feat(supabase): V1-2.1 M4/M5 secure sheet access and review workflow

M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow
(applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14.

- Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live
  auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader
  predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14).
- AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor,
  race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on
  the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17).
- Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/
  author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/
  comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the
  stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy,
  uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket.
  F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3).
- O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and
  the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted.
- Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate
  deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state.

Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) /
122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and
M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint,
build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
This commit is contained in:
bchanot committed 2026-10-28 15:52:49 +01:00
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/**
* RFC 6238 TOTP codes for the sandbox MFA tests (contract
* docs/development/V1-2_ANATOMICAL_SHEETS.md §15): HMAC-SHA1, 30 s steps,
* 6 digits, the parameters GoTrue v2.197.0 uses. Node `crypto` only, no
* dependency. The secret stays in the test's memory: never printed, logged or
* written anywhere.
*/
import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto'
const BASE32 = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'
export const TOTP_STEP_SECONDS = 30
function base32Decode(text: string): Buffer {
const clean = text.replace(/=+$/, '').toUpperCase()
const bytes: number[] = []
let buffer = 0
let bits = 0
for (const char of clean) {
const value = BASE32.indexOf(char)
if (value < 0) throw new Error('totp: secret is not base32')
buffer = (buffer << 5) | value
bits += 5
if (bits >= 8) {
bits -= 8
bytes.push((buffer >> bits) & 0xff)
}
}
return Buffer.from(bytes)
}
/** The 6-digit code of `secret` for the step holding `at` (ms since epoch). */
export function totpCode(secret: string, at = Date.now()): string {
const counter = Buffer.alloc(8)
counter.writeBigUInt64BE(BigInt(Math.floor(at / 1000 / TOTP_STEP_SECONDS)))
const mac = createHmac('sha1', base32Decode(secret)).update(counter).digest()
const offset = mac[mac.length - 1] & 0x0f
const value = (mac.readUInt32BE(offset) & 0x7fffffff) % 1_000_000
return value.toString().padStart(6, '0')
}
/** Milliseconds until the next step starts (a fresh code). */
export function msToNextStep(at = Date.now()): number {
const step = TOTP_STEP_SECONDS * 1000
return step - (at % step)
}