fix(supabase): keep sandbox secrets off command lines and DEV out of reach
Security gate findings on db-sandbox.sh: containers get secrets from 600 env files, psql and the CLI read PGPASSWORD (no password in --db-url), an incomplete secrets file stops the script before any CLI call, the state folder is refused inside the repository.
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@@ -330,8 +330,11 @@ ports on 127.0.0.1 only and distinct from DEV (db 57432, auth 57999, rest
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no volume, so `down` removes the containers and the network by their literal
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names and can never reach a `supabase_*_faunosteo` volume. The password, JWT
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secret and keys are generated at each `up` into a 600 file under
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`~/.cache/faunosteo-db-sandbox` (`FAUNOSTEO_SANDBOX_DIR`), outside the
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repository, deleted by `down`, never printed. Works with rootless Docker.
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`~/.cache/faunosteo-db-sandbox` (`FAUNOSTEO_SANDBOX_DIR`, refused inside the
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repository), with 600 env files that hand them to the containers; deleted by
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`down`, never printed, never on a command line (the CLI and psql read
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`PGPASSWORD` from the environment). An incomplete secrets file stops the
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script before any CLI call. Works with rootless Docker.
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| Command | What it does |
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