feat(supabase): V1-2.1 M4/M5 secure sheet access and review workflow

M4 20261028100000_sheet_access_hardening + M5 20261028110000_sheet_review_workflow
(applied together; no unprotected window). Implements contract §5-§14.

- Catalogue rights table + owner RPCs; has_mfa / has_aal2_session (live
  auth.sessions check); grant_active vs caller_has split; catalogue reader
  predicate; can_edit_sheet on the sheet_editor capability (F14).
- AR-1 B: aal2 required on every platform role change, target verified factor,
  race-free last-owner guard (F18/F19); service_role loses table privileges on
  the catalogue + profiles/profile_roles and EXECUTE on the role RPCs (F12/F17).
- Reviewed lifecycle: version provenance + review columns, content/freeze/
  author triggers, rounds/comments/acknowledgments, save/submit/withdraw/
  comment/acknowledge/decide, atomic publish_sheet_version(review_id) on the
  stored verdict, deprecate/archive/restore, species RPCs, equine working copy,
  uploads with the storage check (F7) + editor INSERT policy + 2 MiB bucket.
  F1-F3,F5,F6,F8,F9,F13,F15,F16 closed. Verdict is a fixture until M6 (V1-2.3).
- O22: SQL business mirror removed, declared status check kept; pgTAP 011 and
  the Rust generator's SQL parts deleted, ledger retargeted.
- Access layer sheets.ts (closed SheetFailure kinds); old client publish gate
  deleted; types regenerated; upload tool reads via get_sheet_asset_state.

Tested on the throwaway sandbox only; DEV untouched. pgTAP 850 (real stack) /
122 (PGlite) green; real-GoTrue AR-1 B + F18 race green; fresh install and
M3->M5 upgrade green; V1-1 regression green; rust:check, typecheck, lint,
build, types drift clean. BDR-084, LRN-095.
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@@ -651,3 +651,12 @@ Apply: SQL test touching a worker queue or shared bucket → neutralise or scope
Context: V1-1 DEV acceptance RESP-01. Owner saw whole-page sideways scroll everywhere at 375 px (DevTools responsive). Sandbox sweep (Chromium mobile + desktop with scrollbars shown via `ignoreDefaultArgs: ['--hide-scrollbars']`, WebKit iPhone, Firefox; 280-430 px) found none at 375; owner then measured DEV with a console snippet (cw/sw + topmost offending boxes, classes only): no overflow without zoom → browser zoom was the cause. Same sweep with long account e-mails found a real defect: dashboard `grid gap-4 md:grid-cols-2` has no explicit column below md → implicit `auto` track = cards' min-content → `truncate` e-mail never truncates, cards past screen from ~31 chars at 320 px.
Fix: `grid-cols-1` (minmax(0,1fr)) + e-mail wraps (`min-w-0 [overflow-wrap:anywhere]`). Test sweeps 320-430 + desktop with long values, proven failing on old code.
Apply: overflow report → ask how observed (zoom, preset, device type), give owner a read-only console probe for DEV, reproduce with realistic max-length values on sandbox; a grid used as a single column on phones needs `grid-cols-1`, else one unbreakable value widens every card.
## LRN-095 — pgTAP across PGlite and the real Supabase image: privileges, roles, storage triggers (2026-10-28)
Adapting pgTAP across PGlite and the real Supabase image: the fixtures must respect privileges the shim doesn't enforce.
- `auth.sessions`/`auth.mfa_factors` added to the PGlite shim (`supabase-shim.sql`) with the pinned image's enums (`aal_level`, `factor_type`, `factor_status`) and NOT-NULL columns, so aal2-session checks run Dockerless. A test that checks a live-aal2 session fabricates the session + factor rows directly.
- API roles (`authenticated`, `service_role`, `anon`) hold no privilege on `auth.*`: every test mutation of `auth.users/sessions/mfa_factors` must run under `reset role` (postgres), never while `set local role authenticated`. Same for seeding `public.*` rows a trigger guards (the content trigger needs `auth.uid()` set, so direct version seeding carries a `request.jwt.claims` sub).
- Real-stack-only divergences: `storage.objects` has a storage-API trigger forbidding direct DELETE/UPDATE (PGlite allows it) — assert "no write policy" via `pg_policies` census, not a runtime throws_ok. PostgREST maps a `raise ... errcode='42501'` to HTTP 403 with code `42501` (not P0001). An EXECUTE-revoked function raises "permission denied for function" before its own body — test that, not the body's custom error.
- A narrow operator read RPC returning JSON `null` for "no row" is cleaner than raising (PostgREST won't surface a raise as a 404 the client recognises); the tool treats `null` as absent.
- Real GoTrue proves what fabricated rows can't: `pnpm db:sandbox test` enrol+verify TOTP → aal2 token, then the role RPC works at aal2 and is refused (mfa_required, 403) at aal1; F18 cross-revoke under real concurrency leaves one owner.