docs(docs): R5.5 gate round 2, checkpoint, memory, TODO
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# Security audit: R5.5 upload tool, fix commits 56593af and fad85c0
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- date: 2026-10-23 | branch `feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core` | scope `git diff a481af5..fad85c0`
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- context read: `crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/{main,storage}.rs`, `crates/core/src/curation/upload.rs`,
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`scripts/{upload-sheet-assets,sheet-assets-e2e,floor-clarification-check}.sh`, `crates/core/tests/upload_tool.rs`,
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contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-23-rust-r5-upload.md`
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- mode: audit (fresh, blind; no prior verdict used). Nothing was edited but this file.
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- not run, by rule: `upload-sheet-assets` against any real stack, `scripts/sheet-assets-e2e.sh`, any service key,
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any transfer tool, any recursive delete.
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## What was measured
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| Check | Result |
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|---|---|
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| semgrep 1.168.0, p/security-audit + p/secrets + p/owasp-top-ten, 75 rules, 11 files (the 10 diff files + `curation/upload.rs`) | 0 findings, 0 errors |
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| guardrails `scan.py --domain api,supabase` | 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (`SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER`, `supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177`), outside the diff, dropped |
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| `cargo test --locked -p faunosteo-core --features upload --test upload_tool` (loopback stub, made-up key, built without `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY` in the env) | 12 passed, 0 failed |
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| `floor-guard.sh develop`, then the script's three regexes applied to its output | 22 findings: 21 requalified (SUPPRESS in `.claude/audits/*.md`), 1 declared (`STUB .claude/memory/evals.md:205`), 0 remaining |
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| `/proc/sys/net/ipv{4,6}/ip_nonlocal_bind` | 0 and 0 |
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| UDP bind probe (no packet sent) on this host (`enp89s0` 192.168.1.100/24, brd 192.168.1.255) | 192.168.1.100 OK; 192.168.1.255 OK; 224.0.0.1 OK; 0.0.0.0 OK; 192.168.1.0, 192.168.1.101, 10.255.255.254 refused |
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| TCP connect to 192.168.1.255:54321 | refused by the kernel, ENETUNREACH (no SYN leaves) |
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| new suppressions in added lines (`nosemgrep`, `nosec`, `eslint-disable`, `@ts-ignore`, `noqa`, `#[allow`, `shellcheck disable`, `floor-guard: allow`) | none in code; the only hits are prose in `.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-upload-security.md` |
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| tracked env files | `.env.example` only |
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## Targeted review of the fixes
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**Error classification and retry** (`storage.rs:17`, `:73-87`, `:189-214`). `ATTEMPTS = 4` gives one try and three
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retries, sleeps 1.0 s, 1.5 s, 2.0 s, so contract C6 "retried three times" holds. Retried: `Io`, `Timeout`,
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`HostNotFound`, `ConnectionFailed`, `Protocol`, and a 5xx status. Every other `ureq::Error` is final.
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`BodyExceedsLimit` maps to a final `State` refusal: the ureq 3.4.2 `LimitReader` raises it wrapped in an
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`io::Error`, and `From<io::Error>` unwraps it back (`ureq-3.4.2/src/error.rs:216-227`), so the guard does fire. The
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test `upload_tool.rs:319` proves it, with exactly one object GET and no write. A retried POST stays safe, because
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`x-upsert: false` turns a replay into a 409 handled as a duplicate and the object is then re-hashed. A retried
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confirm is server-idempotent. Secret exposure: the final branch prints only a fixed text or the numeric limit. The
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retried branch prints `error.to_string()`. For `Io`, `Timeout` and `Protocol` that text carries no header value:
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ureq-proto's `BadHeader` holds the `http::Error` text, not the value, and `BadAuthorizationHeader` has no payload
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(`ureq-proto-0.6.4/src/error.rs:45-53`). Request analysis also runs before the prelude is written
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(`client/sendreq.rs:42`), so a refused key never reaches the wire. The fix is a strict improvement: before it,
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`Http`, `BadUri`, `TooManyRedirects` and the rest were echoed and retried. One residual inaccuracy is listed as L1.
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**DEV-address ownership** (`main.rs:112-124`). `UdpSocket::bind((ip, 0))` sends nothing and is closed on drop. It
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runs before the key is read, and `check_destination` still requires a private IPv4 equal to the DEV host
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(`upload.rs:190-200`). Unspecified and multicast addresses bind but are not private, so they stay refused. The
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directed broadcast of an attached private subnet passes, but the kernel refuses the TCP connection. The test
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`upload_tool.rs:342` discriminates: without the filter the run would reach the network (exit 3), not a
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`Destination` refusal (exit 1). Residuals: L2.
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**Keys off every argv in the e2e script** (`sheet-assets-e2e.sh:18-32`). The key reaches the binary only through a
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prefix assignment inside the `$(...)` subshell (env, not argv). The leak check feeds the patterns to
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`grep -f <(printf ...)`: `printf` is a builtin, and grep's argv holds only `/dev/fd/N`. The keys come from the
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status JSON on stdin; the `python3 -c` argv carries only the field name. `env -u SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY cargo
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build` puts the variable name on argv, never its value. Dropping `env -i` lets the binary inherit the caller's env.
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This is no exposure: the tool reads only `SUPABASE_URL`, `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`, `FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST` and
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`INIT_CWD` (the last two are unset there), it uses `proxy(None)`, and the crate has no logger. An empty key or
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status field would put an empty pattern into `-f`, which matches every output. That fails the case: fail-safe.
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**Launcher** (`upload-sheet-assets.sh:15-16`). Under `set -euo pipefail`, a failed build stops the script before
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the `exec`. Cargo, build scripts and proc macros no longer see the key. Only the `exec`'d binary receives it, in its
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environment, with the folder and `--check` as its only argv. Residual: L3.
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**FLOOR declared line** (`floor-clarification-check.sh:16`, `:23-27`). `DECLARED_RE` is anchored and covers one
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kind, one file and one line, with the dots escaped and a trailing space, so `:2050` cannot match. On the branch it
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matches exactly the one line the R5.4 contract names (`2026-10-23-rust-r5-review.md:69`). Nothing else is
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requalified, `requalified` does not count it, and it is printed under `DECLARED`. The negative proof still fails
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(real SUPPRESS in `src/*.ts`, `src/*.rs` and an active contract). Residual: L4.
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## Findings
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No CRITICAL, no HIGH, no MEDIUM, no new ungated suppression.
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- **L1** `storage.rs:196` (with `:200-202`): `Protocol(_)` counts as transient. That bucket also holds deterministic
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local failures: `BadAuthorizationHeader` for a key with non-ASCII bytes (the `http` crate accepts bytes 0x80 and up
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in a value, ureq-proto's `to_str` refuses them), `OutputOverflow` for a huge key, and `HttpParseFail` for a
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malformed answer. Each is retried three times and ends as `Network`, exit 3. The `final_error` doc comment says
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"a key a header refuses, a malformed answer" are final, which is only true for control characters (`Http`). This
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costs about 4.5 s and a wrong exit code, and nothing is sent or printed. Hint: make `Protocol` final, or retry only
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its response-side variants, and correct the comment.
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- **L2** `main.rs:112-115`: the bind probe also accepts the subnet broadcast (measured: 192.168.1.255). With
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`FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST=192.168.1.255` and `SUPABASE_URL=http://192.168.1.255:54321`, the destination check passes,
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the kernel refuses the TCP connection (ENETUNREACH, measured), the key is never sent, and the run ends `Network`
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instead of `Destination`. The probe also degrades to "any private IPv4" on a host with `ip_nonlocal_bind=1`
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(0 here). Hint: after the bind, `connect((ip, port))` the UDP socket (sends nothing; a broadcast gives EACCES,
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measured) and require `local_addr().ip() == ip`, and document the sysctl dependency.
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- **L3** `upload-sheet-assets.sh:15-16` and `sheet-assets-e2e.sh:15,18`: the binary path `target/release/...` is
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hard-coded, but cargo honours `CARGO_TARGET_DIR`, `CARGO_BUILD_TARGET` and a user `build.target-dir`. If any is
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set, the build lands elsewhere and the script `exec`s a stale binary, possibly pre-fix, with the service key in its
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environment (or a missing one). None is set on this machine (measured; no `~/.cargo/config.toml`, and the workspace
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`.cargo/config.toml` has no target dir). Hint: `env -u CARGO_TARGET_DIR -u CARGO_BUILD_TARGET` on the build, or
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take the path from `cargo build --message-format=json`.
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- **L4** `floor-clarification-check.sh:16`: the exemption is pinned by line number, not content. If a
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`/prune-memory` rewrite puts another STUB on `evals.md:205`, that STUB is silently exempt, while the original
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finding fails loudly. The negative proof has no `evals.md`, so the regex's narrowness is proven only by reading.
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Since this change, the script prints OK while the finding waits for the owner's decision. That is a quality-gate
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question for the verifier and has no security effect. Hint: also match the snippet prefix (`Anomalies: LOW
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report.rs`), and add a proof case with a STUB on another `evals.md` line.
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- **L5** `upload_tool.rs:346-347`: the "not this machine" address 10.255.255.254 is the one WSL2 assigns to `lo`.
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On such a host the test would connect locally with the made-up key and fail with exit 3. This is a portability
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nit (fail-loud) with no exposure. Hint: use a TEST-NET address (192.0.2.1 is not private, so pick a private
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address checked to be non-local at run time).
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Context only, outside the diff, not counted: `supabase/config.toml` sets no `jwt_secret` (only `jwt_expiry` at
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`:89`). The local stack therefore likely signs with the CLI's public default secret, and port 54321 is open to the
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LAN by design (CLAUDE.md "Environments and LAN access"). Anyone on the LAN who knows the public default
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service_role JWT would then hold service_role on the local stack, which makes the tool's key secrecy moot there. I
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did not verify this against the running stack. The diff's RUST.md text names the same point.
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## Verdict block
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```
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SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
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TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
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SCOPE: 11 files (10 in a481af5..fad85c0 + crates/core/src/curation/upload.rs read as context)
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BLOCKING:
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(none)
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REPORTED (non-blocking):
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- [LOW] retry-classification (Protocol treated as transient, doc comment overstates finality) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/storage.rs:196
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- [LOW] dev-address-probe (subnet broadcast binds; relies on ip_nonlocal_bind=0) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:112
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- [LOW] stale-binary-exec (hard-coded target/release vs CARGO_TARGET_DIR) — scripts/upload-sheet-assets.sh:16, scripts/sheet-assets-e2e.sh:15
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- [LOW] floor-declared-line (pinned by line number; no negative proof for DECLARED_RE) — scripts/floor-clarification-check.sh:16
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- [LOW] test-portability (10.255.255.254 is lo on WSL2) — crates/core/tests/upload_tool.rs:346
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PROOF: semgrep 75 rules on 11 files → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks (secrets, SQL concat, unsafe render, authz, error exposure, secret in log, tracked .env, guardrails, new suppressions) + 5 targeted fix reviews → 5 findings (all LOW); cargo test upload_tool 12/12 green; floor classification 22 → 21 requalified, 1 declared, 0 remaining
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```
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