fix(anatomy): V1-2.2 read url() references in their strict spelling only
Security review BLOCK(1): url(#%61) passed the dangling check and the per-view scoping and resolved in browsers. One strict reading now, other spellings are active content; glued names are other functions; the composer refuses an unscoped reference; owner export procedure.
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# Security gate, V1-2.2 owner arbitrations (diff 17d9199..HEAD)
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Mode: audit. Branch `feature/v1-2-anatomical-sheets`, worktree `v1-2`. Date 2026-10-29.
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```
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SECURITY — VERDICT: BLOCK(1)
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TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 present but NOT RUN (p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten are fetched from the registry at run time and the brief forbids network) — effectively DEGRADED: checklist + guardrails scanner + manual attack review + probes on the built wasm module and on headless browsers
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SCOPE: 40 files
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BLOCKING:
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1. [HIGH] url-reference-spelling-mismatch (reader and composer read fewer `url(#…)` spellings than browsers resolve) — crates/core/src/anatomy/svg/sanitize.rs:488 (url_targets), :502 (scope_url_targets), :523 (urls_are_local), :528 (calls_only_local_url); crates/core/src/anatomy/svg/refs.rs:115 (reference_ids); crates/core/src/anatomy/compose.rs:98 (scope_ids) — `fill="url(#%66v.main.g)"` (also `url(#%61)`, and in Chromium `url('#<TAB>a')`) passes the sanitiser, is invisible to `check_targets`, `check_references` and `scope_url_targets`, and is resolved by Chromium and Firefox after percent-decoding: it defeats B1 (dangling check), B2 (view scoping, it reaches another view's `fv.main.g`) and the expansion budget (a 5 KB drawing hangs Chromium for 45 s) — hint: refuse in `urls_are_local` any `url(` whose target is not `#` + `[A-Za-z_][\w.:-]*` followed by optional space or the closing quote then `)` (so `url(#)`, `%`, tab, `/`, non-ASCII after `#` are refused as active), so the sanitiser admits exactly what `url_targets` reads; add a fail-closed check in `compose_canvas` that every composed `url(` target starts with the view scope
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REPORTED (non-blocking):
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- [MEDIUM] scope-key-is-view-id-only — crates/core/src/anatomy/compose.rs:92 — two documents that share a view id (every sheet has `main`) and are inlined in one page share the scope `fv.main.`; the first element in tree order wins, so §10 "never in another view" holds inside one document only
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- [LOW] colour-function-not-whole-value — crates/core/src/anatomy/svg/sanitize.rs:547 — strict `rgb()` is stripped wherever it sits in the value, so `rgb(1,2,3)rgb(4,5,6)` and `url(#a rgb(1,2,3))` (refused before) now pass; invalid CSS the browser drops, no fetch found in 19 hostile values
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- [LOW] test-oracle-shares-the-blind-spot — crates/core/tests/svg_scope.rs:107, apps/app/tests/helpers/svgTree.ts:112 — the oracles read references with `url_targets` / `replaceAll('url(#'`, so they cannot see a reader/browser divergence; no test uses `%`, tab or a non-id first character
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- [LOW] new-lint-allow (context, not a security suppression) — crates/core/tests/svg_scope.rs:6 — `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]`, same header as 49 other test files
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- [LOW] mutation-script-rewrites-sources — .claude/audits/2026-10-29-v1-2-2-mutations-arbitrations.py — edits source files in place and restores them in `finally`; a SIGKILL leaves a mutant in the tree (read only, not run)
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PROOF: semgrep 0 rules on 0 files (not run, no network) → 0 findings; checklist 9 checks (secrets, SQL concatenation, unsanitised render, authz, error surfaces, logging, tracked .env, guardrails scanner, new suppressions) → 1 context finding; manual attack review of 12 files + 3 probe families (built wasm module, Chromium 1248, Firefox 1555) → 1 HIGH, 1 MEDIUM, 3 LOW
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```
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REPORT_WRITTEN: .claude/audits/2026-10-29-v1-2-2-arbitrations-security.md
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## 1. The blocking finding
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### What the code does
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`sanitize::value_acceptable` (sanitize.rs:417) lets a `url(` through when the text after the
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opening, the CSS space and the optional quote starts with `#` (`urls_are_local`, :523), and
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when no other `(` remains (`calls_only_local_url`, :528). It does not look at what follows
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the `#`.
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Three readers then work on the same value, each with its own idea of "the id":
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- `url_targets` (:488) takes the longest run of `[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]` after `#`, and drops an
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empty one.
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- `scope_url_targets` (:502) writes the view scope after `#` only when the next character is
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in that set.
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- `refs::reference_ids` (refs.rs:115), which feeds `check_targets` (B1) and
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`check_references` (cycle and expansion budget), calls `url_targets`.
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When the first character after `#` is outside the set, all three see "no reference" and the
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value is stored and composed byte for byte. A browser does not: it percent-decodes the
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fragment (Chromium and Firefox, measured below), and Chromium also drops a tab inside a
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quoted CSS string (URL Standard: tab and newline are removed from the input).
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### Probes (all throwaway, in the session scratchpad, nothing written in the worktree)
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1. Built wasm module of the worktree (`packages/core-wasm/pkg`, built 16:28, after the last
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source edit at 16:18), `clean_svg` on a one-rect drawing:
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- `fill="url(#nope)"` gives `rejected dangling_reference`.
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- `fill="url(#%6eope)"` gives `clean`. The dangling check is bypassed.
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- `fill="url(#%66v.main.g)"` with a local `<linearGradient id="g"/>` gives `clean`.
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2. Same module, `PreviewBuilder` on the equine draft document with that drawing as the
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horse asset, `view.canvas`:
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- view `main`: `<linearGradient id="fv.main.g"/>` and `<rect fill="url(#%66v.main.g)">`.
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- view `head`: `<linearGradient id="fv.head.g"/>` and `<rect fill="url(#%66v.main.g)">`.
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The reference is not rewritten. In the page the `head` rectangle resolves into the
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`main` canvas.
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3. Browsers, inline SVG in an HTML page, `fill="url(#a)"` control painted red:
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| spelling | Chromium 1248 | Firefox 1555 |
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|---|---|---|
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| `url(#a)` | resolves | resolves |
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| `url(#%61)` | resolves | resolves |
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| `style="fill:url(#%61)"` | resolves | resolves |
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| `url(#%66v.other.x)` (another view's scoped id) | resolves | resolves |
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| `url('#<TAB>a')` (`	`) | resolves | does not |
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| `url(#nope)` | none | none |
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WebKit was not tested.
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4. Budget bypass, Chromium 1248, nested masks written with `url(#%6dN)`, fan-out 10 per
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level, one root rectangle masked by level 0:
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| levels | size | render time |
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|---|---|---|
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| 5 | 3.3 KB page | 0.5 s |
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| 6 | 4.1 KB page | 4.6 s |
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| 7 | 4.8 KB page | 44.8 s |
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Each level costs ten times more. The same structure with plain `url(#mN)` is refused by
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`expanded_size` (10^7 against 50,000). In the core, a value of 250k `url(#a)` gives
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`too_complex` in 58 ms, the same value with `url(#%61)` gives `clean` in 107 ms.
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Firefox timing was not measured.
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### Impact
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- B2 is not met: a drawing can resolve into another view of the page (paint servers,
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filters, masks, clip paths). Into the page itself the reach is theoretical today: no
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page-level SVG resource with an id exists in `apps/app/src` (the brand logos are loaded
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as `<img>` or rasterised, not inlined). Visual only, no fetch, no script.
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- B1 is not met: a reference to an id the drawing does not define is accepted when spelled
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this way.
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- The R3 expansion budget is bypassed. An editor uploads under 5 KB, the verdict and the
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preview say `ok`, the reviewer's or any practitioner's tab freezes when the view draws.
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The PDF export rasterises the same view.
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- The budget bypass exists at 17d9199 (the old `urls_are_local` is the same). The diff does
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not create it, but B1 and B2 are written to close exactly this class and rest on the same
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reader, so they ship with the hole.
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### Fix direction (no code written, report only)
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1. Make the sanitiser the authority. In `urls_are_local` (or a new check called first in
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`value_acceptable`), require for every `url(`: CSS space, optional quote, `#`, one id
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that satisfies `is_reference_name` (first character `[A-Za-z_]`), then space, the same
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quote if one was opened, and `)`. Anything else is non-local and therefore active
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(rejected), which also removes `url(#)`. Then the set the sanitiser admits and the set
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`url_targets` reads are the same by construction.
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2. Fail closed in the composer: after `scope_ids`, walk the composed tree and refuse the
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canvas (`ComposeError`) when a `url(` target does not start with the view scope, or an
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`href` does not start with `#fv.<view>.`. A future reader divergence then cannot produce
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an unscoped reference silently.
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3. Tests with an independent oracle: for every accepted value, normalise the way the URL
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Standard does (strip tab and newline, percent-decode the fragment) and assert it equals
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the `url_targets` list; cases `url(#%61)`, `url(#%66v.x.g)`, `url('#<TAB>a')`, `url(#)`,
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`url(#é)`, `url(#a%2Eb)` (allowed only if the first character rule holds).
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4. After the fix, correct the statements that are false today: docs/development/
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V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md §9.2 and §10 ("a reference resolves only inside its own view"),
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docs/development/RUST.md, docs/ANNOTATION-RENDERING.md.
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## 2. Reported findings
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- MEDIUM, scope key. `id_scope` (compose.rs:92) is `fv.<view id>.`. View ids are unique inside
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one document, not across sheets. A catalogue grid, a comparison or a preview next to the
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editor puts two `main` canvases in one page; ids collide and `getElementById` takes the
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first. Sheet B can then draw with sheet A's gradient or mask. Not verified against the
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V1-2.3+ screens (they are not in this diff). Add a per-handle token, or state in §10 that
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one sheet is mounted at a time.
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- LOW, colour function. `without_colour_functions` (:547) removes a strict `rgb()` anywhere in
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the text. Probed: 19 hostile values around a colour (`url(http://…)`, `expression(`,
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`image-set(`, `src(`, `cross-fade(`, `\72`, `/**/url(//…)`, `behavior:`, `@import`, `var(`,
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`attr(`, `element(`, `-moz-element(`, `paint(`, `RGB(`, nested `url(#a)` as an argument) are
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all refused or removed. The remaining looseness is cosmetic: `rgb(1,2,3)rgb(4,5,6)` and
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`url(#a rgb(1,2,3))` pass and are invalid CSS (bad-url token), dropped by the browser.
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- LOW, test oracle. See table line above.
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- LOW, lint allow and mutation script. See table lines above.
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## 3. What was attacked and held
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- Colour exception, `smuggle url(`, `expression(`, escape, `image-set(`, fetch: a backslash is
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refused for every attribute before the colour code runs; `style_forbidden` runs on the
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original text; a `(` that is neither a local `url(#` nor a strict colour function stays and
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refuses the value. The colour parser admits only ASCII digits, `.`, `%`, comma, CSS space
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and `)` between `rgb(` and the end, so nothing can hide inside it. `glued` blocks `xrgb(`,
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`-rgb(`, `\rgb(`. Uppercase is refused (safe side). No index can leave the slice
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(`digits(end + 1)` only after a `.` at `end`; `index += 1` only after a matched separator).
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Probe table: 17 `fill` and 5 `style` values (19 hostile, 3 valid controls), all as expected.
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- Parsing cost, measured through the built module, attribute values near 2 MiB: `rgb(1,2,3)`
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x150k 132 ms, `rgb(` x400k 35 ms, `rgb(1,` x300k 37 ms, `rgb(` plus 1.9M spaces 26 ms, plus
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1.9M digits 23 ms, mixed spacing 84 ms, `url(#` x400k 97 ms, `url(` x400k 15 ms. By reading:
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each failed colour attempt scans one run of digits and spaces that cannot contain `rgb`,
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and `from` always advances at least 3.
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- `check_targets`, `scope_ids`, `references_resolve`: one pass, recursion bounded by the
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prescan depth cap 64, one `HashSet`. Scoped output is bounded by the budget (50,000
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references) plus 20,000 ids, then by `MAX_COMPOSED_BYTES` (4 MiB) after serialisation.
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- Scoping, spellings: `url( '#x')`, `URL(#x)`, newline and tab before `#` or the quote,
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and `.` in ids all go through the same `url_openings` / `skip_url_prefix` for the checker
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and the composer, so they agree with each other (the unit test at sanitize.rs:715 covers it).
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`href` and `xlink:href` are strict (`#` + reference name after ASCII trim), so a `%`, a tab or
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an odd prefix cannot be kept: a prefixed `x:href` is not on the allowlist and the
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`xlink:href` must be in the xlink namespace. View ids match `[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}`
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(js.rs:158, enforced at deserialisation), so no `.` in a view id and one scope is never the
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start of another's. The layer has no `id`, `href` or `url(`.
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- Checker versus composer, same reading: `reference_ids` (all attributes through `url_targets`,
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`href` / `xlink:href` apart) and `scope_ids` (same set, `id` added) differ only on `id`,
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which cannot hold `(`. No attribute is rewritten and unread, or read and unrewritten.
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The one divergence is browser against both (finding 1).
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- Stored form: verdict (verdict.rs:323) and preview (preview.rs:119) compare the whole text
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with `stored_form(root)` after a removal-free read, so a comment, CDATA, entity, PI, BOM,
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another declaration or spacing cannot reach a round; the sha256 is checked first. The
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upload tool (upload.rs) and `clean_svg` do the same. Compose works on the sanitised tree,
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never on stored text. The `xmlns:xlink` value is unchecked but inert (a rebinding drops the
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xlink attributes that depend on it).
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- `sheet.edit remove` (edit.rs:570): `dependents` runs after `locate`, before any mutation,
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so a refusal leaves the document unchanged; it is a client rule, no authorisation change.
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- Checklist greps on the added lines (secrets, SQL built by concatenation, innerHTML / eval /
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raw, logging, tracked `.env`): nothing. Guardrails scanner: 0 FAIL, 28 WARN, all in
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migrations the diff does not touch, so none kept (gate rule).
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## 4. Not done, and limits
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- semgrep did not run. The three packs come from the registry and the brief says no network.
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The Rust surface of those packs is thin; the manual review above is the substitute, it is
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not equivalent.
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- WebKit was not probed; the Firefox DoS time was not measured; the `<TAB>` form is
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Chromium only.
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- Probes ran headless browsers on local files and Node on the built module. No cargo, wasm or
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Docker build was started (the `check:all` in the worktree was left alone). The probe files
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(HTML pages, screenshots, two Node scripts, a Firefox profile) sit in the session
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scratchpad `/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/0cee2841-f2bb-4081-9e59-3e6fe9cc8112/scratchpad/probe-audit`;
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the `rm -rf` that would have removed them was refused by the permission rules and was not
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retried by another route. Nothing was written in the worktree besides this report; `git
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status` there shows only this file and the owner's `exports/owner/README.md`.
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- The verdict runs in the core, client or worker side; the SQL side cannot check the stored
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form. That trust boundary is outside this diff.
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Reference in new issue
Block a user