docs(docs): V1-2.5 administration, MFA, catalogue documented

CLAUDE.md overview and folder map, IDENTITY §1 and §4, BROWSER_TESTS shell specs, V1-2 contract §16.6 state and §5.7.3-§5.7.4 pointers, design README owning steps with two deviations.
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@@ -605,7 +605,8 @@ management waits, and the first factor can always be enrolled at `aal1`.
#### 5.7.3 Additional, removed and replaced factors
Native behaviour of GoTrue v2.197.0 (source read, V1-2.5 proves it):
Native behaviour of GoTrue v2.197.0 (source read, V1-2.5 proves it; measured
on the sandbox: `IDENTITY.md` §4.1, V1-2.5):
- a second factor: `EnrollFactor` needs `aal2` once a verified factor exists
(403 `insufficient_aal`). A stolen password therefore cannot add a factor;
@@ -629,7 +630,8 @@ Native behaviour of GoTrue v2.197.0 (source read, V1-2.5 proves it):
owner choice under O4, not part of this contract (§5.7.9).
If the sandbox shows `aal1` can enrol a second factor or remove a verified
one, V1-2.5 stops for an owner decision (as §5.6 already says).
one, V1-2.5 stops for an owner decision (as §5.6 already says). It did not
fire (`IDENTITY.md` §4.1).
#### 5.7.4 Password change and reset
@@ -641,7 +643,9 @@ accepted first-factor case, harmless while no role or capability is held, and
the reason the owner role is assigned after enrolment (§5.7.1) and a
capability only to an account with a verified factor (§5.2). Email change and
identity linking stay as configured (`enable_manual_linking = false`); V1-2.5
adds a test that none of them raises a session to `aal2`.
adds a test that none of them raises a session to `aal2` (measured on the
sandbox: `IDENTITY.md` §4.1, V1-2.5; with a verified factor, a password change
or reset is itself refused at `aal1`, so the recovery screens step up first).
#### 5.7.5 Operator path
@@ -2277,6 +2281,16 @@ V1-2.7 on.
and readable by id; every other actor refused in the UI and in SQL.
- Rollback: branch revert.
- Checkpoint: gates only (owner at V1-2.6).
- State 2026-11-02: built and tested on the sandbox, slices A to J of the step
plan: A GoTrue MFA behaviour measured (`IDENTITY.md` §4.1), B M7
`sheet_admin_reads` (with BDR-098), C core op `sheet.empty`, D the
`packages/supabase` accessors (MFA, species, rights, admin and catalogue
reads), E navigation, `RequireCatalog`, `RequireAdmin` and « Accès non
autorisé », F TOTP factors in Mon compte with the step-up, G administration
page, species and rights, H sheet list, creation, overview and working copy,
I catalogue list, sheet and version pages, J the `e2e:shell` journeys.
pgTAP 1941, unit 864, `e2e:shell` 108 passed (6 skipped by design). DEV
untouched; the checkpoint gates are pending.
### 16.7 V1-2.6 Editor level 1