feat(supabase): V1-2.1 M4/M5 secure sheet access and review workflow
M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow (applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14. - Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14). - AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor, race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17). - Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/ author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/ comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy, uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket. F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3). - O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted. - Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state. Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) / 122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint, build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
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/**
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* GoTrue MFA calls of the sandbox (real GoTrue v2.197.0): enrol a TOTP factor,
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* challenge and verify it to reach `aal2`, remove it. Every call carries the
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* user's own access token, as the browser does. TOTP secrets and tokens stay
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* in memory and are never printed.
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*/
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import { stack } from './stack'
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import { msToNextStep, totpCode } from './totp'
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export interface Factor {
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id: string
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secret: string
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}
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export interface MfaResult {
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status: number
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body: Record<string, unknown>
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}
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async function authRequest(
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method: string,
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path: string,
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token: string,
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body?: unknown,
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): Promise<MfaResult> {
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const res = await fetch(stack.authUrl + path, {
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method,
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headers: {
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apikey: stack.anonKey,
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Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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},
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body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),
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})
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const text = await res.text()
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let parsed: Record<string, unknown> = {}
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try {
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parsed = JSON.parse(text) as Record<string, unknown>
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} catch {
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// not JSON: keep an empty body
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}
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return { status: res.status, body: parsed }
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}
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/** POST /factors: a new unverified TOTP factor (the secret is shown once). */
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export async function enrolTotp(
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token: string,
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name: string,
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): Promise<{ status: number; factor: Factor | null; body: MfaResult['body'] }> {
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const res = await authRequest('POST', '/factors', token, {
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factor_type: 'totp',
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friendly_name: name,
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})
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const totp = res.body.totp as { secret?: string } | undefined
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const factor =
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res.status === 200 && typeof res.body.id === 'string' && totp?.secret
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? { id: res.body.id, secret: totp.secret }
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: null
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return { status: res.status, factor, body: res.body }
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}
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/** Challenge then verify with the current code; resolves with the new session (aal2 on success). */
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export async function verifyTotp(
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token: string,
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factor: Factor,
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): Promise<MfaResult> {
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const challenge = await authRequest(
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'POST',
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`/factors/${factor.id}/challenge`,
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token,
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{},
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)
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if (challenge.status !== 200) return challenge
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return authRequest('POST', `/factors/${factor.id}/verify`, token, {
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challenge_id: challenge.body.id,
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code: totpCode(factor.secret),
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})
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}
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/**
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* Verify with a code of a step not used before for this factor: GoTrue refuses
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* a code it already accepted, so a second verification waits for the next step.
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*/
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export async function verifyTotpFreshStep(
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token: string,
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factor: Factor,
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): Promise<MfaResult> {
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await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, msToNextStep() + 200))
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return verifyTotp(token, factor)
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}
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export function unenrol(token: string, factorId: string): Promise<MfaResult> {
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return authRequest('DELETE', `/factors/${factorId}`, token)
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}
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/** The claims of an access token (payload only; the signature is not checked here). */
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export function claimsOf(token: string): Record<string, unknown> {
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const payload = token.split('.')[1] ?? ''
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return JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, 'base64url').toString('utf8')) as Record<
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string,
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unknown
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>
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}
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