fix(domain): refuse three non-canonical v3 shapes, R5.5 LOW fixes, R5.6 plan

check_v3_shape at read_report_document v3 and parse_envelope (sheet, practitioner
as non-objects, severity as non-string); Protocol errors final; DEV address must be
an own unicast address. SQL confirm function and DEV keys characterised, no change.
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@@ -149,6 +149,31 @@ service-worker features) and OAuth providers that refuse `http://` redirect
URIs. When one of those lands, the answer is a private HTTPS origin (local CA
or a private name with a certificate), never the production domain.
### 3.6 The API port 54321 and the stack's keys (checked 2026-10-24)
Measured on the host, no secret printed: `supabase/config.toml` sets no `jwt_secret` and no
signing keys, so the stack signs with the Supabase CLI's **public default** JWT secret and its
`service_role` key is the public demo key (`iss: supabase-demo`). Port 54321 is open to the LAN by
design (table above): any device of the private network that knows those public values can call
the API as `service_role`, past every RLS policy, on DEV data. Nothing of production is involved.
This is an owner decision (no automatic change): give the stack its own secret (a `jwt_secret` /
signing keys read with `env()` from a git-ignored file, then `pnpm db:reset` and new keys in
`.env.worker`), or narrow the 54321 allow rule to the test devices' addresses.
What the UFW listing alone does not prove for 54321, and how to check it (owner, by hand):
```bash
ss -ltnp 'sport = :54321' # who listens, on which address (0.0.0.0 / [::] expected)
sudo ufw status verbose # default incoming policy + any rule naming 54321
docker info -f '{{.SecurityOptions}}' # "rootless" expected: published ports are host sockets, UFW applies
sudo iptables -S DOCKER-USER 2>/dev/null # rootful Docker only: DNAT bypasses UFW, rules belong here
nc -zv -w 3 <DEV host> 54321 # from ANOTHER device: succeeds today (open by design)
nc -zv -w 3 <DEV host> 54322 # from another device: must fail (54323, 54324 too)
```
A DENY on 54322 to 54324 is effective only if the daemon is rootless (§3.1) and the probe from
another device fails; this machine cannot test its own LAN firewall (§3.3).
## 4. Procedure from another device (owner validation)
On the Ubuntu machine: `pnpm db:start`, `pnpm dev:gateway`, the worker
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@@ -3392,3 +3392,47 @@ together with the serde decision above; the seed regenerated once by the Rust to
re-uploaded only if their bytes change (they do not: `horse.svg` is frozen); `.prettierignore` on the
Rust-written paths; the migration-map cascade debt (§11.12) fixed before any changeset renames a view,
zone, region, category or cited reference.
### 11.18 R5.5 closed; targeted corrections before R5.6 (2026-10-24)
Owner brief « Clôture R5.5, corrections ciblées et préparation R5.6 ». Contract
`.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-24-rust-r5-5-closing.md`.
**Real local stack: PASS, run by the owner by hand** (`pnpm e2e:sheet-assets`, 11 checks, verdict
`e2e:sheet-assets OK`). This result is the owner's, distinct from the assistant's simulated-server suite
(`upload_tool`); the assistant did not rerun it. R5.5 is closed. FLOOR clarification and the 4 MiB cap
accepted; `evals.md:205` stays declared, not requalified.
**Two LOW corrections.** `Protocol` errors (a malformed HTTP answer, a key a header refuses) are final, no
longer retried (test `a_malformed_answer_is_final_and_not_retried`: one request, exit 1). The DEV address must
be an own unicast address: bound, then connected to itself (no packet) with that address kept as the local end;
a subnet broadcast binds but refuses the connect (binary test over the host's `inet` and `brd` addresses). The
other LOW reserves of §11.16 stay tracked.
**Serde hardening of three v3 shapes (owner go).** `report::read::check_v3_shape` refuses on the raw value,
before the typed read, `sheet` or `practitioner` not an object and an observation `severity` not a string
(`ReadFailure::Invalid` with the field named). Called at the two entries that read a v3 report from outside:
`read_report_document` (v3 branch: PDF import, bare archives, draft restore) and `parse_envelope` (the session's
archive copy). Nothing else narrowed: an unknown field and an absent `severity` are read as before; `null`
severity was and stays refused (optional, never nullable). Test `characterisation_serde_tolerance` turned
around (5 cases, the envelope entry included). Every R2-R4 suite, the PDF import suites, the envelope goldens and
the N-1 reader pass unchanged; no authentic archive was rejected. Not covered by the go, left as is: the same
derives on Report v2 and on the other contracts.
**`confirm_sheet_asset_upload`, characterised (no SQL change).** EXECUTE revoked from `public`, `anon`,
`authenticated`, granted to `service_role` only (migration 20261009100000; pgTAP 006: an editor gets 42501,
the service role confirms, twice is idempotent; `anon` is covered by the grant, not by its own assertion). The
function sets `uploaded_at` for the row id without checking that `<sha256>.svg` exists in `storage.objects` or
that its bytes match: a service-role caller can confirm a row with no object or with other bytes under the key.
Not exploitable from an API role: no INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE policy exists on the bucket, so only the service
role can place bytes, and the service role already bypasses RLS. In the tool, the row is confirmed only after the
object is read back and hashed. Debt before any public exposure: check the object's existence (and size) in the
function. On DEV, see the next point: the service role is reachable from the LAN today.
**DEV stack (owner §5).** Measured without printing a secret: the stack uses the Supabase CLI's public default
JWT secret, the service key is the public demo key (`iss: supabase-demo`), and 54321 is open to the LAN by
design, so a device of the network can act as `service_role` on DEV. The checks to run for 54321 (listener, UFW,
rootless or rootful Docker, a probe from another device) and the two remedies are in ENVIRONMENTS.md §3.6. No
firewall or configuration was changed.
**R5.6 prepared, not started.** Plan `.claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-24-rust-r5-6-fingerprint-switch.md`.