fix(domain): security audit follow-ups — deserialise JSON by reference, literal delete paths in the wasm build

The security gate (PASS, 0 blocking) reported LOW items: an imported
attachment's Value was copied for the wrapper and the snapshot gate (a
hostile 16 MiB attachment multiplied linear memory), and wasm-build.sh
deleted its outputs through a variable. Every JSON input is now read with
T::deserialize(&Value) (same errors, no copy); one deserialiser instead of
two also shrinks the shipped module from 1,180,281 to 1,046,498 bytes raw
(372,132 → 340,929 gzip). The two outputs are removed on their literal
paths. RUST.md records the numbers, the quarantine retention and the
base-image tag residual.
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bchanot committed 2026-10-14 01:02:30 +02:00
1 parent 8e8c58efca
commit e49009e363
10 files changed
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@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ fn unknown(op: &str) -> Failure {
/// Parses the JSON text of an operation input into its contract type.
pub(crate) fn parse_input<T: DeserializeOwned>(input: &str) -> Result<T, Failure> {
let value = parse_json(input).map_err(|error| Failure::new("invalid_json", error))?;
serde_json::from_value(value).map_err(|error| Failure::new("invalid_shape", error))
T::deserialize(&value).map_err(|error| Failure::new("invalid_shape", error))
}
pub(crate) fn to_value<T: Serialize>(value: &T) -> Outcome {