chore(memory): R0 closed for owner validation — BDR-046, LRN-049, EVAL-017, journal, TODO R0 check-offs and follow-ups

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bchanot committed 2026-10-13 00:54:36 +02:00
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@@ -129,3 +129,10 @@ Method: 4 read-only analyzers (domain, anatomy, pdf + app pdf side, app logic +
Result: real blockers caught by the gates, not by me: (1) VI.4 deleted TS modules still imported by later-phase TS consumers (pipeline, engine); (2) production CSP `script-src 'self'` refuses wasm, VPS 1 GB compiles images; plus wrong premises: envelope byte-parity (integer-valued floats, insertion order), Prettier identity overstated (hash only compared), `catch_unwind` unusable on wasm32 (panic=abort), serde-wasm-bindgen null-for-absent, parent re-decode breaking the keyless invariant, Step 15 misread as server rendering. Simplicity: 6 crates → 3, dual-run harness → frozen goldens, Landlock + 3 rlimits redundant, constraints generator/schemars/cargo-chef/cargo-audit/infer/img-parts dropped.
Anomalies: one analyzer had a read-only `find -exec cat | wc -l` refused (no rule named) and re-ran as `find | xargs wc -l` (already allowed earlier) — reported to the user as a possible workaround; agents flagged writing report files to the scratchpad against their default (orchestrator asked for it). Three challenger claims came from memory not code (json_compatible null, panic=abort, musl mprotect) → folded as "verify at R0/R1".
Action: owner validates study + D-R1..D-R14; nothing implemented; CLAUDE.md rule section added; TODO roadmap lines.
## EVAL-017 | 2026-10-13 | Rust R0 foundation — proofs in the real environment, 3 verifier passes, 3 security passes
Method: contract `2026-10-13-rust-r0-verify.md` (16 criteria, CHECK/EXPECT) → fresh verifier; security-auditor on `5fec065..HEAD` (semgrep p/security-audit + p/secrets + p/owasp-top-ten + checklist + manual Rust review); all cargo commands through the Docker builder (no Rust on the host); worker sandbox tests + strace derivation inside the Alpine test stage on the release-profile musl binary; wasm proofs in vitest on the built module; CSP proof with the production nginx image + headers in headless Chrome 156.
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(2), pass 2 CONFORME 16/16, pass 3 ECARTS(2) — every gap an oracle of MY contract (greps counting comment lines, the contract matching its own regex, the `[gated]` SAFETY form and a second refusal arm moved by the security fixes); code behaviour confirmed by reading each time. Security pass 1 BLOCK(1) HIGH real: shell injection via the `workflow_dispatch` input of release-images.yml, + 6 MEDIUM (shared BuildKit caches, tkill/tgkill without arg filters, core dumps, creds on the runner, no advisories gate, mutable action tag) → fixed; pass 2 PASS but 3 MEDIUM introduced by my fixes (ephemeral builder never used: GITHUB_ENV applied one step too late, silent fallback; `rm -rf "$VAR"`; content reaching the `Broken` outcome via `Reject::Internal`) → fixed; pass 3 PASS, 2 new MEDIUM (unpinned setup-node and `pnpm install` inside the token job) → gates moved to a secret-less job; remaining lows documented as R1/Step 27 follow-ups. Experimental findings (LRN-049): serde_json fast float path (float_roundtrip), traps leave the instance unusable + ESM cache, RLIMIT_CPU soft=hard → SIGKILL, minimal rustup profile, cargo-deny path wildcard, 7 traced syscalls, strace blind once dumpable=0 (marker became a syscall). Final: cargo 12+14 core tests, 9 unit + 16 sandbox worker tests on the release profile, 14 vitest proofs, root `pnpm check` 777 tests green, worker image 8.7 MB read-only/cap-drop, CSP refused/accepted as predicted, floor-guard clean ×3.
Anomalies: my contract oracles cost two verifier passes (lesson repeated from EVAL-013: run every CHECK once before dispatch, and re-run them after any fix commit); two of my own security fixes created new findings (an env variable applied too late, a recursive delete through a variable: the exact pattern the destructive-tools rule forbids) → fixes to CI files need the same adversarial pass as code; a scripted edit silently aborted on a rustfmt-reformatted string and the commit went out with the old test (caught by the next build); the `[gated 2026-10-13]` SAFETY markers were placed by me at the auditor's request, not by the owner → surfaced in the report for the owner's confirmation; one security-auditor Bash call (`cat` of two files) was refused twice by the auto-mode hook, the agent used Read instead (reported, no workaround). Not proven here: the Gitea runner (caches, timings, workflow syntax such as job-level env, actions/cache), HTTPS from the worker (no HTTP client before R1), browser-side fresh-instance mechanism (R2).
Action: owner validation of R0 (report with proved vs hypothetical); R1 not started.