chore(memory): R2 delivered — BDR-050, LRN-054, BLK-010, EVAL-020, journal, TODO, verify contract
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
e49009e363
commit
651f1fef13
7 files changed
+93
-8
No files matched your search
@@ -81,3 +81,10 @@ Status: open (no real data yet; treat before Step 7+ persistence of user reports
|
||||
|
||||
Security audit Step 6 (MEDIUM, pre-existing since Step 1 import): `PDFDocument.load` decodes every `/ObjStm` and xref stream eagerly with its own uncapped FlateStream; measured 408 KB PDF → 400 MB in 1.4 s, 468 MB RSS; `MAX_PDF_BYTES` 50 MiB allows ~50 GB. Attachment cap (16 MiB) covers the attachment only. Impact: tab freeze/OOM for the practitioner on a crafted PDF, no code execution. Cannot refuse `/ObjStm` (pdf-lib `save()` emits object streams in our own PDFs). Options: parse in a Web Worker (bounded blast radius), or locate the attachment by scanning bytes without a full load, or a capped custom decoder. pdf-lib 1.17.1 unmaintained since 2021 (LOW in the same audit).
|
||||
Status: MITIGATED on the browser import path 2026-10-11 (60ee712: byte-scan attachment reader, no `PDFDocument.load` on untrusted bytes, export without object streams; ObjStm bomb read in 5 ms, +0.5 MiB RSS). Then 3a6e926: inflater fed in 16 KiB slices (Chromium read-ahead defeated the cancel: 4 GiB bomb +2.2 GB → +192 MB measured), shared 16 MiB candidate budget, bounded endstream search; final loop: candidates sorted by offset, JSON depth pre-scan. Audits ×3 PASS; worst measured costs on crafted files: +192 MB single bomb, ~0.5 s / ≤0.4 GB for 32 failing inflations, ~1 s deep JSON (before the pre-scan). GATE STILL OPEN before any external-user import (BDR-040): Firefox/Safari inflater read-ahead unmeasured (no browser test runner), Worker/server import with time+memory budget, pdf-lib replacement decision (unmaintained), report collection caps on read, `<use>` nesting budget, low-end phone measurement. Plan: docs/development/PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING.md §5. Never close on passing tests alone.
|
||||
|
||||
## BLK-010 | 2026-10-14 | Agent worktrees created on a stale base; their cleanup refused by the classifier
|
||||
|
||||
Friction: the three `isolation: worktree` forks of R2 started at 605ee7c (an old develop merge), not at the feature branch HEAD 22fea87; each fork noticed and moved its own temp branch (`git reset --hard` / `checkout -B` on the empty worktree, flagged by the classifier as a security warning). After merging their diffs by hand, `git worktree remove --force` + `git branch -d worktree-agent-*` refused by the auto-mode classifier.
|
||||
Root cause: harness side (base commit of the agent worktree), not reproducible from the repo; the removal refusal is the destructive-command policy.
|
||||
Solution: forks briefed with the exact base commit and told to verify `git log -1`; diffs collected uncommitted and copied by literal paths. Leftover: `.claude/worktrees/agent-{a0cefd439bff650a2,a3f684449d0776ad1,af6ebe79b8f742039}` (3.2 GB) + 3 local temp branches at 22fea87 (merged), owner removes them (`git worktree remove --force <path>`, `git branch -d <branch>`).
|
||||
Status: open (harness); workaround documented.
|
||||
@@ -394,3 +394,9 @@ Status: active; awaiting owner validation (TEST FONCTIONNEL + TEST GRAPHIQUE), n
|
||||
Owner decisions: (1) R1 validated 10/10 manual + graphic → R0 and R1 finished into develop (5cfb6f1, f5865f0; the earlier classifier refusal did not recur); (2) identity final: product/app/site = **Faunosteo**, domain **https://faunosteo.com**, no new brand name, logo/palette/mockups kept; (3) environments: DEV = self-hosted Ubuntu native (Claude Code, git, rustup, Vite, Docker rootless, local Supabase, worker), STAGING = `staging.faunosteo.com` planned not created, PROD = separate VPS, current site preserved, no DNS/cert/proxy/data change; isolation of DB/Storage/secrets/accounts/OAuth/payments/mails/files per env, prod data never copied to DEV, merge ≠ deploy, no CI/CD operational (workflows preparatory); (4) permanent rule: the owner tests from other devices (computer, phone) → every test surface addressed by the DEV origin (LAN address or private name), never 127.0.0.1/localhost, never hard-coded; implemented as `scripts/dev-env.sh` (`FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST`, detected via `hostname -I`, prod host refused) + `scripts/supabase.sh` wrapper (config.toml `env()` for api.external_url, auth.site_url, studio.api_url) + `scripts/dev.sh` (`pnpm dev` on the origin, `pnpm dev:offline` without backend) + private-network redirect URLs; (5) exposure: 5173/54321 needed by browsers, Studio 54323 + Mailpit 54324 unauthenticated → private subnet only, PostgreSQL 54322 published by the CLI on 0.0.0.0 (no bind option) → firewall restriction proposed to the owner, not applied; worker no port; (6) Rust native via Cargo, Docker for services/worker/sandbox/images/prod, VPS never compiles.
|
||||
Alt rejected: hard-coded IP in config.toml (first iteration, replaced the same day); Vite `dev:lan` variant (folded into `dev`); binding the CLI ports to loopback (impossible in config.toml).
|
||||
Status: active; `chore/dev-lan-access` awaiting the owner's LAN validation; R2 not started.
|
||||
|
||||
## BDR-050 | 2026-10-14 | R2 implementation choices: Zod semantics in serde, minimal index data, form edits stay Zustand, quarantine, lazy core
|
||||
|
||||
Built on review rev 2 + Annex C; plan `.claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-13-rust-r2-domain-core.md` rev 2 (3 challengers, 45 findings, 1 BLOCKER folded). Choices: (1) JSON read text → `serde_json::Value` (JSON.parse dup-key semantics) → typed; lone surrogate escape → U+FFFD pre-pass (L1, owner to confirm); (2) Zod reproduced by field helpers: `js::present` (optional: absent ok, null refused, skipped), `js::nullable` (required key), `JsInt` (any integer-valued number, JS print), hand-written patterns (no regex crate), `url` crate for `.url()`; unions = untagged enums + literal tag fields at Zod position → byte-equal with `JSON.stringify(Zod.parse(x),null,2)`; PDF label fields in engine dict order → frozen envelopes round-trip byte-equal; (3) quirks ported site by site (Map last-wins, find first-wins, JS truthiness, `??=`, malformed map entry still fails the read); (4) `SheetIndexData` minimal (positions, names, spineIds, nodeKeys as JSON `[zone,...path]`), TS `SheetIndex` = accessors only + `ops`; (5) one core call per user action; form-value observation edits (comment, severity, free text, finding removal) stay Zustand assignments (no per-keystroke wasm, D-R7); store actions answer `{ok}`, callers stop on failure; `hydrateReport` deleted; (6) runtime: sync calls, trap → poison → offline recovery from kept compiled module + pre-imported spare glue record, cap 3, per-generation sheet handles, retry clears all caches; `pkg/` shipped vs `pkg-proofs/`; BUILD_STAMP refuses stale module in tests; (7) quarantine only on content kinds, newest-only keys, source removed after successful copy, pre-rebase raw kept when unresolved > 0; editor never redirects in degraded states; (8) Home and /new read availability from the bundle, core loads at submit / import / editor; (9) import = TS byte scan (until R4) → core `archive.import` (read + rebase one call); export = core `archive.snapshot` → frozen TS engine; (10) publish gate takes the core validator (DI), fails closed; (11) report:compare CLI keeps the frozen domain (R4); practitioner prefill keeps a small Zod schema (D-R7, core not loaded on /new mount); (12) app image wasm stage + gzip_static; DEPLOY: CSP keyword before an R2 image, never built on VPS.
|
||||
Alt rejected: mutation corpus with full outputs (simplicity challenge: drift-free verdict table + characterisation instead); `report.replace_observation` per keystroke; serde internally tagged enums (tag first breaks byte equality); Web Worker for every call (async races in the click chain); unify duplicate-id policies (behaviour change).
|
||||
Status: active; R2 delivered on feature/rust-r2-domain-core, awaiting owner validation, no merge.
|
||||
@@ -150,3 +150,10 @@ Method: contract-level `STORAGE.md` written first; migration + pgTAP by me while
|
||||
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(4) = oracle (`for update` row-lock grep) + FILE SCOPE (tracking files, lockfile) → rev 2 → CONFORME 15/15, floor clean. Security pass 1 PASS (2 MEDIUM: ceiling ratchet by rejected rows, cleartext http any host; 9 LOW) → fixed; pass 2 PASS but my fixes introduced 2 MEDIUM (bypassable host check `127.*`/numeric, ceiling undercount vs contract) → fixed; pass 3 BLOCK(1) HIGH: my purge-queue join let begin spam pin the ceiling with claims → ceiling rewritten on bytes present + cap per pending claim; pass 4 PASS (MEDIUM residual: per-account holding) → 64 MiB per-account budget; pass 5 PASS (LOW hygiene) → comments/doc. e2e 5/5 ×7 (found the Storage API 400-as-404 making purge acks loop: added queue-drained assertion); smoke 18/18 desktop+mobile; final: pgTAP 140 (real stack 420 total), app 300, supabase 37, worker 21+11 native, sandbox 16, allowlist = 7 syscalls unchanged, image 11.6 MB.
|
||||
Anomalies: EVAL-017 lesson again ×3 — each security fix needed its own adversarial pass and twice created a new finding (host check, ceiling join); a security control I added became the attack lever (BLOCK). Fork B's `database.types.ts` hand-write matched the generator byte-for-byte except ordering; fork A found the 400/404 only via e2e. `gitflow finish` of R0 and any `.env*` write refused by the harness classifier; `git config` reads refused too. Verifier sandbox intercepted the literal `pnpm lint` (rtk wrapper) → oracle uses the binary path.
|
||||
Action: owner's manual validation (TEST FONCTIONNEL + TEST GRAPHIQUE), owner runs `gitflow finish` for R0 then R1 after validation; no merge, no deploy, release 0.2.0 untouched.
|
||||
|
||||
## EVAL-020 | 2026-10-14 | Rust R2 domain core — 3 plan challengers, 4 forks, verifier, security ×2, CSP proof on the image
|
||||
|
||||
Method: plan + contract written first (`.claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-13-rust-r2-domain-core.md`), 3 plan-challengers (correctness, robustness, simplicity) before code; freeze-then-switch: envelopes, Zod output oracles, characterisation and verdict tables written by the TS before trusting Rust; forks A/B/C in worktrees on disjoint files (sheet rules + conformance, report/archive rules, editor rules), runtime + app switch by me, fork D adapted the app suites in tree; browser checks with playwright-core from the scratchpad (dev server, prod build, real image under the DEPLOY CSP); contract `2026-10-14-rust-r2-verify.md` (12 criteria, every oracle dry-run before dispatch) → fresh verifier; security-auditor on the whole range, then a focused pass on the fix commit.
|
||||
Result: challengers 45 findings incl. 1 BLOCKER (degraded editor redirect could overwrite an unread draft) → plan rev 2 before any app code; contracts byte-equal to Zod on first run; forks merged with zero conflicts (one stub replaced); fork D found 2 real src bugs (Node source path under happy-dom, failed quarantine reported as success) → fixed with tests. Verifier: 12/12 MET, ECARTS(2) = floor DELETED_TEST (zoneInteraction suite ported to cargo; R0 skip helper replaced by a stricter global setup) → human micro-gate for the owner. Security: PASS (3 MEDIUM nginx false positives pre-existing, 5 LOW) → by-reference deserialisation (also −134 KB raw / −31 KB gzip module) + literal delete paths. Final: cargo core 135, worker+wasm 32, Node 906 (app 313), pgTAP PGlite 12 files / real stack 446, CSP proof 15/15, check:all green ×3, module 1,046,498 B raw / 340,929 B gzip.
|
||||
Anomalies: worktree base stale (BLK-010); harness decodes `\u` escapes in tool inputs (LRN-054); my first runtime test helper reused the pattern Vite rewrites; the CSP proof first failed on its own harness (EN locale, disclaimer modal, caught compile error logs nothing) — proof scripts need the same dry-run discipline as oracles; a security LOW fix improved size, measure before assuming a cost.
|
||||
Action: owner manual LAN validation, L1 decision, approve the 2 deleted test files (floor), then merge go; R3 next, not started.
|
||||
@@ -247,3 +247,7 @@ Owner: R1 10/10 validated, identity final (Faunosteo, faunosteo.com), env DEV/ST
|
||||
- Same day, LAN least privilege (owner brief): measured from a distinct Docker network → Mailpit open without auth, PostgreSQL open, Studio open. Built DEV gateway (nginx, API + Mailpit basic auth on the LAN address), `pnpm dev:gateway`, `pnpm dev:net-check`; gateway proven on alternate ports. Pending owner authorisation: `~/.config/docker/daemon.json {"ip":"127.0.0.1"}` + rootless daemon restart (daemon-wide, only Faunosteo containers on it). LRN-052. Branch not merged; R2 not started.
|
||||
- Same day, owner applied the UFW rules (ENVIRONMENTS.md §3.2) and verified from another device: 54322, 54323, 54324 refused, 54321 answers; app served by the owner's `pnpm dev`. Allowed surfaces 5/5 by dev:net-check. Remaining: owner's 10-step run on computer + phone, then merge go and R2 go.
|
||||
- Owner validated the 10-step path on computer and phone over the LAN; merge go for chore/dev-lan-access. R2 not authorised yet.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-10-14 (Rust R2 delivered)
|
||||
|
||||
Owner: LAN validated, R2 go (brief 2026-10-13), 4 new strings validated (recommended wording). feature/rust-r2-domain-core off develop 1a7ee7d. Plan + 3 challengers (45 findings, 1 blocker) → rev 2. Freeze first (envelopes, N-1 copy, Zod oracles, characterisation 84 + verdicts 765 + editor 49 + conformance 26), contracts byte-equal, rules by 3 worktree forks, runtime (lazy, poison, offline recovery, BUILD_STAMP), app switched (sheet, store, click chain, pickers, import, export snapshot, publish gate fail-closed), quarantine, degraded states, Docker wasm stage + gzip_static, CSP proof on the image 15/15. Verifier 12/12 + floor 2 (deleted tests, owner micro-gate); security PASS → by-ref deserialisation (module 341 KB gzip). check:all green. BDR-050, LRN-054, BLK-010, EVAL-020. Stop: owner validation, no merge, R3 not started, release 0.2.0 untouched.
|
||||
@@ -411,3 +411,13 @@ Apply: any DEV service exposure on this machine; future staging compose.
|
||||
- Rootless (slirp/pasta) containers reach the host's own LAN IP by local delivery, never through the LAN interface → firewall refusals on that interface are invisible to any probe run on the host; prove them from another device (`nc -zv -w 3 <ip> <port>`).
|
||||
- Lesson: an "it should apply" assumption about a third-party tool's binding must be tested before handing a procedure to the owner (I flagged it as a hypothesis, but the owner still spent a daemon restart on it).
|
||||
Apply: any exposure work on this machine; staging compose (bind explicitly there).
|
||||
|
||||
## LRN-054 | 2026-10-14 | Porting Zod to serde without drift; wasm in Vite; agent and harness traps
|
||||
|
||||
- serde silently widens Zod: a missing `Option` field defaults to None (use `deserialize_with` to make a nullable key required), `null` reads as None for an optional (use a `present` helper refusing null), `u32` refuses `2.0` that `.int()` accepts (JsInt over f64), internally tagged enums print the tag first (untagged enum + literal tag field at the schema position keeps Zod order). Zod drops a `__proto__` key in `z.record`; JS regex `$` = end of input; `.min/.max` count UTF-16. Prove with byte equality against `JSON.stringify(Schema.parse(x),null,2)` on real documents, a characterisation set frozen from the old functions, and a verdict table run by Zod once.
|
||||
- Vite: `import x from 'pkg/glue.js?url'` emits the wasm-bindgen glue as an asset (no bundling); `import(`${url}?instance=${n}`)` gives a fresh module record in dev (`/@fs/…`) and build; works under CSP `script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'`. In happy-dom suites Vite rewrites `new URL(rel, import.meta.url)` into `/@fs/…` → Node readFile fails: build paths from `fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)`.
|
||||
- A caught `WebAssembly.compile` CSP refusal logs nothing in the console: read the `securitypolicyviolation` event (`blockedURI` = `wasm-eval`). Headless Chromium defaults to en-US: set the page locale before asserting French strings. The DEPLOY CSP also refuses the footer's external credit logo (img-src).
|
||||
- This harness decodes `\uXXXX` in tool inputs (heredocs, Write): build escape sequences with python `chr(92)`.
|
||||
- `isolation: worktree` forks started at an old commit (605ee7c, not HEAD): each fork had to move its temp branch; brief forks to check `git log -1` first. `git worktree remove` / `git branch -d` on those temp branches refused by the auto-mode classifier → leftover worktrees (3.2 GB) for the owner to remove.
|
||||
- Forks with full context + disjoint file ownership + "no commit, I collect the diff" merged with zero conflicts (one deliberate stub replaced).
|
||||
Apply: R3/R4/R5 ports (same oracle stack), any wasm loaded by Vite, any agent fan-out.
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user