diff --git a/.claude/memory/decisions.md b/.claude/memory/decisions.md index fec3e654..7749700f 100644 --- a/.claude/memory/decisions.md +++ b/.claude/memory/decisions.md @@ -603,3 +603,13 @@ Supersedes for official sheets the 2026-10-25 rule « no graphic editor until St Consolidation also fixed: rights table moved to M4 (M4 used table created in M5); core step V1-2.2 now before worker step V1-2.3; progressive review via per-group acknowledgments with digests. Alt: options not chosen listed in contract §17 and the 2026-10-28 review; O15 B and O4 C rejected outright. Status: ratified; contract under owner final review; V1-2.1 not authorised. + +## BDR-083 | 2026-10-28 | AR-1 ratified option B: aal2 for every platform role change + +Decision (owner brief « V1-2.0 : résolution définitive d'AR-1 »): grant, revoke, replace, promote, demote of any platform role (owner, admin, moderator, support) need valid aal2 session, checked server-side in RPC at call time. No permanent exception (owner, first admin, old accounts, admin UI, direct RPC). aal2 necessary never sufficient: can_manage_platform_role, self-target refusal, last-owner guard stay. Ordinary users no MFA. Completes O4, no change to D1-D9, O1-O23. +Why: aal1 owner session could grant owner to attacker account → enrol own TOTP → aal2 → self-grant all catalogue capabilities. Read from `20261008100200` RPCs. +Shape (contract §5.7): aal2 check 2nd after auth, before role checks (no role oracle); private assign/withdraw re-check for non-null actor; service_role revoked on profile_roles/profiles + RPC EXECUTE (F17); owner-count race locked (F18); first owner: enrol 2 factors first, role assigned last by operator; DEV owner: enrol before M4 applied; recovery operator-only, ban account during enrol window; GoTrue v2.197.0 enrol/unenroll need aal2 once verified factor (source read, sandbox proves). +Alt: A (owner+admin only) rejected: leaves moderator/support weak path; C (accept residual) rejected. +Review (fresh challenger FATAL(4), all integrated, no ratified decision changed): grant needs target with verified factor; private fns: non-null actor = auth.uid() + aal2, null actor only without JWT; advisory lock both RPCs; DEV precondition before M4 = ENVIRONMENTS §3.6 hardening (public default JWT secret + demo service key + 54321 LAN → aal2 forgeable) + seed owner password changed + role holders listed; recovery reordered (ban, password set with owner, unban, enrol). +Reserves: staff read policies (is_platform_admin) stay aal1, owner decision; stolen aal2 session residual; refused attempts not in audit table. +Status: ratified; contract only, no code/migration/DEV change; V1-2.1 not authorised. diff --git a/.claude/memory/journal.md b/.claude/memory/journal.md index 401c3483..55be8ef1 100644 --- a/.claude/memory/journal.md +++ b/.claude/memory/journal.md @@ -467,3 +467,8 @@ R5.4: `draft/{labels,changelog,review_report,drawing,overlay,app_review,svg_comp - Contract rewritten: rights M4, catalogue access fail-closed, MFA + operator recovery, group acknowledgments, worker verdict states, species inactive, equine working copy, SQL mirror removal, steps §16 with 9 headings. - 3 fresh challengers: business CONCERNS, security FATAL (AR-1: aal1 owner grants owner role → bypasses catalogue MFA; O4-D unratified → owner arbitration), simplicity CONCERNS. All other findings integrated (omitted status = inherited, F12 unconditional, F15/F16, reader row predicate, uploads to M5, PreviewSheet editor handle, removal groups). - Docs only, committed + pushed on feature/v1-2-anatomical-sheets. STOP: verdict BLOCKED on AR-1. + +## 2026-10-28 (V1-2.0 AR-1 B ratified, contract updated) +- Owner ratified AR-1 B (BDR-083). Contract §5.7 written: rule, chain, path inventory (2 RPCs, 2 private fns, service_role table grants F17, owner-count race F18), bootstrap, factor/password/recovery, session rules, deploy order (enrol before M4 on DEV), tests §15. +- GoTrue v2.197.0 source read: enrol needs aal2 once verified factor, unenroll verified needs aal2. auth.sessions check kept as to-verify. +- Docs only. Independent security review, then commit + push feature branch. STOP at checkpoint. diff --git a/.claude/tasks/TODO.md b/.claude/tasks/TODO.md index 4c314aae..d64c7942 100644 --- a/.claude/tasks/TODO.md +++ b/.claude/tasks/TODO.md @@ -535,7 +535,8 @@ Order (BDR-071): P0 docs + decisions → V1-1 clients and animals → V1-2 sheet - [ ] V1-2.0 contract and decisions (docs only): read-only audit delivered; contract drafted; 3 fresh plan challengers (correctness, robustness, simplicity); doc fixes (V1-1 status in TODO + V1-1 contract header, CLAUDE.md M1-M3 line); challengers FATAL(2 blockers)/FATAL(1)/CONCERNS integrated (contract §19); STOP at checkpoint: owner ratification of §5-§16 and options O1-O20 - [x] owner review of O1-O20 delivered (2026-10-28, read-only); O21-O23 proposed (catalogue access, SQL mirror, failed verification) - [x] owner ratified O1-O23 (brief « V1-2.0 : ratification des arbitrages O1 à O23 et consolidation du contrat », 2026-10-28, BDR-082) - - [ ] consolidation (docs only): contract rewritten (decisions §17, contradictions C1-C14 §19.2, steps §16 with 9 headings each); IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN §0 + Steps 13/17 notes, ANATOMICAL_SHEET_MODEL stale Zod/TS mentions + V1-2 pointer, OPEN_QUESTIONS conflicts 1-2, V1-1 §5.4 pointer (N1 amended), rule sheet-model, CLAUDE.md pointer; 3 fresh challengers (business CONCERNS 3 major, security FATAL 1 arbitration + 6 major, simplicity CONCERNS 5 major) integrated (contract §19.3); commit + push branch; STOP at checkpoint: owner final review + AR-1 (MFA on platform role grants, contract §17.2), no V1-2.1 + - [ ] consolidation (docs only): contract rewritten (decisions §17, contradictions C1-C14 §19.2, steps §16 with 9 headings each); IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN §0 + Steps 13/17 notes, ANATOMICAL_SHEET_MODEL stale Zod/TS mentions + V1-2 pointer, OPEN_QUESTIONS conflicts 1-2, V1-1 §5.4 pointer (N1 amended), rule sheet-model, CLAUDE.md pointer; 3 fresh challengers (business CONCERNS 3 major, security FATAL 1 arbitration + 6 major, simplicity CONCERNS 5 major) integrated (contract §19.3); commit + push branch; STOP at checkpoint: owner final review, no V1-2.1 + - [x] AR-1 ratified option B by the owner 2026-10-28 (BDR-083): `aal2` on every platform role change; contract §5.7 (rule, inventory, bootstrap, factors, recovery, sessions), F17-F19, M4 scope, tests §15, DEV order §16.11 (enrol before M4); docs only; independent security review then commit + push; no code, migration or DEV change - [ ] V1-2.1 server access and workflow (M4, M5) · V1-2.2 core verdict, preview, change list, edit primitives, SVG cleaning · V1-2.3 drawings and worker verification (M6) · V1-2.4 wireframes (editor, review, admin entry) · V1-2.5 catalogue, admin space, rights, species, MFA · V1-2.6 editor level 1 · V1-2.7 preview, review, publication UI · V1-2.8 equine working copy and review preparation · V1-2.9 FR/EN acceptance and closure (owner checkpoints V1-2.3, V1-2.4, V1-2.6, V1-2.7, V1-2.8, V1-2.9 + each DEV operation of contract §16.11) ## Release readiness track (owner 2026-10-25, distinct from the functional roadmap; nothing here authorises a release or exposure) diff --git a/docs/development/IDENTITY.md b/docs/development/IDENTITY.md index b24d4e2a..a77a2618 100644 --- a/docs/development/IDENTITY.md +++ b/docs/development/IDENTITY.md @@ -90,6 +90,9 @@ enforced by an RLS helper `has_mfa()` on admin tables. Today: - app: no enrolment UI (QR + code), no `aal2` step-up on sign-in; - there is no admin table or screen yet to protect. +V1-2 decision (BDR-083): `aal2` is required for every platform role change, +see `V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md` §5.7 (rule, bootstrap, recovery). + The Security section shows a note instead. To close the gap (a later step): migration adding `private.has_mfa()` and folding it into `is_platform_*` (or into the policies of the first admin table) with pgTAP allowed/denied cases; diff --git a/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md b/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md index e332a2d1..9df422bb 100644 --- a/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md +++ b/docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md @@ -1,14 +1,17 @@ # V1-2 Anatomical sheets: contract Status: decisions RATIFIED, contract consolidated for the owner's final -review (V1-2.0, 2026-10-28), with ONE OPEN ARBITRATION REQUEST (AR-1, §17.2). +review (V1-2.0, 2026-10-28). The arbitration AR-1 is closed: the owner +ratified option B (`aal2` for every platform role change, §5.7, §17.2, +BDR-083). The owner approved the orientations D1 to D8 and added the mandatory requirement D9 (BDR-081, 2026-10-27), then ratified the decisions O1 to O23 in the brief « V1-2.0 : ratification des arbitrages O1 à O23 et consolidation du contrat » (2026-10-28, BDR-082). This revision writes those decisions into the rules, resolves the contradictions C1 to C14 found at the review of the first revision (§19.2), restates the step plan (§16) and integrates a second round -of fresh challenges (§19.3), one finding of which needs the owner (AR-1). It +of fresh challenges (§19.3), one finding of which needed the owner (AR-1, +decided) and a third review of the AR-1 B text (§19.4). It authorises no implementation: V1-2.1 starts only on the owner's explicit go. V1-2.0 changes no code, migration, policy, RPC, anatomical data or DEV state. @@ -31,7 +34,7 @@ Parts: 1 facts, 2 scope, 3 nomenclature, 4 decisions D1 to D9, 5 access, roles and permissions, 6 lifecycle, review, verification and publication, 7 species and new sheets, 8 editor, 9 drawings, 10 loading, 11 screens and journeys, 12 SQL defects, SQL authority and migrations, 13 security, 14 equine sheet, -15 tests, 16 implementation steps, 17 ratified decisions and open arbitration, +15 tests, 16 implementation steps, 17 ratified decisions and arbitration, 18 documents touched by V1-2.0, 19 challenge record. --- @@ -192,7 +195,7 @@ Each layer is checked on the server; none implies the next. | Historical reads | the same predicate (O8) | published and deprecated versions by id, archived sheets included | | Draft reads | a capability and `aal2` | drafts, rounds, verdicts, comments, history, drawings of drafts | | Capabilities | `anatomical_catalog_grants` (§5.2) and `aal2` | edit, review, publish, per the matrix of §5.4 | -| Platform role | `profile_roles` | a precondition of `sheet_editor` and `sheet_publisher`; no catalogue right by itself | +| Platform role | `profile_roles`, changed only with `aal2` (§5.7) | a precondition of `sheet_editor` and `sheet_publisher`; no catalogue right by itself | | Professional status | plan Step 9, not built | none; never inferred from a right or a role | | Workspace membership | V1-1 tables | none: no catalogue rule reads workspace tables and no V1-1 rule reads catalogue tables | @@ -374,14 +377,17 @@ A1 to A6): - Enrolment (V1-2.5, Mon compte, Sécurité): add a TOTP factor (QR code, the secret shown once and never stored or logged by the application), verify it with a code (a factor counts only once verified), name, list and remove - factors. Supabase requires an `aal2` session to remove a verified factor. + factors. GoTrue v2.197.0 requires `aal2` to enrol a factor once one is + verified and to remove a verified factor (§5.7.3, from its source). V1-2.5 proves that an `aal1` session of an account with a verified factor - cannot enrol another factor; if Supabase allowed it, the step stops for an - owner decision, since MFA would then be bypassable with the password alone. + can neither enrol another factor nor remove one; if the sandbox shows + otherwise, the step stops for an owner decision, since MFA would then be + bypassable with the password alone. - Step-up: entering `/app/admin` with an `aal1` session opens the challenge; success upgrades the session; no admin data is requested before. - Sessions: `aal2` belongs to the session. A token refresh keeps it, sign-out - ends it, a new sign-in starts at `aal1` (Supabase behaviour, proven by a + ends the session (an access token already issued stays valid until + `jwt_expiry`), a new sign-in starts at `aal1` (Supabase behaviour, proven by a V1-2.5 browser test). The access token lives `jwt_expiry` (3 600 s in the local configuration; V1-2.1 records the values of the sandbox and DEV). No session time box or inactivity limit is configured, and V1-2 adds no @@ -408,14 +414,297 @@ A1 to A6): The owner's own loss follows the same procedure, run by the owner at the server. The runbook goes to `IDENTITY.md` and is rehearsed on the sandbox in V1-2.9. -- Platform roles (O4-D): `grant_platform_role` and `revoke_platform_role` - require no `aal2`, and an owner may grant the owner role. The first revision - of this contract claimed that the catalogue stays closed without O4-D; the - security challenge of §19.3 showed it does not (an `aal1` owner session - grants owner to another account, which enrols its own factor and grants - itself every capability). O4-D was not ratified, so the contract does not - extend `aal2` to those RPCs: the choice is the open arbitration AR-1 - (§17.2). +- Platform roles (AR-1 B, ratified 2026-10-28): `grant_platform_role` and + `revoke_platform_role` require `aal2` for every platform role; see §5.7. + The earlier option O4-D, left unratified by O4, is superseded by that + arbitration. + +### 5.7 Platform role changes and MFA (AR-1 B) + +Ratified by the owner on 2026-10-28 (BDR-083). It completes the security +contract of O4; it replaces none of O1 to O23. + +**Rule.** Every grant, revocation, replacement, promotion, demotion or +equivalent change of a platform role (`owner`, `admin`, `moderator`, +`support`) requires a valid `aal2` session, checked on the server when the +operation runs. A hidden button is not a control. There is no exception for +the owner, the first administrator, accounts already privileged, older +accounts, the administration screens or direct RPC calls; the only path +without a session is the audited operator path outside the application +(§5.7.5), used for a bootstrap or a recovery. `aal2` is necessary +and never sufficient: `can_manage_platform_role`, the self-target refusal and +the last-owner guard still apply. Ordinary accounts are not asked for MFA; the +requirement covers the operations of this contract (platform roles, catalogue +rights, catalogue administration, protected drafts, review, publication). +Reading the published catalogue follows O21. + +**The flaw and the chain it closes.** `grant_platform_role` and +`revoke_platform_role` check the caller's role, not its assurance level: + +1. an attacker learns the password of an owner; +2. they open a session, which is `aal1`; +3. they call `grant_platform_role` directly and give `owner` or `admin` to an + account they control (or revoke the real owner); +4. that account enrols its own TOTP factor (a first factor is enrolled at + `aal1`) and reaches `aal2`; +5. it grants itself `sheet_editor`, `sheet_reviewer`, `sheet_publisher` + (§5.2) and reviews and publishes official sheets. + +With AR-1 B, step 3 is refused with no write, so steps 4 and 5 never start. + +**Why B and not A.** A (owner and admin only) leaves `moderator` and `support` +changeable from a password-only session. They give no catalogue right today; +`support` opens staff reads (`profiles_select_staff`), and any future +role-based rule would inherit a weak path; revoking them is also a nuisance +attack. B +costs the same one predicate and removes the list of roles from the rule. + +**Inventory of the paths that change platform privileges** (read from the +migrations and `seed.sql` on 2026-10-28; V1-2.1 re-runs the census in pgTAP +001): + +| Path | Who may call it today | Controls today | Added by M4 | Audit | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| `public.grant_platform_role(target, role)` | `authenticated` (and `service_role`, which fails at `auth.uid()` null) | authenticated, not self, `can_manage_platform_role` (owner: any role; admin: moderator and support), not already active | `has_mfa()` as the second check; `EXECUTE` revoked from `service_role` | `platform_role.granted` | +| `public.revoke_platform_role(target, role, reason)` | same | same, plus the last-owner guard | same, plus the guard made race-free (F18) | `platform_role.revoked` | +| `private.assign_platform_role`, `private.withdraw_platform_role` | no API role (`EXECUTE` revoked from public, schema `private` not exposed); RPCs above and privileged SQL sessions | none of their own | a non-null actor must equal `auth.uid()` and pass `has_mfa()`; a null actor is accepted only when the request carries no JWT (`auth.role()` null), so neither an API session nor `service_role` reaches the operator path (§5.7.5) | same events | +| `private.can_manage_platform_role` and the `has_platform_role` family | predicates, no write | n/a | unchanged; `is_platform_*` do not read the assurance level (policies that use them for reads are out of AR-1, see reserves) | none | +| table `public.profile_roles` | `authenticated`: SELECT only, no write policy; `service_role`: default table privileges never revoked (F17) | RLS, privileges | `REVOKE ALL` from `service_role` on `profile_roles` and `profiles` (F17) | none | +| `profiles.active` (deactivation changes who counts as a role holder) | no user path: not in the column grant of UPDATE | column grants | F17 covers `service_role` | none | +| triggers and `handle_new_auth_user` | none writes `profile_roles` | n/a | census asserts it stays so | none | +| `seed.sql` bootstrap (`assign_platform_role(null, ...)`) | local stacks, privileged SQL | none | unchanged, local only (§5.7.5) | `platform_role.granted`, null actor | +| deletion of an auth user (cascade `on delete cascade` to `profile_roles`) | GoTrue admin API with the service key | none | operator procedure only (§5.7.5) | auth log | +| `grant_catalog_right`, `revoke_catalog_right` (M4, §5.2) | owner | owner, `aal2` | already `aal2` | per §5.2 | + +No other path reachable from a user session was found: PostgREST exposes the +`public` schema only, and every write to `profile_roles` goes through the two +RPCs. A claim that this closes service-key abuse would be false: see §5.7.5. + +**Order of checks in both RPCs** (M4), all before any write: + +1. `auth.uid()` is not null; +2. `has_mfa()`; otherwise a refusal with the closed kind `mfa_required`; +3. the caller is not the target; +4. `can_manage_platform_role`; +5. the operation is valid: target exists and is active; for a grant, the + target holds a verified factor (the eligibility predicate of §5.2), so no + role lands on an account whose first factor a password or mailbox holder + could still enrol; role not already active, or active for a revocation; + last active owner kept; +6. the write and its audit row, in the same transaction. + +The assurance check comes before the role checks so that a password-only +session gets the same answer whatever role it holds: no oracle on who is +owner or admin. A refusal raises, so it leaves no row (neither the role nor an +audit row); attempted escalations are therefore visible in the API logs, not +in the audit table. With `[analytics] enabled = false` a raised refusal +reaches the PostgreSQL log only (residual). Returning the refusal as a +closed kind after a committed `log_event` is an option V1-2.1 may propose, +not a decision taken here. + +**Race on the last owner (F18).** `withdraw_platform_role` counts owner rows +without a lock and without `profiles.active`, so two simultaneous +revocations of two owners can both pass and leave none (or only a deactivated +one). M4 takes one transaction-scoped advisory lock at the start of both RPCs +and of the private functions, before checks 3 to 5, and counts owners with +the `has_platform_role` semantics (active profile). Two-session tests: mutual +revocation, revoke against grant. + +#### 5.7.1 First enrolment and the bootstrap of the first owner + +GoTrue v2.197.0 (the image pinned by the local stack; source read on +2026-10-28, behaviour to be proven on the sandbox by V1-2.5): +`EnrollFactor` refuses with `insufficient_aal` when the user already has a +verified factor and the session is not `aal2`. With no verified factor, a first +factor is enrolled from an `aal1` session. Enrolling, verifying and reaching +`aal2` are three steps: a factor counts once verified, and verification +upgrades the session and invalidates the user's sessions below `aal2`. + +Ordinary journey: password sign-in (`aal1`) → Mon compte, Sécurité → enrol +TOTP → verify with a code → `aal2`. Enrolling a factor grants no role and no +capability; MFA is a condition, never a substitute for the checks of §5.2 and +§5.7. + +New environment (no owner, no `aal2` session anywhere), in this order, never +the reverse: + +1. the operator creates the account through the sign-up path or the admin + API, email confirmed, and hands over the initial secret out of band; +2. the future owner signs in, enrols two TOTP factors on two devices and + verifies both; no role exists yet, so nothing is at stake in the window; +3. the operator checks, read-only, that the account has verified factors and + that their names and creation times match what the owner did; +4. only then the operator assigns the owner role from a privileged SQL + session (`assign_platform_role(null, ...)`) and records, in the same + session, an audit row with the reason and the operator's name through + `private.log_event`; +5. the owner signs in again, passes the step-up, and proves an `aal2` call + works and an `aal1` call is refused. + +No public RPC creates an owner, none disables MFA, and no permanent bypass +exists. The `seed.sql` bootstrap (role assigned before any factor, known +password) is a local-fixture exception to this order, acceptable only on a +stack no untrusted party can reach (§5.7.2). Assigning the role last is what closes trust on first use for the +owner account. + +#### 5.7.2 DEV: preconditions of the future transition + +The DEV owner is the seed account, it has no factor, and nothing changes on +DEV during V1-2.0. Two facts of DEV defeat AR-1 B as long as they hold: + +- the stack signs tokens with the Supabase CLI's public default JWT secret, + its `service_role` key is the public demo key, and port 54321 is open to + the LAN (`ENVIRONMENTS.md` §3.6, risk accepted by the owner on 2026-10-24 + « before any untrusted device or user »). Anyone on the network can mint an + `aal2` token for the owner, or act as `service_role`; `has_mfa()` proves + nothing there; +- the owner account's password is the seed's, committed in Git. + +So, before the owner applies M4 on DEV or makes the first grants (§16.11): + +0. the §3.6 hardening is done (own JWT secret or signing keys, or 54321 + narrowed to the test devices; the owner's choice), and the seed owner's + password is changed, or a separate owner is bootstrapped per §5.7.1 and + the seed owner revoked; every active `profile_roles` row of DEV is listed, + and each holder enrols and verifies a factor before M4 or loses the role; +1. read-only check of every factor of each role holder, verified or not (an + unknown one is deleted, and an unknown verified one means a reset first, + §5.7.7); +2. the owner enrols two factors and verifies both from the branch's Mon + compte; this needs no migration, and until M4 is applied every existing + right is unchanged; +3. on the sandbox rehearsal of M4 from the DEV state, `aal2` is shown to + work and `aal1` to be refused for the same account; +4. the recovery of §5.7.7 has been rehearsed on the sandbox; +5. a backup exists. + +Any `db:reset`, or `db:start` on a fresh volume, of DEV after M4 reruns the +seed and reopens these preconditions. + +A failed transition is never a lockout: an owner without a verified factor +still signs in and uses the application at `aal1`, only role and rights +management waits, and the first factor can always be enrolled at `aal1`. + +#### 5.7.3 Additional, removed and replaced factors + +Native behaviour of GoTrue v2.197.0 (source read, V1-2.5 proves it): + +- a second factor: `EnrollFactor` needs `aal2` once a verified factor exists + (403 `insufficient_aal`). A stolen password therefore cannot add a factor; +- removing a verified factor: `UnenrollFactor` needs `aal2` (422 + `insufficient_aal`); an unverified factor can be removed from `aal1`. An + unverified factor gives no `aal2` until verified, so a dormant one left by + an earlier password holder is a path: factor checks list unverified + factors too, and V1-2.5 tests a dormant factor verified later (GoTrue + appears to delete unverified factors of the same type on verification; + not assumed). Assumption: TOTP is the only enabled factor type; +- removing the last factor: allowed from `aal2`. The account then returns to + the first-factor case, where an `aal1` session can enrol; a role holder in + that state keeps the role (residual, §13). A stolen `aal2` + session can therefore replace factors; this is the stolen-session residual + (§5.7.8), not a bypass from the password alone; +- GoTrue downgrades the sessions of a removed factor to `aal1` + (`DowngradeSessionsToAAL1`); its exact scope and the lifetime of + already-issued access tokens are recorded by V1-2.5, not assumed; +- freshness: tokens carry `amr` entries (method and time), so a recent-TOTP + check on the rare role RPCs is technically possible; adopting it is an + owner choice under O4, not part of this contract (§5.7.9). + +If the sandbox shows `aal1` can enrol a second factor or remove a verified +one, V1-2.5 stops for an owner decision (as §5.6 already says). + +#### 5.7.4 Password change and reset + +A reset or change of password yields an `aal1` session. For an account with a +verified factor it cannot add or remove a factor (§5.7.3) and cannot change a +platform role (rule above). For an account without a verified factor, the +reset lets whoever holds the mailbox enrol a first factor: this is the +accepted first-factor case, harmless while no role or capability is held, and +the reason the owner role is assigned after enrolment (§5.7.1) and a +capability only to an account with a verified factor (§5.2). Email change and +identity linking stay as configured (`enable_manual_linking = false`); V1-2.5 +adds a test that none of them raises a session to `aal2`. + +#### 5.7.5 Operator path + +The technical paths are the service key (RLS bypass and GoTrue admin) and a +privileged SQL session on the database container. They are not exceptions +usable from the application: the app never holds the service key; the worker +holds it and can call worker RPCs only; the role RPCs refuse `service_role` +(no `auth.uid()`, and `EXECUTE` revoked in M4). Each use is an owner-authorised +operation (§16.11), written down with its reason, and leaves an audit row +(`private.log_event`, null actor, operator in the detail) in the same +session. + +#### 5.7.6 Actors + +| Actor | Can change platform roles | Note | +|---|---|---| +| Ordinary account | no | no MFA requirement for ordinary use | +| Owner or admin at `aal1` | no | refused at check 2 whatever the role | +| Owner or admin at `aal2` | within `can_manage_platform_role` | admin: moderator and support only | +| Moderator or support at `aal2` | no | `aal2` is not sufficient | +| Worker | no | worker RPCs only (M6) | +| `service_role` key holder | not through the RPCs; yes through GoTrue admin and SQL | outside MFA, §5.7.5 and §13 | +| Operator SQL session | yes | audited by procedure, not by the database | + +#### 5.7.7 Recovery + +Complements the procedure of §5.6, which stands (operator only, out-of-band +identity, reason recorded, no RPC, no screen). + +- Lost phone, account with other factors or another admin: the person uses + the second factor. A person whose only factor is lost follows §5.6 steps 1 + to 4. +- Loss of every factor of the last owner: no application path exists, by + design. On a single-owner platform the operator is the owner acting at the + server, and the real control is server access, not a second person. Order: + 1. the operator signs out every session, deletes every factor (verified or + not), bans the account and writes the audit row `auth.mfa_factor_reset`; + 2. with the owner present, the operator sets a new password with the owner + and lifts the ban; + 3. the owner signs in at once, enrols and verifies two factors; + 4. the operator lists every factor of the account; any it does not + recognise sends the procedure back to step 1. + The owner role and the owner's capabilities stay in place: inert at + `aal1`, since `caller_has` and the role RPCs need `aal2`. Nothing is + re-granted. (For another account, §5.6 step 2 applies: the owner revokes + its capabilities first.) +- Return to a safe state: `aal2` proven and `aal1` refused again on that + account; the audit rows exist; no temporary bypass was left. +- Rehearsed on the sandbox in V1-2.9; the runbook goes to `IDENTITY.md`. + Secrets (QR codes, TOTP seeds) never go in Git, documents, logs or tickets. + Prevention: two factors on two independent devices for every owner. + +#### 5.7.8 Sessions, tokens and stale rights + +- Roles and capabilities are read from the tables at every call; the project + adds no claim to the JWT (no access-token hook), so a revoked right or role + is refused at the next call whatever the token says. +- The `aal` claim lives as long as the access token (`jwt_expiry`, 3 600 s + locally). For the role and rights RPCs only (rare, administrative), V1-2.1 + adds a check that the session named by the token's `session_id` still + exists in `auth.sessions` at `aal2`. The columns and the claim are verified + on the pinned image first; if one is missing, V1-2.1 stops for an owner + decision (claim alone with the residual of up to one token lifetime after + a downgrade, or another check). Nothing here is assumed present. +- A stolen `aal2` session is a distinct risk this design does not remove: + it keeps working until it ends. Reducing it (freshness window, session + limit) is not part of V1-2. +- Concurrent role changes: unique active row per (user, role), lock on the + owner count (F18), one transaction per write. + +#### 5.7.9 Reserves recorded, not decided + +- `is_platform_admin` and the staff read policies (`profiles_select_staff`, + `audit_logs_select_admin`) do not read the assurance level. AR-1 B covers + changes of roles, not those reads; IDENTITY.md §4 foresaw folding `has_mfa` + into them. Left for an owner decision; V1-2.1 does not change them. +- Refused escalation attempts are not in the audit table (§5.7 order of + checks). +- A recent-TOTP freshness check on the role RPCs through `amr` (§5.7.3). +- The DEV hardening of `ENVIRONMENTS.md` §3.6 becomes a precondition of M4 + on DEV (§5.7.2 step 0); the owner chooses its form. --- @@ -1194,6 +1483,9 @@ test that fails on the current code before fixing it. | F14 | `can_edit_sheet` gives every owner and admin full rights on official sheets, with no capability and no MFA | l.494-510 | confirmed by reading | M4 | | F15 | the sheet policy reads `can_use_sheet`, whose `public` branch opens rows to every authenticated account, outside any catalogue right | l.513-526, l.1183-1190 | confirmed by reading | M4 (reader row predicate, §5.3) | | F16 | asset rows have no immutability trigger: a privileged UPDATE of `sha256` changes the drawing of a published version, which its fingerprint does not cover | asset table; `fingerprint.rs` | confirmed by reading | M4 (asset-row trigger), M5 (publication compares sha256) | +| F17 | `service_role` keeps the default table privileges on `profile_roles` and `profiles` (the revokes name `public, anon, authenticated`), so a service-key session can write platform roles directly; `grant_platform_role` and `revoke_platform_role` are also granted to `service_role` without use | `20261008100200` l.247-248 and the revoke on `profile_roles`; `20261008100100` l.100 | confirmed by reading; effective grants checked on the sandbox in V1-2.1 | M4 (`REVOKE ALL` from `service_role` on both tables, `EXECUTE` revoked on the two RPCs) | +| F18 | `withdraw_platform_role` counts active owners without a lock: two concurrent revocations of two owners can both pass the guard and leave none | `20261008100200` l.143-181 (count l.165-169) | confirmed by reading | M4 (advisory lock in both RPCs and the private functions, count on active profiles, two-session tests) | +| F19 | `grant_platform_role` and `revoke_platform_role` do not check the assurance level (AR-1); a grant does not check that the target holds a verified factor; the private write functions trust a null actor from any session | `20261008100200` l.108-181, l.189-238 | confirmed by reading | M4 (`has_mfa()` as the second check, §5.7) | ### 12.2 Rust authority and SQL guards (O22) @@ -1243,7 +1535,7 @@ Inventory of the current SQL checks and their fate: | Id | Step | Content | Data on DEV | |---|---|---|---| -| M4 `sheet_access_hardening` | V1-2.1 | `anatomical_catalog_grants` and its RPCs; `has_mfa`, `grant_active`, `caller_has`; `can_read_official_catalog` and the reader row predicate; `can_edit_sheet` redefined (F14); F1, F2, F3 (fork closed), F5, F6, F8, F9, F12 (every catalogue table), F13, F15; asset-row immutability trigger (F16); historical-sheet protection trigger (§14.2); reader column grants narrowed; personal creation and visibility changes refused | no row changes | +| M4 `sheet_access_hardening` | V1-2.1 | `anatomical_catalog_grants` and its RPCs; `has_mfa`, `grant_active`, `caller_has`; `can_read_official_catalog` and the reader row predicate; `can_edit_sheet` redefined (F14); AR-1 B on the platform role RPCs and the private write functions (F19, §5.7), F17, F18; F1, F2, F3 (fork closed), F5, F6, F8, F9, F12 (every catalogue table), F13, F15; asset-row immutability trigger (F16); historical-sheet protection trigger (§14.2); reader column grants narrowed; personal creation and visibility changes refused | no row changes | | M5 `sheet_review_workflow` | V1-2.1 | version columns `revision`, `authors`, `source_version_id`, `published_review_id`, `document_fingerprint`; sheet column `working_copy_source_version_id`; revision, author and freeze triggers, the historical-sheet write rule; extended immutability guard (§6.8); rounds, comments, acknowledgments; `create_official_sheet`, `create_sheet_draft` adapted, `save_sheet_draft`, submit, withdraw, comment, acknowledge, decide, publish; `create_sheet_working_copy`; species RPCs; catalogue and version read RPCs; upload: `register_sheet_asset` extended, `confirm_sheet_asset_upload` with the storage check (F7), INSERT policy, bucket limit 2 MiB; mirror removal and status check (§12.2); superseded signatures dropped | new columns take their defaults on the equine v1 row (`revision` 0, empty author set); its document, status, number and assets unchanged; bucket limit lowered; no round, no grant | | M6 `sheet_verification_jobs` | V1-2.3 | worker RPCs (claim, input, complete with the verdict structure check, fail), service role only | none | @@ -1261,7 +1553,7 @@ outside the document. | Threat | Control | |---|---| | Privilege escalation through the catalogue | default deny; rights in their own table, written by the owner only with `aal2`; `can_edit_sheet` redefined; no table privilege for API roles or the service role; security definer functions with `search_path = ''`, EXECUTE revoked from public and anon; superseded signatures dropped | -| Escalation through platform roles | open: AR-1 (§17.2) | +| Escalation through platform roles | AR-1 B: `aal2` on every grant and revocation of a platform role, checked in the RPCs before any role check and in the private write functions for a non-null actor; `service_role` has no table privilege and no `EXECUTE` on them; owner count race closed; first factor enrolled before the owner role is assigned (§5.7) | | Takeover of an admin or reviewer account | `aal2` in RPCs and in the capability branches of policies; a verified factor required before a capability is granted; deactivation, expiry and revocation cut access at the next request; two factors for the owner | | Recovery as a back door | no application path resets a factor; operator procedure with out-of-band identity check, capabilities revoked and sessions signed out first, an audit row (§5.6) | | Self-approval | author set maintained by trigger and frozen at submission; no author acknowledges or approves; empty saves refused; content writes without an actor refused | @@ -1285,11 +1577,20 @@ outside the document. Residual risks: -- AR-1 until the owner decides (§17.2); +- the token's `aal` claim outlives a factor removal for up to one token + lifetime unless the session check of §5.7.8 is confirmed on the pinned + image; a stolen `aal2` session can also change platform roles and replace + factors (same residual as below); +- a role holder who removes the last factor from `aal2` keeps the role in + the first-factor case (§5.7.3); +- refused escalation attempts leave no audit row (the transaction raises); +- staff reads gated by `is_platform_admin` stay at `aal1` (§5.7.9); - the service key is also a GoTrue admin credential: whoever holds it can delete factors and sign in as anyone, so MFA does not protect against a service-key holder; the key stays on the server, in the worker and in the - operator's environment; + operator's environment, except on DEV today, where it is the public demo + key and the JWT secret is the CLI default (`ENVIRONMENTS.md` §3.6), so + AR-1 B is forgeable on DEV until that hardening (§5.7.2 step 0); - a capability does not prove a professional qualification: the owner's verification note is a declaration until Step 9; - the owner can create and habilitate a second account of its own; traced, @@ -1475,6 +1776,45 @@ The final approval needs all 30 groups acknowledged, no `to_confirm` and no - deprecated version deletion refused; D8 reads after archive and deprecation; superseded signatures and mirror functions absent; upgrade from the DEV state. +- AR-1 B (SQL, per §5.7; PGlite sets the `aal` claim through the JWT + settings, the `auth.sessions` check needs the real image): + - matrix: no role, owner, admin, moderator, support, each at `aal1` and + `aal2`, plus a deactivated account, on grant and on revoke, for each of + the four roles, on self and on another account; expected: `aal1` always + refused with `mfa_required`, `aal2` allowed only where + `can_manage_platform_role` allows (owner any role, admin moderator and + support), a moderator or support at `aal2` refused; + - regression of the chain: an owner at `aal1` calls the grant RPC directly + for an attacker-controlled account; refused, no `profile_roles` row, no + audit row, no capability grantable to it; same for revoking the real + owner and for a demotion; + - the private functions refused for a non-null actor at `aal1`, the null + actor path still working for the seed; `service_role` refused on the RPCs + and on both tables (F17); the last-owner guard under two concurrent + revocations (F18); + - no partial write on refusal; audit row on success with no secret in it; + - a role revoked then a call with the old token: refused at the next call; + - an account with no role, enrolling a factor, gains nothing; a first owner + initialised on a fresh stack in the order of §5.7.1; + - grant to a target without a verified factor refused; a null actor from + an API session and from `service_role` refused in the private functions; + `aal` claim absent, null or wrongly cased refused; mutual owner + revocation and revoke against grant in two sessions; + - fixtures that call the role RPCs (pgTAP 004 and others, the sandbox + `workspaces.sandbox.ts` seed owner at `aal1`) moved to `aal2` claims or to + the operator path; the PGlite shim gains stand-ins for `auth.sessions` and + `auth.mfa_factors` with columns checked against the pinned image; + - V1-1 regression: workspaces, clients, animals, relations, sign-in and a + practitioner without role unchanged; pgTAP 001 to 014 green with the + existing identity fixtures (adapted only where they assert the old + behaviour of the role RPCs). +- MFA on the sandbox stack (real GoTrue): first enrolment at `aal1`, verify, + `aal2`; second factor from `aal1` refused; removal of a verified factor + from `aal1` refused; removal from `aal2` and the session consequences; + password reset does not reach `aal2`; refresh keeps `aal2`; revoked session + and old token; recovery rehearsal of §5.7.7. Expectations are what the + pinned image really does; any gap with §5.7.3 is written up and decided by + the owner. - Concurrency on the real stack, two sessions: two saves, save against submit, publish against withdraw, two publishers, deprecate against publish, completion against withdrawal. @@ -1505,7 +1845,8 @@ The final approval needs all 30 groups acknowledged, no `to_confirm` and no - Browser (`e2e:shell` on the sandbox, never DEV): journeys A0 to A8, S1, W1, R1, P1 with two accounts (an editor and publisher, a reviewer) plus reader assertions, TOTP codes generated by a test helper (Node `crypto` HMAC, no - dependency, V1-2.5); axe; 320 to 430 px for the catalogue, 375 px for admin + dependency, built in V1-2.1 for the real-GoTrue acceptance of §16.2 and + reused in V1-2.5); axe; 320 to 430 px for the catalogue, 375 px for admin screens; FR and EN. - Each step: `pnpm check:all`, fresh verifier against this contract, fresh security audit. @@ -1529,7 +1870,7 @@ V1-2.1; 5 core loading and validation → V1-2.2; the server verdict → V1-2.3; categories, references → V1-2.6; 10 preview and validation → V1-2.7; 11 equine → V1-2.8; 12 acceptance and closure → V1-2.9. -Owner checkpoints: V1-2.0 (final review of this contract, AR-1), V1-2.3 +Owner checkpoints: V1-2.0 (final review of this contract), V1-2.3 (server workflow and verdict), V1-2.4 (wireframes), V1-2.6, V1-2.7, V1-2.8 (with the business reviewer), V1-2.9 (closure, merge), and each DEV operation of §16.11. @@ -1546,8 +1887,8 @@ V1-2.7 on. - Security prerequisites: none (documents only). - Application changes: none. SQL changes: none. - Tests: documentary checks only (cross-references, ids, tables). -- Acceptance: the owner's final review finds no contradiction; AR-1 decided; - ratification recorded. +- Acceptance: the owner's final review finds no contradiction; AR-1 decided + (B, BDR-083); ratification recorded. - Rollback: revert the documentary commits. - Checkpoint: owner, final review; V1-2.1 starts only on the owner's go. @@ -1560,7 +1901,7 @@ V1-2.7 on. the historical-sheet protection; the upload RPCs and policy; removal of the SQL mirror and the status check; `packages/supabase/src/sheets.ts` with closed failure kinds; the client gate deleted. -- Dependencies: V1-2.0 go, AR-1 decided. +- Dependencies: V1-2.0 go; AR-1 B decided (BDR-083). - Security prerequisites: effective grants of the service role recorded on the sandbox before F12's fix; census of private functions updated (pgTAP 001); every RPC requires `aal2` except the reader RPCs. @@ -1578,6 +1919,12 @@ V1-2.7 on. working copy created from the seeded historical sheet with its drawing; an inactive species invisible to the animal path; types check clean; `pnpm check:all` green. +- Acceptance, AR-1 B: the tests of §15 for §5.7 pass on the sandbox; a + stack upgraded from the DEV state with an owner holding two verified + factors keeps working at `aal2` and is refused at `aal1`; the same upgrade + with an owner holding none stays usable at `aal1` for everything but role + and rights management; the census lists no other write path to + `profile_roles`. - Rollback: branch revert; sandbox rebuilt. - Checkpoint: gates only (owner at V1-2.3). @@ -1647,12 +1994,17 @@ V1-2.7 on. - Security prerequisites: server rules of V1-2.1 in place; the UI is never the boundary. - Application changes: routes and screens of §11.1 except the editor and the - review screen; Mon compte, Sécurité; the TOTP test helper. SQL changes: - none. + review screen; Mon compte, Sécurité; the TOTP test helper (from V1-2.1). SQL changes: + none. Scope split: M4 (V1-2.1) holds every server control of AR-1 B; this + step holds the frontend journey only (enrolment, step-up, factor list, the + `mfa_required` message in FR and EN). - Tests: unit; `e2e:shell` A0, A1, S1, P1; access per right; MFA required; refresh keeps `aal2`; no `aal1` enrolment of a second factor; axe; 320 to 430 px for the catalogue, 375 px for admin screens; FR/EN. -- Acceptance: the owner with MFA grants rights and creates a sheet; an editor +- Acceptance: the owner enrols two factors from Mon compte, reaches `aal2`, + and only then manages platform roles and rights (an `aal1` attempt is + refused in the UI and in SQL); the owner with MFA grants rights and creates + a sheet; an editor creates an inactive species that the animal forms do not show until the owner activates it; a sheet published on the sandbox through SQL fixtures is browsable by a catalogue reader and refused to a confirmed account @@ -1748,8 +2100,12 @@ V1-2.7 on. Each is an owner action, never run by Claude, after its own checkpoint: 1. applying M4 to M6, after a backup and a sandbox rehearsal from the DEV - state; -2. enrolling the owner's two TOTP factors and the first rights grants; + state; M4 is not applied before the preconditions of §5.7.2 (DEV hardening + of `ENVIRONMENTS.md` §3.6, seed owner password, role holders listed, + item 2's factors enrolled and verified), nor before the recovery of §5.7.7 is rehearsed; M4's checks take + effect when it is applied, with no flag that could be left open; +2. enrolling the owner's two TOTP factors (before item 1, §5.7.2) and the + first rights grants (after it); 3. starting the verification worker on DEV: a separate operating checkpoint that first inventories the queues (the avatar upload waiting since AVATAR-01, the due purge rows, quarantine leftovers), states the expected @@ -1757,7 +2113,7 @@ Each is an owner action, never run by Claude, after its own checkpoint: 4. creating, activating or renaming a species; 5. creating the equine working copy and applying the O18 corrections; 6. any submission, approval, publication, deprecation or archive; -7. any factor reset (§5.6) and any `object_conflict` deletion (§9.3); +7. any factor reset (§5.6, §5.7.7) and any `object_conflict` deletion (§9.3); 8. rerunning the equine seed. ### 16.12 Deferred (not V1-2) @@ -1777,7 +2133,7 @@ registry in any build that can be rolled back to; V1-2 does not resolve it. --- -## 17. Ratified decisions and open arbitration +## 17. Ratified decisions and arbitration ### 17.1 Ratified decisions O1 to O23 @@ -1789,7 +2145,7 @@ which would have accepted a browser verdict or deferred MFA, are rejected. | O1 | A + D: three explicit capabilities (`sheet_editor`, `sheet_reviewer`, `sheet_publisher`), granted and revoked by the owner; editor and publisher need a platform role owner or admin; reviewers may be confirmed non-admin accounts; every grant audited, with a required reason, a verification note, a date and an optional expiry; e-mail confirmation is no proof of competence | §5.1, §5.2 | | O2 | A: no author acknowledges or approves; author set frozen at submission and checked on the server; two people suffice; the publisher may be the approver; no silent override for a sole owner | §5.5 | | O3 | B: no `to_confirm` and no `inherited` (absent statuses included) at approval or publication; the historical import is never a base; new elements start `to_confirm`; changes re-open coverage | §6.6, §6.7, §14 | -| O4 | A: `aal2` for every catalogue operation except reading the published catalogue; enrolment, step-up, sessions, loss and operator recovery documented; O4-D evaluated, not ratified, now the subject of AR-1 | §5.6, §17.2 | +| O4 | A: `aal2` for every catalogue operation except reading the published catalogue; enrolment, step-up, sessions, loss and operator recovery documented; O4-D evaluated, not ratified at the time; the arbitration AR-1 then extended `aal2` to every platform role change (§17.2) | §5.6, §5.7 | | O5 | A: one approval closes a round; trace kept for a future quorum | §6.3 | | O6 | A: scope disclaimer required, present in FR and EN and non-blank after trimming; equine texts untouched | §6.7 | | O7 | A: new elements start `to_confirm`; nothing assigns `reviewed` or `inherited` automatically; draft state, element marking and business approval distinguished | §6.6 | @@ -1810,33 +2166,30 @@ which would have accepted a browser verdict or deferred MFA, are rejected. | O22 | Rust core the only authority on document rules; SQL keeps access, relations, states, revisions, locks, atomicity and the verdict's identity; the business mirror is removed in M5 without an unprotected window; one declared status check kept | §12.2 | | O23 | Fail-closed verification: explicit states and outcomes, closed codes per category, idempotent retries under a limit, withdrawal always possible, audit, no partial publication | §6.5 | -### 17.2 Open arbitration AR-1: MFA on platform role grants (O4-D) +### 17.2 Arbitration AR-1: MFA on platform role changes (ratified, option B) Finding (security challenge, §19.3, confirmed by reading -`20261008100200_platform_roles.sql` l.83-95 and l.189-238): an owner may grant -any platform role, owner included, and `grant_platform_role` does not check the -assurance level. From a stolen owner session at `aal1` (password only), an -attacker grants `owner` to an account of their own; that account enrols its -own TOTP factor, reaches `aal2`, grants itself every capability (§5.2) and a -reviewer capability to a third account, then may revoke the real owner. Every -`aal2` control of the catalogue is bypassed. O4-D (extending `aal2` to these -RPCs) was explicitly left unratified, so this contract cannot close the gap on -its own. +`20261008100200_platform_roles.sql`, the two RPCs): an owner could grant any +platform role, owner included, with no check of the assurance level. From a +stolen password-only owner session, an attacker grants a role to an account +of their own, which enrols its own factor, reaches `aal2` and grants itself +every catalogue capability; every `aal2` control of the catalogue was +bypassed. The chain is written out in §5.7. -Options for the owner: +Options put to the owner: A (`aal2` for `owner` and `admin` only), B (`aal2` +for every platform role), C (leave the RPCs and accept the residual). -- A (recommended): ratify O4-D at least for granting and revoking `owner` and - `admin`, the roles that make an account eligible for `sheet_editor` and - `sheet_publisher`: `has_mfa()` in `grant_platform_role` and - `revoke_platform_role` for those roles, in M4, with pgTAP cases. Cost: one - predicate; it changes a V1 identity contract and requires the owner's - session at `aal2` to manage those roles. -- B: ratify O4-D for every platform role. Same cost, broader. -- C: keep the RPCs unchanged and accept the residual explicitly. Then the - catalogue's MFA protects against a stolen editor or reviewer password, not - against a stolen owner password. +Decision (owner, 2026-10-28, BDR-083): **B**. Every grant, revocation or +change of a platform role requires a valid `aal2` session checked on the +server, with no permanent exception. It complements O4 and leaves D1 to D9 +and O1 to O23 unchanged (O1, O2 and O4 are applied, not amended: a role gives +no capability, `aal2` replaces no permission, §5.2, §5.5, §5.7). Where it +lands: rule, inventory, bootstrap, recovery and session rules in §5.7; M4 in +§12.3 (F17, F18, F19); tests in §15; acceptance in §16.2, §16.6; the order of +DEV operations in §16.11. -Until the owner chooses, V1-2.1 does not start (§16.2). +Reserves left to the owner, not decided here: `aal2` on the staff read +policies (§5.7.9). --- @@ -1855,7 +2208,7 @@ First revision (2026-10-27): Consolidation (2026-10-28): - this file: decisions ratified, contradictions resolved, steps restated, - second challenge round integrated, AR-1 open; + second challenge round integrated, AR-1 decided (B) and integrated in §5.7; - `docs/development/IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md`: §0 roadmap row of V1-2, Steps 13 and 17 notes (editor scope moved into V1-2 for official sheets), Step 13's stale `content_jsonb`; @@ -1873,6 +2226,15 @@ Consolidation (2026-10-28): - `.claude/tasks/TODO.md`, `.claude/memory/decisions.md` (BDR-082), `.claude/memory/journal.md`. +AR-1 B integration (2026-10-28): + +- this file: §5.7 (rule, scenario, inventory, bootstrap, factors, password, + recovery, sessions), F17 to F19, M4, tests, steps and DEV order, §17.2 + closed; +- `.claude/memory/decisions.md` (BDR-083), `.claude/tasks/TODO.md`, + `.claude/memory/journal.md`; +- `docs/development/IDENTITY.md` §4: one pointer to §5.7, no other change. + Not touched, with stale `content_jsonb` mentions left for V1-2.9: `BACKEND_ARCHITECTURE.md` l.110, `DOMAIN_MAP.md` l.119. @@ -1926,3 +2288,12 @@ repository before being integrated; none changed a ratified decision. | Business coherence | CONCERNS (3 major, no blocker, no arbitration) | Acknowledgments voided by the later marking, so every equine group acknowledged twice (protocol « editor marks, then reviewer acknowledges », acknowledgment refused on groups with unread elements, §6.3, §14.6); removed zone or view had no group to cover (removal groups); working copy slot blocked by an archived copy (only `active` copies count); anatomical decisions carried out by editors from reviewer comments (§14.5); grant expiry and renewal semantics (§5.2); owner missing from the species list (§5.4); round columns per state (§6.3); base from deprecated or pre-V1-2 versions (base only from a V1-2-published version, §6.2); deprecating the last published version (§6.9); DEV copy as the single source of truth, sandbox copies as rehearsals (§14.4); cleaning table misdescribed the reader (§9.2); `published_by` already exists (M5); O6 « structure » defined; active species names (owner renaming) | | Security and data | FATAL (1 blocker as arbitration request, 6 major) | AR-1: an `aal1` owner session grants the owner role and bypasses every catalogue MFA control (§17.2, open); the defensive status check could not see omitted statuses (structural walk, absent = `inherited`, §12.2); service-role privileges and direct publication (F12 unconditional, guard requires an approved round with a passed verdict, asset-row immutability F16, sha256 compared at publication, GoTrue residual in §13); readers could list draft-only sheets through the `public` branch (reader row predicate, F15); historical sheet deletable or archivable (RPC refusals and trigger, §14.2); poisoned content-addressed key without exit (`object_conflict` runbook with an audited scoped deletion, earlier detection by `PreviewSheet`, §9.3); first-factor trust on first use (verified factor required before a capability, recovery revokes and signs out first, `aal1` enrolment test); minor: serialised size, worker body cap, base from legacy publications, verdict structure checked in SQL, predicates split by caller and stored actor, signed URLs (residual), cleaning fixpoint | | Simplicity and feasibility | CONCERNS (5 major, no arbitration) | Editor step waited for the worker step (uploads moved to M5, editor independent of V1-2.3, verification passing moved to V1-2.7); worker changes understated (separate verification mode and container, per-command limits, avatar lease reused without backoff, sandbox worker a deliverable); no editor render path (`PreviewSheet` as the editor handle with document replacement and `view.canvas`); overlapping coverage rules (one rule on group digests, change list for display only, no earlier digests sent to the worker); status check blind to omitted statuses (fixed as above); minor: core step ordered verdict first; level 1 trimmed (no move to another parent, no dragged vertices, numeric crop); two cleaning classes; rules epoch replaced by release migrations withdrawing rounds; two failure outcomes with categorised codes; comments with a group key only; time budgets and named fixtures; TOTP test helper; `register_sheet_asset` extended instead of a new RPC; purge guard by bucket. Not taken: moving the working copy RPC to V1-2.8 (it stays in M5 so DEV receives one set of migrations) | + +### 19.4 AR-1 B review (2026-10-28) + +One fresh challenger (robustness and security lens) read the AR-1 B text +against the migrations, the seed, the PGlite shim and `ENVIRONMENTS.md`. + +| Lens | Verdict | Findings and what changed | +|---|---|---| +| Security | FATAL (1 blocker, 3 major, 6 minor) | DEV signs tokens with the public default secret and exposes 54321 to the LAN, so `aal2` is forgeable there (precondition §5.7.2 step 0, §16.11, §13 corrected); a grant to an account without a factor reopened the chain (target factor required, check 5); seed owner with a committed password and re-seed after M4 (password change or new owner, reset reopens the preconditions, seed declared a local-fixture exception); recovery runbook unrunnable under a ban and silent on the owner's capabilities (reordered, capabilities inert at `aal1`); minor: unverified factors, null actor keyed on the argument, owner race beyond the count and on inactive profiles, `amr` freshness overclaim, session-check fallback made a stop, sign-out wording, API-log claim, harness gaps (shim, fixtures, TOTP helper moved to V1-2.1), cross-references. None changed a ratified decision |