feat(supabase): retry delay of 2, 5, 10, 20 s for technical verification failures
M6 amended in place (applied only to the throwaway sandbox): a hidden not_before on the round, set by fail_sheet_verification and honoured by the claim; RPC signatures unchanged. pgTAP 021 (68), sandbox cases i (delay with the real worker), j (inputs at the caps, 2 MiB base), k (just beyond).
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@@ -175,7 +175,8 @@ cmake on Alpine). The decode child's traced syscall set did not change with
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the parent's TLS code (§5.4 re-run at R1: the same seven). Image 11.6 MB
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(8.7 MB at R0: ring + rustls). Tests: `crates/worker/tests/job_loop.rs` (11,
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fake backend + fake decoder) and the module unit tests run natively; the
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real-stack end-to-end runs through `pnpm e2e:avatar` (`STORAGE.md` §6).
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real-stack end-to-end runs through `pnpm db:sandbox avatar-e2e` on the throwaway stack since V1-2.3
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(`pnpm e2e:avatar` on DEV, the owner's call; `STORAGE.md` §6).
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The sandboxed child, unchanged from R0:
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@@ -4501,8 +4502,7 @@ Reviews (fresh, 2026-11-01, on `7043d39`):
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password literal in `scripts/db-sandbox.sh`). LOWs fixed: the verdict cap measured twice (child output now
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3 MiB, under the 4 MiB SQL measure of `jsonb::text`); the child's 1 GiB address space above the container's
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512 MiB (`worker-verify` and the sandbox worker now 1 280 MiB, so the child's limit binds first). LOWs open: no
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backoff between attempts (the §6.4 design « without backoff »: an outage of a few seconds can spend the five
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attempts, the round closing `unavailable`; fail-closed, availability only); a document naming several hundred
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backoff between attempts (closed afterwards by the owner decision of 2026-11-01: SQL delay of 2, 5, 10, 20 s, V1-2 contract §6.4; the finding as written on `7043d39` is left); a document naming several hundred
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registered drawings overflows the 64 KiB frame header and is reported `resource_limit` instead of the core's
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`caps` (wrong exit message, no security effect); SQL interpolation of generated ids in the sandbox test only.
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- Verifier: ECARTS(2). W1-W5, W7 met. W6: the hostile corpus through the child was missing (added, above); `pnpm
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@@ -4525,3 +4525,32 @@ WASM 580 522 B gzip in the app image, unchanged by V1-2.3); `pnpm e2e:shell` 86
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Second reviews on `6aa85fe`: verifier ECARTS(1), the one item owner-gated (`pnpm e2e:avatar`, a worker on DEV), the
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hostile corpus met; security PASS (MEDIUM pre-existing sandbox password literal; LOWs: the 3 MiB / 4 MiB relation is
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empirical, a refused verdict ending fail-closed `verdict_refused`; DEPLOY.md memory note, fixed).
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### 13.1 Reserves Q3 and Q4: inputs at the caps, `brk` bounded (2026-11-01)
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Contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-11-01-v1-2-3-reserves.md`. Fixtures (`fixtures.rs`, `test-hooks`): `verify_max_frame()`,
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also `fixture verify-max`: document and base of exactly 2 097 152 bytes (the `jsonb::text` spelling, `": "` and `", "`,
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filler in `attribution.notes`; the core measures `document_bytes` 2 097 152), four drawings of 2 097 152, 2 097 152,
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1 048 576 and 1 048 576 bytes (6 291 456 in all), a frame of 10 486 658 bytes. A drawing is the stored prolog, a 10 × 10
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root, 10 000 `<path d="M0 0L5 5"/>` and a last path whose `d` ends in as many spaces as the size needs. Unit tests run the
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core on each fixture: the maximum is `passed`; four drawings of 2 MiB (no base), five drawings, one drawing of 2 097 153
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bytes and a document of 2 097 153 bytes are `failed` with `verification.validation.caps` (content, exit 0).
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Through the full sandbox (`tests/sandbox.rs`, now 31 tests): `the_maximum_input_is_verified_within_the_limits` (`passed`,
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verdict 2 531 bytes, under the 3 MiB cap and the 90 s deadline), `inputs_just_beyond_the_caps_fail_as_caps_through_the_sandbox`,
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`the_verify_input_cap_is_exact` (a frame of exactly 12 MiB is read, here refused by the frame check; one byte more is refused
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unread by the existing test). Measured on the development host, release build, glibc, sandbox applied: the maximum 104 ms,
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the sheet at every other cap (2 118 765 bytes in, 24 689 out) 142 ms. The Docker `test` stage passes the same tests; its
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log does not print the timings (captured output).
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`brk` in the verify child (`tests/sandbox.rs`, 1 GiB address space): `--alloc-gib 2` and the new hook
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`--alloc-small-gib <n>` (4 KiB chunks kept alive, the small-allocation path) both end in SIGABRT and the survival
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message never appears; `--mmap-exec` and `--signal-parent` die with SIGSYS; `--violate` was already covered. The CPU and
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deadline hooks stay on the decode child. No syscall added to `ALLOWED_SYSCALLS`.
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Derivation: `derive-seccomp.sh` also traces `fixture verify-max` through `verify --no-seccomp`; the traced set is
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unchanged (`brk exit_group getrandom mmap mremap munmap read write`), the allowlist covers it.
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The two misclassifications stay tracked, not fixed (`tests/verify_loop.rs`): a frame header over 64 KiB is reported
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`resource_limit`; an object over the policy is passed without bytes and the verdict lists `caps` then `drawing_missing`
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(its declared size already exceeds the cap), never `size_mismatch`.
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