feat(supabase): V1-2.1 M4/M5 secure sheet access and review workflow
M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow (applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14. - Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14). - AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor, race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17). - Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/ author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/ comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy, uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket. F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3). - O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted. - Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state. Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) / 122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint, build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
9c13bae4bc
commit
77e5fa4cf5
33 files changed
+4613
-1617
No files matched your search
@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@
|
||||
begin;
|
||||
select plan(12);
|
||||
|
||||
insert into auth.users (id, email) values
|
||||
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'root@test.local'),
|
||||
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'alice@test.local'),
|
||||
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b', 'bob@test.local');
|
||||
insert into auth.users (id, email, email_confirmed_at) values
|
||||
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'root@test.local', now()),
|
||||
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'alice@test.local', now()),
|
||||
('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000b', 'bob@test.local', now());
|
||||
-- AR-1 B: the owner needs a live aal2 session, the target a verified factor.
|
||||
insert into auth.mfa_factors (id, user_id, factor_type, status, created_at, updated_at)
|
||||
values (gen_random_uuid(), '00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'totp', 'verified', now(), now());
|
||||
insert into auth.sessions (id, user_id, aal) values
|
||||
('a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'aal2');
|
||||
select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '', true);
|
||||
select private.assign_platform_role(null, '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'owner');
|
||||
|
||||
-- 1. Bootstrap is audited as a system action
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +26,8 @@ select results_eq(
|
||||
|
||||
-- 2. RPC grant and revoke are audited with the actor
|
||||
set local role authenticated;
|
||||
select set_config('request.jwt.claims', '{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","role":"authenticated"}', true);
|
||||
select set_config('request.jwt.claims',
|
||||
'{"sub":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","role":"authenticated","aal":"aal2","session_id":"a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}', true);
|
||||
select public.grant_platform_role('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'admin');
|
||||
select public.revoke_platform_role('00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000a', 'admin', 'rotation');
|
||||
reset role;
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user