chore(workspace): DEV least-privilege exposure — nginx DEV gateway (API on the LAN, Mailpit behind basic auth), network check from a distinct origin, loopback default for the rootless daemon documented

The Supabase CLI publishes 54321-54324 on every interface with no bind
option. Design: the rootless daemon binds published ports on loopback by
default (~/.config/docker/daemon.json {"ip":"127.0.0.1"}, owner action,
not applied), and the DEV gateway (Compose service dev-gateway, profile
dev, container faunosteo_dev_gateway) re-publishes only the API (Kong) and
Mailpit behind HTTP basic auth on FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST; Studio and PostgreSQL
stay loopback (SSH tunnel for Studio). pnpm dev:gateway generates the Mailpit
credentials (gitignored; htpasswd 644 because the rootless container user
cannot read a 600 file, hash only). pnpm dev:net-check probes from a
throwaway container on its own Docker network: app, API health, REST 401,
Mailpit 401/200, PostgreSQL and Studio closed. Gateway proven on alternate
ports (health 200, password login 200, Mailpit 401 / 200).
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bchanot committed 2026-10-13 22:38:40 +02:00
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@@ -54,41 +54,76 @@ into confirmation and recovery mails), `auth.site_url`, `studio.api_url`;
(`192.168.*.*`, `10.*.*.*`, `172.16.*.*`) plus the host-only forms, so PKCE
links return to the origin the browser used.
## 3. What listens where (DEV, measured 2026-10-13)
## 3. Exposure on the private network: least privilege
The Supabase CLI publishes its ports on every interface (`0.0.0.0`, no bind
option); Vite listens on every interface (`server.host: true`).
Target (owner decision 2026-10-13): the browser surfaces are reachable from
the LAN, the administration tools and the database are not.
| Service | Port | Interface | Needed by the remote browser | Protection |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Application (Vite) | 5173 | all | yes | none (dev build, anon key only) |
| Supabase API (Kong: Auth, PostgREST, Storage) | 54321 | all | yes | RLS, policies, the anon key; the service key never reaches a browser |
| Studio | 54323 | all | useful for inspection, not for the flows | **none**: full database access to anyone on the LAN |
| Mailpit | 54324 | all | yes for sign-up and recovery mails | **none**: every DEV mail readable on the LAN |
| PostgreSQL | 54322 | all | no | password `postgres`: **should not be reachable from the LAN** |
| Worker | none | — | no | internal only (Supabase compose network, read-only, no capability) |
| PostgREST, GoTrue, Storage, pg-meta | none | — | behind Kong | — |
| Service | Port | LAN | How it is enforced |
|---|---|---|---|
| Application (Vite) | 5173 | open | Vite listens on every interface (`server.host: true`); dev build, anon key only |
| Supabase API (Kong: Auth, PostgREST, Storage) | 54321 | open | the DEV gateway re-publishes it on `<DEV host>:54321`; RLS, policies and the anon key protect the data; the service key never reaches a browser |
| Mailpit (DEV mails) | 54324 | open **with credentials** | the DEV gateway re-publishes it behind HTTP basic auth (user `dev`, generated password in `docker/dev-gateway/mailpit-password`, never committed) |
| Studio | 54323 | **closed** | loopback only; from another device: SSH tunnel (below) |
| PostgreSQL | 54322 | **closed** | loopback only; tests and the CLI use `127.0.0.1:54322` on the host |
| Worker | none | — | internal, Supabase compose network, read-only, no capability |
| PostgREST, GoTrue, Storage, pg-meta | none | — | behind Kong |
The firewall state of the host could not be read without privileges. The
proposal for the owner (not applied): a host firewall keeping 54322 on
loopback only, and 54323 / 54324 restricted to the private subnet
(`192.168.1.0/24`); 5173 and 54321 open to that subnet. Nothing is exposed to
the Internet by this repository; the box, the router and any public
forwarding stay untouched.
### 3.1 Mechanism (no privileges, no firewall)
HTTP on a private address: the auth flows (PKCE, cookies-free session in
localStorage) work; what does not is any browser feature that needs a
secure context on a non-loopback origin (camera, geolocation, some
clipboard and service-worker features) and any OAuth provider that refuses
`http://` redirect URIs. When one of those lands, the answer is a private
HTTPS origin (local CA or a private name with a certificate), never the
production domain.
The Supabase CLI publishes its ports with no host address and offers no bind
option, so Docker uses the daemon's default address. Two pieces:
1. **The rootless daemon binds published ports on loopback by default**:
`~/.config/docker/daemon.json` = `{"ip": "127.0.0.1"}` (user-level file of
Docker rootless, no sudo). Every port published without an explicit
address, the CLI's included, then listens on `127.0.0.1` only.
2. **The DEV gateway** (`docker/dev-gateway/nginx.conf`, Compose service
`dev-gateway`, profile `dev`, container `faunosteo_dev_gateway`): an nginx
on the Supabase network, published on `<FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST>:54321` (proxy
to Kong) and `<FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST>:54324` (proxy to Mailpit behind basic
auth). `pnpm dev:gateway` starts it (and generates the Mailpit password on
first use), `pnpm dev:gateway:stop` stops it.
Why not UFW: with Docker rootless, published ports are ordinary listening
sockets of the rootlesskit process in the host network namespace, so host
INPUT rules would apply (unlike rootful Docker, whose DNAT bypasses UFW);
but a firewall rule needs sudo, and binding to loopback removes the
listener instead of filtering it. A host firewall stays a possible second
layer, the owner's decision.
### 3.2 Check
`pnpm dev:net-check` probes from a throwaway container on its own Docker
network (a distinct origin that reaches the host by its LAN address only):
app 200, API health 200, REST without key 401, Mailpit 401 without and 200
with the credentials, PostgreSQL and Studio closed; it prints the published
ports of the stack. Exit 1 on any deviation.
### 3.3 Studio from another device
```bash
ssh -L 54323:127.0.0.1:54323 <user>@<DEV host> # then http://localhost:54323 on that device
```
Studio's own API calls go to `http://<DEV host>:54321` (the gateway), which
the device reaches directly.
### 3.4 HTTP on a private address
The auth flows (PKCE, session in localStorage, no cookie) work over HTTP.
What would not: browser features that need a secure context on a
non-loopback origin (camera capture, geolocation, some clipboard and
service-worker features) and OAuth providers that refuse `http://` redirect
URIs. When one of those lands, the answer is a private HTTPS origin (local CA
or a private name with a certificate), never the production domain.
## 4. Procedure from another device (owner validation)
Stack and worker started on the Ubuntu machine (`pnpm db:start`, the worker
container, `pnpm dev`), then from the computer, and again from the phone on
the same network:
On the Ubuntu machine: `pnpm db:start`, `pnpm dev:gateway`, the worker
(`docker compose --profile worker up -d worker`), `pnpm dev`, then
`pnpm dev:net-check` (all OK). From the computer, then from the phone on the
same network:
1. `http://<host>:5173/` opens the Faunosteo home.
2. `/login` shows the sign-in card.
@@ -103,5 +138,7 @@ the same network:
9. Se déconnecter returns to the home; `/app` redirects to `/login`.
10. Same steps on the phone; no horizontal scroll.
A sign-up from the device: Mailpit at `http://<host>:54324`, the link opened
in the same browser as the form.
A sign-up from the device: Mailpit at `http://<host>:54324` (user `dev`,
password: `cat docker/dev-gateway/mailpit-password` on the Ubuntu machine),
the link opened in the same browser as the form. Refused from the device:
`http://<host>:54323` (Studio) and anything on `:54322` (PostgreSQL).
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@@ -59,9 +59,10 @@ Every CLI call goes through `scripts/supabase.sh` (`pnpm db:*`, `pnpm supabase
<args>`): it exports the DEV origin that `config.toml` reads with `env()`
(`api.external_url`, `auth.site_url`, `studio.api_url`). A direct
`node_modules/.bin/supabase start` would leave the literal `env(...)` text in
GoTrue's mail links. Published ports (all interfaces): API 54321, PostgreSQL
54322, Studio 54323, Mailpit 54324 (`ENVIRONMENTS.md` §3 for what each one
exposes).
GoTrue's mail links. Published ports: API 54321, PostgreSQL 54322, Studio
54323, Mailpit 54324, on loopback once the rootless daemon defaults to
`127.0.0.1`; the DEV gateway re-publishes the API and Mailpit (basic auth) on
the LAN address (`ENVIRONMENTS.md` §3).
```bash
pnpm db:start # supabase start: pulls images, applies migrations + seed, prints URLs and keys
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@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ works as `corepack pnpm <cmd>`.
| `pnpm install` | installs the whole workspace from the lockfile |
| `pnpm dev` | Vite dev server of `apps/app` on `http://<FAUNOSTEO_DEV_HOST>:5173`, wired to the local Supabase stack by the DEV origin (`scripts/dev.sh`, `ENVIRONMENTS.md`) |
| `pnpm dev:offline` | the same server without backend (local tool only) |
| `pnpm dev:gateway` / `dev:gateway:stop` | the DEV gateway: Supabase API and Mailpit (basic auth) on the LAN address (`ENVIRONMENTS.md` §3) |
| `pnpm dev:net-check` | allowed / refused access probes from a distinct Docker network |
| `pnpm supabase <args>` / `pnpm db:*` | the Supabase CLI with the DEV origin exported (`scripts/supabase.sh`) |
| `pnpm preview` | serves `apps/app/dist` on :4173 |
| `pnpm typecheck` | `tsc --noEmit` in every package |