diff --git a/crates/worker/src/verify_job.rs b/crates/worker/src/verify_job.rs index 2cb3fc5c..cae69a0a 100644 --- a/crates/worker/src/verify_job.rs +++ b/crates/worker/src/verify_job.rs @@ -246,6 +246,17 @@ enum ChildVerdict { Stop, } +/// The child's own budgets end it with SIGXCPU (CPU, the hard limit sits two seconds +/// after the soft one), SIGABRT (memory) or SIGSYS (seccomp): the same input ends the +/// same way, so `resource_limit` (definitive). Any other signal, SIGKILL first, came +/// from outside (OOM killer, stop): transient `unavailable`. +fn signal_code(signal: i32) -> &'static str { + match signal { + libc::SIGXCPU | libc::SIGABRT | libc::SIGSYS => codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT, + _ => codes::UNAVAILABLE, + } +} + /// Maps every way the child can end to a verdict on the round (§6.5 rows). fn classify_child(run: ChildRun, job: &VerifyJob) -> ChildVerdict { let stderr = run.stderr; @@ -262,7 +273,7 @@ fn classify_child(run: ChildRun, job: &VerifyJob) -> ChildVerdict { .signal(signal) .child_stderr(&stderr) .emit(); - ChildVerdict::Report(codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT) + ChildVerdict::Report(signal_code(signal)) } ChildOutcome::OutputOverflow => { log::warn("child_output_overflow").review(review).emit(); diff --git a/crates/worker/tests/verify_loop.rs b/crates/worker/tests/verify_loop.rs index 136a9ec3..f2e2afbb 100644 --- a/crates/worker/tests/verify_loop.rs +++ b/crates/worker/tests/verify_loop.rs @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ fn tracked_an_object_over_the_policy_is_reported_drawing_missing() { // Tracked misclassification (owner brief 2026-11-01), not fixed: a document naming enough // drawings that the frame header passes 64 KiB is refused by the parent's own framing and -// reported `resource_limit` (a worker failure, retried) where `caps` would name it. +// reported `resource_limit` (a definitive worker failure) where `caps` would name it. #[test] fn tracked_a_header_over_64_kib_is_reported_resource_limit() { let rows = vec![row(); 600]; @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ fn tracked_a_header_over_64_kib_is_reported_resource_limit() { fake.calls().last().unwrap(), &fail_call(codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT) ); + assert_eq!(fake.names().iter().filter(|n| *n == "fail").count(), 1); } #[test] @@ -435,7 +436,8 @@ fn every_child_limit_maps_to_its_closed_code() { ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: 24 }, codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT, ), - (ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: 9 }, codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT), + (ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: 9 }, codes::UNAVAILABLE), + (ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: 15 }, codes::UNAVAILABLE), (ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: 6 }, codes::RESOURCE_LIMIT), ( ChildOutcome::Signalled { signal: 31 }, diff --git a/docs/development/RUST.md b/docs/development/RUST.md index a651ecf9..7f52eddc 100644 --- a/docs/development/RUST.md +++ b/docs/development/RUST.md @@ -4567,3 +4567,29 @@ through `is distinct from`, service role only) fixed in the three round RPCs, pg sandbox `test-db` 1 880 PASS, `types --check` equal and `verify-e2e` 10/10 on a fresh stack and on the upgrades from before M6 and from before M4 (the DEV path); `avatar-e2e` 5/5; `test` 87 and `e2e:shell` 86 (rerun on the final M6 after the verifier's ECARTS(2): the earlier run predated the fix); DEV untouched. + +Retry by effective cause (owner brief 2026-11-01, closure C1). SQL holds the code policy +(`private.sheet_worker_final_codes`: `resource_limit`, `verdict_refused` close the round at the first +occurrence, `closed_by` `definitive` in the audit; the others retry 2, 5, 10, 20 s up to five attempts, +`closed_by` `attempt_limit`); the worker maps the cause to the code (`verify_job::classify_child`, +`signal_code`), as implemented: + +| Child end | Code | Policy | +|---|---|---| +| frame refused by the parent (header over 64 KiB) | `resource_limit` | definitive | +| `Rejected` (input over the child cap) | `resource_limit` | definitive | +| `OutputOverflow` | `resource_limit` | definitive | +| SIGXCPU (CPU budget; the hard limit is two seconds after the soft one, so the budget shows as SIGXCPU) | `resource_limit` | definitive | +| SIGABRT (memory budget, abort) | `resource_limit` | definitive | +| SIGSYS (seccomp filter) | `resource_limit` | definitive | +| SIGKILL or any other signal (OOM killer, stop: from outside; the parent's own kills are `Timeout` and `OutputOverflow`) | `unavailable` | transient | +| `Timeout` (wall clock) | `timeout` | transient | +| transport, Storage | `unavailable` | transient | +| `Broken`, `Failed` | `unavailable`, then the worker stops | transient | +| verdict answered `malformed` | `verdict_refused` | definitive | +| dead lease | `lease_expired` (set by the claim) | transient, immediate | + +What changes for the codes: a SIGKILL is now reported `unavailable` (it was `resource_limit`); the +outcome (`unavailable`) and the code list are otherwise unchanged. A definitive round closes after one +child run instead of five identical ones. Still tracked and open: the header over 64 KiB is reported +`resource_limit` where `caps` would name it (test `tracked_a_header_over_64_kib_is_reported_resource_limit`). diff --git a/docs/development/STORAGE.md b/docs/development/STORAGE.md index 0ef7c77a..2871abca 100644 --- a/docs/development/STORAGE.md +++ b/docs/development/STORAGE.md @@ -261,20 +261,26 @@ unchanged. - Completion: `complete_sheet_verification` answers `passed`, `failed`, `stale` (nothing written, logged) or `malformed` (reported `verification.worker.verdict_refused`). Child timeout → - `verification.worker.timeout`; a signal, an output overflow or an input over - its cap → `verification.worker.resource_limit`; a transport error → - `verification.worker.unavailable`; a broken child → `unavailable`, then the - worker stops (as the avatar loop). A dead lease (10 minutes) is claimed - again as `verification.worker.lease_expired`; the fifth attempt closes the - round `verification_failed` / `unavailable`. + `verification.worker.timeout` (transient); SIGXCPU, SIGABRT or SIGSYS (the + child's own CPU, memory and seccomp budgets), an output overflow or an input + over its cap → `verification.worker.resource_limit` (definitive: the frozen + input gives the same end every time); any other signal, SIGKILL first (the + OOM killer or a stop, from outside) and a transport error → + `verification.worker.unavailable` (transient); a broken child → + `unavailable`, then the worker stops (as the avatar loop). A dead lease (10 + minutes) is claimed again as `verification.worker.lease_expired`. Retry by + cause: `resource_limit` and `verdict_refused` close the round + `verification_failed` / `unavailable` at the first occurrence; the other + codes retry up to the fifth attempt, which closes it the same way. - Retry delay (owner decision 2026-11-01): a failure reported by `fail_sheet_verification` makes the round claimable again after 2 s, 5 s, 10 s, 20 s (after attempts 1 to 4), kept in SQL (`not_before`, hidden from the API roles), so the worker never sleeps for it and the claim of another round is not blocked; the effective delay is that delay plus up to one poll interval (`WORKER_POLL_SECONDS`, 2 s). A verdict (failed or not) is never - retried; a dead lease is claimed again at once. The worker code is the - same as before. + retried; a dead lease is claimed again at once. Only the transient codes + wait: the delay applies to `timeout`, `unavailable` and `lease_expired` + (SQL decides, `private.sheet_worker_final_codes`). - Measured (2026-11-01): the at-caps document (64 views, 1 024 annotations, 8 192 nodes) verified in 185 ms by the worker on the sandbox, verdict 24 689 bytes; the equine draft in about 60 ms. diff --git a/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md b/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md index 061afa0d..bcc25495 100644 --- a/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md +++ b/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md @@ -890,12 +890,19 @@ attempts below a limit), plus a progressive delay for technical retries only else answers `stale` or `malformed` and writes nothing. Moves the round to `open` or to `verification_failed` (§6.5) and audits. - `fail_sheet_verification(review_id, lease_token, code)`: a technical - failure; the round stays `verifying` and becomes claimable after a delay + failure, closed by cause (2026-11-01, `private.sheet_worker_final_codes`). + A definitive code (`verification.worker.resource_limit`, cause intrinsic to + the frozen input or the contract caps; `verification.worker.verdict_refused`) + closes the round at its first occurrence: `verification_failed`, outcome + `unavailable`, the code kept, no delay, never claimed again. A transient + code (`timeout`, `unavailable`, `lease_expired`): the round stays `verifying` + and becomes claimable after a delay that grows with the attempt (2 s after attempt 1, 5 s after 2, 10 s after 3, 20 s after 4; `private.sheet_verification_retry_delay`), kept in the round's `not_before` (a column the API roles cannot read, set here, cleared by the - claim); the fifth failure becomes `verification_failed` with outcome - `unavailable` and clears it. Nothing is written for a stale call. The delay + claim); the fifth failure of a transient code becomes `verification_failed` + with outcome `unavailable` and clears it. The audit payload says which rule + closed the round (`closed_by`: `definitive` or `attempt_limit`). Nothing is written for a stale call. The delay is persisted, so no worker sleeps and any worker honours it; the effective wait is the delay plus up to one poll interval of the worker (2 s by default). Only these technical failures wait: a validation or integrity @@ -942,7 +949,8 @@ five, verdict text at most 4 MiB; the completion also refuses an unknown verdict or code, a duplicated group key and a drawing whose result is not `ok`, and accepts a failed verdict without groups or drawings; worker codes `verification.worker.unavailable`, `.timeout`, `.resource_limit`, `.lease_expired` (a dead lease), `.verdict_refused` (a -completion answered `malformed`), a closed list in SQL (`private.sheet_worker_codes`). +completion answered `malformed`), a closed list in SQL (`private.sheet_worker_codes`); the +definitive ones are `.resource_limit` and `.verdict_refused` (`private.sheet_worker_final_codes`). These values and codes are the implementer's, for the owner's confirmation. The service role executes these four RPCs besides the two upload ones (pgTAP 018). @@ -961,11 +969,13 @@ did not pass; the closed codes keep the categories apart. |---|---|---|---|---| | Business validation | integrity error, caps exceeded, annotation without geometry, annotation outside its view's frame | `verification_failed`, outcome `failed`, codes `verification.validation.*` and the issues | no | fix the draft, submit again | | Integrity | strict parse refused, drawing missing, size or sha256 mismatch, SVG refused, needing a removal or outside the stored form (§9.2), `object_conflict` | `verification_failed`, outcome `failed`, codes `verification.integrity.*` | no | fix or upload again; `object_conflict` follows §9.3 | -| Transient worker error | database or Storage unreachable, worker restart | stays `verifying`, code recorded | yes, after 2 s, 5 s, 10 s, 20 s, up to the limit | automatic | -| Timeout or resource limit | child over its wall-clock or memory limit | stays `verifying`, code recorded | yes, same delays, up to the limit | reduce the document or the drawing if it repeats | +| Transient worker error | database or Storage unreachable, broken child, child killed from outside (SIGKILL or any signal not listed below: OOM killer, stop), worker restart | `verification.worker.unavailable`, stays `verifying`, code recorded | yes, after 2 s, 5 s, 10 s, 20 s, up to the limit | automatic | +| Timeout | child over its wall-clock deadline | `verification.worker.timeout`, stays `verifying`, code recorded | yes, same delays, up to the limit | reduce the document or the drawing if it repeats | +| Resource limit intrinsic to the content | frame refused, input over the child cap, output over its cap, CPU budget (SIGXCPU), memory budget (SIGABRT), seccomp (SIGSYS) | `verification_failed`, outcome `unavailable`, `verification.worker.resource_limit`, closed at the first occurrence | no (the same input ends the same way) | reduce the document or the drawings, submit again | +| Verdict refused | completion answered `malformed` | `verification_failed`, outcome `unavailable`, `verification.worker.verdict_refused`, closed at the first occurrence | no | submit again later; reported to the operator | | Interruption | worker crash, lease expired | claimable again at once (the lease was the wait); counts as an attempt | yes, up to the limit | automatic | | Stale result | completion with an old token, after a withdrawal, or naming another revision | nothing written, logged | no | none needed | -| Definitive failure | attempt limit reached (five; V1-2.3 implements five, for the owner's confirmation) | `verification_failed`, outcome `unavailable`, last code | no | submit again later | +| Attempt limit | a transient code at its fifth attempt (five; V1-2.3 implements five, for the owner's confirmation) | `verification_failed`, outcome `unavailable`, last code | no | submit again later | | Core change | release that changes rules or reader | rounds withdrawn by the release migration | no | submit again | - Withdrawal is always available: the submitter or any editor withdraws a @@ -1715,7 +1725,7 @@ of the document's JSON text in one form, the same for every layer: |---|---|---|---| | M4 `sheet_access_hardening` | V1-2.1 | `anatomical_catalog_grants` and its RPCs; `has_mfa`, `grant_active`, `caller_has`; `can_read_official_catalog` and the reader row predicate; `can_edit_sheet` redefined (F14); AR-1 B on the platform role RPCs and the private write functions (F19, §5.7), F17, F18; F1, F2, F3 (fork closed), F5, F6, F8, F9, F12 (every catalogue table), F13, F15; asset-row immutability trigger (F16); historical-sheet protection trigger (§14.2); reader column grants narrowed; personal creation and visibility changes refused | no row changes | | M5 `sheet_review_workflow` | V1-2.1 | version columns `revision`, `authors`, `source_version_id`, `published_review_id`, `document_fingerprint`; sheet column `working_copy_source_version_id`; revision, author and freeze triggers, the historical-sheet write rule; extended immutability guard (§6.8); rounds, comments, acknowledgments; `create_official_sheet`, `create_sheet_draft` adapted, `save_sheet_draft`, submit, withdraw, comment, acknowledge, decide, publish; `create_sheet_working_copy`; species RPCs; catalogue and version read RPCs; upload: `register_sheet_asset` extended, `confirm_sheet_asset_upload` with the storage check (F7), INSERT policy, bucket limit 2 MiB; mirror removal and status check (§12.2); superseded signatures dropped; the content-size CHECK replaced by the text measure (`octet_length(content::text)`, §12.2) | new columns take their defaults on the equine v1 row (`revision` 0, empty author set); its document, status, number and assets unchanged; the new size CHECK is validated against the existing rows when M5 is applied (the equine document measures 184 105 bytes as `content::text`, measured on the sandbox); bucket limit lowered; no round, no grant | -| M6 `sheet_verification_jobs` | V1-2.3 | worker RPCs (claim, input, complete with the verdict structure check, fail), service role only, with the retry delay (hidden `not_before` column on the round, `private.sheet_verification_retry_delay`: owner decision 2026-11-01, replaces « without backoff »); written as `20261101100000_sheet_verification_jobs.sql`, pgTAP `021`, rehearsed on the sandbox from the state before M4 (M4 to M6 in one `migration up`) and from the state before M6 | none | +| M6 `sheet_verification_jobs` | V1-2.3 | worker RPCs (claim, input, complete with the verdict structure check, fail), service role only, with the retry delay (hidden `not_before` column on the round, `private.sheet_verification_retry_delay`: owner decision 2026-11-01, replaces « without backoff ») and the retry by cause (definitive codes close at the first occurrence, `private.sheet_worker_final_codes`); written as `20261101100000_sheet_verification_jobs.sql`, pgTAP `021`, rehearsed on the sandbox from the state before M4 (M4 to M6 in one `migration up`) and from the state before M6 | none | Each migration ships its pgTAP file (allowed and denied cases), regenerated `database.types.ts`, a `db:sandbox up upgrade` run from the DEV state (with a diff --git a/packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/sheet-verification.sandbox.ts b/packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/sheet-verification.sandbox.ts index 9af9cb61..55a7ba5d 100644 --- a/packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/sheet-verification.sandbox.ts +++ b/packages/supabase/tests/sandbox/sheet-verification.sandbox.ts @@ -301,18 +301,6 @@ async function holdLease(editor: SteppedAccount, d: Draft, attempts: number): Pr throw new Error('lease not held before the worker claimed') } -/** Polls a one-value query until it answers `expected`. */ -async function waitFor(query: string, expected: string, timeoutMs: number): Promise { - const start = performance.now() - let last = '' - while (performance.now() - start < timeoutMs) { - last = await sql(query) - if (last === expected) return - await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 200)) - } - throw new Error(`expected ${expected}, last ${last}`) -} - /** Registers, uploads and confirms one drawing per size on `sheet`; the ids in order. */ async function putDrawings(editor: SteppedAccount, sheet: string, sizes: number[]): Promise<{ id: string; bytes: Buffer }[]> { const out: { id: string; bytes: Buffer }[] = [] @@ -705,6 +693,7 @@ describe.skipIf(!WORKER)('sheet verification by the real worker (V1-2.3)', () => // Tracked misclassification (owner brief 2026-11-01: caps expected; not fixed): a document naming // so many registered drawings (600 rows, about 160 bytes each in the header) that the frame header passes 64 KiB is reported resource_limit. + // The cause is the frozen input: definitive at the first attempt, never claimed again. const many = await newSheet(L) const rows = (await sql(`insert into public.anatomical_sheet_assets (sheet_id, sha256, byte_size, file_name, created_by, uploaded_at) select '${uuidOf(many.sheet)}', md5(g::text) || md5(g::text || 'h'), 900, 'h' || g || '.svg', '${uuidOf(L.id)}', now() @@ -712,11 +701,14 @@ describe.skipIf(!WORKER)('sheet verification by the real worker (V1-2.3)', () => expect(rows).toHaveLength(600) await save(L, many, multiDoc(rows)) const header = uuidOf(await submit(L, many)) - await waitFor(`select failure_code || '/' || attempts from public.anatomical_sheet_reviews where id = '${header}'`, - 'verification.worker.resource_limit/1', 30_000) - // Withdrawn so that the worker stops retrying it (its next claim is 2 s away). - ok(await rpc('withdraw_sheet_review', { review_id: header, note: 'tracked misclassification' }, L.aal2)) - expect((await round(header)).status).toBe('withdrawn') + const closed = await settled(header, 30_000) + const state = (r: Round) => [r.status, r.failure_outcome, r.failure_code, r.attempts] + const final = ['verification_failed', 'unavailable', 'verification.worker.resource_limit', 1] + expect(state(closed.round)).toEqual(final) + expect(await sql(`select not_before is null from public.anatomical_sheet_reviews where id = '${header}'`)).toBe('t') + // Past the first retry delay (2 s) the round is still closed at attempt 1: no second claim. + await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 3_000)) + expect(state(await round(header))).toEqual(final) }, 5 * CAPS_BUDGET_MS) }) diff --git a/supabase/migrations/20261101100000_sheet_verification_jobs.sql b/supabase/migrations/20261101100000_sheet_verification_jobs.sql index 76579b2d..597d3448 100644 --- a/supabase/migrations/20261101100000_sheet_verification_jobs.sql +++ b/supabase/migrations/20261101100000_sheet_verification_jobs.sql @@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ -- the drawings the document references; -- * complete_sheet_verification: the verdict, checked for its binding and -- its structure; `stale` or `malformed` write nothing; --- * fail_sheet_verification: a technical failure, from a closed list. +-- * fail_sheet_verification: a technical failure, from a closed list; +-- transient codes retry after a delay up to the attempt limit, the +-- definitive codes (`sheet_worker_final_codes`) close the round at once. -- The verdict itself is the core's (`compute_verdict`, crates/core); SQL -- checks only that it answers this round and covers this document. @@ -67,7 +69,8 @@ returns text[] language sql immutable set search_path = '' as $$ $$; -- The worker's technical failure codes (§6.5 transient, timeout, resource, --- interruption rows; crates/worker `verify_job`). +-- interruption rows; crates/worker `verify_job`). The worker maps the cause +-- to a code; the retry policy of each code is `sheet_worker_final_codes`. create or replace function private.sheet_worker_codes() returns text[] language sql immutable set search_path = '' as $$ select array[ @@ -77,6 +80,15 @@ returns text[] language sql immutable set search_path = '' as $$ ] $$; +-- The codes whose cause is fixed by the frozen input or the contract caps +-- (resource_limit) or by a verdict the SQL refuses (verdict_refused): a retry +-- would give the same answer, so the round closes at the first occurrence. +-- The others (timeout, unavailable, lease_expired) are transient. +create or replace function private.sheet_worker_final_codes() +returns text[] language sql immutable set search_path = '' as $$ + select array['verification.worker.resource_limit', 'verification.worker.verdict_refused'] +$$; + -- The service role only (the worker's key); anything else is refused. create or replace function private.require_service_role() returns void language plpgsql stable set search_path = '' as $$ @@ -367,9 +379,10 @@ begin end; $$; --- A technical failure of a leased round (§6.5): the round stays `verifying` --- and claimable after its retry delay, its code recorded, until the attempt --- limit closes it `verification_failed` / `unavailable`. Answers `retry`, `unavailable` or +-- A technical failure of a leased round (§6.5): a transient code leaves the +-- round `verifying` and claimable after its retry delay, its code recorded, +-- until the attempt limit closes it `verification_failed` / `unavailable`; a +-- definitive code closes it at once. Answers `retry`, `unavailable` or -- `stale` (nothing written). create or replace function public.fail_sheet_verification(review_id uuid, lease_token uuid, code text) returns text @@ -382,6 +395,7 @@ as $$ declare v_review public.anatomical_sheet_reviews%rowtype; v_final boolean; + v_definitive boolean; begin perform private.require_service_role(); if code is null or not (code = any (private.sheet_worker_codes())) then @@ -392,7 +406,9 @@ begin or lease_token is null or v_review.lease_token is distinct from lease_token then return 'stale'; end if; - v_final := v_review.attempts >= private.sheet_verification_attempt_limit(); + v_definitive := code = any (private.sheet_worker_final_codes()); + v_final := v_definitive + or v_review.attempts >= private.sheet_verification_attempt_limit(); update public.anatomical_sheet_reviews r set failure_code = code, lease_token = null, locked_at = null, not_before = case when v_final then null @@ -405,6 +421,9 @@ begin 'anatomical_sheet_review', v_review.id, null, null, jsonb_build_object('code', code, 'attempts', v_review.attempts, 'outcome', case when v_final then 'unavailable' end, + 'closed_by', case when not v_final then null + when v_definitive then 'definitive' + else 'attempt_limit' end, 'retry_delay_seconds', case when not v_final then extract(epoch from private.sheet_verification_retry_delay(v_review.attempts))::integer end)); return case when v_final then 'unavailable' else 'retry' end; @@ -420,6 +439,7 @@ revoke all on function private.sheet_verification_lease() from public; revoke all on function private.sheet_verification_max_verdict_bytes() from public; revoke all on function private.sheet_verdict_codes() from public; revoke all on function private.sheet_worker_codes() from public; +revoke all on function private.sheet_worker_final_codes() from public; revoke all on function private.require_service_role() from public; revoke all on function private.sheet_document_group_keys(jsonb) from public; revoke all on function private.sheet_review_base(uuid) from public; diff --git a/supabase/tests/021_sheet_verification_jobs.sql b/supabase/tests/021_sheet_verification_jobs.sql index 25f35d64..3f028448 100644 --- a/supabase/tests/021_sheet_verification_jobs.sql +++ b/supabase/tests/021_sheet_verification_jobs.sql @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ -- nothing), technical failures up to the attempt limit with their progressive -- delay (`not_before`), dead leases. begin; -select plan(72); +select plan(89); insert into auth.users (id, email, email_confirmed_at) values ('f0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'own@vj.local', now()), @@ -239,17 +239,19 @@ update public.anatomical_sheet_reviews set locked_at = now() - interval '11 minu set local role service_role; select pg_temp.worker(); select is((select attempts from public.claim_sheet_verifications(1)), 4, 'a dead lease is claimed again'); select is(pg_temp.status('r3'), 'verifying/-/verification.worker.lease_expired', 'the interruption is recorded'); -select is(public.fail_sheet_verification(pg_temp.id('r3'), pg_temp.token('r3'), 'verification.worker.resource_limit'), 'retry', 'a fourth failure is retried'); +select is(public.fail_sheet_verification(pg_temp.id('r3'), pg_temp.token('r3'), 'verification.worker.timeout'), 'retry', 'a fourth failure is retried'); select ok(pg_temp.delayed('r3', interval '20 seconds'), 'after attempt 4 the retry waits 20 s'); select pg_temp.set_not_before('r3', interval '-1 second'); select is((select attempts from public.claim_sheet_verifications(1)), 5, 'claimed after 20 s: fifth attempt'); -- At the limit, a technical failure closes the round unavailable, delay cleared. select pg_temp.set_not_before('r3', interval '1 hour'); -select is(public.fail_sheet_verification(pg_temp.id('r3'), pg_temp.token('r3'), 'verification.worker.resource_limit'), 'unavailable', 'the last attempt closes the round'); -select is(pg_temp.status('r3'), 'verification_failed/unavailable/verification.worker.resource_limit', 'round closed unavailable with the last code'); +select is(public.fail_sheet_verification(pg_temp.id('r3'), pg_temp.token('r3'), 'verification.worker.unavailable'), 'unavailable', 'the last attempt closes the round'); +select is(pg_temp.status('r3'), 'verification_failed/unavailable/verification.worker.unavailable', 'round closed unavailable with the last code'); select ok(pg_temp.not_before_is_null('r3'), 'the fifth failure clears the delay'); reset role; select ok(exists (select 1 from audit.audit_logs where action = 'anatomical_sheet_review.verification_attempt_failed' and resource_id = pg_temp.id('r3')), 'attempt failure audited'); +select ok(exists (select 1 from audit.audit_logs where action = 'anatomical_sheet_review.verification_failed' and resource_id = pg_temp.id('r3') + and metadata ->> 'closed_by' = 'attempt_limit'), 'a transient code closes at the limit: closed_by attempt_limit'); -- 8. A dead lease at the limit is closed by the next claim. set local role authenticated; @@ -262,5 +264,46 @@ set local role service_role; select pg_temp.worker(); select is((select count(*)::int from public.claim_sheet_verifications(5)), 0, 'a round at the limit is not claimed'); select is(pg_temp.status('r4'), 'verification_failed/unavailable/verification.worker.lease_expired', 'its dead lease closes it unavailable'); +-- 9. Definitive codes close the round at the first occurrence; transient +-- codes keep their retry. Rounds are sequential: each follows a closed one. +set local role authenticated; +select pg_temp.act('f0000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000e','f1000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000e'); +select public.save_sheet_draft(pg_temp.id('v1'), 4, pg_temp.doc(pg_temp.id('asset'),'VJ5'), 'five'); +insert into pg_temp.k select 'r5', public.submit_sheet_review(pg_temp.id('v1'), 5, 'five'); +reset role; +set local role service_role; select pg_temp.worker(); +select is((select count(*)::int from public.claim_sheet_verifications(1)), 1, 'fifth round claimed'); +select is(public.fail_sheet_verification(pg_temp.id('r5'), pg_temp.token('r5'), 'verification.worker.resource_limit'), 'unavailable', 'resource_limit at attempt 1 closes the round'); +select is(pg_temp.status('r5'), 'verification_failed/unavailable/verification.worker.resource_limit', 'closed unavailable, code kept'); +select ok(pg_temp.not_before_is_null('r5'), 'a definitive closure sets no delay'); +select is((select count(*)::int from public.claim_sheet_verifications(10)), 0, 'a definitively closed round is never claimed again'); +reset role; +select ok(exists (select 1 from audit.audit_logs where action = 'anatomical_sheet_review.verification_failed' and resource_id = pg_temp.id('r5') + and metadata ->> 'closed_by' = 'definitive' and metadata ->> 'attempts' = '1'), 'closure audited as definitive at attempt 1'); + +set local role authenticated; +select pg_temp.act('f0000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000e','f1000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000e'); +select public.save_sheet_draft(pg_temp.id('v1'), 5, pg_temp.doc(pg_temp.id('asset'),'VJ6'), 'six'); +insert into pg_temp.k select 'r6', public.submit_sheet_review(pg_temp.id('v1'), 6, 'six'); +reset role; +set local role service_role; select pg_temp.worker(); +select is((select count(*)::int from public.claim_sheet_verifications(1)), 1, 'sixth round claimed'); +select is(public.fail_sheet_verification(pg_temp.id('r6'), pg_temp.token('r6'), 'verification.worker.verdict_refused'), 'unavailable', 'verdict_refused at attempt 1 closes the round'); +select is(pg_temp.status('r6'), 'verification_failed/unavailable/verification.worker.verdict_refused', 'closed unavailable, code kept'); +select is((select count(*)::int from public.claim_sheet_verifications(10)), 0, 'a refused verdict is never claimed again'); + +set local role authenticated; +select pg_temp.act('f0000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000e','f1000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000e'); +select public.save_sheet_draft(pg_temp.id('v1'), 6, pg_temp.doc(pg_temp.id('asset'),'VJ7'), 'seven'); +insert into pg_temp.k select 'r7', public.submit_sheet_review(pg_temp.id('v1'), 7, 'seven'); +reset role; +set local role service_role; select pg_temp.worker(); +select is((select count(*)::int from public.claim_sheet_verifications(1)), 1, 'seventh round claimed'); +select is(public.fail_sheet_verification(pg_temp.id('r7'), gen_random_uuid(), 'verification.worker.resource_limit'), 'stale', 'a definitive code with another token is stale'); +select is(public.fail_sheet_verification(pg_temp.id('r7'), null, 'verification.worker.verdict_refused'), 'stale', 'a definitive code with a null token is stale'); +select is(pg_temp.status('r7'), 'verifying/-/-', 'a stale definitive failure writes nothing'); +select is(public.fail_sheet_verification(pg_temp.id('r7'), pg_temp.token('r7'), 'verification.worker.unavailable'), 'retry', 'unavailable at attempt 1 is retried'); +select ok(pg_temp.delayed('r7', interval '2 seconds'), 'after attempt 1 the retry waits 2 s'); + select * from finish(); rollback;