docs(docs): separate public 0.1.0 from develop in README and DEPLOY

README splits the public 0.1.0, develop, DEV-only features and planned
work. CHANGELOG states nothing under Unreleased is deployed. DEPLOY gets
a status notice (historical, unverified, would-break, security
prerequisites) and marks both CSP examples as not production-ready;
fixes stay with RR-5.
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@@ -1,5 +1,56 @@
# Deploy
## Status of this guide (2026-10-25)
This guide was written for the static deployment of 0.1.0, the version
faunosteo.com runs, and is kept as that record. It is not a procedure for
`develop`: nothing authorises deploying it (release readiness track, TODO
RR-1 to RR-10). The corrections this file needs are TODO RR-5.
Historical, true for 0.1.0 and wrong for an image with a backend: the
introduction below ("no backend, no database"), "Data persistence",
"Backups", "Backend CORS", "Frontend API base URL", the rollback's "no
server-side state", and the troubleshooting entries "CORS rejected in
browser" and "volume / data unexpectedly empty".
Not verified for the current code:
- the loopback claim: `docker-compose.yml` publishes `${PORT:-8080}` on every
interface, and rootful Docker bypasses UFW;
- "First-time VPS setup", "Routine deploys" and "Rollback" build the image on
the VPS; an image from R2 on compiles the Rust core and is never built there
(see "Image deploy by digest");
- the fallback that serves `apps/app/dist/` from a plain `nginx:alpine` drops
`docker/nginx.conf` (the `env.js` no-cache rule, the `.wasm.gz` served with
`gzip_static`);
- the VPS sizing table, written before the Rust build stages.
Would break the current application if applied as written:
- the two CSP examples (Option A nginx, Option B Caddy), marked below as not
production-ready: without `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` the editor, the export and
the import cannot load the Rust core; without the Supabase origin in
`connect-src` (it falls back to `default-src 'self'`), sign-in and the
`/app` space fail unless Supabase is served from the same origin;
- a default build (`SHEET_BUNDLE=none`): no anatomical sheet, the editor
refuses to create or import a report.
Security prerequisites before deploying anything built from `develop`:
- the CSP of "WebAssembly and the CSP" with `connect-src` naming the Supabase
origin, checked on the image (`docker/csp-proof/app-image.sh`);
- the container port bound to loopback in fact, checked from outside the VPS;
- a hosting decision for Supabase (`docs/development/OPEN_QUESTIONS.md` Q2),
production SMTP with French auth email templates, captcha, OAuth ids, MFA
for platform roles (RR-3, RR-5);
- the worker's service key out of `.env`, its exposure to the `docker` group
settled (RR-4);
- images built off the VPS and pulled by digest, base images pinned (RR-6);
- the RLS and API items of RR-3 and RR-4 and the dependency advisories of
RR-1 treated or qualified.
---
Single nginx:alpine container behind a host reverse proxy that terminates
TLS. The container serves a static SPA bundle (built from `apps/app`, Node 24,
pnpm 10.13.1) from `/usr/share/nginx/html`
@@ -298,6 +349,10 @@ previous image, never a rebuild of the old engine.
## Data persistence
Historical (0.1.0, no backend): once Supabase or the worker run beside the
application, the database and the Storage objects are server-side state that
this section and the next do not cover.
There are no server-side volumes to back up:
- **In-flight session data** lives in the praticien's browser
@@ -314,6 +369,10 @@ regenerated on every build.
## Backups (cron + retention)
Historical (0.1.0): the `.env` snapshot below is the whole backup only while
the server holds no data; `docs/development/STORAGE.md` §5.2 sets the order
for a backend (database dump first, files within 48 h).
Because there is no server-side state, the backup target is the source
repository plus the `.env` file.
@@ -430,6 +489,11 @@ systemctl status certbot.timer # auto-renew preinstalled on Ubuntu
#### Security headers (Option A only)
Not production-ready (2026-10-25): the `Content-Security-Policy` line below is
the 0.1.0 header. It lacks `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` and the Supabase origin in
`connect-src`; any later image needs "WebAssembly and the CSP" below first
(correction tracked as TODO RR-5).
Add inside the `listen 443` block (under any existing `location` rules
the certbot template inserted):
@@ -460,6 +524,9 @@ the PDF preview emits data URLs.
### Option B — Caddy (auto-TLS, single file)
Not production-ready (2026-10-25): the `Content-Security-Policy` of this
Caddyfile is the 0.1.0 header, with the same gaps as Option A (TODO RR-5).
```bash
apt-get install -y debian-keyring debian-archive-keyring apt-transport-https
curl -1sLf https://dl.cloudsmith.io/public/caddy/stable/gpg.key | gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/caddy-stable-archive-keyring.gpg
@@ -489,6 +556,9 @@ Caddy handles TLS issuance + renewal automatically.
### Backend CORS
Historical (0.1.0): since Step 7 the browser calls the Supabase API, a
cross-origin request unless Supabase is served from the same origin.
N/A. The app has no backend and makes no cross-origin requests. The only
runtime fetches target the same origin (SVG assets, `env.js`).