chore(memory): registries upgraded to format 2 (memory.sh upgrade)

Index-only dates and statuses become body lines, frontmatter format: 2,
Index tables removed. memory.sh check rc 0 before and after; digest
statuses unchanged (BLK-008, BLK-009 open).
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@@ -1,10 +1,29 @@
---
format: 2
type: evals_registry
entry_prefix: EVAL
schema:
id: EVAL-XXX
date: YYYY-MM-DD
output: string (what was produced)
method: string (how it was evaluated - manual read, test, benchmark, user feedback)
anomalies: list of strings (what was wrong, missing, surprising)
action: [keep | correct | deprecate]
rules:
- Log an eval whenever you validate the quality of something Claude produced (report, audit, plan, generated code).
- Action keep - the output is fit for purpose as-is.
- Action correct - needs revision; capture what.
- Action deprecate - the approach itself is flawed; link to the decision that replaces it.
- Entries in English, caveman format (BDR-009): drop articles + filler, fragments OK, technical terms exact.
---
# Evals Registry
Format: EVAL-XXX | Date | What evaluated | Method | Result | Anomalies | Action
---
## EVAL-001 | 2026-05-18 | Scaffold build + test pass
## EVAL-001 — Scaffold build + test pass (2026-05-18)
Method: pnpm install → pnpm build → pnpm test:run → pnpm typecheck.
Result: all pass, 0 errors.
@@ -13,7 +32,7 @@ Action: document in BDR-007, BLK-001.
---
## EVAL-002 | 2026-05-20 | B3 i18n — code review caught hardcoded FR in PDF import
## EVAL-002 — B3 i18n — code review caught hardcoded FR in PDF import (2026-05-20)
Method: cavecrew-reviewer ran against full diff `0a05c47..HEAD` after self-review + analyzer agent both reported CLEAN.
Result: reviewer flagged 3 CRITICAL: pdf/import.ts:9, pdf/attachment.ts:9-10, app/routes/HomeRoute.tsx:32 — hardcoded FR error messages leaking to EN UI.
@@ -22,42 +41,42 @@ Action: fixed in d602726+next via typed ImportError discriminant (BDR-015). Futu
---
## EVAL-003 | 2026-05-21 | PDF vet-marker ⚠ WinAnsi crash slipped past CI
## EVAL-003 — PDF vet-marker ⚠ WinAnsi crash slipped past CI (2026-05-21)
Method: user manual export of a v2.0 horse report containing requires_vet_referral leaves → `EditorRoute.tsx:263 PDF export failed Error: WinAnsi cannot encode "⚠" (0x26a0)`.
Result: 154/154 tests stayed green; bug shipped to user-facing path. Static signal absent (the ⚠ literal was visible in the source but typecheck/lint don't flag font-encoding issues).
Anomaly: pdf.roundtrip.test.ts exercised export with empty observations + no vet findings. The ⚠ prefix was added in 60e1b04-era (`observationPage.ts:407` ternary) without a regression case covering a flagged leaf.
Action: hotfix swapped ⚠ → `(!) ` (WinAnsi-safe). Added regression `vet-referral marker is encodable by the body font` that calls `widthOfTextAtSize` on a prefixed label — would catch any future non-WinAnsi marker. LRN-021 captured the pdf-lib StandardFonts WinAnsi limitation. Follow-up: switch PDF body to embedded TTF (Inter/Fraunces per CLAUDE.md spec) so the catalog can carry arbitrary glyphs — out of hotfix scope.
## EVAL-004 | 2026-07-12 | Tour sweep converged 3 it. — agent spend-limit deaths resumable
## EVAL-004 — Tour sweep converged 3 it. — agent spend-limit deaths resumable (2026-07-12)
Method: /tour full pipeline on faunosteo — semgrep floor ×3 + cso posture (it1) + full clean audit + fresh independent re-verify + doc-syncer. 13 fixed / 10 open residuals / 6 bugs quarantined; 11 commits on unmerged chore/tour-2026-07-12.
Result: re-verify PASS (0 findings on 20 modified files); checks green throughout (typecheck, lint 0, 174/174, build, docker run non-root). Convergence honest: it2 surfaced 1 new tuning note (min-release-age 1440 < 10080 rec) → triaged open → it3 semgrep identical → converged at 3-iteration bound.
Anomaly: both Phase A agents died mid-run on "monthly spend limit" — SendMessage to same agentId resumed from transcript, zero rework. PostToolUse hook false-positived 3× on 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML' as prose inside audit REPORTS (not code).
Action: none blocking. Consider excluding .claude/audits/*.md from sink-pattern hook scan.
## EVAL-005 | 2026-10-08 | Step 1 characterisation suite (91 cases)
## EVAL-005 — Step 1 characterisation suite (91 cases) (2026-10-08)
Method: 7 files on real assets (SVG, catalog, fixtures), oracle = audit tables (06 §4, 05 §2.4). Run typecheck/test/lint/build.
Result: 271/271 green, 0 src change. Audit figures all confirmed (26 mappings score 0, 792/612/41, 48 attrs…).
Anomalies: 4 assertions wrong on first run, all test-side (census regex, stale closure, ZONES drawn as bullet rows not ' · ' line, attachment names in object streams). None app-side.
Action: LRN-033. Known quirks pinned as "KNOWN:" tests (orphan findings, no_attachment cause lost, sphenoid id, fuzzy FR pairs).
## EVAL-006 | 2026-10-08 | Step 3 Supabase foundation — PGlite suite
## EVAL-006 — Step 3 Supabase foundation — PGlite suite (2026-10-08)
Method: 4 pgTAP files (81 checks: schema/privileges 24, profiles RLS 17, platform roles 28, audit 12) + schema↔types (6) + client (2) on PGlite; root typecheck/lint/build; app suite.
Result: all green first run except plan count (27→28) and pgtap-in-public polluting function census; 278 app + 13 package tests. Zero app behaviour change.
Anomalies: `set_config` rows appear in TAP line capture (noise, filtered by regex). `now()` constant in tx broke naive updated_at>created_at assertion.
Action: LRN-035/036. Not executed: real Supabase image (`supabase test db`), `gen types` diff, seed.sql (needs auth.identities + extensions.crypt), REST manual script. Flagged in report + BLK-006.
## EVAL-007 | 2026-10-08 | Step 3 on the real Supabase stack
## EVAL-007 — Step 3 on the real Supabase stack (2026-10-08)
Method: `supabase start` (postgres 17.11.0.004), `supabase test db`, `gen types --local` diff, REST curl script (SUPABASE.md §8) with seed users, psql on audit, `db reset`.
Result: migrations + seed apply from zero; pgTAP 81/81 after fix; REST: alice 1 row, anon 42501, self-deactivate 42501 (column grant), self-grant 42501 (RPC message), cross-row PATCH 0 rows, owner grant → uuid, alice sees her role, owner reads 3 profiles; audit shows system bootstrap + owner grant.
Anomalies: (1) 6 pgTAP counts assumed empty DB — seed rows on real stack (PGlite runs no seed) → scoped to fixture ids + neutralise foreign owners before last-owner test. (2) CLI gen output unformatted + `ComputedFields: never`, no `__InternalSupabase` → hand-written file replaced by generated+prettier; scripts pipe prettier. PGlite harness had hidden both: environment parity gap, not logic gap.
Action: LRN-037 (tests must be seed-agnostic; generated files via deterministic formatter). BLK-006 resolved.
## EVAL-008 | 2026-10-08 | Step 4 sheet model — domain tests, pgTAP both engines, fresh verifier + security gates
## EVAL-008 — Step 4 sheet model — domain tests, pgTAP both engines, fresh verifier + security gates (2026-10-08)
Method: packages/domain 61 vitest (schema 29 + integrity 32, one per rule code); pgTAP 005 (127 checks) + 001 census on PGlite and real stack (`db reset`, `db test` 210/210, `gen types` diff clean); root check (typecheck, 356 tests, lint 0, build); fresh verifier (contract C1–C13) + security-auditor (semgrep 725 rules 0 findings + checklist).
Result: first gate pass → verifier ECARTS(5), security BLOCK(1): private EXECUTE not revoked (BLK-007), visibility change unaudited, 7 RPCs without non-editor denial test, doc/code mismatches, 75-line SQL function, `any` suppression in a test. All fixed same session: +32 pgTAP checks, hardening migration, visibility RPC, caps, authz-first, SQL check split in 4 functions, `set()/unset()` typed mutations. Second pass: fresh verifier (pending at write time).
@@ -65,7 +84,7 @@ Anomalies: 6 test-side fixes on first pgTAP run (RLS hides rows → "no change"
Action: LRN-038/039/040, BLK-007. Keep the two-gate pass on every migration step.
## EVAL-009 | 2026-10-09 | Step 4b equine import — importer tests, pgTAP both engines, Docker build, gates
## EVAL-009 — Step 4b equine import — importer tests, pgTAP both engines, Docker build, gates (2026-10-09)
Method: packages/anatomy 30 vitest (counts in=out on both sides, special cases, determinism, golden artifacts, guards); pgTAP 001–007 on PGlite and real stack (`db reset`, `db test` 256/256, `gen types` diff clean); root check (61+30+20+278, lint 0, build); `docker build` of the app image; Storage API end-to-end (owner 400 before confirmation → 200 after, alice/anon 400); fresh verifier (C1–C12) + security-auditor (semgrep 130 rules, 0 findings).
Result: first pass verifier ECARTS(4) (self-referential in=out control, undeclared importer-authored labels, docs vs literal sql_paths, silent FR→EN fallback) + security PASS with MEDIUM hash-claim bypass (register_sheet_asset accepts any sha256 → editor reads foreign objects). All fixed: `uploaded_at` + `confirm_sheet_asset_upload` (service role) required by the read predicate, bob-claims-hash pgTAP, authored-label anomalies (27 anomalies now), seeds-listed test, Dockerfile missing workspace manifests (found by building, not by the gates).
@@ -74,7 +93,7 @@ Action: fresh verifier re-dispatched on the delta; BDR-034, LRN-041.
---
## EVAL-010 | 2026-10-10 | Step 4c equine curation — research agents, changeset, gates
## EVAL-010 — Step 4c equine curation — research agents, changeset, gates (2026-10-10)
Method: 4 research agents (skull, axial, limbs, osteo/legal), every citation tagged VERIFIED-fetched/snippet/UNVERIFIED; changeset authored in scratch python (44 changes / 679 ops / 48 refs) → pipeline Zod + 20 integrity rules; anatomy 100 vitest (ops, rename propagation, overlay, golden), pgTAP 001–008 on PGlite and real stack (`db reset`, `db test` 267/267, `gen types` diff clean); root check (68+21+100+278, lint 0, build); `docker build`; Storage e2e after upload (owner 200, alice/anon 400); gridded `magick` crops to verify point positions; fresh verifier ×3 + security-auditor ×1.
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(4): B changes left targets `inherited` (CHG-008/032/039 + partials), 3 stale doc numbers, lockfile outside contract scope (orchestrator omission), eslint-disable any in a test → executor: applier rule (B/C ⇒ touched findings/annotations `to_confirm`, `reviewed` refused in B/C), typed test reads, docs. Pass 2 ECARTS(2): JSAVA citation without author (completed from the PDF: Le Roux & Carstens 2018, DOI), DEPLOY.md stale `faunosteo-web`. Pass 3 ECARTS(1): 3 stale doc lines (migration list, "two assets", CLAUDE.md migrations) → fixed by hand, cap of 3 verifier passes reached, not re-verified. Security PASS, LOW: SQL gate did not check reference url scheme → `reference.url.scheme` added (migration still unmerged, pgTAP 008 10 cases); `.env.example` COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME=osteo-report overrides compose `name:` → file denied to Claude, user action.
@@ -83,14 +102,14 @@ Action: user validation of the draft content (REVIEW-REPORT §10: 11 questions);
---
## EVAL-011 | 2026-10-10 | Step 5 app on the canonical sheet — suites on the bundled sheet, archive PDFs, gates
## EVAL-011 — Step 5 app on the canonical sheet — suites on the bundled sheet, archive PDFs, gates (2026-10-10)
Method: golden v2 PDFs frozen from the old pipeline before any change; suites rewritten on the bundled draft (domain 94, anatomy 107, supabase 21, app 168+: service branches 10/5/12/1, store + v2 draft migration, provider, canvas, pickers, card, route click chain, PDF v3 roundtrip FR/EN + both v2 fixtures + synthetic removed/unknown ids); root check, vite builds none/draft (grep of a draft label in dist = 0/1), docker build, real stack 267/267 + types; legacy-vs-app marker style diff by the verifier (0 differences); fresh verifier ×3 + security-auditor ×1.
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(36) = 4 real (golden test not pinning the new generated files, EditorRoute 398 lines, 5 stale doc lines, one eslint-disable) + my contract omissions (scope files, deleted legacy suites) + floor noise ("species" matched "spec"); pass 2 ECARTS(4) = replacement assertions missing for 4 deleted suites; pass 3 ECARTS(4) = doc counts + 3 more suites' assertions (PDF conclusion/metadata/attachment structure, ObservationCard, persistence). All closed by executors (two) and by hand (docs); cap of 3 passes reached → last lot not re-verified. Security PASS with LOW: prototype-key lookup on untrusted ids (fixed: Object.hasOwn + test), unbounded inflate on the primary attachment path + no file cap (fixed: 16 MiB attachment, 50 MB PDF + test), denylist SVG sanitiser acceptable while assets are repo-built (allowlist before Storage-served assets, Step 13).
Anomalies: executor ran `pnpm format` repo-wide and reverted by hand (watch for `format` in briefs); foreign JSON attachment (no version) surfaced as incompatible_version → fixed to no_attachment (legacy message); verifier floor counts deleted legacy tests as findings until CLARIFICATIONS name them.
Action: user validation of Step 5 (manual FR/EN flow, visual before/after); BDR-038, LRN-043.
## EVAL-012 | 2026-10-10 | Step 5 addendum during user manual validation — per-leaf migration tests, archive check tool, final controls
## EVAL-012 — Step 5 addendum during user manual validation — per-leaf migration tests, archive check tool, final controls (2026-10-10)
Method: user asked (while testing) for final controls on last lot + per-leaf test beyond the map + simple v2/v3 PDF comparison method. Built: anatomy test all 612 legacy leaves through `migrateReportV2ToV3` with committed map vs draft document (442 identical / 141 moved = 134 category + 7 leaf renames / 29 removed, snapshots + vet flag verbatim, 26 annotations on right view, v3 re-read stable); app test same leaves via `sheetIndex.nodeAt` + v3 PDF roundtrip; CLI `pnpm report:compare` (pure module + entry, `readAttachedDocument` split out of `extractReportJson`, behaviour unchanged). Contract criteria 16-18 added, gates MET, fresh verifier ×3 + security ×2.
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(2) = floor only (EVAL-011 prose "eslint-disable" false positive → CLARIFICATIONS; 11 dropped `regionFromLabel` assertions → new `legacy.regions.test.ts` on `inferRegionCode`); security PASS + 2 MEDIUM (terminal control chars in untrusted strings; free text printed by default) → executor: `esc()` + `--full` privacy default; pass 2 ECARTS(1) (`--diff` still clear text, JSON.parse message echoed attachment fragment) + security PASS 4 LOW → executor: diff follows `--full`, generic reason, Cc/Cf escaping, regular files only; pass 3 CONFORME. Workspace 94/21/119/181, docker build OK.
@@ -100,7 +119,7 @@ Action: await user manual validation of Step 5; residuals in TODO follow-up.
---
## EVAL-013 | 2026-10-11 | Step 6 autonomous PDF archives — 5 phases by executors, 3 verifier passes, 4 security audits
## EVAL-013 — Step 6 autonomous PDF archives — 5 phases by executors, 3 verifier passes, 4 security audits (2026-10-11)
Method: analysis (3 analyzers + measurements) challenged by 3 plan-challengers (correctness/robustness/simplicity, 48 findings folded in) → user validation with D7/D8/D13 adjustments → Part II contract (exact types) → one executor per phase (0 freeze goldens, 1 domain, 2 anatomy compose, 3 engine, 4 app) with closed contracts, orchestrator commits → whole-step verifier + security auditor → fix loops.
Result: Phase 0 froze 39 goldens (text/images/links per locale × logo mode, view facts) + 2 route characterisation tests with the OLD code; engine reproduced 36 goldens with 0 mismatch (views: data-* 2→0 and hidden-marker titles declared relaxed). Verifier pass 1 ECARTS(31) = all oracle/scope defects of MY contract (grep on parametrised table, xmldom filter, narrow FILE SCOPE, 3 deleted tests with moved coverage) → contract amended → pass 2 CONFORME 13/13. Security pass 1 BLOCK(1) HIGH real + PoC: archived branding URL written unescaped into `/URI` (PDF object injection via `exportFromEnvelope`), +3 MEDIUM/4 LOW → executor fixed (hex URI, strict URL schema, export re-validation, PNG IHDR budget, CSS-escape rules, NaN guard, file.size) → pass 2 PASS but 2 MEDIUM incl. a regression the fix introduced (UTF-16 BOM URI dead in poppler) + PNG double-IHDR bypass → executor → pass 3 PASS + 1 MEDIUM (UPNG nextZero spin on tEXt) → executor (chunk allowlist + IEND) → pass 4 PASS + 3 MEDIUM (UPNG `inflateRaw` spins on truncated IDAT with allowlisted chunks only; IHDR fields unvalidated; zero dimension) → executor: native bounded `inflateFlate` of the IDAT against the exact raw size, IHDR fields, sides ≥ 1, no interlace, raw ≤ 16 MiB → pass 5 focused. Lesson: a third-party decoder on untrusted bytes needs a native oracle in front, not a chunk allowlist. Final: 656 tests (194/21/130/88/223), typecheck, lint, build, docker ×4 green; goldens byte-identical since 8b86b92.
@@ -109,159 +128,159 @@ Action: await user manual validation + UX decision on re-export of the kept arch
---
## EVAL-014 | 2026-10-11 | Step 6 closure round — manual-test feedback, BLK-009 scanner, final audits
## EVAL-014 — Step 6 closure round — manual-test feedback, BLK-009 scanner, final audits (2026-10-11)
Method: user manual tests round 1 (logos absent, picker blurry) → reproduction attempts (headless Chromium dev/preview/Docker, Firefox 157 via esbuild harness + raw WebDriver BiDi client, CDP LayerTree, LCD-fringe metric, headed runs on the Wayland session) → fixes by executors → user round 2 confirmed both OK → closure decisions → BLK-009 implemented (byte-scan reader, no object streams) → verifier + 2 security audits + 1 fix loop.
Result: neither visual defect reproduced here (4 environments, 2 engines, 2 PDF renderers); shipped the environment-independent fixes (branding bundled, no fetch; warnings surfaced) and the user confirmed logos + crisp text. Scanner: verifier CONFORME 7/7; audit 1 PASS + 2 MEDIUM (Chromium DecompressionStream read-ahead defeats the cancel: +2.2 GB on a 4 GiB bomb; ×32 candidate CPU) → executor (16 KiB slice feeding, shared 16 MiB budget, monotonic bounded endstream search, `{` pre-check; 133 pdf tests) → audit 2 focused. Workspace 710 tests, build, docker green.
Anomalies: the blur fix of the previous round (will-change) had been marked PARTIALLY MET "desktop by user" — the user's "still blurry" came from that unverified half; this round could not verify real-GPU text rendering either (headless engines render grayscale AA, headed captures failed) → lesson: a screen-rendering defect needs the user's own capture + an A/B recipe early, not days of headless measurement. The Node vitest suite cannot observe browser stream read-ahead: record browser-only bounds as owed manual checks (PDF_IMPORT_HARDENING §5).
Action: BLK-009 stays "mitigated, gate open" (BDR-040); Step 6 finished into develop; release/0.2.0 prepped for the user's go.
## EVAL-015 | 2026-10-11 | Step 7 identity — gates on the whole step
## EVAL-015 — Step 7 identity — gates on the whole step (2026-10-11)
Method: contract with 16 criteria (`2026-10-11-step-07-verify.md`) → fresh verifier; security-auditor (semgrep 159 rules + checklist) on `c746952..HEAD`; headless e2e vs the local stack (playwright-core in scratchpad, Mailpit API); real-stack pgTAP + docker build by the orchestrator.
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(2): (a) real gap, `safeNextPath` prefix check let `/\host` and `/<TAB>/host` through (router `location.assign` fallback = open redirect after login) → fixed by resolving against a sentinel origin and rebuilding from parsed parts, 5 new cases; (b) contract regex over-matched other unions (`'google' | 'apple'`, `'fr' | 'en'`) → CHECK scoped. Pass 2 CONFORME 16/16. Security PASS, 1 MEDIUM (same redirect, already fixed) + 4 LOW: 3 closed same session (sign-out failure reported, `reauthentication_needed` phrased, exact prod redirect allowlist documented), 1 pre-existing (TOTP not enforced for staff = documented gap). E2E 20/20. Workspace 763 tests, lint 0, build, docker, real-stack pgTAP 280 green.
Anomalies: both gates found the same redirect hole my own tests missed → a prefix check on a URL is never enough, parse it; the auditor misread the sign-out note ("this device") as "everywhere" but the LOW still pointed at a silent failure path worth phrasing. Mockups validated with ChatGPT are not in the repo: the screens follow the written direction and the existing tokens, pixel fidelity unverifiable here.
Action: awaiting user validation of Step 7 (manual procedure IDENTITY.md §5); release/0.2.0 still open for the human go.
## EVAL-016 | 2026-10-12 | Rust-by-default architecture review — 4 analyzers + 3 researchers + 3 plan-challengers
## EVAL-016 — Rust-by-default architecture review — 4 analyzers + 3 researchers + 3 plan-challengers (2026-10-12)
Method: 4 read-only analyzers (domain, anatomy, pdf + app pdf side, app logic + supabase) wrote factual inventories to the scratchpad; 3 general-purpose researchers verified crate versions/maintenance/advisories and Supabase facts on crates.io, RustSec, GitHub, supabase docs (2026-10-12), UNVERIFIED items listed; study rev 1 written from them, committed (6a078da); 3 plan-challengers (correctness FATAL(11), robustness FATAL(11), simplicity CONCERNS(9); 61 findings) → rev 2 with 56 folded, 2 declined with reasons (§0.2).
Result: real blockers caught by the gates, not by me: (1) VI.4 deleted TS modules still imported by later-phase TS consumers (pipeline, engine); (2) production CSP `script-src 'self'` refuses wasm, VPS 1 GB compiles images; plus wrong premises: envelope byte-parity (integer-valued floats, insertion order), Prettier identity overstated (hash only compared), `catch_unwind` unusable on wasm32 (panic=abort), serde-wasm-bindgen null-for-absent, parent re-decode breaking the keyless invariant, Step 15 misread as server rendering. Simplicity: 6 crates → 3, dual-run harness → frozen goldens, Landlock + 3 rlimits redundant, constraints generator/schemars/cargo-chef/cargo-audit/infer/img-parts dropped.
Anomalies: one analyzer had a read-only `find -exec cat | wc -l` refused (no rule named) and re-ran as `find | xargs wc -l` (already allowed earlier) — reported to the user as a possible workaround; agents flagged writing report files to the scratchpad against their default (orchestrator asked for it). Three challenger claims came from memory not code (json_compatible null, panic=abort, musl mprotect) → folded as "verify at R0/R1".
Action: owner validates study + D-R1..D-R14; nothing implemented; CLAUDE.md rule section added; TODO roadmap lines.
## EVAL-017 | 2026-10-13 | Rust R0 foundation — proofs in the real environment, 3 verifier passes, 3 security passes
## EVAL-017 — Rust R0 foundation — proofs in the real environment, 3 verifier passes, 3 security passes (2026-10-13)
Method: contract `2026-10-13-rust-r0-verify.md` (16 criteria, CHECK/EXPECT) → fresh verifier; security-auditor on `5fec065..HEAD` (semgrep p/security-audit + p/secrets + p/owasp-top-ten + checklist + manual Rust review); all cargo commands through the Docker builder (no Rust on the host); worker sandbox tests + strace derivation inside the Alpine test stage on the release-profile musl binary; wasm proofs in vitest on the built module; CSP proof with the production nginx image + headers in headless Chrome 156.
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(2), pass 2 CONFORME 16/16, pass 3 ECARTS(2) — every gap an oracle of MY contract (greps counting comment lines, the contract matching its own regex, the `[gated]` SAFETY form and a second refusal arm moved by the security fixes); code behaviour confirmed by reading each time. Security pass 1 BLOCK(1) HIGH real: shell injection via the `workflow_dispatch` input of release-images.yml, + 6 MEDIUM (shared BuildKit caches, tkill/tgkill without arg filters, core dumps, creds on the runner, no advisories gate, mutable action tag) → fixed; pass 2 PASS but 3 MEDIUM introduced by my fixes (ephemeral builder never used: GITHUB_ENV applied one step too late, silent fallback; `rm -rf "$VAR"`; content reaching the `Broken` outcome via `Reject::Internal`) → fixed; pass 3 PASS, 2 new MEDIUM (unpinned setup-node and `pnpm install` inside the token job) → gates moved to a secret-less job; remaining lows documented as R1/Step 27 follow-ups. Experimental findings (LRN-049): serde_json fast float path (float_roundtrip), traps leave the instance unusable + ESM cache, RLIMIT_CPU soft=hard → SIGKILL, minimal rustup profile, cargo-deny path wildcard, 7 traced syscalls, strace blind once dumpable=0 (marker became a syscall). Final: cargo 12+14 core tests, 9 unit + 16 sandbox worker tests on the release profile, 14 vitest proofs, root `pnpm check` 777 tests green, worker image 8.7 MB read-only/cap-drop, CSP refused/accepted as predicted, floor-guard clean ×3.
Anomalies: my contract oracles cost two verifier passes (lesson repeated from EVAL-013: run every CHECK once before dispatch, and re-run them after any fix commit); two of my own security fixes created new findings (an env variable applied too late, a recursive delete through a variable: the exact pattern the destructive-tools rule forbids) → fixes to CI files need the same adversarial pass as code; a scripted edit silently aborted on a rustfmt-reformatted string and the commit went out with the old test (caught by the next build); the `[gated 2026-10-13]` SAFETY markers were placed by me at the auditor's request, not by the owner → surfaced in the report for the owner's confirmation; one security-auditor Bash call (`cat` of two files) was refused twice by the auto-mode hook, the agent used Read instead (reported, no workaround). Not proven here: the Gitea runner (caches, timings, workflow syntax such as job-level env, actions/cache), HTTPS from the worker (no HTTP client before R1), browser-side fresh-instance mechanism (R2).
Action: owner validation of R0 (report with proved vs hypothetical); R1 not started.
## EVAL-018 | 2026-10-13 | R0 correction: native Rust toolchain on the Ubuntu dev server — 2 verifier passes, 2 security passes
## EVAL-018 — R0 correction: native Rust toolchain on the Ubuntu dev server — 2 verifier passes, 2 security passes (2026-10-13)
Method: host audit first (rustup already user-level, 1.99.0 auto-installed by `rustup show`, system deps present, no sudo); installs `--locked`; scripts moved to `scripts/`, `pnpm check:all` gate; contract `2026-10-13-rust-r0-native-verify.md` (11 criteria) dry-run by me before dispatch (3 oracles fixed: comment prose matched a code grep, per-package vitest totals, README phrasing); fresh verifier ×2; security-auditor on `bd9c7d1..6e2bbec` then on the fix commits; full gate run twice (`check-all.log`, `check-all-2.log`).
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(2) = floor STUB hits on doc prose "(not implemented)" → reworded; pass 2 CONFORME 11/11, floor clean. Security pass 1 PASS + 1 MEDIUM (no advisory check has ever run: nightly job never executed) + 6 LOW (PATH prepend, `rm -rf "$out"` via variable, prctl comment overstating the kernel contract + i32 into variadic unsigned long, dormant CI triggers, native build.rs exposure, drift gate blind to untracked files) → fixed except the trigger question (owner's CI/CD step); pass 2 PASS + 1 MEDIUM (my ci.yml drift step failed open on a git error: `test -z "$(…)"` drops the exit status) + `--untracked-files=all` + stale comment → fixed (496f549), verified by execution + shellcheck, no third dispatch (3-line change). Numbers: native rust-check 32 s warm / 1 s incremental, cold workspace build 31.5 s, wasm 224 777 B (+64 B vs builder, path strings), 14 proofs, `check:all` 1 min 59 s then 1 min 39 s, 777 Node tests, 16 sandbox tests, allowlist covers the trace, worker read-only `run --check` OK.
Anomalies: the R0 note "no cargo on the host" was stale, rustup had been installed 2026-10-12 23:27 (rtk) → always re-audit the host at session start; `rustup show` has a side effect (auto-install) → acceptable here (requested install) but say so; a fix I wrote for one security finding introduced the next MEDIUM (fail-open test) → the EVAL-017 lesson again: CI one-liners need the same scrutiny as code, prefer assign-then-test; the harness clock jumped 01:16 → 09:43 mid-session (timestamps in logs are not durations).
Action: owner's final validation of the R0 correction; R1 not started; CI/CD decision separate (trigger mode, runner label, action pinning, advisories cadence).
## EVAL-019 | 2026-10-13 | Step 8 / R1 files foundation — 2 forks, verifier ×2, security ×5, e2e ×7, browser smoke
## EVAL-019 — Step 8 / R1 files foundation — 2 forks, verifier ×2, security ×5, e2e ×7, browser smoke (2026-10-13)
Method: contract-level `STORAGE.md` written first; migration + pgTAP by me while fork A (Rust loop) and fork B (TS + UI) ran with full context; real-stack e2e (`pnpm e2e:avatar`, worker container, fresh admin user) + headless Chromium smoke (playwright-core in scratchpad, cached chromium, dev server :5174) for the browser canvas path; contract `2026-10-13-step-08-r1-verify.md` (15 criteria, oracles dry-run before dispatch) → fresh verifier; security-auditor on `3f1105b..HEAD` then focused passes on each fix commit; `pnpm check:all` ×4.
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(4) = oracle (`for update` row-lock grep) + FILE SCOPE (tracking files, lockfile) → rev 2 → CONFORME 15/15, floor clean. Security pass 1 PASS (2 MEDIUM: ceiling ratchet by rejected rows, cleartext http any host; 9 LOW) → fixed; pass 2 PASS but my fixes introduced 2 MEDIUM (bypassable host check `127.*`/numeric, ceiling undercount vs contract) → fixed; pass 3 BLOCK(1) HIGH: my purge-queue join let begin spam pin the ceiling with claims → ceiling rewritten on bytes present + cap per pending claim; pass 4 PASS (MEDIUM residual: per-account holding) → 64 MiB per-account budget; pass 5 PASS (LOW hygiene) → comments/doc. e2e 5/5 ×7 (found the Storage API 400-as-404 making purge acks loop: added queue-drained assertion); smoke 18/18 desktop+mobile; final: pgTAP 140 (real stack 420 total), app 300, supabase 37, worker 21+11 native, sandbox 16, allowlist = 7 syscalls unchanged, image 11.6 MB.
Anomalies: EVAL-017 lesson again ×3 — each security fix needed its own adversarial pass and twice created a new finding (host check, ceiling join); a security control I added became the attack lever (BLOCK). Fork B's `database.types.ts` hand-write matched the generator byte-for-byte except ordering; fork A found the 400/404 only via e2e. `gitflow finish` of R0 and any `.env*` write refused by the harness classifier; `git config` reads refused too. Verifier sandbox intercepted the literal `pnpm lint` (rtk wrapper) → oracle uses the binary path.
Action: owner's manual validation (TEST FONCTIONNEL + TEST GRAPHIQUE), owner runs `gitflow finish` for R0 then R1 after validation; no merge, no deploy, release 0.2.0 untouched.
## EVAL-020 | 2026-10-14 | Rust R2 domain core — 3 plan challengers, 4 forks, verifier, security ×2, CSP proof on the image
## EVAL-020 — Rust R2 domain core — 3 plan challengers, 4 forks, verifier, security ×2, CSP proof on the image (2026-10-14)
Method: plan + contract written first (`.claude/tasks/plans/2026-10-13-rust-r2-domain-core.md`), 3 plan-challengers (correctness, robustness, simplicity) before code; freeze-then-switch: envelopes, Zod output oracles, characterisation and verdict tables written by the TS before trusting Rust; forks A/B/C in worktrees on disjoint files (sheet rules + conformance, report/archive rules, editor rules), runtime + app switch by me, fork D adapted the app suites in tree; browser checks with playwright-core from the scratchpad (dev server, prod build, real image under the DEPLOY CSP); contract `2026-10-14-rust-r2-verify.md` (12 criteria, every oracle dry-run before dispatch) → fresh verifier; security-auditor on the whole range, then a focused pass on the fix commit.
Result: challengers 45 findings incl. 1 BLOCKER (degraded editor redirect could overwrite an unread draft) → plan rev 2 before any app code; contracts byte-equal to Zod on first run; forks merged with zero conflicts (one stub replaced); fork D found 2 real src bugs (Node source path under happy-dom, failed quarantine reported as success) → fixed with tests. Verifier: 12/12 MET, ECARTS(2) = floor DELETED_TEST (zoneInteraction suite ported to cargo; R0 skip helper replaced by a stricter global setup) → human micro-gate for the owner. Security: PASS (3 MEDIUM nginx false positives pre-existing, 5 LOW) → by-reference deserialisation (also −134 KB raw / −31 KB gzip module) + literal delete paths. Final: cargo core 135, worker+wasm 32, Node 906 (app 313), pgTAP PGlite 12 files / real stack 446, CSP proof 15/15, check:all green ×3, module 1,046,498 B raw / 340,929 B gzip.
Anomalies: worktree base stale (BLK-010); harness decodes `\u` escapes in tool inputs (LRN-054); my first runtime test helper reused the pattern Vite rewrites; the CSP proof first failed on its own harness (EN locale, disclaimer modal, caught compile error logs nothing) — proof scripts need the same dry-run discipline as oracles; a security LOW fix improved size, measure before assuming a cost.
Action: owner manual LAN validation, L1 decision, approve the 2 deleted test files (floor), then merge go; R3 next, not started.
## EVAL-021 | 2026-10-14 | R2 closure — L1 refusal, deletions proof, fresh verifier + security
## EVAL-021 — R2 closure — L1 refusal, deletions proof, fresh verifier + security (2026-10-14)
Method: owner asked to fix L1 (no silent U+FFFD) + prove the 2 approved deletions + checks before merge. Mapped every JSON entry into the core (TS side always `JSON.stringify` → escapes reach Rust as ASCII); preservation costed (own JSON reader + lossless string type ~150 fields) → AskUserQuestion: refusal + quarantine chosen, detailed import wording chosen. Stale-module proof run before `wasm:build` (suites throw `pkg is stale`). Worktrees checked blob by blob vs branch history (60/66 identical, 6 = stub, merged mod lists, 2 lifted `#[ignore]`). Contract `2026-10-14-rust-r2-l1-verify.md` (13 criteria, each dry-run) → fresh verifier; fresh security-auditor on 36316cf..HEAD.
Result: verifier CONFORME 13/13 (floor 2 = the approved deletions, authorised by REQUEST); security PASS, 6 LOW: wasm-bindgen `&str` would re-encode a raw lone surrogate (unreachable, JSON.stringify callers; documented invariant), `pretty_json` proof op refuses as invalid_json, scanner not string-aware (classification only), newest-only quarantine slot, archive quarantine failure under full storage lets a later reset remove it (pre-existing R2, reported to owner), semgrep partial parse. Final: core 142, Node 915 (app 320, supabase 40, core-wasm 26), PGlite pgTAP 12 files, real stack 446/446, types no drift, check:all green 1 min 32 s, module 1,040,784 B raw / 339,933 B gzip.
Anomalies: refusal broke a test loader (oracle file freezes TS outputs with lone escapes) → loader spells escapes out, never normalises (LRN-055); `cargo deny advisories` (warn-only) shows RUSTSEC-2026-0346/0347/0348 on rustls 0.23.45 (worker, none applicable: no brotli, built-in session cache, no ECH) → bump follow-up; `supabase/.temp/cli-latest` tracked by mistake, rewritten by the CLI, restored; `export PATH=…` denied → absolute `~/.cargo/bin/cargo`; first commit with chained `git config` denied → plain commit OK.
Action: gitflow finish into develop (owner authorised after L1 + checks), worktree cleanup (BLK-010), R3 summary only.
## EVAL-022 | 2026-10-15 | R2 maintenance + R3 anatomy core — challengers, oracles, Chromium, verifier ×2, security ×3
## EVAL-022 — R2 maintenance + R3 anatomy core — challengers, oracles, Chromium, verifier ×2, security ×3 (2026-10-15)
Method: maintenance: AskUserQuestion for B UI, store rewrite + 27 tests, verifier (11/11, floor false positive on `cli-latest`) + security PASS (4 LOW fixed), check:all, merge. R3: 2 analyzers (facts), plan + 3 challengers (FATAL 3 / FATAL 6 / CONCERNS 4; blocker = roxmltree recursion, which I had measured independently) → rev 2; freeze O1–O6 with TS before any change; Rust reader/layer/compose; mutation checks per oracle test; wasm thresholds in fresh instances; app switch; Chromium DOM + 30 screenshots + perf vs develop baseline; CSP proof on image; verifier CONFORME 11/11; security PASS + MEDIUM (prescan closer desync) → fixed → pass 2 PASS (4M differential docs) + LOW (url whitespace) → fixed.
Result: all oracles green (O2 exact incl. order, O1/O3 tree-equal, 42 hostile + 10 generated declared or equal, 4 product SVGs untouched); Chromium live trees = O1, 30/30 pixel-identical; module 395.5 KB gz (+56); editor 503 vs 476 ms, detail 143 vs 125 ms (CPU ×4); check:all green.
Anomalies: my first prescan had the closer-overlap bug (security caught it, tests did not: corpus lacked overlapped closers); first wasm memory threshold measured leaked sessions (harness artefact) → per-case fresh instance; probe in perf script retained detached nodes (fake leak); `env` and `export` refused by harness → inline env vars; cargo fmt reformat broke python patch anchors ×3 (write whole file or re-read).
Action: owner LAN validation (TEST FONCTIONNEL / TEST GRAPHIQUE), owner decisions (EN trigger name, degraded wording), then merge; R4 not started.
## EVAL-023 | 2026-10-16 | Owner-requested audit of 0279953 + bugfix — independent auditor, 3 challengers + confirm, verifier ×2, security
## EVAL-023 — Owner-requested audit of 0279953 + bugfix — independent auditor, 3 challengers + confirm, verifier ×2, security (2026-10-16)
Method: fresh general-purpose auditor on commit only (5 owner axes); claims re-read in code; /bugfix: plan → 3 blind challengers → rev 2 → confirm pass → rev 3; owner AskUserQuestion ×3 batches; bugfixer; gates.sh 5/5; verifier; security; doc-syncer.
Result: audit NOT satisfactory (3 defects: unsaved promise, 4 dead retries, recovery dead end) — all fixed 6371523; app 374 tests, core-wasm 37; verifier pass 1 ECARTS(3) (2 untested surfaces, helper out of scope) → pass 2 CONFORME 12/12; security PASS 2 LOW; docs NONE.
Anomalies: previous session's commit + CHANGELOG claimed "never a retry that cannot work" without surface census; challengers converged on dead end the plan fixed only on canvas; confirm pass found offline restart never reaching stopped → copy moved to save banner (owner choice). Executor found latent GC finalizer throw (not fixed).
Action: R3 stays unmerged until owner LAN confirmation; R4 not started.
## EVAL-024 | 2026-10-17 | R3 final checks — measurements, challengers ×3 + confirm, verifier, security, check:all
## EVAL-024 — R3 final checks — measurements, challengers ×3 + confirm, verifier, security, check:all (2026-10-17)
Method: scratch round-trip test (3 golden reports); fuzz agent (37k draft.restore on shipped wasm + 40 worst cases, OOM threshold); GC agent (Node --expose-gc, 50 recoveries, WeakRef probes, mitigations in scratch); owner AskUserQuestion ×3; plan → 3 blind challengers → rev 2 → confirm → rev 3; bugfixer with negative controls; gates.sh 4/4; verifier; security; check:all; doc-syncer.
Result: copy restorable in app; loop impossible with real drafts, defended anyway; work-loss paths closed; app 405 tests, check:all green (~75 s cached); verifier CONFORME 10/10 (1 floor ASSERT_DROP = guard test moved, authorized by plan); security PASS 2 LOW; docs NONE.
Anomalies: challengers caught trap re-read spending recoveries (2 lenses), BDR-055 contradiction, wrong "parity" cap (50 MiB file vs 16 MiB JSON) only on confirm pass; executor found Retry-during-recovery edge.
Action: owner LAN validation, then merge on owner go; no R4, no release, no deploy.
## EVAL-025 | 2026-10-20 | R4.9 gates — bench, verifier ×3, security ×4, check:all
## EVAL-025 — R4.9 gates — bench, verifier ×3, security ×4, check:all (2026-10-20)
Method: memory bench 3 engines × demo/L × 6 exports + Chromium L 16 + raster control; contract 16 criteria (owner §2 list), fresh verifier per pass; full security gate on 168 R4 source files, then targeted re-gates on each fix; check:all.
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(1): core with no feature did not compile (`restore_copy` used gated `pdf::read` const; workspace feature unification via crates/wasm hid it in rust-check/check:all) → gated + no-feature clippy in rust-check; pass 2 ECARTS(1): §6 lacked J2 merge-gate row → added. Security pass 1 BLOCK(1): `.gitleaks.toml` allowlist (R4.1, owner-approved in journal) lacks owner `[gated]` marker → owner action; MEDIUM serve.mjs `--host ""` bound every interface.
Anomalies: my first host fix = exact-string denylist → bypassed by `0`, `0::`, `::ffff:0.0.0.0`, scoped `::` (re-gate 1); rebuilt resolve-then-BlockList; re-gate 2 found post-bind check dead for IPv6 (`family` 'IPv6' vs 6) and my fstat-first CLI read opened FIFOs before the type check (regression). Each fix of a gate finding introduced the next finding: 3 re-gates for 2 small fixes. Contract CHECKs used root vitest path (absent): oracle defect.
Action: owner checkpoint; floor 21 DELETED_TEST (R4.8 deletions, approved in brief §1) need owner `[gated]` clarification line to clear formally.
## EVAL-026 | 2026-10-22 | R5.1 freeze + D-R5 study — analyzers ×2, oracle generator, cross-stack digests
## EVAL-026 — R5.1 freeze + D-R5 study — analyzers ×2, oracle generator, cross-stack digests (2026-10-22)
Method: 2 analyzer agents (pipeline inventory 43 files, fingerprint census: producers, consumers, 99 PDFs, docs), both refused to write files (role rule) → orchestrator saved reports; generator test (`MAKE_R5_ORACLES=1`) + freeze re-run green 6/6, anatomy 137, domain 262; Node scripts (matrix, PGlite jsonb) + scratchpad Rust binary on core crate: digests compared value by value; tie census 200k values.
Anomalies: R2 oracle test self-referential on number printing (LRN-070) → F1 undetected since R2; docs contradict (BDR-045 vs RUST.md §10.10 / TODO "will change once") → cross-reference added; analyzer inventory counted "10 anomalies" wrong in orchestrator draft (actual 27, records 825 not 690, 16 ledger artifacts) → corrected from oracle counts before commit.
Action: F1 fix proposed, owner go; D-R5 recommendation B + aliases; checkpoint delivered, STOP.
## EVAL-027 | 2026-10-22 | R5.1b + R5.2 gates: check:all, security, verifier
## EVAL-027 — R5.1b + R5.2 gates: check:all, security, verifier (2026-10-22)
Method: check:all green 21:16:39 (app 434, core-wasm 58, domain 262, anatomy 141, supabase 40, curation suites, worker + images); security-auditor semgrep 129 rules / 36 files → PASS, 0 HIGH, 5 LOW; fresh verifier on contract `2026-10-22-rust-r5-f1-importer.md` → CONFORME 12/12 (ran cargo workspace + curation suites + import-equine --check itself, red-before proven by rustc probe).
Anomalies: LOW report.rs `Map` index panics on hand-built ImportResult → fixed (get chain) after verdict, importer suite + --check rerun green; LOW quadratic vertebrae scan, symlink-following `listed()` in --check, lint allows (accepted, operator inputs). check:all ran on pre-commit tree (code identical to 03bdb5e). Verifier floor note: plan B.3.5 "(proposal, not implemented)" heading from R5.1, intended.
Action: checkpoint R5.2 delivered, STOP before R5.3.
## EVAL-028 | 2026-10-23 | R5.3 gates: fresh verifier ×4 + security; successive passes found real defects
## EVAL-028 — R5.3 gates: fresh verifier ×4 + security; successive passes found real defects (2026-10-23)
Method: check:all after each fix round; security-auditor (semgrep 725 rules, checklist) → PASS, 6 LOW (3 fixed: Map index, destination claimed + canonicalised, INIT_CWD absolute only); fresh verifier each round, no history. Pass 1 ECARTS(1) (floor on a plan heading) + 2 unreachable divergences aligned; pass 2 null-on-optional (LRN-072); pass 3 (first attempt died on API credit error, rerun on Opus) repeated keys refused by serde derive, NUL touch-mark silent drop (LRN-073), `--out symlink/` trailing slash followed the link; pass 4 C1-C12 met, C13 docs gaps (lossy UTF-8 read, 2 contrived splits undeclared, stale counts).
Anomalies: green byte parity on real data hid every finding: all were hostile-input or file-protection defects. A verdict reported after post-pass edits was not re-verified → owner required a fresh pass on the final state.
Action: refusal tests now compare reasons by stage; Object.prototype characterised + tested; migration-map debt characterised; final fresh verifier + security on the final R5.3 state before R5.4. Next ports: budget ≥3 verifier passes, probe hostile inputs (null, duplicates, reserved names, symlinks, encodings) in the oracle from the start.
## EVAL-029 | 2026-10-23 | R5.4 gates: 14 rounds (verifier + security + check:all) to converge
## EVAL-029 — R5.4 gates: 14 rounds (verifier + security + check:all) to converge (2026-10-23)
Method: each round fresh verifier (opus, contract from disk, own TS-vs-Rust differential) + fresh security-auditor (semgrep + checklist + memory probes) + `pnpm check:all`; superseded runs stopped. Rounds 1-5: Markdown guard families (denylist → allowlist at round 3); rounds 6-11: resource bounds (table amplification, records per op, string headers, drawings per annotation, fixed parts); 12-14: doc precision only. Final: c4e717d security PASS (LOW only), check:all green 16:41:34; eb667ad (docs/comments only over c4e717d) verifier all 9 clauses MET, ECARTS(13) = floor-guard hits on audit prose quoting suppression keywords (product paths clean).
Anomalies: docs repeatedly claimed bounds "before any row is built" / "tens of MB" that the next audit disproved; counts drifted after each fix; FLOOR family needs a contract Clarification (human gate), never an audit edit.
Action: LRN-074, LRN-075; checkpoint R5.4 to owner with decisions (FLOOR clarification, curation input cap vs 65× parse, bare URLs autolinked, 2 declared quadratic scans), STOP before R5.5.
## EVAL-030 | 2026-10-23/24 | R5.5 gates: 2 rounds + owner real-stack recette
## EVAL-030 — R5.5 gates: 2 rounds + owner real-stack recette (2026-10-23/24)
Method: fresh verifier + security-auditor (opus; pinned Fable agents died on usage credits, re-dispatched), check:all per round; owner ran real-stack e2e by hand.
Anomalies: round 1 verifier ECARTS(4) all real (oversize body → Network+retry, "retried 3×" = 3 attempts, runbook exit codes, FLOOR script never OK); security M1 key on argv in e2e script. Round 2 security 5 LOW (Protocol retried, broadcast DEV addr accepted). Census doc claim "earlier revisions" wrong → corrected before checkpoint.
Action: fixes + negative tests; owner closed R5.5 2026-10-24 (e2e PASS 11/11, owner's run). LRN-076.
## EVAL-031 | 2026-10-24 | R5.6 prep: claimed rehearsal green after extending the patch
## EVAL-031 — R5.6 prep: claimed rehearsal green after extending the patch (2026-10-24)
Method: fresh verifier applied patch in scratch copy, ran every feature set + switched-seed simulation; security read patch.
Anomalies: docs/TODO said "rehearsed green"; green run covered 5-consumer wiring only, then generator + loaded.rs added without rerun → report-compare E0063, 4 curation tests failing unreported; switched seed never simulated (+3 failures incl. frozen R4 O7). Security M1: alias-path export writes report 27c7 + snapshot 12d7 → pre-switch/N-1 readers drop snapshot.
Action: rerun gate after every patch extension, claim only measured state; patch fixed (build, strict block, NotCanonical); docs corrected; M1 to owner.
## EVAL-032 | 2026-10-25 | R5.6 rehearsal: docs claimed export guarded by fingerprint_verified
## EVAL-032 — R5.6 rehearsal: docs claimed export guarded by fingerprint_verified (2026-10-25)
Method: isolated worktree (patch + switched seed), rust:check + check:all green, fresh security + verifier (opus), verifier probe on core export API.
Anomalies: RUST.md said M1 "needs fingerprint_verified" for every consumer; export path (input.rs) never sees LoadedSheet → v0 sheet snapshot gets alias at export (app unreachable, API reachable). Fix needs snapshot_rules.rs, outside owner's 8-file scope → stopped. Also `pnpm format` rewrote append-only audits in worktree (reverted).
Action: claim a guard per call site, not per design; owner decision on snapshot_rules.rs; never run format over .claude/.
## EVAL-033 | 2026-10-25 | R5.7 closure: deletion gates + pre-merge rerun
## EVAL-033 — R5.7 closure: deletion gates + pre-merge rerun (2026-10-25)
Method: ledger 407 TS cases case by case before `git rm`; fresh verifier + security (opus) twice; check:all on R5.7 state, then rerun on 27bf59c after post-check edits; verifier ran 14 scratch reintroduction probes against census.
Anomalies: round 1 verifier ECARTS(2): contract C6 "tsx gone" false vs pnpm optional peer (owner Clarification), digest typo `…dfe7` in docs. Two edits landed after first check:all → owner required full rerun. Census regex accepted `#[ignore]` targets (fixed) and still accepts ignore-before-test (LOW). Docs pointed to premerge record before it existed; `.bin/tsx` wording root-only; SUPABASE.md layout stale since R2. `pnpm audit` never run before this round (cargo advisories only): 57 pre-existing.
Action: LRN-078, LRN-079; rerun gate after any post-check edit; run `pnpm audit` in every pre-merge round; checkpoint to owner, STOP before merge.
## EVAL-034 | 2026-10-25 | Functional inventory put form validation in Rust, against D-R7
## EVAL-034 — Functional inventory put form validation in Rust, against D-R7 (2026-10-25)
Method: P0 doc census + V1-1 contract drafting; inventory `.claude/audits/2026-10-25-functional-inventory.md` cross-checked with RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW Annex A.
Anomaly: inventory criterion 4 placed validation rules (formats, lengths, required fields) in `crates/core` behind wasm facade. D-R7: form constraints stay TypeScript (Zod, i18n keys), SQL CHECK = integrity boundary, constants module + PGlite parity test against `pg_constraint`. Contradiction caught and corrected before V1-1 implementation contract; no code written on it.
Action: V1-1 contract §1 + §8.3 follow D-R7. Check every proposal against Annex A D-R rows before writing it.
## EVAL-035 | 2026-10-25 | V1-1 design draft: 3 fresh challengers found 3 false security claims
## EVAL-035 — V1-1 design draft: 3 fresh challengers found 3 false security claims (2026-10-25)
Method: plan-challenger ×3 (correctness, robustness, simplicity) on `V1-1_OWNERS_ANIMALS.md` before owner checkpoint; evidence read from migrations, harness, worker config, react-router dist.
Anomaly: draft claimed (1) N7 service_role revoke → "D16 holds at key level" (false: service key = GoTrue admin key → magic link / set password → user session); (2) identical 42501 while reusing `require_actor()` (two messages); (3) audit growth bounded (false: `log_event` stores attacker-sized `x-correlation-id`). Also phone search vs E.164 broken, OR search unindexable, backfill untestable, multi-call create duplicates, relation RPCs race, useBlocker needs data router.
Action: all integrated into contract §6.3, §8-§12, §14 + TODO. Claims about key/role reach need proof via the auth admin API too, not only PostgREST grants.
## EVAL-036 | 2026-10-25 | V1-1.1 M1 workspaces: gates and isolated real stack
## EVAL-036 — V1-1.1 M1 workspaces: gates and isolated real stack (2026-10-25)
Method: fresh verifier on contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-25-v1-1-1-workspaces.md` + fresh security auditor (semgrep 3 rulesets + hand SQL review), PGlite + sandbox runs, 5 mutations of M1 (email check, ON CONFLICT, correlation cap, foreign-member guard, service_role EXECUTE) all caught by 012.
Result: security PASS (2 MEDIUM scanner false positives: policy via helper, not raw auth.uid(); LOWs = table names in 42501, residual admin paths, NOT VALID CHECK, pre-existing bounded revoke reason). Verifier C1-C8 MET, C9 UNVERIFIABLE (forbidden to read DEV) → closed by `supabase migration list --local` (M1 remote empty).
Anomalies: first mutation run misread (sed indentation miss, crash not printed) → rerun with crash capture; concurrency script pipefail printed false "UNEXPECTED" after real ERROR → fixed. GoTrue 500 on same-email concurrent sign-up = GoTrue race on users_email_partial_key, not M1.
Action: contract for gates should name a read-only way to check DEV state (migration list) so C9-type clauses are verifiable.
## EVAL-037 | 2026-10-25 | V1-1.2 M2 clients: gates, mutations, sandbox hardening
## EVAL-037 — V1-1.2 M2 clients: gates, mutations, sandbox hardening (2026-10-25)
Method: fresh verifier (contract 2026-10-25-v1-1-2-clients.md) + fresh security auditor; 5 M2 mutations (divergent replay, workspace auth, `_` escape, N9 filter, hourly limit) all caught by 013; real image fresh + upgrade (M2 alone, M1+M2 together).
Result: security PASS (MEDIUM: secrets on argv in db-sandbox.sh, fixture password literal, policy false positive; LOW: empty-secret fallback risk, state dir in repo, uncapped cursor, no read limit). Verifier ECARTS(2): BDR-075 uncommitted (committed after), fresh-mode real run not reproducible by it (rerun after hardening: 661 PASS, types match, 28/28).
@@ -269,28 +288,28 @@ Fixes applied: secrets via env files + PGPASSWORD name only, password-free --db-
Anomalies: Write tool turned `
/
` escapes into raw chars (broke a JS regex) → check new files for raw line separators; prettier over tests/ touched 3 unrelated files → restored; real image adds GRANT hint to table denials.
Action: write Unicode escapes via shell/python when exact bytes matter.
## EVAL-038 | 2026-10-25 | V1-1.3 UI foundations + db:sandbox final check
## EVAL-038 — V1-1.3 UI foundations + db:sandbox final check (2026-10-25)
Method: sandbox scripted check (fresh, upgrade, types, argv scan of /proc cmdlines, negative args/secrets/state dir, DEV fingerprint before/after); 6 mutations on dialog/drawer/avatar; fresh verifier (contract 2026-10-25-v1-1-3-ui-foundations.md) + fresh security auditor.
Result: sandbox 40/42 first pass → defect `up` bad mode/version started 4 containers + secrets before refusing → fixed 57922e0, 15/15 rerun, upgrade rerun green, DEV unchanged. Mutations: 5/6 caught at once; M5 (confirmation closed before removal) missed until RPC slowed. Verifier CONFORME 8/8. Security PASS (MEDIUM pre-existing fixture password literal; LOW seed SQL interpolation of generated values, env breadth to webServer, refused URLs unmasked → fixed). check:all green 23:41:29; e2e:ui 26, e2e:shell 6, vitest app 458.
Anomalies: axe pre-existing serious findings (switcher, top-bar link label-in-name, dashboard dl) → KNOWN list + RR-7; the shell suite found a real focus defect in AvatarSection.
Action: keep mutation pass for browser tests; slow async backends in focus tests.
## EVAL-039 | 2026-10-26 | V1-1.4 M3 animals + relations: gates, mutations, four migration states
## EVAL-039 — V1-1.4 M3 animals + relations: gates, mutations, four migration states (2026-10-26)
Method: 14 mutations of M3 (PGlite pgTAP; M9 swapped into the sandbox, restored, md5 checked); 4 sandbox states (fresh, pre-M1→M1..M3, pre-M1→M1→M2+M3, M1+M2→M3): pgTAP 919, types --check, sandbox suites 46; e2e:ui 26, e2e:shell 6; import:equine --check 0 diff; check:all green 01:11:05 (e2e:ui PASSED, e2e:shell NOT RUN line); fresh verifier (contract 2026-10-26-v1-1-4-animals-relations.md) + fresh security auditor.
Result: verifier CONFORME 11/11; security PASS (MEDIUM: sandbox fixture password literal pre-existing, policy-via-helper false positive; LOW: authz read then lock not re-checked (no membership change in V1-1), no-op/replay unmetered (as M2), reads reachable by GET (app convention), service_role ALL on species pre-existing). Mutations 12/14 caught first pass; M6 (voided-only link counted) + M9 (foreign client locked) survived → tests added (533a1c4), both caught after.
Anomalies: pgTAP 014 green at first run (suspicious) → mutations proved it bites; axe route regex assumed /app/dashboard, dashboard is /app → shell suite failed until fixed (counter-mutations confirm scoping); permission layer refused sourcing sandbox secrets in shell → rehearsal via SQL + container env.
Action: keep lock-wait probes for cross-tenant RPCs (LRN-084); check real route table before path-scoped test rules.
## EVAL-040 | 2026-10-26 | V1-1.5 client screens: gates, three verifier rounds, report check
## EVAL-040 — V1-1.5 client screens: gates, three verifier rounds, report check (2026-10-26)
Method: unit (supabase 92, app 509), access layer vs real PostgREST (sandbox 54), Chromium e2e:shell 42 (36 client journeys), mutations on app (request id per submit, double-click guard, late-answer guard, account reset, re-read loading) all caught; visual pass desktop+375 via temp capture spec; impeccable detect 0; report scan (decoded embedded zip); check:all green twice (02:04:48, 02:15:51); import:equine 0 diff; pgTAP 919; types match. Fresh security auditor + verifier ×3.
Result: security PASS (LOW: test SQL interpolation of sandbox uuids); noted USER_UPDATED reset of workspace unmounting forms → fixed e1c1980. Verifier 1 ECARTS (not-found heading unfocused → fixed 567ad40), verifier 2 ECARTS (docs counts uncommitted; floor assert drop of moved signIn → CLARIFICATIONS), verifier 3 CONFORME 11/11.
Anomalies: Prettier over whole src reformatted 39 files → restored, edits re-applied on originals; duplicate h1 (pre-existing top bar) broke selectors; StrictMode ran listener cleanup; drawer exit kept page inert; shell HTML report held typed passwords (BROWSER_TESTS claim false since V1-1.3) → reporter removed; permission layer refused rm -rf via variable (correct) and secrets sourcing.
Action: format new files only; dispatch verifier after committing docs; scan reports by content.
## EVAL-041 | 2026-10-26 | V1-1.6 animal screens and relations: gates, three verifier rounds
## EVAL-041 — V1-1.6 animal screens and relations: gates, three verifier rounds (2026-10-26)
Method: access layer by fork (unit 35, real PostgREST sandbox 7); screens unit tests by fork (57); Chromium e2e:shell 82 (animals 40), 3 full runs; 12 unit + 2 browser mutations all caught; visual pass desktop+375 (one batch fix: relation actions bordered); impeccable detect 0; check:all green 17:19:26; import:equine 0 diff; pgTAP 919; types match; DEV restore step rehearsed on sandbox (counts equal, 26 expected privilege errors). Fresh security auditor + verifier ×3.
Result: security PASS (MEDIUM pre-existing sandbox literal pw; LOW trace override by argv). Verifier 1 ECARTS: client journey failed after passing (late replay of the animal-section reload added by V1-1.6) → dropLateReplays for every shell spec. Verifier 2 ECARTS: pgTAP 014 #237 regex `20[0-9]{2}-` matched a workspace uuid on long-lived sandbox (latent V1-1.4 false positive; would stop DEV db:test) → metadata minus workspace_id. Verifier 3 CONFORME 12/12.