fix(workspace): LAN exposure via host firewall — the Supabase CLI forces 0.0.0.0, so PostgreSQL / Studio / raw Mailpit close by UFW rules on the LAN interface; gateway reduced to Mailpit behind basic auth on 54325

Owner run: the CLI prints 'All services bind to 0.0.0.0' and ignored the
rootless daemon's default address; the gateway could not share 54321/54324
with 0.0.0.0 listeners. Now: Kong serves the API directly; the DEV gateway
serves only Mailpit with basic auth on <DEV host>:54325; ENVIRONMENTS.md §3
gives the exact UFW rules (interface-scoped deny on 54322-54324, two cases
by current UFW state), rollback and impact; dev:net-check proves the
allowed surfaces from a distinct Docker network (5/5 OK) and prints the
refusal checks to run from another device, since a rootless container's
traffic to the host is delivered locally and cannot see the LAN firewall.
LRN-053 corrects LRN-052.
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bchanot committed 2026-10-13 23:01:19 +02:00
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@@ -403,3 +403,11 @@ Apply: every Storage call in later steps (documents, logos), every `returns tabl
- Rootless bind mounts: a 600 file owned by the user is unreadable by the container's non-root user (subordinate uid) → nginx 500 "open() htpasswd failed (13)". Make hash-only files 644, keep clear secrets 600 outside the mount.
- Probing "closed" vs "open" with curl: exit 7 (refused) / 28 (timeout) = closed; a non-HTTP TCP service (PostgreSQL) gives exit 52/56 = OPEN. HTTP 000 alone proves nothing.
Apply: any DEV service exposure on this machine; future staging compose.
## LRN-053 | 2026-10-13 | Correction of LRN-052: Supabase CLI 2.120 binds 0.0.0.0 explicitly; rootless container probes cannot see the host LAN firewall
- Owner applied `~/.config/docker/daemon.json {"ip":"127.0.0.1"}` + restart: the CLI still published 54321-54324 on 0.0.0.0 and prints "All services bind to 0.0.0.0" → it sets the host IP explicitly; the daemon default never applies. LRN-052 bullet 1 is wrong for the CLI (still true for address-less ports of other containers). Only a host firewall closes PG/Studio/raw Mailpit; UFW rules scoped `in on <lan-iface>` work on rootless listeners.
- A gateway cannot share a port with a 0.0.0.0 listener whatever its own address ("port is already allocated") → serve the authenticated Mailpit on another port (54325).
- Rootless (slirp/pasta) containers reach the host's own LAN IP by local delivery, never through the LAN interface → firewall refusals on that interface are invisible to any probe run on the host; prove them from another device (`nc -zv -w 3 <ip> <port>`).
- Lesson: an "it should apply" assumption about a third-party tool's binding must be tested before handing a procedure to the owner (I flagged it as a hypothesis, but the owner still spent a daemon restart on it).
Apply: any exposure work on this machine; staging compose (bind explicitly there).