feat(supabase): foundation migrations (audit, profiles, platform roles) + pgTAP suite
- schemas private/audit, set_updated_at, append-only audit.audit_logs, private.log_event - profiles created by auth.users trigger; own-row RLS; column-level UPDATE grant - platform_role enum (owner/admin/moderator/support), profile_roles history table, is_platform_* helpers, grant/revoke RPCs audited; writes only via RPC - config.toml (public schema only, strong passwords, no edge runtime), local seed - 79 pgTAP checks: allowed and denied paths for every policy
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-- Foundation: schemas, shared triggers, append-only audit log.
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-- Conventions: docs/development/BACKEND_ARCHITECTURE.md §3, §7; business architecture §29.
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-- Forward-only. Never edit after it has been applied: write a new migration.
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-- Schemas
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-- private: security-definer helpers and internal functions. Not exposed to
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-- PostgREST (config.toml api.schemas lists public only).
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create schema if not exists private;
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-- audit: append-only event log, read by platform admins only.
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create schema if not exists audit;
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revoke all on schema private from public;
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revoke all on schema audit from public;
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-- Policies evaluated for API roles call private.* helpers by qualified name,
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-- which needs USAGE on the schema. EXECUTE is granted per function below.
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grant usage on schema private to anon, authenticated, service_role;
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grant usage on schema audit to authenticated, service_role;
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-- PostgreSQL grants EXECUTE on every new function to PUBLIC. Flip the default
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-- for both schemas so a helper is callable only where a migration says so.
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alter default privileges in schema private revoke execute on functions from public;
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alter default privileges in schema audit revoke execute on functions from public;
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-- Shared trigger: updated_at
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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create or replace function private.set_updated_at()
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returns trigger
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language plpgsql
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set search_path = ''
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as $$
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begin
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new.updated_at := now();
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return new;
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end;
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$$;
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comment on function private.set_updated_at() is
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'BEFORE UPDATE trigger: stamps updated_at. Attach to every table that has the column.';
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-- Audit log (business architecture §29)
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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create table audit.audit_logs (
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id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
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occurred_at timestamptz not null default now(),
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-- null actor = system action (migration, worker, bootstrap).
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actor_user_id uuid,
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-- "<domain>.<verb>" e.g. platform_role.granted. Kept as text + CHECK: the
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-- set grows with every step.
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action text not null
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constraint audit_logs_action_format check (action ~ '^[a-z_]+\.[a-z_]+$'),
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resource_type text not null
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constraint audit_logs_resource_type_format check (resource_type ~ '^[a-z_]+$'),
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resource_id uuid,
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organization_id uuid,
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target_user_id uuid,
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-- Sanitized by the caller: never report contents, passwords, tokens.
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metadata jsonb not null default '{}'::jsonb
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constraint audit_logs_metadata_object check (jsonb_typeof(metadata) = 'object'),
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correlation_id text
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);
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comment on table audit.audit_logs is
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'Append-only trace of sensitive operations. Insert only through private.log_event(). No FK on user ids: rows outlive accounts.';
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create index audit_logs_occurred_at_idx on audit.audit_logs (occurred_at desc);
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create index audit_logs_actor_idx on audit.audit_logs (actor_user_id, occurred_at desc);
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create index audit_logs_target_idx on audit.audit_logs (target_user_id, occurred_at desc);
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create index audit_logs_resource_idx on audit.audit_logs (resource_type, resource_id);
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-- Append-only, enforced for every role including the table owner.
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create or replace function audit.reject_mutation()
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returns trigger
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language plpgsql
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set search_path = ''
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as $$
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begin
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raise exception 'audit.audit_logs is append-only (% refused)', tg_op
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using errcode = '42501';
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end;
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$$;
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create trigger audit_logs_append_only
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before update or delete on audit.audit_logs
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for each row execute function audit.reject_mutation();
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-- Privileges: nobody writes through the API; admins read (policy added with
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-- the role helpers in the platform-roles migration).
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revoke all on audit.audit_logs from public, anon, authenticated, service_role;
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grant select on audit.audit_logs to authenticated, service_role;
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alter table audit.audit_logs enable row level security;
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create or replace function private.log_event(
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p_actor_user_id uuid,
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p_action text,
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p_resource_type text,
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p_resource_id uuid default null,
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p_target_user_id uuid default null,
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p_organization_id uuid default null,
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p_metadata jsonb default '{}'::jsonb
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)
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returns uuid
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language plpgsql
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security definer
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set search_path = ''
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as $$
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declare
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v_id uuid;
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v_correlation text;
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begin
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-- PostgREST exposes request headers as a JSON setting; absent elsewhere.
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v_correlation := nullif(current_setting('request.headers', true), '')::jsonb ->> 'x-correlation-id';
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insert into audit.audit_logs (
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actor_user_id, action, resource_type, resource_id,
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target_user_id, organization_id, metadata, correlation_id
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)
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values (
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p_actor_user_id, p_action, p_resource_type, p_resource_id,
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p_target_user_id, p_organization_id, coalesce(p_metadata, '{}'::jsonb), v_correlation
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)
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returning id into v_id;
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return v_id;
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end;
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$$;
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comment on function private.log_event(uuid, text, text, uuid, uuid, uuid, jsonb) is
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'Single write path into audit.audit_logs. Called from server-side functions only; never granted to API roles.';
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revoke all on function private.log_event(uuid, text, text, uuid, uuid, uuid, jsonb) from public;
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grant execute on function private.log_event(uuid, text, text, uuid, uuid, uuid, jsonb) to service_role;
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