fix(supabase): R5.5 gate round 1, final errors, four attempts, keys off argv, runbook
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# Security audit: Rust R5.5 upload tool (2026-10-23)
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Mode: audit. Scope: `git diff 637ea63..HEAD` (commits 2c44506, a481af5), 25 files, branch
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`feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`. Contract: `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-23-rust-r5-upload.md`.
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Fresh, blind scan. No run against a real stack, no transfer tool, no service key used.
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```
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SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
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TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
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SCOPE: 25 files
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BLOCKING:
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(none)
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REPORTED (non-blocking):
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- [MEDIUM] secret-on-argv — scripts/sheet-assets-e2e.sh:29, :31
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- [LOW] secret-in-build-env — scripts/upload-sheet-assets.sh:14
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- [LOW] destination-trust (cleartext key, DEV address not proven local) — crates/core/src/curation/upload.rs:194-198
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- [LOW] error-classification (non-transient errors retried as Network) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/storage.rs:76-81
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- [LOW] doc-exit-code — docs/development/SUPABASE.md:152 vs crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:167-175
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- [LOW] toctou-file-read (documented, hash-mitigated) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:49-67
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- [LOW] confirm-not-hash-bound (pre-existing RPC) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/storage.rs:173-181
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- [LOW] lint-allow (architecture lint, not security) — crates/core/src/bin/upload_sheet_assets/main.rs:21 + 4 test files
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- [LOW] floor-guard-waiver (fixture lines, not security) — scripts/floor-clarification-check.sh:42-45
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- [LOW] serde-tolerance (pre-existing, characterised only) — crates/core/tests/characterisation_serde_tolerance.rs
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PROOF: semgrep 45 rules on 25 files → 0 findings; checklist 21 checks → 10 findings
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```
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## Method
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- semgrep 1.168.0, the three pinned packs, `--metrics=off`, on the 25 existing files of the diff:
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45 rules applied (Rust, bash, JSON, YAML, Markdown), 0 findings, 0 errors, 0 skipped rules.
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Semgrep's Rust coverage is thin, so the review below is mostly manual reading.
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- Checklist (8): hardcoded secret, SQL by concatenation, unsanitised render, sensitive endpoint
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authz, internals surfaced, secret in a log, tracked `.env` / credential file, guardrails scanner
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(`scan.py --domain api,supabase`: 0 FAIL, 1 WARN outside the diff, see below).
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- Anti-gaming (1): every added suppression or waiver line in the diff.
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- Brief focus (12): destination allowlist, redirects, proxy, key exposure (logs, errors, argv, env,
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stubs, e2e), path traversal and symlinks, TOCTOU, size and memory bounds, overwrite / delete /
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visibility, partial failure and resume, error classification, retries on non-idempotent calls,
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dependency additions.
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- Dynamic, hermetic only: `cargo test -p faunosteo-core --features upload --locked` on
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`upload_tool`, `curation_upload`, `curation_caps`, `characterisation_serde_tolerance`: 25/25
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pass (loopback stub, made-up key, `SUPABASE_*` unset). A scratch probe (scratchpad crate, path
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dependency, `--offline`) fed 40 crafted URLs to `check_destination`.
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## What holds (verified, not taken from the docs)
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- Destination allowlist. 40 probes: decimal, hex, octal and short IPv4 forms (`2130706433`,
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`0x7f000001`, `0177.0.0.1`, `127.1`) all normalise to a loopback and are accepted as such;
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IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`, `[::ffff:7f00:1]`), `0.0.0.0`, `0`, `localhost.`,
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`localhost.localdomain`, `127.0.0.1.nip.io`, public addresses, names, `ws:`, `file:`, `https:`,
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zone ids are refused. Userinfo and backslash tricks (`evil.com\@127.0.0.1`, `127.0.0.1:54321@evil.com`,
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`evil.com#@127.0.0.1`) are refused. Accepted oddities (`http://@127.0.0.1:p`, percent-encoded or
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full-width `localhost`, `http:127.0.0.1:p`, trailing `/.`) all reduce to an allowed host. The
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decisive property: the origin used for every request is rebuilt from the parsed `Host` and port
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(`upload.rs:224-233`), never the raw string, so no check/use parser differential exists.
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- The key is read only after the destination check (`main.rs:110-115`) and after every local file
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is verified (`main.rs:177-178`): a refused destination or a bad file sends nothing.
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- No redirect: `max_redirects(0)` in ureq 3.4.2 returns the 3xx as a response, never follows it and
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never errors (`ureq-3.4.2/src/run.rs:224-236`, `config.rs:257-258`); the 3xx then fails
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`expect_status`. No proxy: `.proxy(None)` overrides the default `Proxy::try_from_env()`
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(`ALL_PROXY` / `HTTP_PROXY`). No `gzip` / `brotli` features (workspace `Cargo.toml:43`), so no
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decompression bomb; every body is capped (1 MiB, objects 16 MiB + 1).
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- Key never in a URL, a message or a log: two headers only (`storage.rs:88-89`), `Secret` has a
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redacted `Debug` and no `Display`, `Storage` has no `Debug`; `required_env` names the variable,
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never the value; ureq error texts (`error.rs:229-276`) carry no header value; server bodies are
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never echoed (`expect_status`). Test key is a made-up literal (`upload_tool.rs:14`).
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- No overwrite, delete or visibility change: only GET and POST are issued (`storage.rs:104, 123,
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142, 161, 177`), uploads carry `x-upsert: false`, the bucket must answer `public: false`, an
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existing object is hashed and other bytes refuse the run.
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- Order and resume: whole plan computed read-only before the first write (`main.rs:180`); the
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object is read back and hashed before the row is confirmed (`main.rs:147-163`). The POST retry is
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safe: a retried create that already landed answers Duplicate, which leads to the read-back check;
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the confirm RPC is idempotent (`20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:41-50`).
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- Paths: folder and files canonicalised and confined with component-wise `starts_with`; manifest
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file names are `[A-Za-z0-9._-]`, no leading dot, `.svg`; ids are lowercase hex / uuid, so the
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object key and the PostgREST filter carry no injection.
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- Memory: drawings are read under 16 MiB, then refused above 2 MiB by the SVG reader
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(`prescan.rs:33`), so at most 64 x 2 MiB is held; curation files now capped at 4 MiB with
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`take(cap + 1)` (`import_equine.rs:93-99`) and in the core (`schema.rs:386-392`).
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- C1: `curation/upload.rs` has no `std::fs`, `std::env`, socket or clock. `ureq` is optional under
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`upload` only; `crates/wasm` enables `pdf-read, pdf-write` only. Cargo.lock adds one edge
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(`faunosteo-core -> ureq`); ureq 3.4.2 was already locked for the worker, no new package.
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## Findings
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### M1 [MEDIUM] service and anon keys on process argv in the e2e script
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`scripts/sheet-assets-e2e.sh:29` runs `env -i ... SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY="$key" "$BIN"`:
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`env` is `/usr/bin/env`, an external process, so the key sits in its argv, readable by every local
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user through `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and `ps`, and recorded by any execve audit rule. Line 31,
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`grep -qF -e "$key" -e "$SERVICE" -e "$ANON"`, puts the service and anon keys on the argv of an
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external `grep`. This contradicts the script's own header ("held in variables, never printed") and
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the C7 intent. Impact is bounded: the key is the local stack's, the machine is single-user, the
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window is short, the owner runs the script. Hint: pass the key as a bash prefix assignment in a
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subshell that first unsets the variables you want cleared (`( unset FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST INIT_CWD;
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SUPABASE_URL="$url" SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY="$key" exec "$BIN" "$@" )`), and match with
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`grep -qF -f <(printf '%s\n' "$key" "$SERVICE" "$ANON")` (`printf` is a builtin).
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### L1 [LOW] service key in the environment of the compile step
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`scripts/upload-sheet-assets.sh:14` runs `cargo run --release`: on a first run, or after any source
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or lockfile change, cargo builds with the operator's exported `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY` visible
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to every build script and proc-macro of the dependency tree. The tree is locked and cargo-deny'd,
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so this is a supply-chain exposure only. Hint: `env -u SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY cargo build
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--release --locked ...`, then `exec target/release/upload-sheet-assets "$@"`.
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### L2 [LOW] destination trust: cleartext key, DEV address not proven local
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The key always travels over plain `http` (https is refused), with no server authentication. Any
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process listening on the allowed local port receives it: declared and accepted in RUST.md §11.16.
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The DEV branch (`upload.rs:194-198`) accepts any private IPv4 equal to `FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST`
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without proving it is an address of this machine; if both variables name another LAN host, the key
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crosses the LAN in clear. C2 allows this and `scripts/dev-env.sh:15` derives the address from
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`hostname -I` by default. Hint: in the binary, `UdpSocket::bind((ip, 0))` succeeds only for a
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local interface address; refuse otherwise.
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### L3 [LOW] non-transient client-side errors retried and reported as Network
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`storage.rs:76-81` maps every `ureq::Error` to `Network`, retries three times, exit 3. That
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includes `BodyExceedsLimit` when the destination holds an object above 16 MiB + 1 under the key
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(a State condition: downloaded three times, then "network error") and `Error::Http` from a key
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holding characters invalid in a header (a usage error). No write follows either case, so no
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security consequence, but C6 says refusals are final and C8 that errors are classified. Hint:
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match `BodyExceedsLimit` to `State` and `Http` / `BadUri` to a non-retried kind.
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### L4 [LOW] exit code 2 documented as "usage"
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`docs/development/SUPABASE.md:152` lists "2 usage"; a wrong argument count exits 1 with kind
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`Content` (`main.rs:167-175`, asserted by `upload_tool.rs:314`). The code matches C8 ("2 usage
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(argument not UTF-8)"); the runbook overstates. Hint: say "2 an argument is not UTF-8".
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### L5 [LOW] check/open race on file reads (documented, mitigated)
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`main.rs:49-67`: canonicalise, then `metadata`, then `open` the canonical path; a component swap
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between them is not defended, as the comment states. Mitigation is real: the bytes read must hash to
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the manifest's sha256 and pass the SVG reader, so a swap cannot exfiltrate unknown content. Single
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user working copy.
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### L6 [LOW] confirmation not bound to the hash (pre-existing RPC)
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`storage.rs:173-181` confirms by asset id; the row hash is checked at plan time and the object is
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verified just before, but `confirm_sheet_asset_upload(asset_id)`
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(`supabase/migrations/20261009100000_sheet_asset_storage.sql:34-52`, outside the diff) does not
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re-check `sha256`. A row hash change between plan and confirm would confirm an unverified pairing.
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No API role writes asset rows (`authenticated` holds SELECT only), so the window needs a
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service-role actor. Note for a future migration (an expected-hash parameter), not this diff.
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### L7 [LOW] new lint allows (context, not a security suppression)
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`main.rs:21` `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` and the same inner attribute (plus
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`unwrap_used`, `expect_used`) at the head of the four new test files. `clippy.toml` lists clock,
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file and environment methods: an architecture lint for the core's I/O purity (C1), the same pattern
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as `import_equine.rs` and `report_compare.rs`. Not a security checker, not blocking. CLAUDE.md
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still says "the two files allowed std::fs"; it is three now.
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### L8 [LOW] floor-guard waivers on fixture lines (context)
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`scripts/floor-clarification-check.sh:42-45` carry `# floor-guard: allow negative-proof fixture`
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on lines that write `@ts-ignore`, `nosemgrep` and `nosec` into a `mktemp -d` throwaway repo. The
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tokens are bash string literals; they silence no semgrep or security check on this repository
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(no finding on those lines, semgrep ignores `nosec`). The waiver silences floor-guard (a test-floor
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guard, printed WAIVED) and carries no `[gated <date>]` marker. Not blocking under the security
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rule; reported so the orchestrator sees it.
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### L9 [LOW] serde tolerance of the gated readers (pre-existing, characterised only)
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`crates/core/tests/characterisation_serde_tolerance.rs` pins that the R2 contracts accept a struct
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as a positional array and a unit enum as a one-key map, where Zod refused. This reaches the
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untrusted PDF import path: an integrity risk for crafted files (fields assigned in the wrong order
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without error), not a memory or execution one. No reader changed in this diff; the owner decision
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is pending before R5.6 (RUST.md §11.16).
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## Outside the diff (not counted)
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- guardrails WARN `SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER`
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`supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql:1177` (`species_select_active` not
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tied to `auth.uid()`): file not in the diff.
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- Blind spot for the owner: `supabase/config.toml` sets no `jwt_secret` and no signing keys, so
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the local stack most likely signs with the Supabase CLI default secret, making the local
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`service_role` key a publicly documented value. ENVIRONMENTS.md exposes the API port 54321 to
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the LAN. If that holds, anyone on the private network can already act as `service_role` on the
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DEV stack, and the care this tool takes with the key protects little there. I did not run
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`supabase status` to confirm the key value.
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- Not verified here: `scripts/sheet-assets-e2e.sh` against the real stack (owner-run by design;
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not run, per the brief). The anon-key and wrong-key cases rely on the real Storage answer.
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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
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# R5.5 verification — round 1 (fresh verifier, Opus; pinned model out of credits) on 2c44506 + a481af5
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Contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-23-rust-r5-upload.md`. Persisted by the orchestrator (the verifier is read-only).
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VERIFY — VERDICT: ECARTS(4)
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- C1 MET, C2 MET (`http://127.0.0.1:80` refused, stricter, pinned), C3 MET, C4 MET
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- C5 NOT-MET: an object over MAX_ASSET_BYTES+1 hits ureq BodyExceedsLimit, mapped to Network and retried; exit 3 instead of a final State (no write happens, safety holds)
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- C6 NOT-MET: ATTEMPTS = 3 is three attempts (two retries), not "retried three times"
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- C7 MET (observation: e2e script puts the key on `env` argv, security M1)
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- C8 MET, C9 MET, C10 MET
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- C11 NOT-MET: SUPABASE.md exit codes say "2 usage", code exits 1 on usage; exit-1 list misses manifest and handshake. Nit: serde table "zone as array" row unpinned and contradictory wording
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- C12 MET (no frozen path in the diff, documentSha256 27c7383c…2660, import --check 0 differences 6+12)
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- C13 MET with caveat: `floor-clarification-check.sh` cannot print OK while the declared evals.md:205 STUB stands
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- C14 UNVERIFIABLE by the verifier (check:all ran elsewhere: green 21:21:38, log in the session scratchpad)
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- FLOOR diff-scoped: clean, 4 waived (fixture lines authorised by the R5.4 clarification)
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- Runs: cargo test upload 251/29 suites, curation 241/27, workspace 277 (1 ignored), cli 259; fmt, clippy (5 configs), deny ok; `--check` RSS 18696 KB
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## Fixes after round 1 (orchestrator)
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C5: `final_error` maps BodyExceedsLimit to a final State, test `an_oversized_object_is_a_final_state_refusal_not_retried`. C6: ATTEMPTS = 4 (one try, three retries). C11: SUPABASE.md exit codes and retry wording; RUST.md table row reworded. C13: the script lists the declared line apart (still not requalified) and prints OK. Security M1, L1, L2, L3 fixed (RUST.md §11.16, gate round 1).
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