNER_PASSWORD)
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return session.body.access_token as string
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}
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const refusal = (result: { status: number; body: unknown }) =>
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[result.status, (result.body as { message?: string }).message]
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describe('AR-1 B on the seed owner (§16.2)', () => {
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let target = { id: '' }
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beforeAll(async () => {
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// Factors left by an interrupted run of this file are removed first.
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await sql(`delete from auth.mfa_factors where user_id = '${OWNER}' and friendly_name like '${FACTOR_PREFIX}%'`)
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expect(await sql(`select count(*) from auth.mfa_factors where user_id = '${OWNER}'`)).toBe('0')
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expect(await sql(`select count(*) from public.profile_roles where user_id = '${OWNER}' and role = 'owner' and revoked_at is null`)).toBe('1')
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const account = await confirmedAccount('seed-owner-target')
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await stepUp(account.token)
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target = account
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}, 60_000)
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afterAll(async () => {
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await sql(`delete from auth.mfa_factors where user_id = '${OWNER}' and friendly_name like '${FACTOR_PREFIX}%'`)
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await sql(`delete from auth.sessions where user_id = '${OWNER}'`)
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if (target.id) await sql(`delete from auth.users where id = '${target.id}'`)
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})
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it('without a factor: usable at aal1, refused only for roles and rights', async () => {
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const token = await passwordSession()
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expect(claimsOf(token).aal).toBe('aal1')
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expect((await rest(`/profiles?select=id&id=eq.${OWNER}`, token)).body).toEqual([{ id: OWNER }])
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expect(((await rest('/workspaces?select=id', token)).body as unknown[]).length).toBe(1)
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expect(((await rest('/species?select=id', token)).body as unknown[]).length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
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expect(refusal(await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, token)))
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.toEqual([403, 'mfa_required'])
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expect(refusal(await rpc('list_catalog_grants', {}, token))).toEqual([403, 'rights.mfa'])
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expect(refusal(await rpc('grant_catalog_right', { user_id: target.id, kind: 'catalog_reader', reason: 'x' }, token)))
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.toEqual([403, 'rights.mfa'])
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}, 60_000)
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it('with two verified factors: works at aal2 and is refused at aal1', async () => {
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// First factor from the aal1 session (no verified factor yet), second from aal2 (§5.7.1, §5.7.3).
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const aal1 = await passwordSession()
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const first = await enrolTotp(aal1, `${FACTOR_PREFIX}-1`)
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expect(first.status).toBe(200)
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let aal2 = (await verifyTotp(aal1, first.factor!)).body.access_token as string
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expect(claimsOf(aal2).aal).toBe('aal2')
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const second = await enrolTotp(aal2, `${FACTOR_PREFIX}-2`)
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expect(second.status).toBe(200)
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aal2 = (await verifyTotp(aal2, second.factor!)).body.access_token as string
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expect(await sql(`select count(*) from auth.mfa_factors where user_id = '${OWNER}' and status = 'verified'`)).toBe('2')
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const grant = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, aal2)
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expect(grant.status).toBe(200)
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expect((await rpc('revoke_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support', reason: 'test' }, aal2)).status).toBe(200)
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expect((await rpc('list_catalog_grants', {}, aal2)).status).toBe(200)
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// A new password sign-in starts at aal1: refused, whatever the factors.
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const again = await passwordSession()
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expect(claimsOf(again).aal).toBe('aal1')
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const refused = await rpc('grant_platform_role', { target_user_id: target.id, role: 'support' }, again)
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expect([refused.status, errorCode(refused), (refused.body as { message?: string }).message]).toEqual([403, '42501', 'mfa_required'])
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expect(refusal(await rpc('list_catalog_grants', {}, again))).toEqual([403, 'rights.mfa'])
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// And that aal1 session cannot add a third factor (§5.7.3).
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expect((await enrolTotp(again, `${FACTOR_PREFIX}-3`)).status).toBe(403)
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}, 60_000)
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})
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