docs(docs): V1-2.5 administration, MFA, catalogue documented
CLAUDE.md overview and folder map, IDENTITY §1 and §4, BROWSER_TESTS shell specs, V1-2 contract §16.6 state and §5.7.3-§5.7.4 pointers, design README owning steps with two deviations.
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@@ -605,7 +605,8 @@ management waits, and the first factor can always be enrolled at `aal1`.
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#### 5.7.3 Additional, removed and replaced factors
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Native behaviour of GoTrue v2.197.0 (source read, V1-2.5 proves it):
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Native behaviour of GoTrue v2.197.0 (source read, V1-2.5 proves it; measured
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on the sandbox: `IDENTITY.md` §4.1, V1-2.5):
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- a second factor: `EnrollFactor` needs `aal2` once a verified factor exists
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(403 `insufficient_aal`). A stolen password therefore cannot add a factor;
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@@ -629,7 +630,8 @@ Native behaviour of GoTrue v2.197.0 (source read, V1-2.5 proves it):
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owner choice under O4, not part of this contract (§5.7.9).
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If the sandbox shows `aal1` can enrol a second factor or remove a verified
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one, V1-2.5 stops for an owner decision (as §5.6 already says).
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one, V1-2.5 stops for an owner decision (as §5.6 already says). It did not
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fire (`IDENTITY.md` §4.1).
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#### 5.7.4 Password change and reset
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@@ -641,7 +643,9 @@ accepted first-factor case, harmless while no role or capability is held, and
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the reason the owner role is assigned after enrolment (§5.7.1) and a
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capability only to an account with a verified factor (§5.2). Email change and
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identity linking stay as configured (`enable_manual_linking = false`); V1-2.5
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adds a test that none of them raises a session to `aal2`.
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adds a test that none of them raises a session to `aal2` (measured on the
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sandbox: `IDENTITY.md` §4.1, V1-2.5; with a verified factor, a password change
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or reset is itself refused at `aal1`, so the recovery screens step up first).
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#### 5.7.5 Operator path
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@@ -2277,6 +2281,16 @@ V1-2.7 on.
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and readable by id; every other actor refused in the UI and in SQL.
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- Rollback: branch revert.
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- Checkpoint: gates only (owner at V1-2.6).
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- State 2026-11-02: built and tested on the sandbox, slices A to J of the step
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plan: A GoTrue MFA behaviour measured (`IDENTITY.md` §4.1), B M7
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`sheet_admin_reads` (with BDR-098), C core op `sheet.empty`, D the
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`packages/supabase` accessors (MFA, species, rights, admin and catalogue
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reads), E navigation, `RequireCatalog`, `RequireAdmin` and « Accès non
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autorisé », F TOTP factors in Mon compte with the step-up, G administration
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page, species and rights, H sheet list, creation, overview and working copy,
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I catalogue list, sheet and version pages, J the `e2e:shell` journeys.
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pgTAP 1941, unit 864, `e2e:shell` 108 passed (6 skipped by design). DEV
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untouched; the checkpoint gates are pending.
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### 16.7 V1-2.6 Editor level 1
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