chore(memory): R2 delivered — BDR-050, LRN-054, BLK-010, EVAL-020, journal, TODO, verify contract

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bchanot committed 2026-10-14 01:05:13 +02:00
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@@ -81,3 +81,10 @@ Status: open (no real data yet; treat before Step 7+ persistence of user reports
Security audit Step 6 (MEDIUM, pre-existing since Step 1 import): `PDFDocument.load` decodes every `/ObjStm` and xref stream eagerly with its own uncapped FlateStream; measured 408 KB PDF → 400 MB in 1.4 s, 468 MB RSS; `MAX_PDF_BYTES` 50 MiB allows ~50 GB. Attachment cap (16 MiB) covers the attachment only. Impact: tab freeze/OOM for the practitioner on a crafted PDF, no code execution. Cannot refuse `/ObjStm` (pdf-lib `save()` emits object streams in our own PDFs). Options: parse in a Web Worker (bounded blast radius), or locate the attachment by scanning bytes without a full load, or a capped custom decoder. pdf-lib 1.17.1 unmaintained since 2021 (LOW in the same audit).
Status: MITIGATED on the browser import path 2026-10-11 (60ee712: byte-scan attachment reader, no `PDFDocument.load` on untrusted bytes, export without object streams; ObjStm bomb read in 5 ms, +0.5 MiB RSS). Then 3a6e926: inflater fed in 16 KiB slices (Chromium read-ahead defeated the cancel: 4 GiB bomb +2.2 GB → +192 MB measured), shared 16 MiB candidate budget, bounded endstream search; final loop: candidates sorted by offset, JSON depth pre-scan. Audits ×3 PASS; worst measured costs on crafted files: +192 MB single bomb, ~0.5 s / ≤0.4 GB for 32 failing inflations, ~1 s deep JSON (before the pre-scan). GATE STILL OPEN before any external-user import (BDR-040): Firefox/Safari inflater read-ahead unmeasured (no browser test runner), Worker/server import with time+memory budget, pdf-lib replacement decision (unmaintained), report collection caps on read, `<use>` nesting budget, low-end phone measurement. Plan: docs/development/PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING.md §5. Never close on passing tests alone.
## BLK-010 | 2026-10-14 | Agent worktrees created on a stale base; their cleanup refused by the classifier
Friction: the three `isolation: worktree` forks of R2 started at 605ee7c (an old develop merge), not at the feature branch HEAD 22fea87; each fork noticed and moved its own temp branch (`git reset --hard` / `checkout -B` on the empty worktree, flagged by the classifier as a security warning). After merging their diffs by hand, `git worktree remove --force` + `git branch -d worktree-agent-*` refused by the auto-mode classifier.
Root cause: harness side (base commit of the agent worktree), not reproducible from the repo; the removal refusal is the destructive-command policy.
Solution: forks briefed with the exact base commit and told to verify `git log -1`; diffs collected uncommitted and copied by literal paths. Leftover: `.claude/worktrees/agent-{a0cefd439bff650a2,a3f684449d0776ad1,af6ebe79b8f742039}` (3.2 GB) + 3 local temp branches at 22fea87 (merged), owner removes them (`git worktree remove --force <path>`, `git branch -d <branch>`).
Status: open (harness); workaround documented.