docs(docs): R5.3 second final round: shape alignment, residual risks measured, R2 derive leniency raised to the owner; audits, TODO
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@@ -40,3 +40,9 @@ Contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft.md`. Fresh verifier,
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- Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final.md`): MEDIUM-1 a 20,000-segment field path (40 KB changes.json) overflowed the stack; MEDIUM-2 `--out` writes not exclusive after the claim; LOW-1 the NUL field path (same as the verifier); LOW-2 `..` and parents created before a failed claim; LOW-3 a destination inside the seed accepted; LOW-4 INIT_CWD and direct-run base; LOW-5 non-UTF-8 argument panic; LOW-6 clippy disallowed list partial (pre-existing); LOW-7 the test allow line (convention).
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- Fixed: NUL segment refused at the op (`reserved key`); field paths capped at 8 segments; document depth capped at 64 levels after every op (iterative walk); `--out`: `..` refused, parent must exist, destination inside the seed refused, destination printed before writing, every folder `create_dir`, every file `create_new`; `args_os`. Documented: direct-run base (LOW-4). Kept: LOW-6 (pre-existing lint scope, out of R5.3), LOW-7 (test convention). Tests added: field-path refusals and 20,000 segments refused without crash, 40 nested adds refused at the bound, 8 `--out` refusals against the built binary with nothing written.
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- Next: a fresh verifier and a fresh security audit on the fixed commit.
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## Second final round on 314cf04
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- Verifier ECARTS(3): C2, C3 (one family) and C13. serde's derives accept a struct written as a positional array and a unit enum written as a one-key map, in changes.json, references.json and the curated document (gate through the R2 derives); Zod refused all. 55,000-changeset random differential (TS generator, Rust probe): 7,436 accepted on both sides byte-identical, 335 mismatches, all this family but one message (`document has no "categories"` vs `document has no list "categories"`). C1, C4 to C12 MET (18 tests, 203 crate tests, `--check` 0/12, refusal probes, floor clean). Note: the same derives sit in the R2 report and archive contracts (unverified there).
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- Security PASS (`.claude/audits/2026-10-23-rust-r5-draft-security-final2.md`): MEDIUM memory amplification (no cap); LOW quadratic depth walk, `--check` and reads following symlinks, residual TOCTOU, `write_exclusive` any component, lossy normalisation, test aimed at the real seed, suppressions context, lint list gaps.
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- Fixed: `draft/shape.rs` (typed reading serialised back, compared by shape) on both authored files and the gate; 10 changesets + 2 references files frozen from TS (all refused by TS, refused alike); missing-list message aligned; reads: regular file, 16 MiB cap; `listed` does not follow links; `write_exclusive` plain names, root re-checked; seed guard as pure `inside` + unit test, integration test no longer targets the seed. Kept, declared in §11.13: memory amplification, quadratic walk, single-user TOCTOU residual, lossy UTF-8 and repeated keys. Raised to the owner: the R2 derive leniency in the gated readers.
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@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
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# Security gate (fresh): R5.3 draft port, final 2
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Branch `feature/rust-r5-pipeline-core`, HEAD `314cf04`, scope `git diff 5e114da..HEAD`
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(32 files), focus on `9f11499`. Fresh run: no earlier verdict consulted.
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```
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SECURITY — VERDICT: PASS
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TOOL: semgrep 1.168.0 — p/security-audit, p/secrets, p/owasp-top-ten
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SCOPE: 32 files
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BLOCKING:
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(none)
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REPORTED (non-blocking):
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- [MEDIUM] resource-cap/memory-amplification — crates/core/src/curation/draft/records.rs:68
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- [LOW] resource-cap/cpu-quadratic — crates/core/src/curation/draft/apply.rs:109
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- [LOW] check-follows-symlinks — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:148
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- [LOW] out-toctou-residual — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:203
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- [LOW] write-exclusive-components — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:246
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- [LOW] silent-input-normalisation — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:66
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- [LOW] test-targets-real-seed — crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:681
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- [LOW] suppression-context (new, test crate, documented policy) — crates/core/tests/curation_draft.rs:7
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- [LOW] suppression-context (pre-existing) + lint list gaps — crates/core/src/bin/import_equine.rs:15
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PROOF: semgrep 129 rules on 32 files → 0 findings; checklist 10 checks → 9 findings
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```
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## Tool notes
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- semgrep 1.168.0, pinned packs only, `--metrics=off`. The first run died inside semgrep-core
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(`io_uring_queue_init: Cannot allocate memory`, sandbox memlock limit). The rerun with
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`EIO_BACKEND=posix` scanned all 32 files: 0 errors, 129 rules run (163 loaded), 0 findings.
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- These packs carry almost no Rust rules. The Rust analysis below therefore rests on a full
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read of every changed product file plus runtime probes, not on semgrep.
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- Guardrails scanner (`api,supabase`): 0 FAIL, 1 WARN (`SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER` in
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`supabase/migrations/20261008110000_anatomical_sheets.sql`, outside the diff, dropped).
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## Checklist
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| # | Check | Result |
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|---|---|---|
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| 1 | Hardcoded secret, token, key, auth URL (diff incl. docs, `.claude`, oracle JSON) | none (only `https://example.org/a`) |
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| 2 | SQL by concatenation / interpolation | none: `seed.rs` interpolates constants only, `sql_text` doubles quotes, the document goes into `$equine_doc$…$equine_doc$`, and a document holding the tag is refused. The trimmed document always ends with `}`, so no prefix of the tag can join the closing tag. `config.toml` `sql_paths` lists literal files, so an `--out` under `supabase/seed/` is never executed by `db reset` |
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| 3 | Unsanitised render / `eval` | none (no rendering; the TS oracle test has no sink) |
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| 4 | Sensitive endpoint without authz | N/A (dev tool, no endpoint) |
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| 5 | Stack trace / internal path to end users | none (operator CLI only) |
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| 6 | Secret / PII in a log | none |
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| 7 | Tracked `.env` / credential file | none (`.env.example` only, outside the diff) |
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| 8 | Guardrails scanner | 0 findings in diff files |
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| 9 | New suppressions (anti-gaming) | no `nosemgrep` / `nosec` / `eslint-disable` / `ts-ignore` / `noqa`; one clippy allow (L7) |
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| 10 | Brief-specific: seed protection, `--check` read-only, `--out` semantics, caps, strict validation, author data | M1, L1 to L6 |
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## Findings
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### M1 [MEDIUM] No memory cap: hostile `changes.json` amplifies about 10,000× (non-blocking)
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`records.rs:68-75`: every record deep-clones the whole `Op`, value included, plus
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`before`/`after`. `ops.rs:145-164`: a subtree `set` writes the value into every entry and
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records it once per entry. `ops.rs:193,197`: a `rename` records the whole item twice, subtree
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included. `import_equine.rs:60-68`: input reads have no size bound. The depth and segment
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caps of `9f11499` bound the stack. Nothing bounds memory, the document size or the record
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volume.
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Measured with the release probe under `ulimit -v 3000000`:
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| input | size | peak RSS | outcome |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| real `changes.json` | 227 KB | 14 MB | OK, 825 records |
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| add 1,000 nodes + subtree `set` of a 100 KB description | 154 KB | 1.10 GB | OK, accepted and rendered |
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| same, 2,000 nodes | 211 KB | > 2.38 GB | abort: `memory allocation of 804175406 bytes failed` |
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| 5,000-node category + 200 rename ping-pongs | 300 KB | 2.13 GB | OK |
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| same, 500 renames | 326 KB | > 3 GB | abort |
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Growth is linear in (ops × item size): one 90-byte rename op on that category costs about
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10 MB. A 1 MB hostile file asks for tens of GB. This host has 14 GB of RAM with its 3 GB of
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swap already full, so the result is an OOM kill or thrashing, during `--check` as well. No
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data is lost and nothing is written. The input is an authored repository file, which can come
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from a contributor PR on an MIT project. The TypeScript cloned the same way, so this is a
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parity issue. It still falls short of the owner's explicit "depth and resource caps"
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requirement.
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Fix direction:
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- Cap the input files in the binary (for example `changes.json` ≤ 4 MiB; the real file is
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227 KB).
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- Bound the curated document next to `assert_depth`: node count or serialised size, plus
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string length.
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- Optionally, records reference the op (index or `Rc<Op>`) instead of cloning it.
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### L1 [LOW] Quadratic CPU: whole-document depth walk after every op
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`apply.rs:109,125-147`: `depth_of` (new in `9f11499`) walks the whole document after each op.
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A 2.4 MB input (20,000-node added subtree, then 10,000 one-field `set` ops) takes 9.9 s. The
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cost is O(ops × document). Fix direction: the input cap of M1. Otherwise compute depth
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incrementally (the depth of the touched item's path plus the depth of the written or inserted
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value).
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### L2 [LOW] `--check` and input reads follow symbolic links of the committed seed
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`import_equine.rs:148`: `listed` decides recursion with `entry.path().is_dir()`, which follows
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links. `import_equine.rs:60-62,163`: `fs::read` follows links and has no size bound. Two
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consequences:
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- A committed `draft/x -> /` makes `--check` walk the filesystem and print file names to
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stderr, bounded only by ELOOP and time.
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- `curation/changes.json -> /dev/zero`, or a FIFO, ends in OOM or a hang.
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Both stay read-only and local, with no exfiltration. Traced by reading: no symlink was planted
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in the repository. Fix direction: use `entry.file_type()` (no follow) and report a symlink as a
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difference; read inputs only after a `symlink_metadata` regular-file check and under a size
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cap.
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### L3 [LOW] Residual check-then-use window in `--out`
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The path is canonicalised at `import_equine.rs:203`, then the folder is created at `:216`.
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Each intermediate folder is checked with `symlink_metadata` at `:252`, then the file is opened
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at `:257-261`. All of these are path-based. A concurrent local actor with write access to the
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destination's parent, or the owner of a pre-existing empty destination, could swap a
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component for a symlink between check and use. The impact is bounded: every file is
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`create_new` (O_EXCL) with a fixed name, so nothing is overwritten, truncated or deleted. The
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worst case is new fixed-name files in another folder the user can write. Fix direction, only
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if wanted: hold the claimed root as a directory fd and create children with
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`openat`/`mkdirat` + `O_NOFOLLOW` (rustix or cap-std). Otherwise document the single-user
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machine assumption.
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### L4 [LOW] `write_exclusive` accepts any path component
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`import_equine.rs:244-255` pushes each component of `relative` without refusing `RootDir`,
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`ParentDir` or `Prefix`. Today every name is a compile-time constant (`render_artifacts`,
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`render_draft_artifacts`, `assets/Horse.svg`), so this is not exploitable. It becomes a
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traversal if R5.4 derives a file name from data, for example review drawings named after view
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ids. Fix direction: refuse any component other than `Component::Normal`.
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### L5 [LOW] Silent input normalisation, against "author data never dropped silently"
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- `import_equine.rs:66-68`: invalid UTF-8 in `changes.json` or `references.json` silently
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becomes U+FFFD.
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- `schema.rs:382-384` (`js::parse_json`): a duplicated key keeps its last value, and the first
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is dropped without notice.
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Both are declared parity with `readFile(..., 'utf8')` and `JSON.parse`. Fix direction: refuse
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invalid UTF-8 (`String::from_utf8`) and duplicate keys in the authored files, or warn.
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### L6 [LOW] A test runs the real binary against the official seed path
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`curation_draft.rs:676-701` runs `import-equine --out <seed>/new-folder`. If the seed guard
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regressed, the test itself would create `new-folder/` with 12 files inside the official seed
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before its assertion fails (no overwrite). For the same reason this gate did not run
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`cargo test --test curation_draft`: the brief forbids `--out` against a repository path. Fix
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direction: assert the seed refusal through the pure claim logic with an injectable seed root,
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or keep it and accept the regression risk knowingly.
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### L7 [LOW, context] New lint allow in a test crate: not a security suppression
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`curation_draft.rs:7` adds
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`#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods, clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]`. It sits on an
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integration-test crate, uses the same line as 10 existing test files, and follows the policy
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written in `clippy.toml` ("Tests … allow these lints locally where they own I/O"). It silences
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no security scanner and no security finding, so it is not blocking.
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### L8 [LOW, context] Pre-existing allow, and gaps in the I/O ban list
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`import_equine.rs:15` `#![allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` was already present at
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`5e114da`. Separately, `clippy.toml` bans only `fs::read`, `read_to_string`, `write`,
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`File::open`/`create`, `env::var`/`var_os` and the clocks. `fs::create_dir*`,
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`OpenOptions::open`, `read_dir`, `canonicalize`, `remove_*`, `env::current_dir`,
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`env::args_os` and `process::Command` would pass the lint inside the library. A grep confirms
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that `crates/core/src` outside `src/bin` uses none of them today. Fix direction: extend the
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list.
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## Verified, no finding
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Stack and validation. The probe linked `faunosteo-core` with the `curation` feature and ran
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in debug on a 2 MiB thread, in debug on the main thread, and in release:
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- a 20,000-segment field and a 9-segment field are refused; the 8-segment field is refused
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later by the strict shape check;
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- `name.\0touched` is refused; a `\0touched` key inside a value is refused at parse;
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- a value at serde's 128 nesting limit is refused with "recursion limit exceeded";
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- a 122-deep object value, a 58-level children chain and 40 chained adds (refused at op 29)
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all end with "nests more than 64 levels";
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- moving an item into itself is refused;
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- no crash, no panic in any mode.
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Margins on real data: document depth 10 against the cap of 64; field segments at most 2
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against the cap of 8.
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`--check`, as briefed: `legacy-import` 6 files, 0 differences; `draft` 6 files, 0 differences
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(6 pending R5.4). `git status` clean afterwards.
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`--out`, 20 cases in a fresh `mktemp -d`. A copy of the binary was built there; the
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repository stayed clean.
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- Written:
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- an absent folder: 12 files, `document.json` byte-identical to the seed;
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- an existing empty folder;
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- a parent symlink: the files land at the canonical path;
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- an interior `./`;
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- a relative path with an absolute `INIT_CWD`; a relative `INIT_CWD` is ignored.
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- Refused with exit code 2 and nothing created:
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- an existing non-empty folder; a file;
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- a symlink, `symlink/`, `symlink/.`, a dangling symlink (its target is not created);
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- a missing parent; `..`; `""`; `/`; an extra argument; a non-UTF-8 argument.
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Scratch total: 74 files = 6 × 12 + 2 fixtures.
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Seed protection, traced by reading and not run against the repository:
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- the parent is canonicalised, then compared with `starts_with` component by component
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against the canonical seed;
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- a root equal to the seed, or to any ancestor, is non-empty and refused;
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- a final-component symlink is refused;
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- `folders()` is computed before the claim, so a refused changeset creates nothing.
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The library performs no file system, environment or process access. The Rust ownership model
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rules out reference cycles from `move`.
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Probe artefacts (scratch only):
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`/tmp/claude-1000/-home-bchanot-Documents-faunosteo/9b0edf59-ccd2-4662-b90c-e473dd78028e/scratchpad/secfinal2.SbMNbq`
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@@ -317,6 +317,8 @@ feat/findings-tree-v2 merged (FindingsTreePicker tracked in HEAD); all work belo
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- [x] R5.3e (security PASS 6 LOW / 3 fixed; verifier 4 passes, last C1-C12 met + C13 docs fixed after; check:all green 00:10:03) gates: security auditor (diff), independent verifier on the contract `.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft.md`; docs RUST.md §11.12-11.13, CHANGELOG, CLAUDE.md commands; memory → checkpoint report, STOP before R5.4
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- [x] R5.3f owner 2026-10-23: Object.prototype member characterised (safe, accepted, test), migration-map debt kept + characterisation test, refusal reasons compared by stage; final fresh verifier + security on the R5.3 state
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- [ ] debt (owner 2026-10-23, after R5): migration map replays cascade records by their op (`applyRecord` / `apply_record`): a view, zone, region, category or cited-reference rename corrupts the map; fix both sides as a declared change before any changeset uses such a rename (RUST.md §11.12)
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- [ ] OWNER DECISION (found 2026-10-23 by the R5.3 final verifier): serde derives of the R2 contracts read a struct from an array and a unit enum from a one-key map, where Zod refused; likely reachable by the gated readers of imported PDFs (`archive/read.rs`, `report/read.rs`, `pdf/import.rs`); probe the readers, then a per-file go for a strict deserialisation (RUST.md §11.13)
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- [ ] chore (pre-existing, security gates R5.3): `clippy.toml` disallowed list misses `fs::create_dir*`, `OpenOptions::open`, `read_dir`, `canonicalize`, `remove_*`, `env::current_dir`, `env::args_os`, `process::Command`; extend so the core's no-I/O rule is enforced, not only observed
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- [ ] R5.4 review overlays + app drawings on the R3 layer/compose (parsed trees), CHANGELOG + REVIEW-REPORT
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- [ ] R5.5 `upload-sheet-assets` bin + runbook (local stack run)
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- [ ] R5.6 D-R5 switch (convention, aliases, membership test in gated readers with per-file go, seed regenerated once by the Rust tool, `.prettierignore`, CHANGELOG)
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@@ -2885,7 +2885,7 @@ until the switch; no fingerprint change; the cleaned `horse.svg` is read as froz
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re-cleaned; the review drawings and the two Markdown reports are R5.4. Contract
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`.claude/tasks/contracts/2026-10-22-rust-r5-draft.md`.
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`crates/core/src/curation/draft` (2,718 lines, feature `curation`):
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`crates/core/src/curation/draft` (2,846 lines, feature `curation`):
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| Module | Ports |
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|---|---|
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@@ -2916,16 +2916,17 @@ Parity, every expectation written by the TypeScript (`tests/curation_draft.rs`,
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- the 612 legacy leaves through the core's `read_report_document` on the produced map: 442
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identical, 141 moved, 29 removed, every resolved leaf a leaf of the produced document, the
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29 flagged paths exactly those the map sends to null, the FR snapshots kept;
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- 64 synthetic changesets on the mini sheet (`oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json`,
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- 74 synthetic changesets on the mini sheet (`oracles/r5/curation-synthetic.json`,
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generator `packages/anatomy/tests/r5.curation-synthetic-oracles.test.ts`): 11 accepted
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cases (every op kind, numeric and anchored positions, subtree scopes with skipped equal
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values, the review rule on levels A, B and C, the five rename cascades and a reference
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rename, re-homing, two chained changes, the two migration-map debt cases below) byte for
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byte on the formatted document, the records, the stats, the migration map and the seed
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SQL; 51 refusals (19 schema, `null` on `scope`, `position` and `field` included, 32
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applier, integrity and shape gates included) refused alike, with the same reason: the
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same message for an op or change refusal (change id and op index included), the same
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stage for a schema or gate refusal; 5 references files refused alike; two declared
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SQL; 61 refusals (23 schema, `null` on `scope`, `position` and `field` and the shape
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family below included, 38 applier, integrity and shape gates included) refused alike, with
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the same reason: the same message for an op or change refusal (change id and op index
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included), the same stage for a schema or gate refusal; 7 references files refused alike;
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two declared
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differences below (one refusal, one acceptance), each held by its own test.
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Differences declared (none reachable by the committed files, since the folders are
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@@ -2960,6 +2961,15 @@ findings only (33) and no reference, so the equine map is untouched. A future ch
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renaming a view, zone, region, category or a cited reference must not be published before
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the fix (a declared behaviour change on both sides, after R5).
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Aligned on Zod, not a difference: serde's derives read a struct from a positional array
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(`"title": ["Titre", "Title"]`, a whole change or reference as an array) and a unit enum
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variant from a one-key map (`"level": {"A": null}`, `scope`, `review_status`, `laterality`,
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the reference `type`); Zod refused both. Each authored file and the curated document are
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compared, by shape, with their typed reading serialised back (`draft/shape.rs`): an object
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stays an object, an array an array of the same length, a scalar a scalar of its kind (found by
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the final verifier's 55,000-changeset differential; 10 changesets and 2 references files frozen
|
||||
from the TypeScript). The R2 contracts carry the same derives (open item below).
|
||||
|
||||
Kept as the TypeScript: invalid UTF-8 in the two curation files becomes U+FFFD
|
||||
(`readFile(path, 'utf8')`, as R5.2 kept for the catalog); a repeated key in either file keeps its first position and its last
|
||||
value (`JSON.parse`, through the core's `parse_json`; tested on a change and a reference);
|
||||
@@ -2999,10 +3009,32 @@ checked after every op); `--out` writes were not exclusive after the claim (fixe
|
||||
`create_dir` and `create_new`); `..`, a missing parent and a destination inside the seed are
|
||||
refused, the destination printed before writing, a non-UTF-8 argument refused; the binary's
|
||||
refusals are tested against the built binary (`out_refuses_every_unsafe_destination_and_writes_nothing`).
|
||||
Second final round on 314cf04: verifier ECARTS(3) (the serde shape family above, in the
|
||||
authored files and the gate, plus a missing-list message) and security PASS (MEDIUM memory,
|
||||
LOW: quadratic depth walk, `--check` and reads following symbolic links, residual
|
||||
check-then-use window, `write_exclusive` accepting any component, lossy normalisation, a test
|
||||
aimed at the real seed). Fixed: the shape comparison; `document has no list` for a missing
|
||||
list; every read a regular file under 16 MiB, never a link; `--check` lists a link without
|
||||
walking into it; `write_exclusive` takes plain names only and re-checks the claimed folder;
|
||||
the seed refusal tested on the pure check (`inside`), no test targets the real seed. Kept and
|
||||
declared: the measured residual risks above.
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.13 Checkpoint R5.3
|
||||
|
||||
Residual risks: the `--check` allowance for the six R5.4 files hides nothing about the
|
||||
Open item for the owner (outside R5.3, gated readers): the serde leniency above is in the R2
|
||||
derives of `domain/sheet/schema.rs` and very likely of the report and archive contracts, so
|
||||
the readers of imported PDFs (`archive/read.rs`, `report/read.rs`, `pdf/import.rs`) would
|
||||
accept an object written as an array or an enum written as a map where the frozen Zod reader
|
||||
refused it. Not probed on those readers, not changed: a fix there needs the owner's per-file go.
|
||||
|
||||
Residual risks, measured by the final security gate and kept: memory has no cap beyond the
|
||||
16 MiB read bound (a hostile 211 KB changeset of subtree sets on a 2,000-node addition asks
|
||||
for more than 2 GB, as the TypeScript's clones would); the depth check walks the document
|
||||
after every op (a 2.4 MB changeset takes about 10 s); `--out` assumes a single-user machine
|
||||
(a concurrent process able to write the destination's parent could still swap a component
|
||||
between a check and its use, never overwriting: every file is `create_new`); invalid UTF-8
|
||||
and repeated keys are read as the TypeScript read them. Residual risks of the slice: the
|
||||
`--check` allowance for the six R5.4 files hides nothing about the
|
||||
produced files but means the draft folder is not yet compared whole (R5.4 removes it); the
|
||||
touch marks are a reserved prefix (a NUL character starts it), refused in any authored value
|
||||
at parse and in any field path segment at the op, and removed after each change, so no mark
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user