diff --git a/.claude/memory/decisions.md b/.claude/memory/decisions.md index fe90a9d4..da9fd3d9 100644 --- a/.claude/memory/decisions.md +++ b/.claude/memory/decisions.md @@ -698,3 +698,13 @@ Also kept by owner: per-document-instance prefix required on top of per-view pre **Alternatives**: larger threshold (6 px) refused equine; renderer-based measure (new dependency, WASM budget); area threshold (thin sliver keeps area). Rejected. **Status**: accepted + +## BDR-093 — V1-2.3 VERIFIED: M6 worker verdict, retry by cause, sandbox-only e2e; CPU-contention MEDIUM accepted temporarily (2026-11-02) +- **Status**: accepted +**Decision**: V1-2.3 VERIFIED by owner 2026-11-02 (brief « Clôture V1-2.3 et lancement V1-2.4 », HEAD 57b93af), sandbox scope only. Kept: M6 (four service-role RPCs, five worker codes, lease 10 min, verdict cap 3 MiB child / 4 MiB SQL), retry by effective cause (`resource_limit` intrinsic to frozen input and `verdict_refused` close at first occurrence; `timeout`, `unavailable` incl. external SIGKILL, `lease_expired` transient, delays 2/5/10/20 s, five attempts, `not_before` in SQL, no blocking wait), stale and null-token protections, avatar e2e on sandbox only (`pnpm e2e:avatar` alias, DEV script removed, suite refuses non-sandbox URL, container, key issuer), per-session sandbox secrets, seccomp `brk` + budgets, no `worker-verify` on DEV. + +**Accepted temporarily (sandbox scope, NOT fixed, NOT a deploy authorisation)**: MEDIUM CPU contention: document needing ~60 s CPU under host contention can reach 90 s wall deadline first → `timeout` → retried up to five runs (~8 min worker time); owner refused `unsafe` rusage read at this stage. Re-examine before enabling `worker-verify` on DEV or exposing verification to external users. Register: V1-2 contract §13 accepted risks. LOWs open: header > 64 KiB → `resource_limit` not `caps`; oversized object → `[caps, drawing_missing]` not `size_mismatch`; SIGABRT also panic / host ENOMEM; verdict bound to another round answers `stale`. Four historical test reductions justified in `.claude/audits/2026-11-01-v1-2-floor-reductions.md`. + +**Rationale**: definitive failures deterministic for frozen input → one child run, not five; transient by environment keeps retries; SQL owns code policy so any worker honours it. Evidence: RUST.md §13.1, V1-2 contract §6.4/§6.5, gates on 3c141c9 (check:all, pgTAP 1898, verify-e2e 10/10, avatar-e2e 5/5, e2e:shell 86, DEV untouched). + +**Alternatives**: retry every worker code (five identical runs on deterministic failure, refused by owner); per-call `final` flag in RPC (signature change, rejected); rusage-based timeout classification (needs `unsafe`, deferred by owner).