feat(supabase): V1-2.1 M4/M5 secure sheet access and review workflow

M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow
(applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14.

- Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live
  auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader
  predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14).
- AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor,
  race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on
  the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17).
- Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/
  author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/
  comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the
  stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy,
  uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket.
  F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3).
- O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and
  the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted.
- Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate
  deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state.

Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) /
122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and
M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint,
build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
This commit is contained in:
bchanot committed 2026-10-28 15:52:49 +01:00
1 parent 9c13bae4bc
commit 77e5fa4cf5
33 files changed
+4613 -1617

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+12 -5
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@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@
begin;
select plan(12);
insert into auth.users (id, email) values
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'root@test.local'),
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'alice@test.local'),
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b', 'bob@test.local');
insert into auth.users (id, email, email_confirmed_at) values
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'root@test.local', now()),
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'alice@test.local', now()),
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b', 'bob@test.local', now());
-- AR-1 B: the owner needs a live aal2 session, the target a verified factor.
insert into auth.mfa_factors (id, user_id, factor_type, status, created_at, updated_at)
values (gen_random_uuid(), '00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'totp', 'verified', now(), now());
insert into auth.sessions (id, user_id, aal) values
('a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'aal2');
select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '', true);
select private.assign_platform_role(null, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'owner');
-- 1. Bootstrap is audited as a system action
@@ -20,7 +26,8 @@ select results_eq(
-- 2. RPC grant and revoke are audited with the actor
set local role authenticated;
select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","role":"authenticated"}', true);
select set_config('request.jwt.claims',
'{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","role":"authenticated","aal":"aal2","session_id":"a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}', true);
select public.grant_platform_role('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'admin');
select public.revoke_platform_role('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'admin', 'rotation');
reset role;