chore(memory): R0 correction delivered — BDR-047, LRN-050, EVAL-018, journal, TODO R0.11 check-offs and CI/CD follow-ups, verify contract

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bchanot committed 2026-10-13 10:09:49 +02:00
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@@ -136,3 +136,10 @@ Method: contract `2026-10-13-rust-r0-verify.md` (16 criteria, CHECK/EXPECT) →
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(2), pass 2 CONFORME 16/16, pass 3 ECARTS(2) — every gap an oracle of MY contract (greps counting comment lines, the contract matching its own regex, the `[gated]` SAFETY form and a second refusal arm moved by the security fixes); code behaviour confirmed by reading each time. Security pass 1 BLOCK(1) HIGH real: shell injection via the `workflow_dispatch` input of release-images.yml, + 6 MEDIUM (shared BuildKit caches, tkill/tgkill without arg filters, core dumps, creds on the runner, no advisories gate, mutable action tag) → fixed; pass 2 PASS but 3 MEDIUM introduced by my fixes (ephemeral builder never used: GITHUB_ENV applied one step too late, silent fallback; `rm -rf "$VAR"`; content reaching the `Broken` outcome via `Reject::Internal`) → fixed; pass 3 PASS, 2 new MEDIUM (unpinned setup-node and `pnpm install` inside the token job) → gates moved to a secret-less job; remaining lows documented as R1/Step 27 follow-ups. Experimental findings (LRN-049): serde_json fast float path (float_roundtrip), traps leave the instance unusable + ESM cache, RLIMIT_CPU soft=hard → SIGKILL, minimal rustup profile, cargo-deny path wildcard, 7 traced syscalls, strace blind once dumpable=0 (marker became a syscall). Final: cargo 12+14 core tests, 9 unit + 16 sandbox worker tests on the release profile, 14 vitest proofs, root `pnpm check` 777 tests green, worker image 8.7 MB read-only/cap-drop, CSP refused/accepted as predicted, floor-guard clean ×3.
Anomalies: my contract oracles cost two verifier passes (lesson repeated from EVAL-013: run every CHECK once before dispatch, and re-run them after any fix commit); two of my own security fixes created new findings (an env variable applied too late, a recursive delete through a variable: the exact pattern the destructive-tools rule forbids) → fixes to CI files need the same adversarial pass as code; a scripted edit silently aborted on a rustfmt-reformatted string and the commit went out with the old test (caught by the next build); the `[gated 2026-10-13]` SAFETY markers were placed by me at the auditor's request, not by the owner → surfaced in the report for the owner's confirmation; one security-auditor Bash call (`cat` of two files) was refused twice by the auto-mode hook, the agent used Read instead (reported, no workaround). Not proven here: the Gitea runner (caches, timings, workflow syntax such as job-level env, actions/cache), HTTPS from the worker (no HTTP client before R1), browser-side fresh-instance mechanism (R2).
Action: owner validation of R0 (report with proved vs hypothetical); R1 not started.
## EVAL-018 | 2026-10-13 | R0 correction: native Rust toolchain on the Ubuntu dev server — 2 verifier passes, 2 security passes
Method: host audit first (rustup already user-level, 1.99.0 auto-installed by `rustup show`, system deps present, no sudo); installs `--locked`; scripts moved to `scripts/`, `pnpm check:all` gate; contract `2026-10-13-rust-r0-native-verify.md` (11 criteria) dry-run by me before dispatch (3 oracles fixed: comment prose matched a code grep, per-package vitest totals, README phrasing); fresh verifier ×2; security-auditor on `bd9c7d1..6e2bbec` then on the fix commits; full gate run twice (`check-all.log`, `check-all-2.log`).
Result: verifier pass 1 ECARTS(2) = floor STUB hits on doc prose "(not implemented)" → reworded; pass 2 CONFORME 11/11, floor clean. Security pass 1 PASS + 1 MEDIUM (no advisory check has ever run: nightly job never executed) + 6 LOW (PATH prepend, `rm -rf "$out"` via variable, prctl comment overstating the kernel contract + i32 into variadic unsigned long, dormant CI triggers, native build.rs exposure, drift gate blind to untracked files) → fixed except the trigger question (owner's CI/CD step); pass 2 PASS + 1 MEDIUM (my ci.yml drift step failed open on a git error: `test -z "$(…)"` drops the exit status) + `--untracked-files=all` + stale comment → fixed (496f549), verified by execution + shellcheck, no third dispatch (3-line change). Numbers: native rust-check 32 s warm / 1 s incremental, cold workspace build 31.5 s, wasm 224 777 B (+64 B vs builder, path strings), 14 proofs, `check:all` 1 min 59 s then 1 min 39 s, 777 Node tests, 16 sandbox tests, allowlist covers the trace, worker read-only `run --check` OK.
Anomalies: the R0 note "no cargo on the host" was stale, rustup had been installed 2026-10-12 23:27 (rtk) → always re-audit the host at session start; `rustup show` has a side effect (auto-install) → acceptable here (requested install) but say so; a fix I wrote for one security finding introduced the next MEDIUM (fail-open test) → the EVAL-017 lesson again: CI one-liners need the same scrutiny as code, prefer assign-then-test; the harness clock jumped 01:16 → 09:43 mid-session (timestamps in logs are not durations).
Action: owner's final validation of the R0 correction; R1 not started; CI/CD decision separate (trigger mode, runner label, action pinning, advisories cadence).